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Abstract 
This thesis is an analysis of the ways in which images of bodily disgust function in 
social conflicts. It considers the necessary embodiment of political struggle: that is, the 
ways in which inequalities are sustained and contested through the material forms taken 
by human bodies and the meanings attached to bodily states. 
In chapter one I map out the theoretical grounding for an inquiry into 
embodiment, by showing how the physical forms taken by bodies are produced by social 
practices. I argue that `the body' should be seen as a biological product, a `body project', 
regulated and transformed by its environment. This in turn leads me to a consideration of 
how such body-shapings sustain regimes of power through constructing for subjects 
physical forms which are designed to maintain existing systems of inequality. Through a 
reading of Michel Foucault's work, I show how such bodies are also able to resist power 
by making use of the material and discursive structures which seek, but fail, to render 
them wholly submissive. 
In chapter two I look at the ways in which the body acts as a map of the psyche, 
producing a subject which understands itself in terms of its experience of its body parts. I 
also consider how the body acts as a social symbol, encoding anxieties about the society 
that it inhabits. By considering both psychoanalytic accounts, and the work of Mary 
Douglas, I interrogate how concepts of order, form, and integrity become central to 
embodied subjectivity. 
In chapter three I consider how, in the Naked Lunch Quartet, William Burroughs 
represents the body as under threat from repulsive external substances, and how his 
depiction of such substances in fact relies on a notion of body matter itself as repulsive. I 
will show how this results from his conceptualization of bodily materiality as antithetical 
to freedom, and I argue that by demonstrating the impossibility of escaping from acts of 
invasion and possession, Burroughs's texts in fact undermine the libertarian position that 
he adopts. In chapter four I develop this argument through a comparison with Julia 
lv 
Kristeva's concept of abjection. I suggest that his representation of abject bodies enables 
Burroughs to critique the invasive mechanisms of authority, but requires that he collude 
with the stigmatizing discourses of authority in order to adopt such a position. In 
particular I consider how this affects his representation of gender. 
In chapter five I show how David Cronenberg's Shivers may be read as a film 
that both sustains and critiques the notion of innate bodily disorder. I argue that this is 
derived from his reliance upon notions of a hierarchy of bodies derived from inequalities 
of race and class. In chapter six I develop this critique with a reading of Cronenberg's 
The Fly. I suggest that this film is much more explicit about the fact that bodily chaos is 
in fact a state experienced by the socially excluded. It offers a critique of the processes 
by which we are made to feel disgust at our bodies, suggesting that disgust inaugurates a 
logic of paranoid purification, which in fact impedes the possibilities of the acceptance of 
those bodies which fall outside certain social limits. 
Finally, in my conclusion, I look at how Cronenberg's Rabid might be seen as a 
compendium of the issues of embodied politics, and use this to suggest possible 
directions in which the work of this thesis might be extended. 
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Introduction 
`St Angela of Foligno', Simone de Beauvoir tells us, `drank with delight the 
water in which she had just washed lepers' hands and feet'. ' In Angelina's own words: 
This beverage flooded us with such sweetness that the joy followed us home. 
Never had I drunk with such pleasure. In my throat was lodged a piece of scaly 
skin from the lepers' sores. Instead of getting rid of it, I made a great effort to 
swallow it and I succeeded. It seemed to me that I had just partaken of 
communion. I shall never be able to express the delight that inundated me. (Quoted in The Second Sex, p. 685) 
I assume that, like me, you find such an image not only unsettling, but physically 
disgusting: I feel my stomach turn when I read it. Why should this be the case ? One sort 
of answer would be that it is inherently so: that this physical event is one that naturally 
revolts and which we are biologically programmed to find disgusting as a means of self- 
protection. I want to begin from the position that it is not necessarily so 
- 
that the 
feelings which such an image generates are a complex response to the cultural concerns 
that the image mobilizes. After all, it is clear enough that the act does not simply revolt 
Angelina: she herself seems to experience a relationship of pleasure 
- 
if not ecstasy 
- 
to 
this particular interchange of bodies. At the same time her pleasure seems to rely on the 
relationship that she has to particular notions of bodily disgust: if the act were not 
already constructed as physically disgusting, she could take no pleasure in transcending 
the conventional limits of the body. ' Rather than being inevitable, the distress that we 
attach to such a physical event then arises from its violation of a series of precepts about 
the body: that the body is a regular, integral object, its cleanliness maintained by precepts 
covering its behaviour and self-discipline. This particular act focuses on a point of 
extreme vulnerability, the mouth, through which the inner space of the body is reached 
by the outer world. The entry of food into the body questions the separateness of 
Angelina's body, reminding us that it maintains its existence through absorbing alien 
' On the life of this thirteenth century saint and her relationship to Christian traditions of 
bodily mortification, see Rudolph M. Bell, Holy Anorexia, pp. 103-113. 




and that one volume of body matter (the leper's) may become imbricated with 
that of another (Angelina's). Then, the morsel of leper's flesh challenges the notion of 
the body's integrity, suggesting a body that collapses into pieces 
- 
unsettling any sense of 
a body as ordered and whole. And the contagion associated with leprosy suggests the 
ease with which an apparently beautiful or regular body might too become scarred and 
disorganized. The image thus mobilizes a series of tensions within notions of the 
acceptable forms, practices, and contours of the human body. 
This thesis will explore how images such as this operate within a range of 
`discourses of disgust': those collections of statements, images and conceptual structures 
regarding the human body which mark various of its attributes, activities and organs as 
repulsive. What psychic processes generate this disgust in the body of the observer ? 
What social processes invest some aspects of the body with disgust and not others ? 
What material situations organize these events and how does representation affect those 
material situations ? My aim is not to locate some final answer to these questions, but to 
explore a number of useful approaches, in order to show the variety of ways in which 
bodily disgust may be deployed and the range of social situations in which it plays a role. 
This thesis began as an analysis of the ways that images of bodily disgust were 
used in various discourses to underwrite a language of purification and redemption, and 
in particular their function in sexual politics: homophobic imagery of sex between men as 
sickening; notions of bisexuality as an infectious plague; the pathologization of sado- 
masochism; gay male and lesbian constructions of the body of `the opposite sex' as 
repulsive; the representations of transsexual surgery as a crime against nature. It was to 
rely heavily on the idea of a repressed natural body and was to seek out texts where this 
body was able to speak for itself, rather than being silenced by culture 
-a line of thought 
heavily influenced by the work of Mikhail Bakhtin. However, I became increasingly 
interested in the ways that such a discourse of the natural served only to legitimate 
particular cultural priorities, and hence my enquiry moved towards viewing the body as a 
constructed object. Although I still have sympathies with, for instance, Deleuze and 
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Guattari's arguments for the body as a site of anarchic energy, ' it now seems to me 
untenable to think of the body as the site of essentially free impulses which are 
imprisoned by social conditioning and which struggle to get out: the ` hydraulic' or 
`repressive' conception of bodily desires famously criticized by Foucault in The History 
of Sexuality: An Introduction. Instead I am interested in the body as an object all of 
whose capacities, limitations, desires and practices emerge through a social matrix. While 
I still hold my initial position that disgust for aspects of the body is constructed in and 
through discourses of bodily stigmatization which serve forms of social power, I am now 
also arguing that those bodily forms and discourses of the body which resist that 
stigmatization are also and equally constructed through a social matrix. 
As a result, my interest has shifted away from phenomenological approaches, in 
which the intentional desires and innate material capacities of the body are the originary 
forces that produce society, rather than being produced by the social milieux they 
occupy. ` The attempt to speak of fixed properties and experiences of the body, as 
phenomenology predominantly does, ignores the ways in which the body is malleable and 
the extraordinary range of different forms that it takes. Such considerations warn against 
typically phenomenological phrasing such as: `hands inherently beckon to the 
phenomenal world as the phenomenal world invites the touch of hands' (Laura Doyle, 
Bordering on the Body, p. 70). Such claims are written as if bodily experiences were 
immutable and universal and as if, as Carol Bigwood claims, bodily experience 
constituted `a direct and primitive contact that goes on behind our everyday attitudes' 
(`Renaturalizing the Body (with the help of Merleau-Ponty)', p. 61). 5 
' Most obviously in Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus, the two volumes of their 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 
` See for instance Laura Doyle, Bordering on the Body ; Rosalyn Diprose, The Bodies of 
Women; Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception and Sense and Non- 
Sense; and Steven Shaviro, The Cinematic Body. 
' This is not to say that phenomenology may not be developed in different directions, so 
as to avoid such problems. For phenomenological approaches to the body which focus 
on diverse body types within a political framework, see Nick Crossley, `Body- 
Subject/Body-Power: Agency, Inscription and Control in Foucault and Merleau-Ponty'; 
and Iris Marion Young, `Throwing Like a Girl' and Other Essays in Feminist 
Philosophy and Social Theory, esp. chs. 8-10. In particular, it is the current work of 
3 
One consequence of this shift was that it soon became obvious that to talk abut 
`the body' as a singular object was to participate in certain problematical foundationalist 
discourse (see chapter one), as if all claims about bodily experience and materiality were 
true for all bodies, rather than specific to certain bodies. As Elizabeth Grosz has 
observed `there is no body as such 
- 
there are only bodies' (Volatile Bodies, p. 19, 
emphasis in the original). I have therefore tried throughout to distinguish between `the 
body', when I feel I am making general claims for all bodies 
- 
for instance, the Cartesian 
construction of the body as an obstacle to the mind's apprehension of truth; and to refer 
to `a body' or `bodies' where my claim depends on experiences and material features that 
differ from one body to another. This may at some points produce difficult or unusual 
grammatical constructions, but I believe that it makes an important point about the need 
to keep in mind the bodily differences that are occluded if one talks only and always 
about `the body'. 
Let us look again at Angela of Foligno. We might ask many questions of this 
image. Firstly, the event has particular material conditions which enable it to take place 
at all. How did the bacteria that cause what we now call Hansen's disease come to infect 
the bodies of the lepers washed by her ? How did the living conditions of certain bodies 
cause them to be more prone or resistant than others to infection ? What physical spaces 
were designed to separate these bodies and how did they experience this ?6 What 
practices of seclusion served to protect other bodies but failed to protect this one ? How 
does Angelina come to be in this space, at this time ? Why is she washing ? Is it a 
function of her gendered social position ? 
Secondly, this is an interaction between two bodies that have been labelled: a 
leper and a saint. We might ask: how did a certain biological condition came to be 
constructed as `leprosy' ? What meanings did it have ?' What meanings does it have 
transsexual activists and theorists which is suggesting new ways of thinking about the 
role of phenomenology in the study of embodiment: see for instance Henry S. Rubin, 
`Phenomenology as Method in Trans Studies', which challenges `the fashionable 
prohibition against the use of phenomenology' (p. 279). 
6 See for instance Foucault, Discipline and Punish, pp. 195-200. 
' See Mary Douglas, `Witchcraft and Leprosy: Two Strategies for Rejection'. 
4 
now ? How did those meanings translate into 
- 
and how were they produced by 
- 
the 
physical practices that separated lepers from the rest of the population ? We might also 
observe that this is a story. Why has this story been preserved ? In what different forms 
does it circulate ? What does the story mean to its different readers ? Beauvoir, for 
instance, quotes it to illustrate the ways that for female mystics the problematic status of 
women's bodies within Christianity is addressed when such a body is both chastized 
through subjecting it to such treatment and affirmed through a focus on its capacity to 
behave in such a miraculous fashion 
- 
but presumably the Church would use this incident 
to make very different claims. 
Thirdly, we might ask why Angela is doing this. What does the leper's flesh mean 
to her ? What relationship does it have with her understanding of her own body ? Does 
she see this flesh as like, or unlike hers ? What pleasure does she take in it ? Was the act 
disgusting to her ? Was it disgusting to the person whose flesh she swallowed ? 
Lastly, this is an interaction between two bodies: how do these two people come 
to be in the relationship of the one who washes and the one who is washed ? What did 
the body of the leper mean to Angela ? What relationship between the two does this act 
signify ? How does it enforce or resist other relationships that might exist between them? 
What is achieved by enacting those relationships through this particularly bodily incident? 
This sketch of questions marks out for this thesis four areas of bodily 
significance, all of which are mutually overlapping, but which provide a plausible 
heuristic model for a study of the body such as this. They will set the terms for my 
subsequent explorations, and function as a temporary index to the areas which this thesis 
studies. 
First: physical and somatic embodiment. I will argue that the body is shaped. 
Diet, clothing, and exercise shape the growth of a body, with different classes and 
genders being guided to develop different muscles and postures. The physical 
expressions of emotion are ordered by different cultural norms; the body is pierced or 
scarred, circumcized or banded. We might think of medical interventions to `correct' 
disabilities, adults' efforts to quieten children's voices, school-codes disallowing certain 
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haircuts or body-piercings. It would be pointless to try and amass a comprehensive list, 
what Claude Levi-Strauss has called `an inventory of all the possibilities of the human 
body and of the methods of apprenticeship and training employed to build up each 
technique' (Introduction to the Work of Marcel Mauss, p. 8). But I will offer a general 
theory of such a process of socially structured embodiment, in which the physical form 
embodies for the subject her or his social location, and the power-structures which define 
it. 
Second: discursive representations of the body. In particular, I will be 
considering representations of normality and deviance. This field includes legal, literary, 
and medical images of the body 
- 
all those sites of the body's representation which offer 
an explicit or implicit set of meanings for the body, its zones and functions. Concomitant 
with that these sites offer firstly an implied set of practices (right and wrong) for different 
bodies (how should a woman speak ? how should a man walk ? ), and secondly an 
implied range of social relations and limitations which affix to certain bodies (is the 
proper place for the epileptic body an asylum or a hospital ? is the proper destination of a 
hermaphroditic body male or female ? ). Such representational discourses clearly play a 
part in transmitting disciplinary practices such as those within my first category: they set 
or question the acceptable range of bodily forms, thereby variously asserting and 
challenging the legitimacy and the goals of practices which shape the body. They also 
feed inwards, where the psyche is making what we shall see is its own very different 
picture of the body, which forms my third category. 
Third: internal psychic and affective relations with the body. The image of the 
body which we carry within us and the feelings which we attach to the processes and 
organs of our own bodies not only support our sense of embodiment and reflect the 
bodily categories which we occupy, but also chart an endless process of libidinal 
investment and meaningful attribution. The most intimate and idiosyncratic rituals of 
washing or grooming carry the weight not only of the cultural histories which have 
produced them, but also of the personal histories which have led to their formation. 
Fourth: interpersonal relations between bodies. This area covers the ways in 
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which individual physical embodiment and environmental pressure shape the possibilities 
for aggressive, co-operative, defensive or dominating interactions. Foucault's famous 
example of Bentham's Panopticon (Discipline and Punish, pp 195-228), determines not 
only the bodies of prisoners, generating moods and postures of defence, until worn down 
to acquiescence, but, crucially, it also determines the embodiment of the viewer. From 
the mundanities of eye-strain and repetitive strain injury, it is productive of a straining, 
suspicious and dominating body, defined by a form of interaction: the gaze towards the 
prisoner. This is more than an environment which shapes the bodies of guard and 
prisoner independently 
- 
it is an environment which shapes bodily relationships. I shall be 
considering the relationships between bodies not simply as an effect of the power 
relationships that subtend them, but rather as an independent and indispensable element 
of embodiment, as generative of other structures as it is generated by them. 
Such questions do not necessarily rule out a phenomenological enquiry 
- 
how do 
I experience these various aspects of embodiment ?- but they do insist on always 
returning such questions to a map of the particular contexts which determine what such 
an encounter means and by which it was made possible. Such an enquiry therefore 
requires a threefold methodology, taking into account the role of the discursive, the 
psychic, and the material. I shall be arguing throughout this thesis that we must 
consider all three levels. But while I view the separation of the social into these three 
domains as a useful method, I also argue that the three are indissociable: the discursive is 
also always the material (texts written down, books printed, television broadcast), the 
material is also always the psychic (the role that elements of our physical environment 
play in constructing desire and fear; the role that our desires play in generating physical 
events), and the psychic is always also the discursive (one thinks of Lacan's ` The 
Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious'). While useful, the separation of the three is 
thus also always at best a simplification, and at worst substantially misleading. I shall 
therefore attempt to stress at all points the mutually constitutive relationship between the 
three, without assuming that any one is - as in the marxist formula 
- 
`determining in the 
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final instance'. 8 
In Part One I consider two different ways in which the body is `constructed': 
firstly, the physical forms in which it is produced, and secondly the different psychic and 
semiotic forms in which it is understood. I argue for a methodology by which we can 
interpret the different ways in which the body operates in culture, arguing that the 
material, psychic, and discursive elements of the body are mutually constitutive. 
Throughout this, I maintain a political focus on what it might mean for different bodies 
to be free and, drawing on Foucault, consider what freedom might be for the body. 
Having established some parameters for an analysis of the meanings of the body, in Parts 
Two and Three I consider the early Naked Lunch quartet of William Burroughs (The 
Naked Lunch, The Soft Machine, The Ticket That Exploded, and Nova Express) and 
three ` body horror' films directed by David Cronenberg (Shivers, The Fly, and Rabid) as 
demonstrations of how these bodily dynamics operate, enabling us to understand their 
forms in all their complexities. I argue that while these texts are founded on notions of 
the body as both disordered and disgusting, which are absolutely central to dominant 
modem body-discourses, they also effect a critique of the social structures that produce 
these ways of seeing the body and offer us promising alternatives. By refusing to avoid 
the ways in which bodies disturb and offend, they are texts from which we may learn to 
use bodily disgust, while they also suggest the limitations involved in using images of the 
disordered body as a vehicle for political intervention. 
My accounts of these two bodies of work do not claim to be exhaustive - indeed, 
I necessarily neglect certain aspects of each: I do not, for instance, consider how 
Cronenberg's work is affected by his being Canadian9 or how Burroughs's writing 
engages with the concerns of Beat writers. " Rather, I want to show how a concern with 
'For the initial marxist formulation of this much-discussed phrase, see Frederick Engels, 
`Letter to Joseph Bloch'. 
9 For work in this area see William Beard, ` The Canadianness of David Cronenberg'; 
Piers Handling, ` A Canadian Cronenberg'; Geoff Pevere `Middle of Nowhere: Ontario 
Movies After 1980'; and Bart Testa, `Technology's Body: Cronenberg, Genre, and the 
Canadian Ethos'. 
10 For such a reading of Burroughs see Edward Halsey Foster, Understanding the Beats 
8 
the representation of the body may be viewed as a critical approach in its own right 
which, while not uninflected by such concerns, takes as its object embodied situations 
which have their own dynamics and their own histories. Moreover, I am concerned with 
how their works form a sustained inquiry into the uses of the body, and in doing so, I 
treat them as texts which may educate us, and as no less legitimate theoretical inquiries 
than those of the more conventional `theorists' of Part One. I will therefore not use 
Foucault or Douglas to `read' Burroughs and Cronenberg, but treat Burroughs and 
Cronenberg as equally valuable theoretical resources. Consequently, while recognizing 
that their work is shaped by a range of generic, economic, and historical forces, I will 
nevertheless treat them as the primary producers of the work to which their names are 
attached, just as I have done with Foucault, or Kristeva, while also studying the ways in 
which their work exceeds and frustrates any intentions that they may have had during its 
production. 
In the final chapter I argue that the social production of bodies does not mean 
that the body is only ever a vehicle of power: rather, the processes by which social forces 
produce embodied subjectivities require bodies to be subversive as well. 
Looking again at Burroughs and Cronenberg, I suggest that in both cases these 
representations of bodily disorder offer not so much an image of a body free from the 
social, as a form of the body constructed through social terms in such a way that it 
displaces and reconfigures them. 





particular directions that I have chosen to follow in this thesis. Firstly the body 
- 
as I 
have read in innumerable introductions to innumerable books on the field 
- 
is now a hot 
topic: the British Sociological Association's 1998 conference was entitled `Making 
Sense of the Body', and featured nearly three hundred papers on aspects of research into 
the body, while a conference held at The University of Manchester in June 1998 
pp. 1-27 and pp. 149-189; David Glover, `Utopia and Fantasy in the Late 1960s: 
Burroughs, Moorcock, Tolkien'; and John Tytell, Naked Angels: The Lives and 
Literature of the Beat Generation, pp. 36-51 and pp. 111-139. 
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suggested that the field is so saturated as to have reached the end of its life, and titled 
itself `After the Body'. The study of the meanings, material forms and histories of the 
body is expanding rapidly, and during the writing of this thesis I have more or less kept 
up with a steady stream of texts which have variously confirmed or refuted my ideas, and 
by turns enriched my project or left it seeming outdated. On a more banal level, these 
texts have also deprived me of various possible titles. The past five years have seen the 
publication of Volatile Bodies, Deviant Bodies, Posthuman Bodies, Sexy Bodies and 
American Bodies; of the more poetic The Body in Parts, Corporealities, The Body 
Emblazoned, Bodies that Matter, Bodyscape, Telling Flesh: The Substance of the 
Corporeal and Bordering on the Body, of more prosaic titles such as The Bodies of 
Women, Embodied Practices, Food, the Body and the Self, and The Perfectible Body; " 
and finally of an entire journal on Body and Society, within whose past twelve issues I 
have watched a whole host of putative titles and promising puns fall into the hands of 
others. In a sense this was predictable: that I was interested in theorizing the body could 
hardly be an isolated decision. It is a symptom of the fact that the body is becoming an 
object of increased theoretical attention, as well as an increasing personal anxiety. 121 
have tried to maintain a balance between articulating my own theoretical position and 
accommodating this extraordinary wealth of material. I hope that my text has been able 
to move beyond the volume of other work on the body which has shaped it, while also 
acknowledging its precedents. 
" The respective authors and editors are: Elizabeth Grosz; Jennifer Terry and Jaqueline 
Urla (eds. ); Judith Halberstam and Ira Livingston (eds. ); Elizabeth Grosz and Elspeth 
Probyn (eds. ); Tim Armstrong (ed. ); David Hillman and Carla Mazzio (eds. ); Susan 
Leigh Foster (ed. ); Jonathan Sawday; Judith Butler; Nicholas Mirzoeff; Vicki Kirby; 
Laura Doyle; Rosalyn Diprose; Kathy Davis (ed. ); Deborah Lupton; and Kenneth 
Dutton. 
12 A brief survey of possible reasons for such developments include: the crisis in the 
organic definition of the body resulting from biotechnological advances; the renewed 
awareness of the impossibility of ever producing `trouble-free' healthy bodies that has 
followed the so-called `new diseases' such as HIV, Chronic Fatigue Syndrome, and BSE; 
the escalating emphasis - in the form of both celebration and hostility - on the body as the 
site for the development of new forms of pleasure (piercing, drug use, development of 
sexual possibilities). 
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Secondly, and perhaps equally predictable, was the fact that my two cultural 
resources, David Cronenberg and William Burroughs would also become objects of keen 
interest. Work on Cronenberg, as William Beard has recently observed, `has centred on 
his astonishing co-incidence with the heavily theorized "hot topics" of gender, the body 
and technology' ('The Canadianness of David Cronenberg', p. 115) 
- 
and we might say 
much the same of Burroughs. 13 In an environment of interest in explorations of the body, 
it was inevitable that these two would figure strongly. When the recent collection 
Posthuman Bodies came out, nobody could have been less surprised than me to see that 
it contained the regulation one essay on Burroughs and one essay on Cronenberg, while 
a recent literature search showed that PhD theses on Burroughs had been submitted in 
1991,1992,1993 and two in 1994. Less predictable was the fact that during 1997, in the 
final stages of this thesis, both figures would appear so spectacularly outside the 
academic arena: Cronenberg via the extraordinary 
- 
if short lived 
- 
debate over his film 
Crash, and William Burroughs through his death on August 2nd. I mention these two 
events here since they will hardly figure at all in the pages that follow. Although it seems 
crucial to acknowledge the visibility that has accompanied them, both events fall outside 
the periods in their careers that interest me in this thesis. These most recent bodily 
scenarios in the careers of the two must perhaps await a future project. 
Thirdly, I offer a qualifier about my ambivalent attitude to the uses of history. It 
would certainly be possible to produce ever-more specific micro-histories of the body: 
`The Homosexual Beat Body in William Burroughs' or `David Cronenberg and the 
Postmodern Canadian Body'. And I certainly have considerable respect for work such as 
that of Hillel Schwartz, who takes bodily specificity to the level of the particular forms in 
which the shoplifting body was constructed in early twentieth century Britain ('The 
13 As a result of this, interest in Burroughs has also been fuelled by his retrospective 
reconstruction as a forerunner of the 80s/90s science fiction sub-genre, cyberpunk. See 
Veronica Hollinger, ` Cybernetic Deconstructions: Cyberpunk and Postmodernism', p. 42. 
Phrases from Burroughs's Naked Lunch quartet are used as titles for two key works on 
cyberpunk: Scott Bukatman, Terminal Identity: The Virtual Subject in Postmodern 
Science Fiction and Larry McCaffery (ed. ) Storming the Reality Studio: A Casebook of 
Cyberpunk and Postmodernism. 
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Three-Body Problem and the End of the World'). But at the same time, one consequence 
of exploring the shared fields of the material, the discursive and the psychic, is that they 
operate with very different histories, some of which stretch over hundreds of years and 
some of which are much more historically and geographically specific. I hope that my 
analysis both documents such micro-histories to some extent, and makes more general 
claims at the same time. It may be that in assuming such an entity as `the body' we betray 
a discursively and historically specific notion of the human 
- 
that in fact no such object 
exists for all cultures and at all times. "' It may be that a body threatened by discord and 
disgust is the product of a particular historical situation, " rather than an ongoing 
problem for subjectivity (the position which we shall see has been adopted by Mary 
Douglas and Julia Kristeva). Earlier drafts of this thesis contained such vague qualifiers 
to my comments about the body as `in the West', `under capitalism', `within patriarchy'. 
But the very generality of those terms suggests the difficulty of pinning down concrete 
historical or cultural boundaries for the sorts of body that I consider here. While a 
project to determine exactly where and when such conceptions of the body have 
obtained, and where they have not, might be possible (although I remain agnostic on this 
question), this thesis is not such a project. 16 Part of my interest in the image of the body 
14 In an interview with the sociologist Bryan Turner (whose work I study in chapter one), 
Richard Fardon poses this difficult issue in the form of the following question: `Could I 
ask you, to put it in a rather concrete fashion, if you are suggesting that - Buddhists who believe in reincarnation, Africans who think that different elements of their body, say 
blood, bone and flesh, derive from different parts of their kinship network, New Guinea 
Highlanders who must continue to make payments to specific kin throughout their lives 
on account of the debts that arise from their embodiment because of a network of kin to 
whom they are indebted 
- 
all share a common ontology arising from something they are 
calling "the body" which exists pre-culturally for them and can be recognised 
immediately and extra-texturally [sic] by us? ' (Bryan Turner, Regulating Bodies, 
pp. 254-255). I imagine that `extra-texturally' is a misprint for `extra-textually'. 
" The argument that pre-modern bodies are marked by a less intense anxiety about 
disorder is made in David Hillman and Carla Mazzio's `Introduction' to their collection 
The Body in Parts, pp. xvii-xviii. 
16 The classic text on the variability of the body is the three volume Fragments for a 
History of the Human Body (Michel Feher, ed. ), which refuses to offer an overall 
account of the relationship between its dispersed studies of embodiment. A more recent 
and more linear sketch of the body's history is offered by Harvie Ferguson `Me and My 




as an object of disgust is that it seems to stretch 
- 
albeit in different ways 
- 
throughout a 
considerable expanse of history and culture. Although this thesis situates its bodily 
problematics broadly within that confluence of conditions which we call `modernity', " I 
will therefore be arguing that we cannot define the particular point at which the concern 
for a body menaced by its own disgusting matter emerged, although we may consider the 
different forms that it has taken, and the different ends it has served. 
Fourthly, although I will stress the ways in which the body is marked as repulsive, 
it is also true that the body is not only or always an object of disgust: consider the body 
sculpted in the gym or on the racetrack; the body bronzed on the beach; the body 
nurtured and softened through beauty products; the adored body of the film star or the 
model; the eroticized body of the pornographic performer. Yet we should remember that 
such bodies remain heavily marked by their relationship to disgusting bodily materiality. 
They are bodies achieved only through the active transcendence or elimination of less 
desirable bodily properties. They are bodies regarded as exceptional in their success at 
parting from the abject matter to which the rest of us are consigned ('If only I had a body 
like hers/his'). And above all they are haunted by the inevitability of their return to it, 
through disease, old age, and death. Although the body need not always be disgusting, 
the body is always defined by its relationship to the possibility of disgust, primarily 
because the construction of socially licit embodied subjects is constructed through a 
relationship to purity and order. 
Finally, regarding the status of my own text, I will assume that, as Judith Butler 
has argued, any text that speaks about the body is at the same time a further formation 
of that body' (Bodies That Matter, p. 10) 
- 
and that as such this thesis contributes to the 
processes that produce embodiment, rather than simply documenting them. As Jean- 
Michel Berthelot puts it, `the lexeme "body" is an instrument rather than an object of 
Image of the Body in Pre-Modern Society' and `Me and My Shadows: On the 
Accumulation of Body-Images in Western Society: Part Two 
- 
The Corporeal Form of 
Modernity'. 
17 On the case for a distinctively modern body see Frances Barker, The Tremulous 
Private Bodies: Essays on Subjection; and Catherine Gallagher and Thomas Laqueur 
(eds. ), The Making of the Modern Body. 
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knowledge' ('The Body as Discursive Operator', p. 20). That is, the ` body' which I 
discuss is not simply an object to be scrutinized, but a concept which is transformed by 
its discussion 
- 
which in turn may transform our own experience and use of our bodies. I 
do not take this thesis to be a disinterested account of the body, but rather to be itself 
constituting the body in ways that I think are more beneficial, more just, and more 
hopeful for social change, rather than merely more accurate. For my reader, then, I can 
do no more than hope to invoke the bodily relationship to the text imagined by Roland 
Barthes: 
Whenever I attempt to `analyze' a text which has given me pleasure, it is not my 
`subjectivity' I encounter but my `individuality', the given which makes my body 
separate from other bodies and appropriates its suffering or its pleasure: it is my 
body of bliss that I encounter. (The Pleasure of the Text, pp. 62-63) 
And so this text is dedicated 
- 
in both senses of the words 
- 
to the bodies of its readers. 
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PART ONE 
The Embodied Subject 
and the Intimacy of Power 
Chapter One 
The Body Project 
I took the opportunity of being alone in the courtyard to look at my coarse 
hands and my common boots. My opinion of those accessories was not 
favourable. They had never troubled me before, but they troubled me now, 
as vulgar appendages. 
Charles Dickens, Great Expectations (p. 61) 
We believe, in any event, that the body obeys the exclusive laws of 
physiology and that it escapes the influence of history, but this too is false. 
The body is molded by a great many distinct regimes; it is broken down by 
the rhythms of work, rest, and holidays; it is poisoned by food or values, 
through eating habits or moral laws; it constructs resistances. 
Michel Foucault, ` Nietzsche, Genealogy, History'(p. 87) 
(i) Starting Points 
Pip, the protagonist of Great Expectations, is undergoing an experience 
with which many of us will be familiar: he is not happy with his body. Why not? 
We might answer this with reference to his ways of thinking about his body - of 
labelling and evaluating it 
- 
that result in distress. But such an approach leaps 
ahead, leaving unanswered two important, and more fundamental, questions. 
Firstly, why is it that Pip is so concerned with his body at all; why should the form 
of his body be so invested with emotion? It is this question that I shall focus on in 
chapter two. And secondly 
- 
which it is the aim of this chapter to consider - how 
has that body itself come about; how, as Foucault asks, was it `molded' (sic), so 
that the texture of its hands might one day be an object of shame? The linking 
between the form that Pip's hands take and the emotions that they generate in him 
mark the two domains with which these first two chapters will be concerned. As 
the thesis progresses, my focus will be more and more on those particular bodies, 
body parts, and body activities that are imaged as repulsive, and the variety of 
sources and uses of emotions such as shame and disgust. But in this first chapter I 
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am concerned with more general theories of bodies' material forms. Before 
considering what aspects of embodiment are regarded as disgusting, by whom, 
and why, I will be considering how the different material forms that human bodies 
take are generated, and offering a general account of `embodied politics': that is, 
the ways in which the interests of social groups amongst whom power is unequally 
distributed are served by the attributes and behaviours of moulded bodies. 
Where does the forming of the body start ?I open with this question since 
it raises a key issue in many `common sense' approaches to the body, but is also 
central to, and problematic in, more sophisticated sociological accounts. As we 
shall see, the assumption that there must be, in any account of the production of 
the cultural variability of bodies, a starting point which is the unsocialized, purely 
physical matter of a body, is not easy to dislodge 
- 
we may detect it even in 
Foucault's formulation of a body that is `molded'. 
Judith Butler has posed the problem in this form: `we may seek to return to 
matter as prior to discourse to ground our claims about sexual difference only to 
discover that matter is fully sedimented with discourses on sex and sexuality that 
prefigure and constrain the uses to which that term can be put' (Bodies That 
Matter, p. 29). Taking the configurations of sexual difference as her prime instance, 
she reminds us that any discussion of `the body' must always be the discussion of a 
body of determinate sex 
- 
and by implication, of determinate age, and race, and 
shape. Consequently, 'when we talk about `the body' as a physical object we 
inevitably find our language saturated with specific assumptions about what sort of 
body this is. She considers, for instance, how the apparently factual notion of inert 
body matter, acted on by transformative culture, itself betrays a gendered notion of 
the passive feminine mass which takes its shape from an active masculine 
intervention (Bodies That Matter, chapter one). By doing so, she invites us to 
question whether the body has a beginning, or whether it is the construction of 
such a point, of a founding moment for the body, which produces the 
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possibility of thinking about `a' or `the' body at all. 
Faith in such a point is visible in many attempts to formulate a theory of 
the body. In his 1934 paper `Body Techniques', Marcel Mauss enumerates the 
ways in which a body learns how to act and perform from the society it inhabits. 
Mauss moves through an extraordinary range of bodily activities, showing how 
running, walking, standing, sleeping, breathing, and swimming take different 
forms in different cultures, and for people of different genders and ages. The 
choice of such activities as examples is an important one, for it is an attempt to 
indicate, against claims that there are a basic set of instinctive, or given, bodily 
practices, that all bodily activities are social. Hence walking, standing or sitting 
- 
which might seem at first to be universal activities, undertaken by all bodies 
- 
in 
fact turn out to be `assembled for the individual not by himself alone but by all his 
education, by the whole society in which he belongs' (p. 105). As Mauss maps out 
culturally specific forms of bodily behaviour, his list expands to the point where 
he summarizes his position as being that: `there is perhaps no "natural way" for 
the adult' (p. 102). 
To raise now the question that persists in this enquiry: what then is 
constructed? Certain practices? All practices? Mauss assumes that we know what 
the body is, and can therefore study its changes. But at the same time, in order to 
formulate such a study there are already a number of assumptions in place, setting 
the very terms by which we are able to ask such questions. Butler sketches out this 
problematic in some detail, and it is worth quoting her argument at length. Here, 
she is questioning whether we can ever appeal to the ` sex' of a body as, to some 
extent, a biological given: 
The moderate critic might concede that some part of `sex' is constructed, 
but some other is certainly not, and then, of course, find him or herself not 
only under some obligation to explain how it is that `sex' comes in parts 
whose differentiation is not a matter of construction. But as that line of 
demarcation between such ostensible parts gets drawn, the ` unconstructed' 
becomes bounded once again through a signifying practice, and the very 
boundary which is meant to protect some part of sex from the taint of 
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constructivism is now defined, by the anti-constructionist's own 
construction. Is construction something which happens to a ready-made 
object, a pregiven thing, and does it happen in degrees? Or are we perhaps 
referring on both sides of the debate to an inevitable practice of 
signification, of demarcating and delimiting that to which we then `refer', 
such that our `references' always presuppose 
- 
and often conceal 
- 
this 
prior delimitation? Indeed, to `refer' naively or directly to such an extra- 
discursive object will always require the prior delimitation of the extra- 
discursive. And insofar as the extra-discursive is delimited, it is formed by 
the very discourse from which it seeks to free itself. (Bodies That Matter 
p. 11) 
Putting the act of reference back into the referent, Butler problematizes the 
possibility of ever locating such an origin except as a socially specific fantasy of 
what such an origin could be like. ' We might object though, that such a linguistic 
problem has little bearing on the physical question of when the process of bodily 
production begins. It might be argued that it is the slippage between two senses of 
`construction' 
- 
the social construction of meaning and the material construction 
of the body 
- 
which creates a problem where in fact none exists. For all the 
problems we may have in specifying whether there is a physicality the idea of 
which is not constructed through language, surely we can specify a physical 
moment at which the body has yet to be materially shaped by social forces? 
To trace the problems of such an endeavour, I want to turn to Bryan 
Turner, whose work forms a protracted enquiry over several years into the 
sociology of the body, ' and who, influenced by Mauss, adopts just such a position: 
These practical activities [of walking, swimming, sitting etc. ] require an 
organic foundation, but the elaboration of these potentialities requires a 
cultural context. It was for this reason that Mauss talked about `body 
techniques' which, while depending upon a common organic foundation, 
are nevertheless both personal and cultural developments. (Regulating 
Bodies, p36) 
' Critical readings of Butler's text, insisting on the necessity of separating the 
material from the discursive - without, I would suggest, ever successfully 
achieving it - are offered by Pheng Cheah, `Mattering'; and Teresa L. Ebert, ` The 
Matter of Materialism'. 
2 Turner's most important texts in this field are The Body and Society, `Recent 
Developments in the Theory of the Body', and Regulating Bodies: Essays in 
Medical Sociology. 
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I take Turner to exemplify a certain tradition in the theorization of the body, 
which assumes that while the activities of the body and the meanings assigned to 
it are culturally constructed and variable, there is a given, pre-cultural body, which 
learns physical behaviours from the society it enters. Although this may at first 
seem convincing, I shall be arguing that the body is not simply a given organic 
object which society shapes. What is Turner's `common organic foundation' 
which is exempt from culture? Where can we locate the entry of this biological 
body into the social? Is there a moment of entry where it crosses from the domain 
of the untouched, into the domain of the malleable? 
It is tempting enough to begin with the body at the moment of birth 
- 
the 
moment where Turner begins (Regulating Bodies, p. 15) 3 This is, after all, 
Mauss's starting point in his elaboration of a `biographical list of body 
techniques' ('Body Techniques', p. 110) 
- 
that is, a list that runs from birth to 
death. But the focus on birth is a product of the limited notion of `technique' 
itself, since it presumes that what we must study is how a body learns to behave. 
After some reflection we must see that even at birth any particular body is already 
the result of countless social processes which affect firstly the sort of body on 
which Mauss's techniques act, and secondly where within the social order bodies 
are produced. The type and location of the body that is born has already been 
shaped by, for instance: the social organization of conception (who is allowed, 
obliged, and forbidden to get pregnant); the varying rates of fertility in both men 
and women, and the role of factors such as diet, stress, and healthcare in their 
change; the status of abortion (who can and cannot get one; who is encouraged or 
forced to get one; how competing ideologies encourage and discourage it; which 
types of foetuses are recommended to be terminated); intra-uterine ` care', a 
medical regulation of the foetus which may be harmful, or affect growth, and may 
3 Similarly, Chris Shilling wrongly calls birth the point of `human entry 
... 
into 
social life' (The Body and Social Theory, p. 203). 
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lead to recommendations of termination 
- 
all of which are variable across countries 
and classes; poisons, drugs and pollution 
- 
the likelihood of whose entry into, and 
shaping of, the body of the foetus are themselves socially differentiated, along with 
other influences on the body of the foetus such as diet and working conditions of 
the mother; the criteria for `successful' pregnancy 
- 
those social and medical 
determinations as to what the end-product should (and should not) be, according 
to whose variability there are different chances of a foetus being produced with a 
particular body-shape, notably at the expense of bodies classified as having 
conditions such as Down's Syndrome, spina bifida, or cerebral palsy. 
So the body-at-birth is itself only the end-point of an elaborate series of 
social processes, some of which have as their endpoint the production of a baby 
(and a baby of a particular form), but for others of which the birth is merely one 
point in a monitoring and disciplining of the meaning and the functioning of the 
body 
-a process which for any individual begins before their conception and 
continues after their death. In other words, we are not born with a body awaiting 
socialization 
- 
rather, bodies are produced by which the subject may be born. ' 
My goal in the rest of this chapter is to show how the experience of a 
particular type of body contributes to a particular type of subjectivity. I will argue 
that we cannot think of the body as vehicle or container for subjectivity, but must 
rather study the coterminous presence of body and subject in a relationship of 
mutual effectivity. `The' body is always a way of being in the world, which, 
because it is physically produced in certain ways, both entails and prohibits certain 
forms of subjectivity. 
4 Butler makes the claim in this form: `the process by which a bodily norm is 
assumed, appropriated, taken on 
... 
[is] not strictly speaking undergone by a 
subject, but rather 
... 
the subject, the speaking "I", is formed by virtue of having 
gone through such a process' (Bodies That Matter p. 3). 
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(ii) Embodiment 
Embodiment is a crucial term for thinking about subjectivity as constituted 
through the forms our bodies take: it proposes that all subjects must be thought of 
as subjects with bodies, since we inevitably make sense of our world, and act in it, 
through the particular type of body which we have. Bryan Turner has argued that 
`embodiment has emerged out of a general dissatisfaction with the legacy of 
Descartes' rational actor' (`Preface' to Pasi Falk, The Consuming Body, p. xi). 
Descartes's account draws on, and reworks, traditions that precede him: the 
Socratic account of the body as an impediment to knowledge ` on the ground that it 
confuses the soul, and doesn't allow it to gain truth and wisdom when in 
partnership with it' (Plato, Phaedo, p. 11) and Christianity's account of the body as 
the source of sin from which the soul must separate itself (Anthony Synnott, The 
Body Social, pp. 129-138) s In this western philosophical tradition, the mind is 
separate from and superior to the body. Consequently, Descartes's proposal is that 
`the mind, by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from the body' so that 
`even if the body were to cease, it [the mind] would not cease to be all that it is' 
(Discourse on Method, p. 54). In this account, the body can be detached from 
perception, consciousness, and awareness, all of which are not physical events, but 
events of the mind, leaving ` the philosophizing ego in its disembodied solitude' 
(Haw Yol Jung, ` Phenomenology and Body Politics', p. 4). 
As Elizabeth Grosz says, what is missing from this account of the body is 
the body's `constitutive role in forming thoughts, feelings, emotions and psychic 
representations' (Volatile Bodies, henceforth VB, p. 10). But we should not forget 
I Although it is also important to note that neither of these generalizations 
adequately describes the complexities of Classical and Christian thought about the 
body. Foucault's second and third volumes of The History of Sexuality record how 
the classical body is also - if problematically - an object of value, while Caroline 
Walker Bynum's ` The Female Body and Religious Practice in the Later Middle 
Ages' challenges the notion that Christianity views the flesh only as sinful. 
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that Descartes is interested in escaping the body precisely because he regards the 
body as productive of knowledge 
- 
and thereby as capable of misleading him: `our 
senses sometimes play us false', he notes (Discourse on Method, p. 53). He seeks 
to produce a bodiless subjectivity because he recognizes that embodiment prevents 
the subject-with-body (who is always, we must remember, a subject by means of 
the body) achieving a secure objective epistemology. His fault lies not, as Grosz 
puts it, in ignoring the effectivity of the body per se, but in imagining the possibility 
of some mode of consciousness which was not conditioned by the body. 6 
Against this, the concept of embodiment relies on the argument that it is 
always through the body that awareness takes place, and that the body plays a 
crucial role in determining how we see the world. One easy example of this would 
be the presence of bodily metaphors in speech, defining the unconscious role that 
the body is playing in our capacity to make sense of our experiences. ' In reaching 
for a state of pure mind, Descartes writes that `examining attentively what I was, 
and seeing [voyant] that I could pretend that I had no body' (Discourse on 
Method, p. 54). The casual reintroduction of a bodily activity ('seeing') into the 
very activity that negates the body reminds us that in fact forms of thought must 
always take place with reference to bodily experiences on which they are 
modelled. ' For Descartes, thought is a linguistic and visual phenomenon, but in 
6 This aspiration towards dis-embodied consciousness is also part of a wider 
political problem since, as Laura Doyle has argued, when mind is classified as the 
superior function, `dominant groups associate themselves with mind or spirit and 
associate subordinate groups with body or matter' (Bordering on the Body, p. 28). 
' For other studies of the physical connotations and social assumptions of terms 
such as `up' and `down', `heavy' and `light', see Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A 
Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, pp. 467-484; Arthur Frank, `Bringing 
Bodies Back In: A Decade Review', pp. 156-159; and Jean A. Laponce, `Relating 
Biological, Physical and Political Phenomena: The Case of Up and Down'. 
' For critiques of Descartes's use of sight as the privileged metaphor for 
knowledge, see Hwa Yol Jung, ` Phenomenology and Body Politics'; and Suren 
Lalvani, Photography, Vision, and the Production of Modern Bodies, ch. 1. It 
might be argued that phenomenology finds its roots in a break from the Cartesian 
separation of the viewing subject from her/his world: see for instance Edmund 
Husserl, Cartesian Meditations 
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representing these elements as disembodied, he suppresses any recognition of the 
necessary physicality of its being so. After all, just as thought may take the form 
of `seeing', so too for each of us the interior voice of inner speech will always be 
imagined along bodily lines: its volume and modulation, its tone and pace, its 
inflection and accent. Moreover Descartes's entire `disembodied' state of radical 
scepticism is itself only enabled by particular physical conditions: `now therefore, 
that my mind is free from all cares, and that I have obtained for myself assured 
leisure in peaceful solitude, I shall apply myself seriously and freely to the 
general destruction of all my former opinions' (Meditations, p. 95). It is the 
environment of the body that generates this particular state of mind 
.9 
Indeed Mauss argues for just such a notion of subjectivity, since he 
stresses the ways in which the variable physical experiences which he describes 
also shape the forms taken by thought. Mauss insists that `different psychical 
states arise' from different forms of bodily activity (`Body Techniques', p. 111). 10 
Attempts to separate out bodily and mental activities are therefore inevitably 
unsuccessful. Since the forms that bodily activity takes vary from body to body, 
so too the modes of mental activity that accompany them must change, suggesting 
the limitations of Descartes's conception of a mind which, without a body, ` would 
not cease to be all that it is'. 
But against the fact of embodiment, the dream of the bodiless subject 
persists, our Cartesian legacy constantly returning. This belief in the possibility 
that the body might be eliminated resurfaces, for instance, in much recent writing 
on cyberspace and hyper-reality. The argument goes, broadly, that in a world of 
text exchanges, where subjects are free to devise their own identities, to assign 
9 Indeed, as Mary Russo suggests in another context, it may even be that the desire 
to transcend the body and reach a state of pure mind is itself the expression of a 
bodily craving: the desire to recapture the oceanic formlessness of the womb (The 
Female Grotesque, pp. 35-36 and p. 51). 
10 Ian Hunter and David Saunders offer a more detailed account of how Mauss's 
body techniques might be seen as determining different forms of mental activity 
(`Walks of Life: Mauss in the Human Gymnasium'). 
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themselves new genders or physical attributes, the body as we know it ceases to 
be relevant. Symptomatic of this approach is an essay by Juniper Wiley titled, 
appropriately enough, `No BODY is "Doing It": Cybersexuality as a Postmodem 
Narrative'. " For Wiley, cyberspace is ` the contradictory, ambiguous, and 
fragmented world of computer-mediated-communication among disembodied, 
voiceless, faceless text-producers' (p. 161). Since, Wiley argues, reality exists here 
only as the text produced by communicating terminal-users (p. 150), a user may 
adopt any body, claim any gender, imagine any physical act, so that by 
`dematerializing the corporeality of the body' (p. 157) a world is produced in 
which `newly generated personas 
- 
faceless, voiceless, bodiless 
- 
displace history 
with a timeless present' (p. 152). 
Yet we must ask: in what sense are these participants in such exchanges 
`bodiless'? For their text input issues from fmgers tapping on keyboards, it is 
through their eyes that the text messages are received, and its is their spines which 
protracted terminal-use is gradually reshaping. The fantasy of the disposable body 
is a sign of the constant need to return to the question of the body's presence. 
How, I ask myself, can a serious analysis of cyber-sexuality ignore the bodies who 
type or who masturbate while engaging in textual encounters? For it is their 
postures, their images and their feelings which interact with the new possibilities 
of cyberspace. This supposedly `bodiless' territory comes into being only by 
means of the actions of bodies, and through subjects whose experience of their 
world 
- 
including the experience of their computer-interactions 
- 
is mediated by 
those bodies. Such users bring with them the histories of the body techniques they 
have learned 
- 
histories which shape the very ways in which they communicate 
via their terminals, and histories which, in stark contrast to Wiley's claim, cannot 
simply be `displaced'. 
" For similar celebrations of technological disembodiment, see Cynthia J. Fuchs, 
` "Death Is Irrelevant": Cyborgs, Reproduction, and the Future of Male Hysteria'; 
and Sandy Stone, `Split Subjects, Not Atoms; or, How I Fell In Love With My 
Prosthesis'. 
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As Nick Crossley has put it: `our body is our way of being in the world, of 
experiencing and belonging to the world. It is our point of view on the world' 
('Merleau-Ponty, the Elusive Body and Carnal Sociology', p. 48). This is what 
Mike Featherstone and Bryan Turner have referred to as `sentient embodiment' 
- 
that mode of knowledge which is always already bodily ('Body and Society: An 
Introduction', p. 3). The different mouldings of our bodies constitute different ways 
of seeing the world (and vice-versa). Crossley takes his cue from Merleau-Ponty's 
juxtaposition of Western and Japanese styles of anger: `the angry Japanese smiles, 
the Westerner goes red and stamps his feet' (Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology 
of Perception, p. 189). Crossley argues that our different bodily styles both give 
rise to, and themselves rise out of, different understandings of the world. Refuting 
the idea that emotion takes place in the interiority of consciousness, Merleau-Ponty 
argues that `anger, shame, hate and love are not psychic facts hidden at the bottom 
of another's consciousness: they are types of behaviour or styles of conduct which 
are visible from the outside' (Sense and Non-Sense, p. 52). The physical presence 
of emotion in the form of heartbeat, posture, facial expression, tone of voice, and 
body temperature, all suggest that the different physical forms that emotion takes 
constitute different experiences of the world. Crossley points out that we do not 
simply `have different ways of expressing anger or love. We have different ways of 
being angry and in love 
... 
Differences in affective styles amount to existential 
differences' ('Merleau-Ponty, the Elusive Body and Carnal Sociology', p. 53). 
And it is not, therefore, just `affective styles' which construct such 
existential differences. Our bodies are moulded by diet, by clothing, by learned 
posture, by medicine, by culturally specific forms of facial expression or gesture, all 
of which give rise to particular perceptions and particular modes of relating to the 
world. Whether that be camp or machismo, there can be no mode of thinking 
without a body. From such an argument it becomes clear that, returning to our 
disembodied cybernauts, however much it may be true that computer interfaces 
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enable the timid to post hectoring rants, the embarrassed to engage in sexually 
explicit exchanges, and straight men to pass as lesbians, it is nevertheless from the 
embodied world-view of a subject seated at a keyboard that these possibilities 
emerge. The keyboard posture 
- 
relaxed and in control, crouched and anxious, 
slow and heavy with food 
- 
cannot be eradicated from such an equation. ' And 
with that posture come the attendant histories of race, class and gender privilege 
which have constructed it. 
(iii) Sport and Class: A Case Study 
The costs and benefits of social hierarchies and conflicts are central to the 
processes that generate, shape and distribute human bodies. How can we analyze 
these histories of privilege that accrue to bodies? In what ways does a body carry 
the marks of its social location, and in what ways is social power dependent on 
particular bodily activities? Drawing on the work of Pierre Bourdieu, Chris 
Shilling has analysed sport in terms of its stratification of body types according to 
class. " For Bourdieu and Shilling 
, 
the body is a vehicle for the expression of 
class-power, in whose postures and practices, and through whose socially-specific 
skills, spaces such as the polo-ground or ballroom are demarcated according to 
class interest, and forms of consciousness which maintain class interests are 
rehearsed and consolidated through the pleasures and pursuits of the physical. 
Like Mauss, Bourdieu argues that in the process of its education, the body 
acquires a particular physical form. Skills are developed through their being 
'Z Fortunately, more recent theorizing of cybernetic embodiment has responded to 
this line of argument. See Anne Balsamo, ` Forms of Technological Embodiment'; 
Vicky Kirby, Telling Flesh: The Substance of the Corporeal, ch. 5; and Deborah 
Lupton, `The Embodied Computer/User'. 
" Bourdieu's work offers an analysis of the process by which the social 
determinants generate diverse body-forms. See Distinction: A Social Critique of 
the Judgement of Taste; `Men and Machines'; Outline of a Theory of Practice; 
and `Sport and Social Class'. 
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imprinted in muscles and ligaments; reflexes are sharpened and senses are 
encouraged to focus on particular signals. Our physical form, says Bourdieu, is a 
`political mythology realized, em-bodied, turned into a permanent disposition, a 
durable manner of standing, speaking, and thereby of feeling and thinking' (Outline 
of a Theory of Practice, pp. 93-94). The cultivation of what Shilling calls the 
`relative intractability of corporeal habits and customs' (The Body and Social 
Theory, p. 133) is a learning process which fits (or fails to fit) the body for certain 
social spaces. One location where a given bodily form is acquired is at school, in 
sporting activities. Such activities, Shilling points out, are class-specific: `while 
polo and golf may be available to pupils in elite private schools in England, those in 
state schools are more usually channelled into playing soccer or netball' (p. 137). 
Shilling points out that this aspect of learning plays a role in the body's 
physical construction. Skills, postures, and musculature are all developed in and 
through the body 
- 
and they bring with them access to particular social settings. 
For in adult life these class-specific bodies are the bodies which will be both skilled 
at the practices of, and at ease with the mood of, the milieux of golf-clubs and 
polo tournaments. He points out that `developing a taste for elite sporting and 
leisure activities is important as while these activities may not always represent a 
direct route to a career for the dominant classes, they can lead to social situations 
which indirectly facilitate entry into a profession or allow business contacts to be 
forged' (p. 137) 
- 
or indeed, he adds, facilitate economically advantageous 
marriages. So these webs of class-power are secured by, amongst other things, 
bodies which are fitted for certain events 
- 
events whose value as a site of the 
distribution of jobs, contacts, and sexual alliances within a class depends upon the 
guarantee that members of other classes are excluded. And such exclusions are 
maintained not just by virtue of unreachable prices, but by bodies which have not 
been fitted to the physical practices which will take them there. 
Shilling stresses that as well as having this instrumental value, the 
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socialization of the body into class-specific activities is a means by which those 
differences are naturalized, since they are so intimately felt in the contours of the 
body: `the significance of this is not simply that the lifestyles of women and men 
from different social classes become inscribed within their bodies, but that these 
bodies ` fit' people for different activities' (p. 135). Thus the difference between, 
for instance, manual labour and `the professions' is made to seem natural because 
it is encoded within the experience of the body 
- 
with the result that attempts to 
cross these boundaries are fraught with the shame and discomfort attendant on the 
recognition that one has the wrong body for a given social domain. '' 
In Charles Dickens's Great Expectations, from which I take one of this 
chapter's keynote quotations, this use of the body to mark class boundaries 
structures the young working-class Pip's visit to the wealthy Miss Havisham's 
house. In the house, Miss Havisham's adopted daughter Estella taunts Pip about 
his clothes, his social skills, and his body. Pip comes to see himself in a new light: 
`I took the opportunity of being alone in the courtyard to look at my coarse hands 
and my common boots. My opinion of those accessories was not favourable. They 
had never troubled me before, but they troubled me now, as vulgar appendages' 
(p. 61). Crucially, it is at the level of the body that Pip experiences shame. His 
body has not been `fitted' for the space of Satis House, while Estella's has. And it 
is the particular discomfort of its being his body which is unfitted that makes the 
slight so intense, resulting in a particularly bodily expression of frustration and 
humiliation: `I cried, I kicked the wall, and took a hard twist at my hair; so bitter 
were my feelings, and so sharp was the smart without a name, that needed 
14 According to Bourdieu, ` the dispositions durably inculcated by objective 
conditions (which science apprehends through statistical regularities as the 
probabilities objectively attached to a group or a class) engender aspirations and 
practices objectively compatible with those objective requirements' (Outline of a 
Theory of Practice, p. 77). See also Bourdieu's `Men and Machines', which argues 
that industrial labour is sustained by bodies whose physical conditionmakes their 
entry into other spaces or their adoption of other practices difficult both materially 
and psychologically. 
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counteraction' (p. 61). The impossibility of naming the feeling is again a function 
of the felt intimacy of its bodily character - so inward and intense that it seems to 
belong to the realm of the physical, the natural, and hence the unchangeable, 
rather than to the domain of language, culture, the symbolic order (the place from 
which may yet issue a `counteraction'). 'SAs Bourdieu says, in a different context: 
`his body, which contains a history, espouses his function' ('Men and Machines', 
p. 309). 
Dickens's elision of the difference between boots and hands, marked by 
their both being ` accessories' and `appendages', indicates both the extent to which 
all class-specific structures are felt to be as fixed to the subject as the body (boots 
are just as much appendages as are hands), but simultaneously how all class- 
specific marks are equally socially determined (hands are no less accessories than 
are boots). "' For Dickens, this complex social moment becomes the narrative of 
the story 
- 
spurring on Pip's desire for personal transformation so that he can be 
worthy of Estella, and find a way to refit both his body and his wardrobe, thereby 
crossing the lines of class. Crucially, without a bodily change he can never 
achieve the transition. " 
Beyond their instrumental value in securing jobs or closing the doors of 
educational establishments, forms of embodiment define broader outlooks: 
complex networks of emotions and values may be sustained by the activities in 
which a body engages and the physical sensations and changes that result from 
them. Thus Shilling, drawing on Bourdieu, suggests that bodily experiences are 
made available in order to consolidate class-specific outlooks: 
11 If one were writing a history of embodiment then the question of whether the 
body is necessarily our most intimate zone, or whether this is a consequence of 
one particular way of constructing its meaning, would be an interesting test-case 
for the diversity of bodily experience. 
16 We might also add that boots can affect the shape that feet grow into, the 
posture that their wearer adopts, the relative risk and pain of walking through 
different physical environments. 
17 On the varying cultural roles of hands, see Bryan Turner, ` Reflections on the 
Epistemology of the Hand'. 
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For example, fitness training for its own sake is often engaged in by the 





such is the meaning of their existence 
- 
the deferred 
satisfactions which will reward their present sacrifice' 
... 
In contrast, 
professionals in the field of cultural production such as university teachers, 
tend towards activities which combine the health-oriented function of 
maintaining the body with' the symbolic gratifications associated with 
practising a highly distinctive activity' such as mountaineering or walking 
in remote places. As Bourdieu notes 
... 
this combines the `sense of mastery 
of one's own body' with the `exclusive appropriation of scenery 
inaccessible to the vulgar'. (The Body and Social Theory p. 132)'8 
In these activities the body is not merely expressing a class-specific attitude, 
rather it is being directed into activities which will generate such attitudes. As 
long as these bodies keep to their appropriate spheres, their activities will produce 
the requisite sense of endeavour or superiority which shores up their location in 
the economic structure. So we can see that forms of embodiment produce outlooks 
which are not just 
- 
as we saw earlier 
- 
`different existential perspectives', but are 
rather structures which maintain relations of power. 19 As Bourdieu says of taste: 
Taste, a class culture turned into nature, that is, embodied, helps to shape 
the class body. It is an incorporated principle of classification, which 
governs all forms of incorporation, choosing and modifying everything 
that the body ingests and digests and assimilates, physiologically and 
psychologically. It follows that the body is the most indisputable 
materialization of class taste. (Distinction: A Social Critique of the 
Judgement of Taste, p. 190, emphasis in the original) 
What Bourdieu makes clear is that the practices of the body are entwined 
with the social orders in which those bodies lie. And I would argue that we must 
extend this to apply not only in the sense that a given body is shaped in particular 
18 Shilling's two quotations are from Bourdieu's `Sport and Social Class', p. 839. 
19 Shilling also discusses how, for instance, the decisions that working-class 
mothers often take to `sacrifice their own bodily needs.. in order to fulfil those of 
their husbands and children' in the face of a limited household budget, generate 
forms of embodiment (p. 131). There is both the measurable physical effect in 
terms of `the disproportionately high incidence of physical illness among mothers 
with children' (p. 131), and also the symbolizing in that bodily deprivation of an 
entire mode of being, whose orientation away from pleasure and towards service 
articulates a place, and- with it a social order, in this economy of scarcity. 
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ways in the course of its lifetime, but also in the sense that any event which affects 
bodies is inevitably governed by the physical conditions and physical locations of 
bodies 
- 
phenomena produced by the social arrangements which have guided the 
development of those bodies, determined their distribution in space, and created 
the physical environments in which they live. The direction of this model of 
material bodies insists, for instance, that the tsetse fly, the earthquake, or the gene 
for eye colour, are no less social phenomena than the plastic surgeon. From the 
gradual northward spread of malaria in response to global warming, through to the 
ways in which homophobia has encouraged health professionals to permit the 
spread of HIV, we must remember that the various physical states through which 
bodies pass never have the status of the purely natural. And yet, as I want to 
suggest by looking at the work of Bryan Turner and Susan Bordo, the hope of 
defming just such a distinctive realm of unsocialized biology persists in much 
theorization of the body, at the expense of this more accurate model in which the 
materiality of the social is coterminous with the materiality of the virus and the 
gene. 
(iv) `I Refute It Thus': Social Constructionism and Its Discontents 
In general terms, we can define social constructionism as `a position 
within the sociology of knowledge, which claims that our knowledge of reality is 
the consequence of social processes' (Bryan Turner, Regulating Bodies, p. 105). 
However, to speak of `the social construction of the body' is to invoke two 
distinct 
- 
but, I will be arguing, inseparable 
- 
objects. On the one hand, it refers to 
the various discursive models of what the body is, how it works, and what it 
means 
- 
what we might call the constructed epistemology of the body. Here we 
might think of the division of the body into the four humours of medieval 
medicine or the one-sex model of Galenic biology (Thomas Laqueur, Making 
Sex). These are ways of conceptualizing the body which vary from culture to 
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culture. But at the same time, the phrase also refers to the ways in which the 
material body is, as we have seen, quite literally socially constructed by the 
physical environments in which it is situated - what we might call the constructed 
ontology of the body. 
In the remainder of this chapter I will be arguing for the inseparability of 
the two fields, and arguing that the practices which produce differentiated bodies 
are entwined with those that produce knowledge of them, and vice versa. But in 
this section, I want to focus on certain resistances to a radical constructionist 
account such as that offered here. In the case of our knowledge of the body, it 
might be asked: is it really the case that all forms of knowledge are equally 
socially constructed? Aren't molecular biology and genetics better models, more 
accurate models, and therefore less ideological models of the body than their 
predecessors? And in the case of the physical construction of the body, while the 
fact of a social influence on bodily activities of all sorts seems clear enough, does 
it not seem that certain biological events are less affected by society than others? 
While the physical event of, say, the cutting open of a body's skin by a plastic 
surgeon is very obviously determined by culturally specific notions of what body 
types are desirable, what scientific research should be funded, and how access to 
surgery should be organized, surely the rate at which blood pumps out of the cut - 
or the fact that the body has blood at all 
- 
is not a social product in the same 
sense? 
Both these objections to a radically constructionist account of embodiment 
attempt to define a certain material stability by which the body might be assessed: 
either a way of knowing the body whose epistemology is not socially constructed 
or a biological fact about the body whose ontology is not socially constructed. 
They look to materiality because, as Jacques Derrida says, matter conveys `values 
associated with those of thing, reality, presence in general' (Positions, p. 64): the 
stable, the real, the definite. I want here to consider, and challenge, two attempts 
to determine just such a point of material stability, one by Bryan Turner, and the 
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other by Susan Bordo 
- 
theorists whose general position is to stress the social 
variability of bodily phenomena 
- 
in order to show the consequences and problems 
of an investment in a grounding biological facticity. My argument here will be 
rather that in different situations there are particular biological stabilities, the 
condition of whose becoming stable should be interrogated rather than accepted as 
a given. I suspect faith in corporeal material stability because attempts to claim any 
particular physical features of the body as stable necessitate marking them as self- 
evident because they are material, as if the material were not changeable. 
Consequently such arguments exempt some aspect of the body from the possibility 
of change 
- 
paralyzing politics in the procese. 2° Against this, I shall argue that both 
the meanings of body material and the state of that material itself 
- 
even its most 
inward biological components 
- 
derive from social processes. 
Turner's account assumes, as we have seen, that `fundamental aspects of 
embodied activity, such as walking, standing or sitting, are social constructions' 
(Regulating Bodies, p. 36), but against the claim that everything about the body is 
equally constructed, Turner invokes the possibility that: `some things ("hysteria") 
may be more socially constructed than others ("gout")' (Regulating Bodies, p. 26). 
In which sense is Turner using the word `constructed' when he makes his 
distinction ? If by `constructed' he means physically produced, then he would seem 
to be performing an untenable about-face, since his own work describes precisely 
how and why gout is socially constructed through different physical influences 
(The Body and Society, pp. 220-222). As an illness `associated with poor diet, lack 
of exercise and alcoholism' (p. 220) it is the product of certain lifestyles, 
particularly associated with leisure and consumption: `gout, like melancholy, was a 
disease of affluence, leisure and urban civilisation' (p. 221). A set of economic 
conditions, a configuration of class, a certain distribution of wealth, a specific way 
of displaying wealth such that it acquired social meaning: these are the determining 
20 The search for a gay gene would seem to be a case in point. 
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conditions for this supposedly `less constructed' condition. 
On the other hand, we might assume that by `constructed' he refers to 
epistemology 
- 
yet even here the claim seems equally untenable. Again, his own 
work has documented how the meaning of gout too is constructed, for it came in 
the eighteenth-century to connote `personality and social status' (p. 221), a disease 
with some prestige which marks one as leisured. However, as the Protestant work 
ethic displaced the cultivated idleness of the gentry, gout has come to signify not 
dignified leisure, but contemptible laziness. And there is another sense in which 
Turner's own example serves to disprove the very case he is trying to make. The 
very fact that `gout' is recruited by him to act as the example of a relatively `less 
constructed' bodily state is an instance of its construction as meaningful in a 
particular way 
- 
that is, an instance of its social construction. Turner's sentence, 
apparently an objective observation on gout, is in fact a discursive production of a 
new significance for gout. We are back with Butler's insistence on the discursive 
construction of that which is referred to as unconstructed. 
Why, I am drawn to ask, of all the conditions to oppose to hysteria, does 
Turner choose one whose social variability his own work has charted? It seems to 
result from a desire to distinguish between conditions that have a quantifiable 
organic existence, and those which are, as he says of hysteria, ` a psychosomatic 
expression' (The Body and Society, p. 125). Yet while they may emerge through 
different social conditions, gout, no less than hysteria, is the physical inscription 
onto the body of a socially specific position, and the classification of this physical 
inscription with a term which sustains particular social meanings. In using an 
example whose thorough sociality he himself has already demonstrated, Turner 
attempts to make a theoretical distinction which requires an unnecessary 
qualitative distinction between the different routes by which bodily states are 
generated: those that are primarily physical, and those that are primarily psychic 
but are expressed through the physical. Yet if we recognize that the psychic is 
always and necessarily embodied, such an attempted division seems to make little 
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sense: the embodied subject is a mass of different bodily states resulting from the 
different processes that transform it, none of which are in any meaningful sense 
more or less constructed than any other. 
This confrontation within Turner's own discourse, his attempt to go 
against the grain of his work, reveals some of the problems in theorizing 
embodiment. For by reworking his own material, Turner's aim would seem to be 
to suggest that even in what is acknowledged to be constructed (in both senses of 
the word), there is a fundamental grounding in an asocial biology. Turner makes 
his own investment in such a notion of an element of asocial material stability in 
the body clear enough: `I want to retain the foundationalist view 
... 
in order to 
have a politics 
... 
of human rights' (Regulating Bodies, p. 256). Turner argues that 
rights require a transcultural concept of the body in order to recognize the 
universality of physical problems like hunger and ageing. " He wants to retain 
certain physical properties of the body as natural facts which will secure a 
political programme of basic rights. But against this, I would offer the quotation 
from Nietzsche with which Turner ends The Body and Society: 
For there is no such thing as health as such, and all attempts to define a 
thing that way have been wretched failures. Even the determining of what 
is healthy for your body depends on your goal, your horizon, your 
energies, your impulses, your errors and above all on the ideals and 
phantasms of your souL Thus there are innumerable healthy of the body; 
and the more we allow the unique and incomparable to raise its head, and 
the more we abjure the dogma of the ` equality of men', the more must the 
concept of a normal health, along with a normal diet, and the normal 
course of an illness, be abandoned by the medical men. (The Gay Science, 
quoted in The Body and Society, pp. 234-235) 
If Turner is unable to pursue Nietzsche's radical anti-normativity, it is because he 
does not believe that it will yield a workable model of human rights. The fact of 
Z' A position which he develops in `Outline of a Theory of Human Rights'. For a 
critique of Turner's position, and the outline of an alternative notion of rights 
which embraces the changeability of human life, see Malcolm Waters, `Human 
Rights and the Universalisation of Interests'. 
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the body's physical malleability must be used by him to indicate, not its 
variability, but its continuity, via the invocation of a `common ontology' 
(Regulating Bodies, p. 254): we all need food, water, air. I, though, am arguing 
that the radical physical variability of bodies renders any return to what is 
unconstructed a dubious dream, which will take us nowhere. For even our most 
apparently basic biological conditions are not the fixed raw material for society, 
but are themselves already the result of evolutionary processes that take place 
within, and have been responsive to, social organization. ' `The human body' is 
not a finished object with fixed needs, but a work in progress whose needs are 
themselves in constant alteration. It would seem far more useful to remain 
sensitive to the diversity of all aspects of human embodiment and, furthermore, to 
recognize that any given bodily configuration is only a point of temporary 
stability within a process of change. Rather than deciding in advance what `the 
body' is and what it needs, we might then interrogate the temporarily stable facts 
of our differential embodiments and ask what politics they might entail. This is 
not to say that the health of certain bodies does not require particular physical 
resources. But I would argue that it is only by refusing to decide in advance what 
physical resources `the body' requires that we may enable the most open 
recognition of the different resources that might benefit different bodies. 
But the invocation of bodily differences may also result in a flawed vision 
of material stability, if the variation in material bodies is taken as the ground for 
certain unchanging differences. I therefore want to offer, alongside Turner, Susan 
Bordo's equally problematic use of the body as marked by persistent differences 
between essentially fixed biological forms. In her Unbearable Weight: Feminism, 
Western Culture, and the Body, Bordo makes similar objections to radical 
220n the debate about how biological evolution has responded to social change, 
see Ted Benton, ` Biology and Social Science: Why the Return of the Repressed 
Should Be Given a Cautious Welcome', and `Why the Welcome Needs to Be 
Cautious: A Reply to Keith Sharp'; and Keith Sharp, ` Biology and Social Science: 
A Reply to Ted Benton'. 
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constructionism, but from a different perspective. Like Turner, Bordo is not 
making an unproblematic assertion of biological fact, but rather arguing for a 
mediated position in which the body has a natural, organic existence upon which 
culture acts. Thus while Bordo wants to recognize the diversity of meanings that 
may be assigned to the body, and the diversity of experiences that accompany 
them, she insists that there are fixed points of biological stability. Taking issue with 
the position that reproduction does not constitute an adequate grounding for a 
binary division of the experience of gender, she is sceptical about the idea that: 
the differences in various social constructions of reproduction, the vast 
disparities in women's experiences of childbirth, and so forth preclude the 
possibility that the practices of reproduction can meaningfully be 
interrogated as a source of insight into the difference gender makes. (p. 230) 
She responds: `I find this conclusion remarkable. Women's reproductive 
experiences do, of course, differ widely, but surely not as widely as they do from 
those of men, none of whom (up to now 
- 
technology may alter this) has had even 
the possibility of carrying a child' (p. 230). Like Turner, Bordo takes ` social 
construction' as a discursive phenomenon, which determines `experience', and 
which affects certain aspects of the body's physical condition, but leaves 
untouched a core of physical events on which that experience and condition are 
based. But in fixing `reproduction' as the brute biological given which, while 
amenable to different experiential interpretations, represents a point of shared 





the female body. 
Reproduction is in no sense a universal fact for women. A consideration of 
the ways in which infertility rates vary by class and geography, of women either 
born without wombs or who have had them removed through hysterectomy, of 
intersexed and transsexual women, suggests that the notion of pregnancy and/or 
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childbirth can hardly be plausibly recruited as a marker of a biologically guaranteed 
femaleness. ' Bordo's figuration of reproduction as a shared reality amongst 
women thus elides particular women from the category `woman'. As Judith Butler 
has suggested, the attempt to define a shared essence produces `domains of 
exclusion' with `coercive and regulatory consequences' (Gender Trouble, p. 4). 24 
For instance, transgender theory would suggest that Bordo's insistence that men 
have never yet been able to bear children is itself a construction of the meaning of 
`man' and `woman' at variance with that argued for by the transgender liberation 
movement: that the identity `man' is entirely compatible with biological bodies 
which Bordo's position would insist on labelling `woman'. Such men have borne 
children 
- 
often against their will 
- 
while living within a regime of sex-gender 
regulation which insists on regarding them as women. By such a definition there 
are many men who have been pregnant: it is simply that Bordo needs to define 
`man' in a way that writes them out of existence. 
Childbirth is thus a capacity which, again, varies as body-forms vary. It is 
not the case that bodies are born with fixed capacities which social forces then 
inflect, modify or adapt. Rather, the capacities which any given body has are as 
thoroughly determined as the meanings with which they are invested. Yet even 
23 As well as this biological account of the production and distribution of fertility, 
we might also think of Pierre Bourdieu's account of how `practices of fertility' in 
the petit-bourgeoisie mime their economic commitment to prudence, frugality, and 
measured expenditure (Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, 
pp. 331-338). 
24 Another perspective involving similar tensions is offered by Dennis W. Allen, 
`Homosexuality and Narrative'. Allen looks at how Hawaii's House of 
Representatives attempted in 1992 to pre-empt the possibility of the state's 
legalization of same-sex marriages by declaring that marriage was intended only 
for `couples who appear, by virtue of their sex, to present the biological possibility 
of producing offspring from their union' (p. 617). But as with Bordo's example, the 
attempt to ground a social constituency ('heterosexuals') in a biological invariant 
('the biological possibility of producing offspring') soon unravelled the very 
constituency it was attempting to maintain, since such a definition excludes those 
male-female couples who are biologically unable to produce children and therefore, 
by such a definition of the institution of heterosexual marriage, renders them unfit 
to partake in the institution (p. 618). 
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calls for complex positions of mediated embodiment may nevertheless search for 
biological footholds which fit ill with my argument that all bodily forms are 
produced. Despite these various attempts to exempt some aspect of our biology 
from social influence, none of these biological footholds prove secure. Even 
Shilling's assertion that `we cannot escape from the inevitability 
... 
of death' (The 
Body and Social Theory, p. 187) must be treated sceptically. The designation of 
`death' as a universal experience is itself a social figuration. I am thinking here 
not simply of the fact that, as Barthes points out against the naturalization of 
death, we all die at different times and for different reasons" 
- 
but rather that the 
supposed `fact' of death is itself a particular cultural interpretation of the body. 
Caroline Walter Bynum, for instance, records the medieval argument that the 
corpse should be regarded as merely one stage in the material process from human 
birth to rebirth, and as such should be treated as being in a state that might be 
more properly considered a continuation of life, rather than its cessation,. She 
observes that `the event we call death is not a radical break' if the underlying 
model is of a material continuity of the body that must, necessarily, continue until 
Judgement Day ('Material Continuity, Personal Survival, and the Resurrection of 
the Body: A Scholastic Discussion in its Medieval Contexts', p. 77). It is thus not 
even the case that we all 'die'. 26 
But this is not to deny that in particular social formations, at particular 
times, commonalities exist. On the contrary, my argument is precisely that the 
forms, meanings, experiences and relationships of the body are, to the extent that 
u As Barthes has it: `must we really celebrate its essence once more, and thus risk 
forgetting that there is still so much we can do to fight it? ' ('The Great Family of 
Man', p. 109). 
26 This problem of the clash between bodily events that one culture regards as 
unchanging, but which another culture views as non-existent, is a recurrent 
problem for the analysis of embodiment. For instance, in his Mortality, 
Immortality and Other Life Strategies, Zygmunt Bauman fords himself in the 
difficult position of asserting that death is universal, while documenting cultures 
in which its inevitability is not accepted. His solution is to argue that the belief in 
immortality can only be grasped as a self-deluding attempt to manage the fact of 
mortality. 
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they are produced, necessarily recurrent and stabilized. " Indeed, the fact that we 
can specify the continuity of an experience like death is possible only for this 
reason: in this society, at this time, we do all die, even if elsewhere, at other times, 
such a statement would be 
- 
and will be 
- 
ludicrous 28 But within a given social 
formation accounts such as these, all of which speak about our bodies to us, play 
a role in the construction of our sense of what our bodies are through the 
assumptions they make about what is unchanging. As Butler points out, `the 
assumption of a certain contoured materiality, is itself giving form to that body' 
(Bodies That Matter, p. 17). These statements of what the body ` is', how it works, 
what it can do, produce a regime of bodily accounts which in turn generate the 
practices that produce that body. Bourdieu's reading of the body is also helpful 
here, since he emphasizes the way that bodily stabilities achieve the 
naturalization of the political (Outline of a Theory of Practice, p. 94-95). Where 
we inhabit a body whose physical form and social meaning seems unchangeable, 
an equally unchangeable political claim is being embodied in it. This might offer 
us a useful way of understanding the investment in the assertion of a site of bodily 
stability such as we see in Bordo and Turner. We should therefore always ask: 
what stabilities does the assertion of a bodily stability attempt to assert? What is at 
stake in this notion of the corporeal? 
I have suggested that Turner uses bodily stability as a guarantee of an 
embodied humanism. The reasons for Bordo's assertion lie in her search for the 
grounds of a feminist politics which, in its commitment to the struggle for the 
rights of `women' must constitute the form `woman' to defend, a construction 
Z' I say `stabilized' rather than ` stable', to emphasise the active force that is 
necessary to maintain given material forms: insofar as the social order is partially 
stabilized, it produces bodies which are also partially stabilized. 
28 As Linda F. Hogle recounts, the gradual technological intervention into states 
that would once have been terminal is steadily eroding the possibility of declaring 
the point at which a body becomes dead. ('Tales from the Cryptic: Technology 
Meets Organism in the Living Cadaver'). 
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enabled by Bordo's invocation of a fixed biological fact 29 There may well be 
points where such political stability is the most useful tactic 
- 
but as we have seen 
in the case of Bordo's invocation of childbirth, it is not unproblematic. I would 
therefore argue that Bordo's argument proceeds in the wrong direction. The 
assumption of her argument might be paraphrased as: `Given that there is a 
political movement organized around the identity "woman", what grounding can 
be found to maintain it? ' But I would pose the question in the opposite form: 
given that certain bodily forms (not only gender) are socially organized in 
temporarily fixed forms, what social unities result from them, what political action 
do they enable, and how can we alter those socio-physical fixities even as, 
necessarily, we deploy politics on the basis of their existence? Bordo's 
parenthetical concern to register the possibility of male pregnancies ('up to now 
- 
technology may alter this') displaces into the future the need to think about the 
different physical forms that bodies take, as does her concern with experience, not 
matter, as the variable element of her account of childbirth. Her account uses the 
image of a changing future as the contrast for an unchanging past (women have 
always had babies until now), when in fact pregnancy should be analyzed in terms 
of the constant changes in who has the capacity to reproduce, in the course of 
which certain consistent and stable material bodily conditions do indeed emerge - 
but they emerge as produced, regulated and contested, rather than as natural and 
immutable. Thus the question of how and why a certain material form exists 
should be the object of an enquiry, rather than the assumption on which a 
theoretical claim is based. In other words, we must ask: what political projects 
follow from the forms of materiality that we are currently obliged to assume, and 
how can we pursue those projects while still seeking to alter the material forms 
Z' On the debates over the legitimacy, and political consequences, of the 
deployment of the terms ` woman' and `women' see also Tania Modleski, 
Feminism Without Women; Denise Riley, Am I That Name?; and Monique Wittig, 
`The Straight Mind' and Other Essays, especially `The Category of Sex', `One Is 
Not Born a Woman' and `The Straight Mind'. 
42 
that found them? 
As a result of the attempt to use the body as a guarantee of stability, a 
particular anxiety attends to Bordo's use of `body' - one that appears in her hostile 
rebuttal of attempts by Donna Haraway to assert the body's malleability. Haraway 
argues, via the figure of the cyborg, that the body is malleable, mobile, and not 
bound to one physical form or location ('A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, 
Technology and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century'). Bordo reacts 
scornfully: `What sort of body is it that is free to change its shape and location at 
will? ' she asks, and answers: `no body at all' (Unbearable Weight, p. 229). 
Resistant to 
- 
and perhaps unnerved by 
- 
the fact of the body's malleability, Bordo 
is quick to reduce the sophistication of Haraway's arguments, treating Haraway's 
work as if it were an account of voluntaristic bodily transformations which 




the body 30 
Haraway in fact argues for no more than the possibility of changes in the material 
form of the body which, while far-reaching, are constrained at all points. 
Moreover, she is particularly attentive to the fact that such changes takes place not 
at will, but via a dangerous, if constructive, engagement with body-shaping forces 
which are outside our control. She is explicit that `the main trouble with cyborgs 
of course, is that they are the illegitimate offspring of militarism and patriarchal 
capitalism', who may nevertheless be used for `a subversion of its teleology as 
star wars' ('A Cyborg Manifesto', p. 151). " The `subversion' of embodied power 
3° For a similar critique of the supposed tendency to disembodiment in postmodern 
theory see Somer Brodribb, Nothing Mat(t)ers: A Feminist Critique of 
Postmodernism, which reads postmodernism as a'politics of discarnate desires' 
dreaming of a world in which `mind will no longer need to make reference to the 
body in its identity claims: unchained at last from the sensations and limitations of 
the flesh' (p. 144). As my earlier critique of Wiley suggests, I am sympathetic to 
such a reading, but I do not believe that we stand to gain by making the flesh more 
rigid than it in fact is, and thereby contributing to a naturalizing of the social 
which sustains the regimes of domination that we are supposedly resisting. 
31 In `Envisioning Cyborg Bodies' Jennifer Gonzalez gives a particularly strong 
account of different forms of the ` cyborg of slavery', the (usually female) figure 
whose bodily transformations are in the service of masculinist power and 
corporate technology. 
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is very different from an assumption that such power is largely ineffectual, which 
Bordo imputes to her; and the seeking out of bodily changes is not the same as a 
failure to recognize oppressive bodily stabilities. An insistence on the different 
experiences and different physical capacities of the body is not, as Bordo argues, 
an attempt to dematerialize the body and to replace it with a disembodied politics. 
Rather, it is to argue for an analysis of the concrete materialities as which we 
exist, while simultaneously holding on to the practical possibilities for their 
change. 
The trajectory of my own work is, clearly enough, to suggest that these 
oppositions between biology and discourse, between what is changeable and 
unchangeable, what is constructed and what is not, are unsuccessful. The zero- 
degree of physicality remains a fantasy, the asocial body a myth, and the purely 
biological phenomenon impossible to find. Like Descartes's attempt to define a 
consciousness without a body, these dreams of a body without a society that 
produced it are doomed to failure. For inevitably, the existence of a human body 
is always the sign of a functioning society which brought it to birth and beyond. 
Just as no body is ever without race or sex, so no body is without sociality. There 
is no body of which we cannot ask: how did it come to be like this? What actions 
of other humans brought it to be in this place, at this time, in this state? Who fed 
or did not feed it, and on what? Who taught or did not teach it a posture, and how? 
Who sustained or did not sustain its health, and why? And what assumptions 
about what the body is, how it works, and what it means, do these other practices 
entail? 
In order to understand how these relationships of body-knowledge and 
body-practice are interrelated, it is useful to look at the work of Michel Foucault, 
according to whom any theory of `an intelligible body' is always bound up with 
the production of a particular type of `useful body' (Discipline and Punish, 
henceforth DP, p. 136). For any accounts which seek to explain the materiality of a 
referential body - Turner's, Bordo's, and mine as well - all have their correlative 
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social practices which act on such bodies, and for which such explanations fit the 
bodies in question. 
(v) Foucault's Docile Bodies 
Central to my own thinking about bodies has been the work of Michel 
Foucault, and it is to this work that I wish to turn now: both because it remains 
such a useful resource for thinking about the social conditions of embodiment 
and because in addressing the various debates that his work has generated it will 
be possible to define my own position more clearly. In doing so, I find myself in 
agreement with Nancy Fraser's description of Foucault: ` I believe that Foucault 
does not really have a single consistent position' ('Michel Foucault: A "Young 
Conservative"? ', p. 37). It is possible to construct several different Foucauldian 
theories of the body with, as Fraser says of Foucault's theories of power, `some 
textual evidence in favour of each reading' (p. 37). For instance, it is certainly 
possible to argue 
- 
as I will systematically refuse to do here 
- 
that at some points 
in these texts Foucault believes in a pre-social bodily materiality that provides an 
untouchable site for resistance to socialization. But my interest here is to account 
for how the matter of the body is formed, governed, and ordered. This then is an 
attempt to construct, out of the volumes of material signed with Foucault's name, 
a particular theory of embodied subjectivity which develops my line of argument 
about the production of the material body, and attempts to account for the 
possibility of such a body resisting the power structures by which it is constructed. 
For Foucault, thinking and talking about the body is part of the insertion of 
the body into a field of power, for `there is no power relation without the 
correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not 
presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations' (DP, p. 27). The 
question of how particular material bodies emerge (the social construction of their 
ontology) is therefore inseparable from how those bodies are talked about (the 
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social construction of their epistemology). Foucault insists that knowledge about 
the body can never be innocent or factual 
- 
as I have tried to show in the cases of 
Turner and Bordo 
- 
but is always part of attempts to orchestrate and resist power 
and the physical forms of embodiment that it produces. 
This linking of power and knowledge has been taken as indicating in 
Foucault a concern only with how the body is rendered in discourse, since that is 
the domain in which knowledge would seem to operate. Shilling claims that in 
Foucault's writing `society is brought so far into the body that the body disappears 
as a phenomenon 
... 
As the body is whatever discourse constructs it as being, it is 
discourse rather than the body that needs examining in Foucault's work' (The 
Body and Social Theory, p. 81). It is certainly true that Foucault describes his own 
project as one which will `substitute for the enigmatic treasure of "things" anterior 
to discourse, the regular formation of objects that emerge only in discourse' (The 
Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 47). " But for him this implies looking at how those 
objects are brought into being through their material regulation as well, since to 
speak about an object is also to designate how that object should be treated. 
Foucault's account of the body is then as much concerned with the material 
consequences of discourse for the body - such as its postures, diet, exercise and 
medical treatment 
- 
as with discourse in Shilling's reductive sense of it as only the 
ways in which the body is discussed. In his own sceptical dismissal of the study of 
discourse solely as ideology, Foucault specifies that different discourses of the 
body ` were not to be joined at the level of a speculative discourse, but in the form 
of concrete arrangements' (The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, henceforth 
32 Foucault is distancing himself here from his first book, Madness and 
Civilization, which attempts to offer just such a history of phenomena outside 
discourse. Derrida famously asserts the impossibility of this project in `Cogito and 
the History of Madness' 
-a critique which, as Robert Young has observed, 
Foucault vehemently refutes in `My Body, This Paper, This Fire', but whose 
repudiation of the possibility of speaking in the name of an outside of discourse 
Foucault was quick to adopt (Robert Young, White Mythologies, pp. 71-73). For 
an account of the work's reception see Georges Canguilhem, ` Georges 
Canguilhem on Michel Foucault's Histoire de La Folie'. 
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HS, p. 140), and makes his aim clear: 
I do not envisage a `history of mentalities' that would take account of 
bodies only through the manner in which they have been perceived and 
given meaning and value; but a `history of bodies' and the manner in which 
what is most material and most vital in them has been invested. (HS, p. 152) 
His construction of such a history begins with his argument that `in 
concrete terms, starting in the seventeenth century', two movements to organize 
the body are visible (HS, p. 139). One ` centred on the body as a machine: its 
disciplining, the optimization of its capabilities 
... 
its integration into systems of 
efficiency and economic controls' (HS, p. 139). This regime of power is achieved 
by ` the disciplines: an anatomo-politics of the human body' (HS, p. 139). Here, the 
focus is on the styling of individual bodies, and is compatible with Mauss's 
argument for the social specificity of bodily practices. The other `focused on the 
species body', and is concerned with the biology of entire populations: 
`propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and 
longevity' (HS, p. 139). Into this category come eugenics, vaccination campaigns, 
birth-control, sanitation, all those technologies which aim to organize the health of 
the nation, and which are maintained through ` an entire series of interventions and 
regulatory controls: a bio-politics of the population' (HS, p. 139). By focusing on 
these two processes 
- 
which he characterizes as `two poles of development linked 
together by a whole intermediary cluster of relations' (HS, p. 139) 
- 
Foucault 
makes the physical condition of the body crucial in his analysis of modem social 
formations. " 
Such an analysis builds on the account of modem subjectivity which 
33 My focus on his analysis of the body should not be taken to erase Foucault's 
other contributions to post-structuralist thought, most notably on the problem of 
knowledge. It may be, as Christina Crosby has argued, that an interest in 
Foucault's genealogies as an assemblage of sociological facts is a convenient way 
of avoiding engaging with the challenges he poses to the problem of knowledge 
itself ('Dealing with Differences') 
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Foucault offers in Discipline and Punish, where his focus was the concept of 
`discipline', a distinctive modern form of bodily attention `which the whole of 
society pursues on each individual through innumerable mechanisms' (DP, p. 303). 
The practices that make such demands on the body are dispersed through a 
frightening array of modem institutions, producing power in a range of everyday 
locations: the school, the hospital, the office. As he breaks these domains down 
into their component practices (e. g. the examination, the seating arrangement, the 
lecture), Foucault reminds us that we must consider these practices as `techniques 
possessing their own specificity in the more general field of other ways of 
exercising power' (DP, p. 23) not just effects of some larger social order 
- 
and in 
doing so moves us some way from Bourdieu's account of the body as simply the 
materialization of class interests. But at the same time Foucault asks us to consider 
how such techniques may well also participate in shared histories, so that, in the 
case of the prison for instance, the autonomous techniques of psychiatrists, 
doctors, parsons, penologists, judges and philosophers converge in `a single 
process of "epistemologicojuridical" formation' in which may be found `a 
common history of power relations' (DP, p. 24), marked on the one hand by a 
shared form of rationality, and on the other by `the coherence of its results' (DP, 
p. 26). Foucault terms his method of analysis an investigation of the `micro-physics 
of power' (DP, p. 26). 
As we can see, such an analysis considers not only the shaping of particular 
bodies, but also the shaping of the social landscape that encourages and 
discourages the production of different bodies, that monitors their health or their 
growth. Such an analysis requires us to consider the architecture of the buildings 
designed to house bodies (DP, pp. 141-149; HS, pp. 27-29); an analysis of the social 
programmes of eugenics; the regulation of diet; or the distribution of different 
populations through city-planning. These are all exercises of social power which, 
as we have seen with Bourdieu, are materialized in the form of particular body- 
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types. Such a production of active, healthy, useful bodies leads to a concern with 
classifying body attributes along the axis of normality and deviation, since `a 
normalizing society is the outcome of a technology of power centred on life' (HS, 
p. 144). This concern with utility is expressed through the promotion and 
preservation of sanctioned bodily types, and the correction of others, producing 
what Foucault calls `docile bodies' (DP, pp. 135-169): bodies that are socially 
useful, that follow the practices prescribed for them, and that maintain those 
practices through self-scrutiny. Foucault's account thus enables us to consider both 
how individual bodies become the objects of attention, and how larger physical 
forces simultaneously result in and are maintained by the formation of particular 
body-types. He offers us both a number of historically specific processes by which 
the modern body is produced, and a general theory of the importance of the body 
as a site of the maintenance of all social organizations. 34 
Foucault's account should warn us against designating, as Turner and 
Bordo do, certain phenomena as outside the concerns of an enquiry into the 
material and discursive construction of the body. His position reminds us that no 
analysis can in advance rule out the possibility that certain events may be sites 
through which power operates. Nor does it allow us to accept certain bodily 
formations or biological facts as natural or unproblematic. Rather, if a body has 
reached a certain disposition, Foucault reminds us that we must ask what processes 
of power and control brought it to such a point: `one needs to study what kind of 
body the current society needs' ('Body/Power', p. 58). It is the complexity with 
which he treats the mechanisms through which power is brought to bear that 
makes Foucault most compelling for me. Both The History of Sexuality and 
Discipline and Punish, make the case that as long as power is conceived of as `a 
limit set on freedom' (HS, p. 86), we only have a partial picture of its operation, 
" On the debate over which aspects of Foucault's claims about power are 
historically specific and which cover more general philosophical terrain, see Nancy 
Fraser, 'Foucault's Body Language'; and Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical 
Discourse of Modernity, pp. 266-293. 
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and ignore the ways in which power also operates as a proliferation of possibilities 
and an incitement to pursue them. In the case of The History of Sexuality, this 
resides in the famous claim that `we must not think that in saying yes to sex, one 
says no to power' (p. 157), since the domain of sexual science already encourages 
us to focus our time, energy and speech on sex, and, as we do so, to become 
further enmeshed in procedures of self-scrutiny, and normalizing judgement 33 In 
making a similar argument in Discipline and Punish, Foucault speaks of the way 
that carceral thinking encourages new types of deviance in its designation of a 
norm, whose result is ` the formation of delinquency on the basis of subtle 
illegalities' (p. 301). Delinquency, as the sign of the ever-present risk that any 
subject might lapse into criminality, is not simply an object that carceral law must 
deal with, but is rather its product. Delinquency exists because the penal system 
encourages us to be always watchful for signs of it. 
But in both cases power's productivity enables it to operate more 
effectively. Delinquency and sexuality, although posed as problems for these 
systems to solve, are in fact the necessary objects by which these systems function. 
They encourage a constant self-scrutiny which is one practice in the social network 
of the monitoring and assessing by which interventionist techniques are legitimated. 
Such self-monitoring fulfils our fear of error, while all the time generating only 
more signs of that error: `you will end up in the convict-ship, the slightest 
indiscipline seems to say' (DP, p. 299). As Jacques Donzelot says, wherever the 
sociologist is asked to explain some `social problem', they should instead ask: what 
need for social control is being met by the simultaneous invention of this `problem' 
and the generation of a concomitant regime of professional and governmental 
solutions to it (The Policing of Families, p. 220) ? 
For Foucault, power thus operates in the form of what I shall call 
`regulated production'. Particular sites of discipline generate new actions in those 
I explore this argument in more detail in chapter two. 
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on whom it operates, and consequently Foucault's ` docile bodies' are not passive 
bodies 
- 
they are bodies that exercise, that write, that labour in factories, that take 
aerobics classes, that cook particular types of food. And those practices are 
inseparable from an embodied subjectivity that scrutinizes itself, assesses the 
meaning of its actions, and in doing so subjects itself to particular institutional 
exercises of discipline. So the production of such active bodies is also the 
production of regulated bodies: the embodied subject is only active in certain ways 
and to certain ends (it exerts itself to eat certain foods, to undertake certain 
physical activities), and understands its activities in a certain light (as enabling 
utility rather than pleasure) 
- 
an understanding which, as we have seen, in turn 
gives rise to new bodily activities (it feels shame at its weight and so goes on 
diets). Bodies are thus active in the service of the forms of construction that limit 
them. 
I would accept the criticism that Foucault's work does not always consider 
how these practices are stratified by gender36- and equally would add that they do 
not consider how they are stratified by race. But I would add that Foucault never 
claims that his work is an exhaustive account of the forces that shape bodies, and 
he concludes Discipline and Punish by describing it as `a historical background to 
various studies of the power of normalization' (p. 308). 37 We might well want to 
36 On the debates around Foucault's limited consideration of gender see Irene 
Diamond and Lee Quinby (eds. ), Feminism and Foucault: Reflections on 
Resistance; Teresa de Lauretis, Technologies of Gender, p. 3; Lois McNay, 
Foucault and Feminism, pp. 1147; Meaghan Morris, The Pirate's Fiancee, 
pp. 55-56; Elspeth Probyn, Sexing the Self, pp. 112-117; Caroline Ramazonoglu 
(ed. ), Up Against Foucault: Explorations of Some Tensions Between Foucault and 
Feminism; Margrit Shildrick, Leaky Bodies and Boundaries pp. 46-49; and Kate 
Soper, `Forget Foucault? ' pp. 26-27. 
 Other researchers have extended the Foucauldian critique into new domains: 
Suren Lalvani's Photography, Vision and the Production of Modern Bodies 
considers how photography became a potent institutional force for regimenting the 
postures, arrangements and conceptions of nineteenth century bodies; and Jacques 
Donzelot writes on the management of the family (The Policing of the Family). 
The contributors to Deviant Bodies (Jennifer Terry and Jacqueline Urla, eds. ), 
consider the way that the different sciences construct notions of deviance; and 
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ask of his analyses: what social practices are particular to the bodies of women and 
what are particular to those of men ? What social practices are particular to black 
bodies and what are particular to white bodies? But while we will inevitably need 
to consider practices which Foucault does not, and this may result in arguments for 
substantial modes of modem power which Foucault's account does not consider, it 
is Foucault's own arguments on the twin domains of `an anatomo-politics of the 
human body' and `a bio-politics of the population' that will enable such an 
analysis. To identify other techniques of body-fashioning does not mean that such 
modes of domination have an altogether different logic to those particular modem 
forms of power that interest Foucault, nor does it mean that these bodies are 
subject to greater (or lesser) degrees of bodily intervention. Against claims that 
Foucault overlooks the possibility that some bodies are more constructed than 
others, we must bear in mind that, as Elizabeth Grosz has said: 
women are no more subject to this system of corporeal production than 
men; they are no more cultural, no more natural, than men. Patriarchal 
power relations do not function to make women the objects of disciplinary 
control while men remain outside of disciplinary surveillance. It is a 
question not of more or less but of differential production. (VB, p. 144) 
Embodied subjects are located in a network of obligations and prohibitions, 
encouragements and discouragements, within which they orient themselves, and 
through which they are situated. As malleable bodies are arranged in prisons and 
those writing in Foucault's New Domains (Mike Gane and Terry Johnson, eds. ) 
extend his work to new areas of govemmentality and professionalization. It is 
important to bear in mind the open-ended form of Foucault's enquiry, precisely as 
a resistance to the regularity with which critiques of Foucault accuse him of 
neglecting some important social domain (Judith Still, ' "What Foucault Fails to 
Acknowledge": Feminists and The History of Sexuality'). While we may, for 
instance, accept Sandra Lee Bartky's point that Discipline and Punish does not 
consider the difference that gender makes to punishment, and that `to overlook the 
forms of subjection that engender the feminine body is to perpetuate the silence 
and powerlessness of those upon whom the disciplines have been imposed' 
(`Foucault, Femininity and Patriarchal Power', p. 64), there is nothing in Foucault's 
methodology which makes it unable to analyze gender, even if that is not always a 
field on which he focuses. 
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classrooms, subjectivities are produced which are tied to regimes that make sense 
of bodies and that order their physical matter. We have moved from Mauss's 
anecdotes about how different nationalities walk, to a model of the body in which 
the smallest physical motions 
- 
and even the very matter of the body itself 
- 
are 
securing points for regimes of palpable misery. 
This raises a number of questions, to which I will be offering provisional 
answers 
- 
and which perhaps constitute an entire discourse around Foucault in 
themselves. Does this account of power as regulated production enable us to ask in 
whose interests power operates ? How does such a theory of the total production 
of bodies account for everyone who does not behave in these ways ? Can such a 
model enable us to judge between desirable and undesirable uses of power ? If the 
body is always styled, are some styles preferable ? Are some damaging ? Is there a 
Foucauldian body politics ? 
From the outset, such a project faces a series of problems. Foucault's 
account of all history as `the various systems of subjection' and `the hazardous 
play of dominations' ('Nietzsche, Genealogy, History', p. 85) has led many critics 
to argue that in the very moment that the body is made the central domain of 
power, it becomes impossible to analyze what would constitute a desirable form of 
resistance: if the body is simply shaped in many different ways, how can we judge 
which of those ways are more desirable than others ? 38 Then, as we saw in 
Bourdieu's account of the body, to theorize its physical malleability may render it 
so completely a product of the social order that the body would seem to have no 
capacity to alter the social scenes in which it is located. 39 Thus for Pasi Falk, in 
38 Habermas regards this as leading Foucault into an ethical cul-de-sac (The 
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, pp. 279-282), in which his position requires 
us to see no difference in freedom or autonomy between, say, a body shaped by 
Olympic training and one shaped by a concentration camp. For a similar account of 
this aporia see Jon Simons, Foucault and the Political, pp. 112-116; and Rudi 
Visker, Michel Foucault: Genealogy as Critique, pp. 123-124. 
39 For a critique of some of the problems of resistance in Bourdieu's work, see 
Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, pp. 50-60. 
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Foucault's work `the subject is reduced to a mere product' (The Consuming Body, 
p. 6), a set of effects unable to act back. For some this is his strength: he gives an 
account of the terrible fact of humanity's absolute submission which may rouse us 
to action (John O'Neill, Five Bodies, pp. 140-147). And yet to accept such an 
account of complete docility would seem to preclude the very possibility of action 
- 
a position which, for others, is his limitation. "' Against this Foucault is often 
invoked the Foucault of the second two volumes of The History of Sexuality, who 
seems to offer an account of `self-fashioning' in which the subject is an active 





both as the pessimistic historian of absolute oppression and as the 
anarchic theorist of absolute liberty. 
But these attempts to slant Foucault in favour of either liberty or 
domination are made possible only by the systematic neglect of Foucault's careful 
situating of the two as necessarily dependent. Accounts of their mutual 
incompatibility would seem to entail a wilful elision of this position, such as 
Edward Said's extraordinary claim that in The History of Sexuality Foucault's 
`profoundly pessimistic view' is that power is ` irresistible and unopposable' 
because of his ` singular lack of interest in the force of effective resistance' 
`0 See for instance Peter Dews, ` Power and Subjectivity in Foucault'; Bryan 
Turner, The Body and Society, pp. 172-174; and Chris Shilling, The Body and 
Social Theory, pp. 80-81. Nancy Hartsock suggests that Foucault views power as a 
force which one cannot change for the better (`Foucault on Power: A Theory for 
Women? '). She sees this as a consequence of Foucault's position as a man, which 
makes him a beneficiary of power. The best he can hope to be, she suggests, is ` a 
colonizer who refuses' (p. 164), but never a victim of power. This attempt to carve 
the world into `colonizers' and `colonized' fails precisely because it cannot take on 
board Foucault's account of the dispersal of power. When Hartsock ('Associate 
Professor of Political Science and Women's Studies at the University of 
Washington') places herself on the side of the victims, and claims that she therefore 
has a superior faith in the value of resistance, one longs for an interrogation of her 
own privileges, and perhaps some recognition by her of Foucault's homosexuality. 
" See for instance Arnold I. Davidson, ` Archaeology, Genealogy, Ethics'; Paul 
Patton ` Taylor and Foucault on Power and Freedom'; and Elspeth Probyn, Sexing 
the Self, pp. 128-137. For a critique of the attempt to recuperate Foucault for a 
liberal notion of agency, see Toby Miller, The Well-Tempered Self, pp. 173-180. 
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resistance' (`Foucault and the Imagination of Power', p. 151). Said's apparent 
authority for such a reading of Foucault is this paraphrase: `power, he writes in his 
last phase, is everywhere' (p. 150). But Said's paraphrase erases the other 
formulation that accompanies this: `points of resistance are present everywhere in 
the power network' (HS, p. 95). What the elision of this phrase 
- 
which even an 
inattentive reader could hardly miss 
- 
suggests is that at stake in these figurations 
of Foucault is the difficulty of accommodating his insistence that power and 
resistance are interminably complicit. Instead, he is reworked so as to appear to 
believe more in the force of one or the other. 
I am equally uncomfortable with the argument that, as Kate Soper has 
suggested, Foucault's claims for practices of freedom are contradicted by the 
theoretical models he uses, with the result that Foucault's ` libertarian impulse is 
sustained only through an autotelic or existential conception of the subject which 
is belied by the radical anti-humanism of the account which is given of social 
process' (`Forget Foucault', p. 25), leading to an insoluble aporia or tension in 
Foucault's work. Here, rather than privileging one aspect of the critique over 
another, the two are assumed to be contradictory: since Foucault's account denies 
human agency and progress in the traditional humanist conception, how can he 
make claims for possibilities of freedom? But at the same time, if he believes in 
the possibility of freedom, how can he offer us an account so antithetical to 
agency and progress? 
In Soper's reading, Foucault is divided between offering and foreclosing 
the possibility of social change -a recognition of the difficulty of his account 
which is at least more satisfying than the attempt to reorganize it in favour of one 
or other pole. But Soper's vocabulary of `tensions', and her figuring of Foucault 
as situated in a paradoxical contradiction of impulses only reinstalls the logic by 
which these accounts seem incompatible. We should not simply lament this 
position as a contradiction. Rather, we must account for Foucault's own stress on 
the mutual interdependency of domination and resistance, in which power is not a 
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property held by some against others, but is rather `a way in which certain actions 
modify others' ('The Subject and Power', p. 218), available to us all, I shall argue, 
through those very processes which might at first seem to deprive us of agency. 
Although an account of the tensions between submission and agency in Foucault's 
writing has become an almost inevitable part of any account of his work, 42 it is 
nevertheless important to chart Foucault's position here in some detail since, 
firstly, his arguments form one of the central strands of this thesis and, secondly, I 
will argue, it is at the level of the body that Foucault himself most often locates 
resistance. 
Insofar as the body is encouraged to act in particular ways, it is an object 
on which power acts and, as we have seen with Bourdieu, may make that power 
particularly difficult to resist since the body's entire physical bearing acts to 
naturalize those effects. But Foucault insists that power is not simply `a physical 
determination' ('The Subject and Power', p. 221) because it always entails the 
possibility of a response which will resist its effects. Power ` is exercised only over 
free subjects, and only insofar as they are free' (p. 221). In this account the 
opportunity for resistance is always present. As if to push this claim to its limit, he 
takes as an example the concentration camp to show how even in that most 
restrictive and damaging of locations there is room for what he terms a `practice 
of liberty', since `no matter how terrifying a given system may be, there always 
remain the possibilities of resistance, disobedience, and oppositional grouping' 
('Space, Knowledge and Power', p. 339)! ' His analysis seeks out the sites where 
alternative actions may take place and where alternative ideas may be formulated 
'2 It is, for instance, the central question in almost every one of the fourteen essays 
in David Couzens Hoy (ed. ), Foucault: A Critical Reader. 
'3 One detects perhaps both some justifiable frustration, and some recognition of 
the apparent pessimism of his work, when Foucault tells one interviewer that 
`what I've said does not mean that we are always trapped, but that we are always 
free' ('Sex, Power and the Politics of Identity', p. 386). We might even go so far 





and makes it in his later work the set of conditions that enables 
freedom. 
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which do not simply reproduce the conditions of domination 
- 
but which equally, 
as we shall see, do not simply break from them. Where then does this freedom 
emerge from? In this analysis I shall be looking at two areas in which freedom is 
exercised: the material space, where particular actions are enforced and/or 
restricted (often simultaneously), and the discursive space where ideas, values, 
and practices are conceptualized. I shall also consider two different ways in which 
Foucault conceives of possible exercises of freedom: immediate resistance to 
particular acts of coercive power, and the exercise of self-fashioning in 
pleasurable styles, both of which I will argue, must be seen in terms of their 
ambivalent resistance to domination. 
(vi) Foucault's Resistant Bodies 
I want to begin with Foucault's account of resistance to the regime of the 
prison in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. `All these movements' argues 
Foucault ` have been about the body and material things' (DP, p. 30). He is 
particularly concerned with the fact that resistance within the prison takes the 
form not only of demands by inmates for change in particular practices, but also 
of a more general opposition to the fact of the disciplinary environment itself. 
They were `revolts at the level of the body against the body of the prison' in 
which `what was at issue was not whether the prison environment was too harsh 
or too aseptic, too primitive or too efficient, but its very materiality as an 
instrument and vector of power' (DP, p. 30). The coterminous materiality of body 
and environment 
- 
the meshing of bodies with discipline and the exercises of 
micro-power over them - then become the site of an opposition by the body, 
which seems to stage its own resentful resistance to the forces that press on it. 
While the charge of the impossibility of resistance has been levelled at Foucault's 
account of the subjectivization of persons, who cannot resist because they are 
unable to imagine actions outside the horizons of the subjectifying discourse, 
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Foucault's own examples of resistance seek to locate it in sites of material action, 
where new practices might emerge out of the very bodies upon which power 
acts. ` 
Does this mean that Foucault sees the body as an independent force, a 
source of transcendental values? Nancy Fraser certainly thinks so, and declares 
Foucault's invocation of the body as a material site of resistance to be naive 
(`Foucault's Body Language', pp. 62-63). Moreover she argues that in and of itself 
the body cannot be the source of some spontaneous political revolt: `here is where 
my capacity to imagine a plausible Foucauldian response runs out. I can form no 
concrete picture of what resistance 
... 
in the name of bodies and pleasures would 
be like' (p. 63). But, I wish to argue, it is precisely in his interest in concrete 
instances of resistance that Foucault's theory of the body becomes most useful. 
We need not assume that the possibility of bodily resistance indicates some 
spontaneous freedom housed within the body, if we imagine that when power 
demands particular bodily movements, postures and practices, in doing so it 
recognizes at the physical level the possibility that these bodies may act otherwise. 
For Foucault, power is conceived as `always a way of acting upon an acting 
subject or acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action' 
(`The Subject and Power', p. 220), an exercise of force which imposes one set of 
actions at the expense of others, and which therefore produces subjects who have 
the opportunity of acting otherwise precisely because such possibilities are 
internal to and installed by that exercise of power. 
The physical force of the prison thus becomes a site of resistance because 
the prison assumes subjects who are free to act otherwise 
- 
not because the body is 
a natural source of resistance, but because the body is produced as insubordinate 
" What is perhaps missing from such an account of resistance as the material 
reaction of the body, is a formulation of resistance on behalf of others. The 
missing term might be empathy: the capacity to act so as to preserve the bodies of 
others. Perhaps the most interesting direction in which to extend Foucault's work 
would be to offer a bodily account of empathy. 
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by the material practices of power that produce it there. " The demand to be silent 
contains within it the recognition of, and therefore the production of, the 
possibility of speech 
- 
just as the obligation to speak produces the possibility of 
silence. The physical practices through which such docile bodies are produced are 
simultaneously training those bodies in postures of refusal, installing in their 
gestures the capacity to defy, and invoking in their muscles alternative 
movements. Power is thus actively installing such possibilities within the subject 
even in the act of foreclosing them. The body that is structured by disciplinary 
techniques is thus a body able to conceive of itself as performing possible 
practices other than those which are required. As Crossley notes, Foucault ` does 
not adopt the behaviourist option of viewing the result of training as simple 
propensity to repeat certain actions' ('Body-Subject/Body-Power', p. 109). Rather, 
any body-training itself generates conditions antithetical to the social domains of 
power which produces it. Thus while, as I have argued so far, embodiment 
constitutes an experience of the world in terms of its dominant power structures, it 
also enables a critical purchase. 
It is thus not the case, as Peter Dews has argued, that `without some 
evocation of the intrinsic forces of the body, without some theory which makes 
the corporeal more than a malleable tabula rasa, it is impossible to reckon the 
costs imposed by "an infinitesimal power over the active body" ('Power and 
Subjectivity in Foucault', p. 90). For Dews, Foucault's failure is that `he has no 
positive libidinal theory of the body', which invalidates any political possibilities 
since `only if we can produce a counterfactual, specifying how a situation would 
change if an operation of power were cancelled, or a repressed desire made 
conscious' can there be any meaningful notion of freedom (p. 92). But in arguing 
for the thoroughly material force of freedom, we can see how Foucault figures 
" For alternative materialist accounts of Foucault and power see Paul Patton, 
`Taylor and Foucault on Power and Freedom', and Ann Game, Undoing the 
Social, who relates Foucault to Henri Bergson's arguments about the material 
continuity of the body with its environment. 
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freedom not as the retrogressive search to regain repressed desires, but rather as 
the future-oriented development of new possibilities. ` Dews conflates the future 
possibilities that might follow `if an operation of power were cancelled' with a 
notion of repression in which the only imaginable outcome of the lifting of power 
is the freeing of an innate desire. But if we think in terms of new bodily 
possibilities, we can see how escape from any given practice of power's control 
calls not for the return of the repressed, but rather for the creation of body-forms 
and practices which may previously never have existed 
- 
some of which may have 
been explicitly forbidden, but others of which have simply been overlooked 
because the body has been actively producing itself in forms which unwittingly 
preclude any such alternatives. 
And yet at the same time, the actions that resist power are not only 
opposed to it in some straightforwardly liberatory way. As we have seen, the 
penal society requires delinquency, rather than being undermined by it, and the 
heteronormative state requires the figure of the pervert. These actions that unsettle 
any given site of authority may also reinforce it. But rather than assuming that 
resistance may therefore only take the form urged upon us by Jean Baudrillard 
- 
absolute apathy"- Foucault instead invites us to consider resistance as an act 
whose meanings and effects are only ever provisional. Power overthrown at one 
point by a given action may be reinstalled at another as a consequence of the same 
action. The resistant body thus appears in his writing not in the form of the 
privileged revolutionary agent, but rather as the site of a provisional opportunistic 
stand against power, which offers us little in the way of long-term strategy 
At the same time, it is important to recognize that Foucault's own position here 
has changed over time - Madness and Civilization makes the attempt to think just 
such a resistant repressed force. My sense of the importance of thinking in terms 
of future possibilities for new bodily forms has been confirmed by my recent 
discovery of Kathryn Bond Stocktons `Bodies and God: Poststructuralist 
Feminists Return to the Fold of Spiritual Materialism', a particularly impressive 
argument along very similar lines. 
" See Baudrillard, `Fatal Strategies' and `The Masses: The Implosion of the 
Social in the Media'. 
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because the long-term is never within our sight: it is only as a new configuration 
of exercises of power comes to act upon us that we can develop our new 
responses to them. 
My Foucauldian position on embodiment and its relationship to power 
would argue as follows. The body must be styled in particular ways, for instance 
through exercises of force which teach it how to move, how to talk, how to eat. 
The body that is free from power is not an option. As a body is shaped, it is also 
bound to particular regimes of domination 
- 
as both their beneficiary and their 
victim. The physical production of differentiated bodies is therefore one which 
limits what those bodies can do, but even in doing so it makes new opportunities 
and physical capacities available to them. In taking my lead from Foucault, I 
therefore assume that it is possible for any body to act against instances of power 
which order its life through domination and inequality, and in doing so to 
exercise power itself. The adversarial relationships in which a body is situated 
- 
productive, regulative, coercive 
- 
may yield the potential for struggles in which 
that body can act otherwise than required. However, it is also the case that in 
doing so it may also consolidate the regimes that it resists, or that it may itself 
enter into other bodily regimes in which it is a body that dominates, even as it 
seeks to stop being a body that is dominated. Following such an argument, 
`freedom' is not simply the opportunity to undertake a greater range or number of 
actions (as it is for libertarianism), since this account recognizes that these may be 
no more than multiple oppressive obligations. " Rather, ` freedom' as such is 
replaced with a notion of temporary situated struggles for alternatives to given 
practices of coercion. And the long-term effectivity of such struggles should be 
judged by the extent to which they themselves produce or evade new forms of 
coercion. 
Crucial to such a theory is the recognition that it may well be impossible to 
" The ` free market' being a case in point, where what is called `free' is in fact a 
series of elaborate obligations. 
61 
separate in any straightforward way acts which `empower' from those which 
`disempower'. If this has distressed critics hoping for some guide as to which 
practices should be preferred over others, this is precisely because Foucault's 
work insists upon a complex interweaving of dominations and freedoms, both 
discursive and material, in which few acts are unproblematically acts of liberation, 
and all acts take place within contexts in which they are implicated with regimes 
of authority. `9 Let us consider this case: 
In a great many cases power relations are fixed in such a way that they are 
perpetually asymmetrical and allow an extremely limited margin of 
freedom. To take what is undoubtedly a very simplified example, one 
cannot say that it was only men who wielded power in the conventional 
marital structure of the 18th and 19th centuries; women had quite a few 
options: they could deceive their husbands, pilfer money from them, refuse 
them sex. Yet they were still in a state of domination insofar as these 
options were ultimately only stratagems that never succeeded in reversing 
the situation. ('The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of 
Freedom', p. 442) 
While we can account for these actions partly in terms of material possibility, 
these examples of resistance are suggestive of Foucault's entire treatment of 
power. Although he does not present them as such, we may notice how these 
forms of resistance are crucially predicated on aspects of modem embodied 
subjectivity. Stealing money is related to that juridical product `delinquency' 
which, as we have seen, is generated by a penal scrutiny that asks all subjects to 
consider of themselves what crimes they might be on the point of committing. We 
might even go so far as to say that the penal system produces subjects who are 
more likely to consider crimes than other systems: it is the penal system that 
enables the consciousness that conceives of resistant criminal possibilities. And 
abstinence from sex, while making a claim outside the discourses of domestic 
duty, is at the same time produced by the Christian tradition of chastity (see for 
'9 Foucault distances himself from notions of `liberation', warning that any so- 
called moment of liberation ` is not in itself sufficient to define the practices of 
freedom that will still be needed' ('The Ethics of the Concern for Self, p. 433). 
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instance Foucault, ` The Battle for Chastity'). " It would not therefore be going too 
far to say that this resistant figure is the product of discourses which enable her to 
resist one site of power 
- 
that of her husband 
- 
even as she consolidates others. 
We must view this possibility as operating through two types of mobility: the 
mobility of physical possibility and the mobility of relations of discourse. That is, 
the material possibilities of taking actions, and the discursive possibilities of 
articulating what so many of his critics suppose that Foucault cannot account for: 
demands or ideas that do not serve the interests of a particular locus of power. 
Describing the investments of power in a healthy body, Foucault points out 
that ` once power produces this effect, there inevitably emerge the responding 
claims and affirmations, those of one's own body against power, of health against 
the economic system, of pleasure against the moral norms of sexuality, marriage, 
decency. Suddenly, what had made power strong is used to attack it' 
('Body/Power', p. 56). Here the desire for physical health, inculcated by 
capitalism's need for a vigorous workforce, may be used to counter the capitalist 
demands for labouring bodies, since such labour damages the body. The desire for 
sexual pleasure, installed as a way of encouraging contentment in marriage and 
reproductive utility, becomes the origin of claims for the right to alternative sexual 
pleasures. 
We can see how this process of bodily resistance is not only physical, as in 
the case of the prison, but also discursive. Foucault's language suggests that the 
ways that the languages of power incite us to obey ('health', `pleasure') cannot be 
contained within the horizons that those discourses use to construct them. The 
discourse of pleasure which grounds the subject in late capitalism cannot 
absolutely determine those physical acts which might be situated in the discourses 
of pleasure: anal sex, recreational drug use, joyriding. Transgression is achieved 
S0 Elspeth Probyn's ` The Anorexic Body' offers a similarly Foucauldian analysis of 
anorexia in the nineteenth century as achieving a provisional limited power through 
its deployment of Christian doctrine and mythology against domestic duty. 
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by positioning new material possibilities within the discursive slots occupied 
previously by acceptable practices 
- 
possibilities that exist not in spite of their 
prohibition, but because of it. Similarly the notion of a reverse discourse assumes 
that discourse entails a certain flexibility: to say that something is bad or 
forbidden entails the possibility of saying it is good or desirables` 
Thus, as V. N. Volosinov has argued in Marxism and the Philosophy of 
Language, 52 we must see discourse not as an unchangeable artefact which, in the 
structuralist formulation, `speaks us', but rather as a collection of living utterances 
which engage with and dispute one another. Volosinov insists that even a given 
word does not have its meaning fixed, but is capable of being re-oriented to enable 
alternative meanings to circulate. `Any real utterance, in one way or another or to 
one degree or another, makes a statement of agreement with or a negation of 
something' and so exists in `a state of constant tension, or incessant interaction 
and conflict' (p. 80). This `multiaccentuality' means that words do not fix 
meanings in an absolute form whose accompanying subject positions we are then 
obliged to enacts' Rather, the particular uses of language that take place enact the 
discursive and material conflicts of the speakers. "' We might, for instance, think of 
s' Foucault's best known example of a reverse discourse is the one by which, in 
the late nineteenth century, the medical category `the homosexual' enabled those 
classified as such to formulate claims on their own behalf thereby ` using the same 
categories by which it [i. e. homosexuality] was medically disqualified' (HS, 
p. 101). In Discipline and Punish, Foucault makes a similar case for the way that 
radical nineteenth century critiques of the penal system indict the rich by 
refiguring them as the criminals - responsible for crime, and therefore deserving 
punishment 
- 
so that ` a whole effort was being made to reverse this monotonous 
discourse on crime' (p. 288), enabled by the terms that it is challenging. 
52 There is some debate as to whether this text is to be considered as the work of 
Mikhail Bakhtin, writing under Volosinov's name, as a collaborative effort 
between Bakhtin and Volosinov in which Bakhtin plays a major role, or as the 
product of a school of thinkers whose mutual influences are not easily calculable. 
See Nina Perlina, ` Bakhtin-Medvedev-Volosinov: An Apple of Discourse'. 
 This is the essence of Volosinov's critique of structuralism: `individuals do not 
receive a ready-made language at all, rather they enter upon the stream of verbal 
communication' (p. 81). 
s' For two particularly striking examples of such an approach see Jonathan 
Dollimore, Sexual Dissidence: Augustine to Wilde, Freud to Foucault; and Alan 
Sinfield, Faultlines: Cultural Materialism and the Politics of Dissident Reading. 
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the ways that Pip's hands can be reaccentuated so as to indicate not the clumsiness 
of a subject who is to be excluded from the refined bourgeois world, but rather the 
heroic virility of the labourer. ss 
However, where more rigidly materialist theorists such as Volosinov and 
Bourdieusb treat the material as the site of conflicts which are then manifested in 
discourse, Foucault insists that we see the relationship between the material and 
the discursive very differently: 
Instead of having to deal with an economic, social or political history which 
encompasses a history of thought (which would be its expression and 
something like its duplicate), instead of having to deal with a history of 
ideas attributed (through a play of signs and expressions, or by relations of 
causality) to extrinsic conditions, one would be dealing with a history of 
discursive practices in the specific relationships which link them to other 
practices ('Politics and the Study of Discourse', p. 64). 
Although he explicitly rejects an expressive model of language, in which discourse 
is merely the superstructural `duplicate' of the power relations of any particular 
material situation, he is equally careful not to offer in its place an idealist model of 
discourse as an emanation of isolated consciousness. Discourse takes place as a 
number of material forms of utterance, and is interwoven with other practices: the 
forms in which the body is imagined are inseparable from the technologies of the 
medical examination, the structure of the prison, the architecture of the school. 
At the same time discourse is a site of freedom, since its meaning is not 
fixed in any simple way. Foucault refers to the ` polyvalence' of discourse (HS, 
ss `Images of class struggle, in contrast [to images of elite bodily refinement], give 
a sense of the class for itself, and the most direct and worldwide way of doing this 
is through images of physical strength, the working man's muscles or clenched 
fists. Against this iconography of mass class interest, the rulers become portrayed 
as fragmented, obese or effete' (David Morgan and Sue Scott, ` Bodies in a Social 
Landscape', p. 17). 
36 Bourdieu follows a similar line of thinking, regarding language as a site of 
`incessant struggles over the classifications which help to produce the classes' 
although he insists that conflicts in language `are the product of the struggles 
between the classes and depend on the power relations between them' 
(Distinction, p. 481). 
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pp. 100-102), the capacity of a given discourse to operate otherwise than in tandem 
with a particular exercise of power, since `discourses are not once and for all 
subservient to power' (HS, pp. 100-101). Thus while discourse constrains how we 
attribute significance, it is not a force which defines the absolute limits of thought, 
since the power relations which sustain it are themselves `mobile, reversable, and 
unstable' ('The Ethics of the Concern for Self', p. 441). As Toby Miller argues, 
although Foucault has a notion of an underlying episteme in any given period 
- 
the 
distinctive relationship between its various discursive practices"- he characterizes 
it as a dispersed space of practices which are related but not unified, enabling 
opportunities for pleasure within the social which do not simply reinforce systems 
of domination (The Well-Tempered Self, pp. 175-176) and also, I would add, acts 
of resistance which may enforce the system but are resistance nevertheless: the 
actions of Foucault's hypothetical eighteenth-century wife sustain the power of 
penology (her guilt sustains her penal subjectivity) and Christian chastity (the 
refusal of sex confirms sex as a site of sin) even as they challenge the power of 
her husband. We must therefore think of the body simultaneously as sustaining 
and transgressing, affirming and subverting. 
Foucault's account of power clearly places the capacity for agency at the 
centre of his account of the subject, so that, in Jana Sawicki's summary, he is 
`presupposing the existence of a critical subject, one capable of critical historical 
reflection, refusal, and intervention. This subject does not control the overall 
direction of history, but it is able to choose among the discourses and practices 
available to it and use them creatively' (Disciplining Foucault p. 103). For 
Sawicki, as for Foucault, ` choice' here is not voluntarist, but rather the 
constrained, limited and always compromised choice of constructed capability. 
We might then argue that even as The History of Sexuality declares that the 
constant interrogation of sexuality perpetuates subjectivities that enmesh us in 
unwelcome power-structures, Foucault's theoretical position entails the possibility 
" See Foucault, ` Politics and the Study of Discourse'. 
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of a resistant sexual discourse, through the necessary caveat that no form of 
speech can have its final meaning defined but rather, even as it sustains relations 
of domination, must also be able to overthrow them. In a culture where we are 
expected to talk and think about sex in particular ways, we can always talk about 
sex more than we are supposed to, or less; talk about it where we are not supposed 
to, or not talk about it where we are; talk about it but not in the way that we are 
supposed to; talk about it when we are supposed to be doing it, or do it when we 
are supposed to be talking about it se This places me in agreement with Leo 
Bersani's reading of Foucault as calling for a sexual politics that takes the form 
`not of a struggle against prohibition, but rather a kind of counter-productivity' 
involving our `deliberately playing on the surfaces of our bodies with forms or 
intensities of pleasure not covered, so to speak, by the disciplinary classifications 
that have until now taught us what sex is' (Homos, p. 81). We can extend 
Bersani's account further than merely pleasure, as a reminder that resistance may 
also involve the invention of new forms of unpleasurable struggle, and may 
include pleasures rather less deliriously masculinist than Bersani's 
- 
such as, to 
invoke once more the eighteenth-century wife, the pleasure of finding the freedom 
to say no. 
To turn to a final area of Foucauldian enquiry: Foucault's account of 
power as the solidification of mobile relations of force opens up, in The Use of 
Pleasure and The Care of the Self, another space of bodily possibility 
- 
one that 
has been particularly provoking for a number of theorists otherwise sympathetic to 
his work"- and that is the space of freedom achieved by means of adherence to 
socially legitimated body practices. Indeed, I would even go so far as to suggest 
that Foucault's work is precisely a sustained meditation on this question: how can 
s' This is, of course, the very condition of Foucault's own History of Sexuality 
which, as Leo Bersani has said, `conforms to the cultural imperatives it 
denounces', by writing extensively on sex in the process of critiquing the 
compulsion to document sex ('The Subject of Power', p. 5). 
S' See for instance Jean Grimshaw, ` Practices of Freedom'; and Kate Soper, 
`Forget Foucault? '. 
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ethical freedom be experienced within the social order as opposed to being 




in Madness and 
Civilization to articulate the project of rescuing an insurgent, asocial force from 
the social by which to oppose it, Foucault's work turns increasingly to the 
question of power as the necessarily social. His last two published volumes of The 
History of Sexuality take this process to their necessary conclusion: asking how 
pleasure and freedom might be achieved not by resistance against, but by 
adherence to, the rules and codes of particular cultures. 60 
In these texts, Foucault describes ancient Greece and Rome as governed 
by an ethics in which a bodily styling - of sex, of diet, of exercise, of sleep 
- 
produces citizens who have available to them a range of pleasurable practices 
which enable them to live their lives with both pleasure and, perhaps more 
importantly, with the power over their bodies lying in their own control. This is an 
account of a society that Foucault is careful to stress he does not find admirable 
and does not believe we can return to ('The Return of Morality', pp. 465-470). But 
what particularly interests him about it is its production of body styles as an open- 
ended range of practices, rather than, as in Christianity, a single norm of bodily 
obedience to which all subjects must aspire (Rudy Visker, Michel Foucault: 
Genealogy as Critique, pp. 91-95). This aspect of past embodiment enables us to 
reflect on the conditions of contemporary freedom: the rise of new sexual styles, 
the prominence of a diversity of subcultures, and consequently the articulation of 
a multitude of possible pleasurable bodily governmentalities without a single law 
of particular practices for all ('The Return of Morality', p. 473). 
As Terry Eagleton has pointed out, in these texts Foucault's account of 
autonomy seems alarmingly close to his account of domination: self-monitoring, 
60 For a slightly different account of this train of thinking in Foucault see Rudi 
Visker's Michel Foucault: Genealogy as Critique. Visker views this as a problem 
which Foucault never solves, and argues that in all his texts the trace of a desire to 
assert an asocial force remains to trouble his accounts of the discursive production 
of the social. 
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detailed bodily surveillance, the selection of particular practices, the physical 
styling of the self through corporeal discipline (The Ideology of the Aesthetic, 
pp. 391-393). It may thus be the case that, as Jean Grimshaw has argued, this 
account does not enable us to ask the question: `when should we see a concern for 
one's own body, a programme of monitoring one's fitness or concern for one's 
appearance, as an exercise of creative self-mastery rather than as the result of the 
internalisation of norms of bodily appearance which serve to undermine other 
forms of autonomy? ' (`Practices of Freedom', p. 67). But where for Grimshaw and 
Eagleton this amounts to a failure in Foucault's later work, what I have been 
concerned to show here is the impossibility of conceiving of agency other than 
through the exercise of power through bodily stylization. In answer to 
Grimshaw's question 
- 
which would seem wilfully to ignore the effort Foucault 
has made to counter such reductive accounts of politics 
- 
the unfortunate fact is 
that it is rarely likely to be either one or the other. The search for discourses which 
speak for the body against particular exercises of power over it may then 
- 
and we 
shall see this recurring with Burroughs and Cronenberg 
- 
derive their force from 
their deployment of established, if not conservative, discourses on the body. 
But this should not deter us from acting now 
- 
indeed, Foucault's 
argument is that we must act now: `my point is not that everything is bad, but that 
everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is 
dangerous then we always have something to do. So my position leads not to 
apathy but a hyper- and pessimistic activism. ' ('On the Genealogy of Ethics: An 
Overview of a Work in Progress', p. 343). If, as we have seen, the body must 
always be styled, then to claim that stylization is `a highly masculinist view of 
ethics' (Grimshaw, ` Practices of Freedom', p. 70) would seem to have missed the 
fact that we do not have a choice about whether to adopt bodily styles, and nor do 
we have a choice about whether we learn those styles from a place in a network of 
power. 
Grimshaw claims that in Foucault's analysis `he writes of an elite class of 
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males who are simply assumed to be free; whether their self-mastery and self- 
surveillance is really that, rather than an internalised disciplinary technique 
... 
is 
wholly evaded' ('Practices of Freedom', p. 67) Closer to the mark is Toby Miller, 
who points out that in Foucault's analysis `the relative autonomy within particular 
fractions of particular social formations to manufacture and manage oneself is 
dependent on the institutions of those formations' (The Well-Tempered Self, 
p. 178), which, as Foucault makes clear, must be oppressive to others and 
damaging to oneself even as they are enabling (The Use of Pleasure, pp. 65-77; 
`On the Genealogy of Ethics', pp. 344-351). Power enables us to act. For Grosz 
`its enmeshment in a disciplinary regime is the condition of the subject's efficacy, 
as either conformist or subversive' (VB, p, 144). Grosz's ` either/or' puts the case 
too strongly since, as I have insisted, it is rarely the case that a subject is wholly 
one or the other 
- 
and rarely even the case that any particular practice, event, or 
discourse can be decisively reckoned as achieving only conformist or subversive 
ends. 
At the level of the body this call for resistance may mean developing 
physical styles which do not suit the docile body perpetuated through discipline, 
and which take their cue from finding alternatives to the particular bodily styles 
that are most demanded. Such resistances take place at the level of muscles 
trained to act in new ways (so as to be more able to resist assault, for instance) or 
at the level of molecular biology (the rejection of social utility produced by 
heroin). And it means pursuing the legitimated physical practices made available 
within a culture, which nevertheless challenge its structures of power. For 
instance, one thinks of the way that gay male culture's excessive investment in a 
conventionally attractive male body, while drawing heavily on a general body 
fascism, nevertheless pushes it in a direction that discomforts heterosexual 
masculinity, by creating male bodies which perform a double violation of 
acceptable codes by basking passively in the male gazes which are directed upon 
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them. 61 But it also means speaking otherwise about bodies 
- 
invoking not the 
discursive forms of utility and pleasure which have so far prevailed, but forms 
which alter the object in question. " In altering the knowledge of the body, such 
forms must also alter the practices by which the body is shaped and the physical 
environment which orders it. 
None of which, for Foucault, is in any simple way guaranteed to be 
effective 
- 
all forms of resistance and pleasure can be recuperated. Asked ` can we 
be sure that these new pleasures won't be exploited in the way advertising uses 
the stimulation of pleasure as a means of social control? ', Foucault answers 
firmly: `we can always be sure it will happen, and that everything that has been 
created or acquired, any ground that has been gained will, at a certain moment, be 
used in such a way' ('Sex, Power and the Politics of Identity', p. 385, emphasis in 
the original). 
Foucault's vision of bodies as absolutely produced and yet also needing to 
resist contemporary forms of that production has posed problems for many 
writing on him. Nancy Fraser has suggested that Foucault must have an unstated 
normative ethics: 
Foucault calls in no uncertain terms for resistance to domination. But 
why? Why is struggle preferable to submission? Why ought domination to 
be resisted? Only with the introduction of normative notions could he 
begin to tell us what is wrong with the modem power/knowledge regime 
and why we ought to oppose it. (`Foucault on Modern Power', p. 29) 
While with somewhat more venom, Stephen White tells us that Foucault's politics 
`provides us 
... 
with no way of distinguishing the resistance of the women's 
movement 
... 
from, say, the Ku Klux Klan' (`Foucault's Challenge to Critical 
61 On the rise of the assumption that the male body was not an appropriate object 
for a consuming gaze, see Kaja Silverman, ` Fragments of a Fashionable 
Discourse'. 
62 It is as examples of such a discursive shift that Barbara Freeman reads Helene 
Cixous ('Plus Corps Donc Plus Ecriture: Helene Cixous and the Mind-Body 
Problem'), and Jane Gallop reads Luce Irigaray (Thinking Through the Body, 
pp. 91-99), as philosophers whose new imaginings of the body are effective in 
producing new physical forms. 
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Theory', p. 430). But in spite of such appeals for a formula to assess what acts of 
resistance are desirable and what are not, Foucault's work will not provide us with 
a revolutionary programme 
- 
indeed, he insist that he won't ('The Concern for 
Truth', pp. 462-463). After all, who is this imaginary figure who requires such 
distinctions? It is not as if either the women's movement or the Ku Klux Klan is 
asking for Foucault to help them make these decisions. It is only a political 
philosophy that has divorced itself from the fact that these struggles are already 
taking place, and do not themselves ask for such legitimation, that regards 
Foucault's ` failure' to offer it as politically paralyzing. Instead of trying to 
prescribe struggles for us, he offers a method which can identify and interrogate 
the conditions of knowledge and power, and which may make available to those 
of us who are already embarked on such struggles an understanding of the role of 
the body in them. For Foucault's method is precisely one which does not need to 
provide us with an overarching model by which we may decide what to do, since 
it is rather an account of how and where resistance is already taking place 
- 
and it 
is, in that sense, a method which does not need political philosophers to decide 
what is good or bad, what strategies to adopt, what values to espouse, since such 
decisions are already taking place in the daily material struggles by which we seek 
to carve out more freedom: our bodies are already making those decisions. "
Perhaps it is for this reason, because his is a theory that sees power from the 
perspective of those who act against it, rather than from that of those who lay 
down methods by which to act, that so many political philosophers seem to treat it 
with such ire. 
69 Asked ` have you written these books for the liberation movements? ' Foucault 
replied: `not for, but as a function of the situation today' ('The Concern for 
Truth', p. 461). 
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(vii) Conclusion 
Although part of the value of Foucault for an account of the body is his 
reorganization of our conceptions of where power operates, displacing 
conventional political categories of race, class and gender, this has also been a 
consequence of his work for which he has been particularly condemned. " I would 
therefore suggest that my reading of Bourdieu's account of class and the body be 
taken not as a supplement to Foucault, but rather as demonstrating through their 
connections that a class-based analysis is not ruled out by Foucault's work 
- 
although it is substantially complicated by it. Foucault's work suggests the 
breadth of forms of social organization that might need to use the body in 
particular ways: the carceral imagination; the great god sex; the medical 
establishment. Alongside these ominous new configurations of modernity 
Bourdieu's work fixes our attention on the bodily presence of more conventional 
power-structures of class - just as it would also have been possible to use other 
approaches in order to insist on the importance of gender or race. 65 What I want to 
note here are the necessary connections between the ` micro-physics of power' 
which Foucault asks us to analyze, and the macro-structures of domination which 
" In addition to the feminist critiques which I have already referenced, see 
Edward Said, The World, the Text and the Critic, (pp. 243-247), which accuses 
Foucault of an approach which `causes him to obliterate the role of classes, the 
role of economics' (p. 244); and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, for whom Foucault's 
concern with micro-locales is seen as taking place at the expense of an analysis of 
Western domination: ` the clinic, the asylum, the prison, the university 
- 
all seem 
to be screen-allegories that foreclose a reading of the broader narratives of 
imperialism' ('Can the Subaltern Speak? ', p. 86). 
bs Not that Foucault is uninterested in such concerns. Robert Young has argued for 
the centrality of a concern with colonialism and ethnography in `Foucault on Race 
and Colonialism'; Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow insist that class domination 
remains a central concern in Foucault's work (Michel Foucault: Beyond 
Structuralism and Hermeneutics, p. 186); while Frances Bartkowski has argued 
that we see Volumes Two and Three of the History of Sexuality as an engagement 
with the meanings of masculinity (`Epistemic Drift in Foucault') 
. 
For a less 
sympathetic reading of Foucault as offering a `universalising and gender-blind 
conception of the human subject' (p. 26) see Kate Soper, ` Forget Foucault? '. 
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they produce. 
Rather than applying Foucault's particular categories 
- 
the docile body, the 
disciplinary society 
-I am therefore more concerned in this thesis with a network 
of conceptions of the body, which interlock in different ways with the range of 
body-forming practices which I have outlined here. Although the importance of 
those particular discursive practices which interested Foucault will be evident in 
the thesis, I am also concerned to outline other fictions of embodiment and to 
subject them to these Foucauldian questions of how power operates through them, 
and how we may best turn them towards aims of freedom and resistance. I wish 
to retain a strong emphasis on the complicity of power and resistance, and on the 
necessity of enunciating bodily resistance through the very forms of bodily 
discourse that have caused the most harm. 
As we have seen, the body's regulation fits it not only to bear meanings, 
but to sustain the social conditions of the production of those meanings. There are 
no aspects of the body which just `happen'. The body is encouraged and 
discouraged, obliged and hindered, to produce itself via disciplinary practices. The 
body is not simply made meaningful, but is rather the means by which the 
conditions that make meaning possible are sustained: languages, social relations, 
economic structures, institutions. The body perpetuates these conditions whether 
casting down its eyes in deference or staring fixedly in revolt; whether building 
hospitals and palaces or manufacturing the explosives to destroy them; whether 
symbolizing culturally proscribed activities through its stigmatization or affirming 
culturally sanctioned practices through its celebration. But it is precisely because 
the body is the site for the maintenance of these structures, that it is also the place 
of their subversion. And it is in this sense that we must understand embodiment: 
the occupation of a corporeal subject-position, whose perceptions of the world, 
whose capacities in the world, and whose meanings for the world, are the result of 
the ongoing engagement with the body by diverse social practices, which may be 
both sustained and contested by the body which bears them 
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I have been concerned here to chart how different physical bodies are 
produced, how power-relations are sedimented by them, and how they also 
operate as a site of resistance to domination. Central to the utility of the body is its 
orchestration of a network of emotions, which a material-discursive account of 
embodiment can only partially account for. Thorough and incisive though the 
various bodily theories I have used are, their focus is not the intensity of emotion 
concentrated on the body - on, for instance, Pip's tears. In the next chapter, I 
therefore wish to turn in more detail to the psychic dynamics of embodied 
subjectivity and the way in which the particularly intimate experience that each of 
us has of our body is traversed by lines of power. 
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Chapter Two 
Discord and Disgust 
What is being carved in human flesh is an image of society. 
Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger (p. 116) 
(i) Writing on the Body, or Writing the Body into Being ? 
In his short story `In the Penal Settlement', Franz Kafka describes a 
machine which physically etches the sentence of the law onto the flesh of the 
condemned prisoner. The sentence, explains the device's operator, does not need 
to be explained, justified, or read to the prisoner since `he'll learn it corporally, on 
his person' (p. 174). As Elizabeth Grosz has suggested, in her reading of the story 
as an allegory of the physical operations of power, it is not just pain that results 
from such a device, but a mode of knowledge (VB, pp. 134-37). Kafka stresses that 
the goal of the process is the final moment in which `enlightenment comes even to 
the most dull-witted' (`In the Penal Settlement', p. 180). Through marking, the 
prisoner learns his place in society, so that `his consciousness is the end result, an 
effect, of the deepening inscription of the surface of the body' (VB, p. 136). '
Such an account recapitulates some of the key points of my discussion so 
far: the role of a physical environment in making, maiming, and ordering the body; 
the inscription of power relationships directly onto the body so produced; the 
emotional states and modes of subjectivity produced by such a body-writing. It 
also raises the problem of resistance: how can the body thus inscribed read its text 
'Other readings of Kaflca's story - which is also translated as `In the Penal Colony' 
- 
have been offered by Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life pp. 131- 
153; Roy Pascal, Kafka's Narrators: A Study of His Stories and Sketches, pp. 60- 
89; David Porush, The Soft Machine: Cybernetic Fiction, pp. 41-44; and Steven 
Taubeneck, `Irony, Contingency and Postmodernity: "In the Penal Colony"'. 
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otherwise ? If in Kafka's account, the inevitable result of this body-writing is the 
subject's reading of the body as affirming the text which writes subjectivity, then 
we can ask: under what conditions might this text be read otherwise ? When can 
the multiaccentuality of the sign unsettle the text of the sentence carved into the 
body ? 
But at the same time, Judith Butler cautions us about the usefulness of 
Kafka's image, observing in her discussion of it that if we understand the body as 
that upon which subjectivity is inscribed, then we make the erroneous assumption 
that `there must be a body prior to that inscription, stable and self-identical' 
(Gender Trouble, p. 130). She remains suspicious of theorists who, while reading 
the body as saturated with social meaning, treat such meaning as mapped onto a 
body which, like Kafka's prisoner, exists prior to the writing. She takes issue with 
Foucault's formulation that ` the body is the inscribed surface of events' (Foucault, 
`Nietzsche, Genealogy, History', p. 83) and criticizes its unanalyzed assumptions: 
, by maintaining a body prior to its cultural inscription, Foucault appears to assume 
a materiality prior to signification and form' (Gender Trouble, p. 130). 
Butler's choice of words is important for her project. I have already shown 
in the previous chapter how she is concerned to question the ways in which theory 
produces the foundational entities that it claims to find, and her description of 
Foucault is marked by such an intent. To say that he is `maintaining a body' is not 
only to say that he is taking an intellectual position, but also to point out that his 
own text renews its fiction, reproduces it as fact, keeping it in circulation. 
Moreover, for him to `assume a materiality' is not simply to believe in it, but to 
adopt it, to wear it, to constitute himself as formed from such a materiality. These 
moments of assumption and maintenance in Foucault's text create `the body' as a 
foundational entity when there cannot even be said to be ` a body' prior to its 
production as such. 
Similarly, Grosz suggests that we must read Kafka's story not as 
symbolizing the event which inscribes meaning onto the tabula rasa of the awaiting 
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body, but rather as an allegory which begs the Derridean question: `how and in 
what terms to think that writing which is prediscursive, that writing or trace which 
produces the page to be inscribed? ' (VB, p. 119). ' The goal of this chapter is to 
consider how the body comes to be produced as matter awaiting inscription. For 
the writing traced over the prisoner's body is a physical form of a conception of 
the prisoner's body which already exists in the law and in the minds of those who 
enforce and transgress it. In the law, the body has therefore been already written as 
in need of writing, already inscribed in such a way as to prepare it for further 
inscription. I shall be arguing that the psychic, discursive, and material mappings of 
the body which make it thinkable produce it in the form of both a discord in need 
of organization, and a disgusting object in need of cleansing in which discord 
and disgust are the fictions which permit the thinking of the body in terms of its 
capacity for being ordered and purified. 
Central to this portion of my enquiry will be psychoanalysis, since it is a 
discipline that has often been concerned with the processes by which an image of 
the body develops for the subject, and is sensitive to the fact that, in Lacan's 
words, it all happens as if [sic] the body-image had an autonomous existence of 
its own, and by autonomous I mean here independent of objective structure' 
(`Some Reflections on the Ego', p. 13). Psychoanalysis is thus an indispensable 
resource for those of us interested in how the body is lived through a series of 
images shaped by fear and desire, mapping out for us our most intense emotional 
experiences. At the same time, psychoanalysis is also guilty of prescriptive 
developmental narratives, casual disregard for historical changes in structures of 
subjectivity, and an investment in masculinity as a psychic norm. All of which, I 
shall be suggesting, make it a field whose claims need to be treated with some 
caution, but which at the same time make it an accurate account of 
- 
at the very 
least 
- 
the psychic structures that obtain in the period over which it has flourished. 
2A question pursued more recently in Vicki Kirby, Telling Flesh: The Substance 
of the Corporeal. 
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(ii) The Bodily Ego 
In the conventional psychoanalytical account, says Grosz, ` the subject only 
gradually acquires a sense of unity and cohesion over and above the disparate 
heterogeneous sensations that comprise its experiences' (VB, p. 3 1). The sensations 
of light, temperature, sound and smell that arrive from the outside, and the pains, 
pleasures and motions that it feels inside, form an undifferentiated sensory space? 
Moreover, while we might now 
- 
as subjects securely ensconced in our bodies 
- 
apply that inside/outside distinction to the experiences of the young child, it makes 
no such distinction itself, but only enters into a flux of experiences. Its own 
heartbeat, the voices around it, the movement of its limbs, the objects that move 
near to and far from it, are all alike. They comprise a synaesthetic panorama of 
mobile, discontinuous sensation. It is out of this that the subject emerges, with a 
sense of itself as whole. Where does the model for this unification come from ? 
From the body. 
For Freud, ` a unity comparable to the ego cannot exist in the individual 
from the start' ('On Narcissism', p. 69). With its integrity and coherence it is a 
systematic structure that must develop over time, and which must find a model for 
the unity which enables it to emerge. `The ego' says Freud, ` is first and foremost a 
bodily ego' (`The Ego and The Id', p. 364). Its sense of itself as whole, as singular, 
as separate from its world, and as surrounded by others, is modelled on its 
apprehension of its body and the environment surrounding that body. For Freud, 
this awareness of the body is not simply a sensory awareness 
- 
what he calls `an 
In the course of this chapter I shall be focusing on touch and sight as the means 
by which the subject grasps her/his own body and makes sense of the surrounding 
world. But as Paul Rodaway has shown, the body orients itself through the 
complex interaction of all the senses (Sensuous Bodies: Body, Sense and Place). 
Theoretical work on smell, taste and sound is far less developed compared to that 
on touch and sight, a lack which Rodaway's work goes some way towards 
remedying. 
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indifferent psychical energy' ('On Narcissism', p. 70) 
- 
but is erotic: `we can decide 
to regard erotogeneticity as a general characteristic of all organs [of the body] and 
may then speak of an increase or decrease of it in a particular part of the body. For 
every such change in the erotogeneticity of the organs there might then be a 
parallel change of libidinal cathexis in the ego' ('On Narcissism', p. 77, my 
emphasis). Although I shall be challenging this assumption later, it is useful to note 
now that as the body becomes an object of desire, so too does the ego, finding 
itself only through the body. The ego is thus coterminous with the body, and the 
varying cathexes of the one operate also as the varying cathexes of the other: the 
ego's first love object is itself, grasped through 
- 
or rather, grasped as 
- 
the body. '
In her analysis of this Freudian model of the corporeal subject, Grosz 
points out that if the ego is modelled not simply on a physical body, but on the 
body as grasped through libidinal cathexis, then ` the ego is not a point-for-point 
projection of the body's surface but an outline or representation of the degrees of 
erotogeneticity of the bodily zones and organs' (VB, p. 37). Rather than being 
modelled on an objective image of the body, the ego becomes aware of the 
embodied self as the body becomes an object of sexual pleasure. She takes up 
Freud's analogy of the ` cortical homunculus': this was the nickname given by early 
neurologists to the distinctive pattern formed by their mapping of sensory 
responses in different portions of the brain, and was earned by virtue of the map's 
apparent resemblance to a small, inverted, distorted human (Warren Gorman, The 
Body Image and the Image of the Brain, pp. 17-20). Freud argues that the bodily 
ego has the same form as this creature ('The Ego and the Id', p. 365), and Grosz's 
analysis of images of homunculi shows how with their large eyes, mouths and 
genitals, Freud's analogy suggests that the body image is marked by the 
biologically variable intensities of the body's sensations, with the points of the body 
` In his paper `On Narcissism: An Introduction' Freud makes a provisional 
distinction between what he calls `ego-libido', a love of the self, and `object libido', 
the desire that goes outwards to other objects (p. 68). The body, as both self and 
object, troubles this distinction. 
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that produce the most intense physical sensations being the most marked on the 
homunculus. And yet we might extend this analysis in another direction: for is it 
not also the case that these points which draw Freud's attention could be read not 
simply as points of extreme biological sensitivity, but also as sites of extreme 
cultural fascination ? Freud's bodily ego should perhaps not be read simply as a 
biologically sexualized experience of embodiment, but rather as a map of the 
socialization of the sexed body, its various zones more marked not only according 
to their biological sensitivity, but also their cultural sensitivity. His use of the image 
of the cortical homunculus suggests that the model for the ego, while it is 
constructed through an awareness of sensations both from outside and from 
within, is not a simple reconstruction of the self-as-body, but is rather a self forged 
from a representation of the varying ways in which different zones of the body 
come to be objects of awareness. 
We should at this stage be clear about five issues. Firstly, the ego is not 
prior to the awareness of the body, not a psychic object that seizes on the body as 
a mode of expressing itself. Rather, the ego takes shape as a body. The generation 
of a sense of bounded physical form is the event which enables the ego to come 
into being, not an act which the ego performs. Having founded itself thus, it then 
seems necessary that subsequent physical identifications will be made by the ego, 
but the initial, founding event is an action without a subject. It may therefore be 
difficult for us to conceptualize or discuss it accurately. 
Secondly, Freud is not simply arguing for a biological libido which is a 
natural property of the body. Although Freud's own treatment of this idea changes 
through his work, -' the key term here is Trieb (rendered by translators as both 
`instinct' and `drive'), " the difficulty of defining which Freud recognizes when he 
See Editor's Note to `Instincts and their Vicissitudes'. 
6 For James Strachey's explanation of his choice of the term `instinct' see The 
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 1, 
pp. xxiv-vi. Lacan explains his rejection of the translation in `The Subversion of the 
Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious', p. 301. 
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describes this as a term which is `somewhat obscure, but which is indispensable to 
us in psychology' ('Instincts and Their Vicissitudes', p. 114). Freud describes Trieb 
as `on the frontier between the mental and the somatic' ('Instincts and Their 
Vicissitudes', p. 118) and, as Anika Lemaire argues, the biological connotations of 
the term instinct are `to be explained precisely by the difficulty of grasping what 
lies before the unconscious' (Jacques Lacan, pp. 126-127). The possibility of a 
sexual instinct or libido that pre-exists the social forms in which it exists in the 
subject `is part of the unknown dimension of truth and cannot be the object of any 
knowledge' (Jacques Lacan, p. 128). For Freud it is only these social forms of the 
sexual that we may grasp, and so the drive `is provisionally to be understood [as] 
the psychical representative of an endosomatic, continuously flowing source of 
stimulation' ('Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality', p. 82-83). ' Thus although 
'libido' occupies an ambivalent place between biology and culture, psychoanalytic 
theory has stressed that we must never simply read these as innate biological 
processes. In Lacan's re-reading of Freud, this sexual cathexis of objects is 
precisely not biological, but rather `that part of sexuality that passes into the 
networks of the constitution of the subject, into the networks of the signifier' (The 
Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-analysis, p. 177). As Charles Sheperdson 
has argued, `to speak of the "drive" as constitutively detached from nature is to 
stress the imperative of inscription 
... 
the structural inevitability of representation 
which characterizes human sexuality' ('The Role of Gender and the Imperative of 
Sex', p. 161). The libidinal cathexes that take place are not biological events, but 
are rather psychic acts which take place through socially structured situations 
- 
through the forms of signification by which they are grasped, but also, as I shall be 
insisting here, through the material practices which surround the infant's body. 
Thirdly, and following from my last point, this bodily mapping makes the 
development of the body crucially bound up with its whole environment. The 
7On the social character of the drives see also Juliet Mitchell, Psychoanalysis and 
Feminism, pp. 20-22 and p. 21, n. 4. 
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mapping of a body is not a solipsistic process, but is the development of a 
sexualized self-awareness generated out of the sensory experiences of early 
childhood: sights and sounds, smells and sensations. As such the precise 
environment of the child will determine the erotic experiences that it encounters, as 
well as providing the psychic structures with which to make sense of them. Freud's 
model is on the one hand prescriptive, insofar as the ego is modelled on a 
biological notion of uneven erotic intensity, where certain zones (eyes, head, 
genitals) are necessarily privileged erotic zones, as we can see in the case of the 
homunculus; but at the same time it allows 
- 
indeed, it assumes 
- 
that each body 
has its own erotic history, formed out of different cathexes. $ The desires of others 
will mark themselves in the way a body is touched, talked to, and moved: 
In this sense, the ego is an image of the body's significance or meaning for 
the subject and for the other. It is thus as much a function of fantasy and 
desire as it is of sensation and perception: it is a taking over of sensation 
and perception by a fantasmatic dimension. (VB, p. 38) 
These libidinal investments are not, in Grosz's account, the natural expressions of 
an uncivilized body. They are the contours of a subjectivity formed through social 
interaction, whose form is that of the environment through which it is produced: 
The psychic investment in the body as a whole and in its various parts is as 
much a function of the subject's relations with others as it is the result of 
the subject's own sensations and libido. In this sense, the body image is the 
result of shared sociocultural conceptions of bodies in general and shared 
familial and interpersonal fantasy about particular bodies. (VB, p. 84) 
Those libidinal investments which are socially awkward thus prove not to be the 
stubborn residues of the presocial, but rather the enacted desires of the social, 
routed through fantasy. 
Fourthly, as Pasi Falk has pointed out, although Freud stresses the bodily 
' Here it follows the model of much Freudian psychoanalysis: a rigid normative 
model, often with a biological underpinning, which in fact opens up into an account 
of how every subject deviates from the account in different ways- Freud's theory of 
sexual development is perhaps the most obvious example of this structure. 
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ego, this process might be more accurately understood as the formation of a bodily 
subject or bodily self (The Consuming Body, pp. 8-9, n. 3). As well as mapping out 
a conscious sense of self, the body serves to map out those experiences which will 
later be rendered unconscious, since certain zones of the body are invested with a 
libidinal intensity which is later repressed. We can therefore already see that what 
emerges in such a modelling of the subject on the experience of the body, must also 
be a cultural map of taboos and proscriptions. 
Lastly, Grosz has reminded us that this `body image', which she describes 
as a `corporeal mapping' of subjectivity, alters over time (VB, p. 62). Grosz 
stresses that this map is changeable, a sensitive register of the events which mark 
the body. As such it undergoes constant modification: any given mapping may be 
remade! The ` body image' is thus not a fixed sense of the corporeal self, but a 
contingent sense of what that self is at a given time. Moreover, Grosz insists that in 
spite of the visual connotations of `image' the body image is synaesthetic (VB, 
p. 67). It is the sense of being a physical presence in a world of other physical 
presences. 
I have already argued in chapter one for the body as a socially produced 
object. What Freud offers us is an understanding of the psychic processes by which 
the subject is modelled on that body. Sociological accounts of the body can explain 
to us how economic inequalities are sustained through bodily differentiations; how 
physical attributes are shaped and ordered by organizational forces; and even how 
subjects grasp their sense of their role in the world through the different bodily 
modalities that result from these social forces. But Freud suggests that there may 
be a radical discontinuity between the physical shape of the body and the body 
image by which each subject conceives of their embodied self. Rather than seeing 
9 She is perhaps influenced here by Deleuze and Guattari, who resist reading the 
map as the authoritative interpreter of space, and remind us that: `the map is open 
and connectable in all of its dimensions; it is detachable, reversible, susceptible to 
constant modification. It can be torn, reversed, adapted to any kind of mounting, 
reworked by an individual, group, or social formation' (A Thousand Plateaus, 
p. 12). 
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the subject as emerging through a simple mapping of the regulated production of 
the body, Freud suggests a body image which is both dreaded and desired 
- 
which 
may appear monstrous or seductive, exaggerated or physically extraordinary at the 
points where it is touched by a society's greatest concerns. 
It is not, however, necessary to agree with Freud's strictly sexualized 
account of this process. What Freud achieves in his attempt to sexualize the 
grasping of the body is precisely the introduction of the socially and personally 
specific into what might otherwise be assumed to be a natural and invariant process 
of self-recognition. The Freudian concepts of drive and libido are the means by 
which any idea of a natural or physical sense of body-mapping is displaced by the 
idea of a conflictual, personal, socially inflected, variable, and unique cluster of 
corporeal intensities. In spite of Freud's insistence, there is no reason for us to 
regard such an imaginary anatomy as solely or primarily sexual. 
Moreover, although such an anatomy enables the unity of the subject to 
come into being, we might already notice the extent to which this body verges on 
disunity: in its flexibility, its distortions, and its amenability to becoming monstrous 
or grotesque. How each of us grasps our body is predicated on the disorder which 
bodily unity displaces 
- 
but in a strange sense the possibility of disorder lingers on 
in this supposedly unified body, in the form of its plasticity. It is to this persistence 
of disorder within and across the body that I wish to turn now. I will go on to 
interrogate some of the assumptions of the psychoanalytic narrative of bodily 
coherence, asking how, at the level of material and discursive practices, such a 
coherent subject is achieved, how the possibility of bodily disorder and disunity is 
produced through them, and also how psychoanalytic theory might occlude what is 
at stake in those practices even as it highlights them. 
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(iii) Ordering the Body / Embodying Order 
The question of the acquisition of body-image has been explored in detail 
by Kaja Silverman. Silverman calls this process of the organization of a bodily 
subject `imaginary captation' (The Threshold of the Visible World, henceforth 
TVW, p. 32) 
- 
referring to both the way in which a body is grasped only as an 
imaginary anatomy, and the extent to which such a figuration is a forcible capture 
and control of the subject. She relates the process to three domains: the visual, the 
physical, and the cultural. Crucially, these shaping influences persist and change 
over a lifetime. Silverman's tripartite construction of the bodily ego involves: 
(i) a visual grasp of the body as a whole object, coterminous with the self; 
(ii) a physical sense of the contours of the body; 
(iii) a culturally ratified sense of the meaning of that body. 
Following such a division, I wish to consider how each of these three areas might 
be used in developing my account of embodiment, and how we might see social 
inequality being both reinforced and confronted within such processes. 
Lacan's account of `the mirror stage' is perhaps the best known 
explanation for the visual dimension of the process by which the disunified subject 
becomes whole, and it forms the starting point for Silverman's enquiry. In `The 
Mirror Stage as Formative of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience' 
Lacan sees the human subject as passing from `a primordial Discord, betrayed by 
the signs of uneasiness and motor unco-ordination of the neo-natal months' and on 
to `the assumption of the armour of an alienating identity' (p. 4). Alienating though 
it is, this assumption nevertheless takes place `in a flutter of jubilant activity' (p. 1), 
welcomed by the subject precisely because it seems to offer an escape from the 
intolerable primordial Discord. Lacan's account therefore depends on the 
assumption firstly that this chaos is experienced as undesirable, and secondly that 
the visual image which greets the child is already unified. Given that the form of 
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recognition is, by Lacan's own account, `an illusory unity 
... 
which is Man's 
particular and tragic destiny' ('Some Reflections on the Ego', p. 16), why does it 
take place ? Is the rejection of bodily discord for bodily unity an inevitable step, 
perhaps even the natural destination of the subject ? Certainly the spontaneous 
moment of jubilant assumption is presented by Lacan as inevitable: the child who 
looks into the mirror `brings back an instantaneous aspect of the image' ('The 
Mirror Stage', p. 2), its apparent wholeness. 
Yet the convenient resemblance of this narrative to other cultural narratives 
(perhaps most obviously the creation myth from Genesis) makes it seem like the 
recapitulation of certain cultural assumptions about the body. As Laura Doyle has 
shown in Bordering on the Body, this discourse of the body as matter in need of 
order plays a key role in modem hierarchical discourses, where the social status of 
a ruling class, race or gender is both guaranteed by harnessing the energy of 
materiality 
- 
in the language of nineteenth century eugenics, by `blood' or `vitality' 
- 
and simultaneously defined by ascendance over such materiality: the ruling 
classes' social ascendance over those classes, races, and genders supposedly more 
in the thrall of the material, and their individual ascendance over the pull of their 
own material desires. As Doyle says of Romanticism's defining construction of the 
body, from this conception of the ordering of the material there emerges a 
particular tension: 
Nineteenth-century science would also inherit the tension or contradiction 
that issues from this subsumption of a materiality which is at first 
celebrated. Both the poets and the scientists sense and cautiously circle the 
irony teetering in the balance. They must `descend' into the world of soil, 
cottages and children; they must privilege, study, listen to, even submit to 
the feminized and other-racialized material world in order to build their 
visionary fortress firmly upon it. To gain the metaphysical 
- 
to become elite 
in a secular word - they must trek through the blood and mess of the 
physical 
... 
But they must not lose themselves in it. (Bordering on the 
Body, p. 53) 
Psychoanalysis would seem to inherit this conception of a body which must be 
ordered, and whose materiality is the source of subjectivity only on the condition 
87 
that it is transcended. Consequently, it adheres to a suspicion of bodily disorder, 
which it imagines as a natural and undesirable organic condition, and one that is 
destined to be replaced by a more regulated form. 
We must also recognize here that the psychoanalytic narrative is not the 
only account of subjectivity available to us. " The insistence on a body which 
emerges as order out of chaos may be no more than the maintenance of an 
ideological fiction. It may therefore be, as Charles Levin has argued, that this is 
precisely the weakness of Lacan 
- 
that his account maintains a mode of 
understanding the body which is in fact an unnecessary, if not damaging, mode of 
teaching us how to interpret our own bodies (`Carnal Knowledge of Aesthetic 
States', pp. 100-101). But conversely 
- 
as Juliet Mitchell has said of Freud 
- 
psychoanalysis is concerned with accounting for `how we acquire our heritage of 
the ideas and laws of human society within the unconscious mind' (Feminism and 
Psychoanalysis, p. xvi). It is an analysis of the processes by which subjectivity is 
produced, which are also the processes by which particular social forms of 
subjectivity are regulated. While it may not necessarily be the case that, as we see 
Lacan claim, these are invariant stages in the formation of every subject, it may yet 
be the case that this narrative records accurately the processes of modern 
embodiment precisely because psychoanalysis is a product of the same socially 
shaping forces through which such embodiment takes place. I therefore want to 
retain these accounts of the bodily ego and the mirror stage not because I assume 
that they are an accurate account of the necessary processes of the production of 
subjectivity, but because they offer such a thorough account of the processes by 
which subjectivity is produced for us now. 
We might start to make the shift to such a diagnostic 
- 
rather than 
10 For a summary of alternative positions on the infant's sense of its body see 
Charles Levin, `Carnal Knowledge of Aesthetic States'. For an analysis of Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty's treatment of the embodied infant see Laura Doyle, Bordering on 
the Body, pp. 76-80. For perspectives from child psychology see Margaret Bullowa 




account by considering that the stability of the body is not only 
produced through the visual image. Our sense of the body as a whole form is also 
created by our tactile experience of it: as a thing that we touch and touch with; as a 
thing that is touched by others; as a thing whose posture we shape, and whose 
physical presence in space, as extended matter, we learn through our motion. To 
explore this sense of integral self as learned rather than automatically adopted, 
Silverman draws on the work of Viennese neurologist and psychoanalyst Paul 
Schilder, who argues that the bodily ego is produced not only through sight, but 
also through physical contact and movement. The development of posture is vital 
in such a sense of self, for it enables the subject to define how s/he takes up space, 
and thereby is the process by which the subject comes to conceive of her or himself 
as occupying space in the first place. Body posture is not a given, nor can it be 
acquired in a moment of jubilant assumption. The gradual awareness of a physical 
self thus comes when the body is touched and shaped by those around it. 
Schilder's work thus strengthens my argument that the bodily ego emerges over 
time, and is open to alteration. " 
But more radically, Silverman makes the point that these touches are 
necessarily social. They are not neutral biological events which merely help to 
define a `real' bodily territory. They are the social interactions through which the 
subject comes into being and which carry with them the imprints of desire and 
loathing. Looking at the production of the sense of a racial body, Silverman 
argues that `the way in which the body is touched (or, for that matter, not touched) 
can also communicate love for, or revulsion against, its color' (TVW, p. 231, n. 21). 
Thus the physical sensations which produce a sense of bodily integrity 
simultaneously imbue that body with meaning. They help the child not merely to 
(mis)recognize their physical contours, but also to make (social) sense of the body 
" As ever, it is important to remember that the body is not simply touched in a way 
that makes us aware of `it', but is touched, looked at, talked about in a way that 
makes the ` it' of the body come into existence. 
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that is thus produced, and to mark particular bodily attributes as desirable or 
undesirable, welcome or unwelcome, ordered or disorderly. 
Silverman stresses that this sense of acquired self is also present in Lacan's 
account, in that the visual scenario in which the child sees itself recalls that other 
staple of Lacan's work, that fantasized omniscient scrutiny which defines for each 
of us who we are and which `no look can actually approximate: the gaze' (TVW, 
p. 18). Since the child is caught up in familial structures that watch it, she suggests 
that in its moment of self-recognition we should be aware of the extent to which its 
apparently natural and personal witnessing of its own body must in fact derive from 
its being caught in such a gaze, whose terms the child's own look merely emulates. 
Although we look upon our own bodies and make sense of them, Lacan 
sharply differentiates the gaze from the subject's look, conferring visual 
authority not on the look but on the gaze. He thereby suggests that what is 
determinative for each of us is not how we see or would like to see 
ourselves, but how we are perceived by the cultural gaze. (TVW, p. 19) 
Over and above how I see my body, is my awareness of how my body is seen. 
Visual apprehension, physical sensation and cultural meaning all work 
through and with one another. Alongside the physical messages of love and hate 
come opportunities for the child to be apprehended by itself as an image: both in 
the eyes of others around it, and before its own eyes. The vocabulary that 
surrounds a child makes it visible to itself. `now see what you've done' and `just 
look at yourself, are phrases with a mirror-function that contributes towards the 
always-unfinished process of captation. They invite the child to see itself in terms 
of dominant values which ascribe to its body a place. The presence of cultural 
surveillance is thus paramount in both Lacan's and Shilder's accounts. Whether 
physical touch or parental gaze, the meaning of the body is shaped by patterns of 
condemnation and praise which make sense of body types, body parts, and body 
acts. 
Silverman points us towards one particularly useful theorist in this area, 
Frantz Fanon. In Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon gives an account of the 
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experience of blackness, and relates it to the experience of `a slow composition of 
my self as a body in the middle of a spatial and temporal world' (p. I 11). For 
Fanon, this composition is not jubilant, but haunted by the possibility that such a 
composition will take place on the terms of the white onlookers whose gaze forces 
a meaning onto his body. ` As long as the black man is among his own' says Fanon, 
`he will have no occasion 
... 
to experience his being through others' (p. 109). But 
then ` the occasion arose when I had to meet the white man's eyes' (p. 110). As 
bearer of the culturally legitimate gaze, the white man's eyes have the force of 
authority, to which Fanon returns again and again in his account: `already I am 
being dissected under white eyes, the only real eyes. I am fixed' (p. 116). Fixed by 
the racist gaze, Fanon's sense of self undergoes a physical transformation as `the 
corporal schema crumbled' (p. 112). 
Such a body, says Fanon, ceases to be ` a physiological self, to balance 
space, to localize sensations' (p. 111). These roles suggest the calm and logical 
functions of the ideal body. This is a physical self whose role is `to balance', 
orienting itself in the world, and `to localize', drawing differentiated information 
out of sensory diversity. It is an ordered and ordering body. But under white eyes, 
instead of a comfortable physical propriety, it experiences itself as physically 
improper because of its culturally condemned corporeality: `I was responsible at 
the same time for my body, for my race, for my ancestors' (p. 112). The self is no 
longer an integrated wholeness, but becomes a carnal disorder: ` what else could it 
be for me but an amputation, an excision, a hemorrhage that spattered my whole 
body with black blood? ' (p. 112) The fixing of this body by a gaze thus 
simultaneously effects its reduction to a singular meaning 
- 
faced by the white 
man's gaze, Fanon finds that `I 
... 
made myself an object' (p. 112) 
- 
and the 
disordering dissolution of the black body into a catalogue of racist images: 
I discovered my blackness, my ethnic characteristics, and I was battered 
down by tom-toms, cannibalism, intellectual deficiency, fetichism [sic], 
racial defects, slave-ships, and above all: "Sho' good eatin' ". (p. 112) 
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Fanon is keen to preserve the possibility of a body which is not 
fixed/disordered by such a gaze, a body which is free. His commitment to a certain 
Sartrean Hegelianism gives him faith that the self may constitute itself apart from 
the objectifying gaze of the other, may be a self only for itself. His image of the 
black man `among his own' invokes a utopian space of mutual acceptance, 
suggesting that an otherwise comfortable body image is marred only in those 
situations where `not only must the black man be black; he must be black in 
relation to the white man' (p. 110). All of which begs the question of absences 
from Fanon's work which have often been queried: what must the black woman be 
and for whom must she be it ? What must the black gay man be and for whom ? 'Z 
Fanon's account skirts the possibilities that there might be numerous gazes 
operative in any space, and thereby forestalls a consideration of the way in which 
his own gaze might legitimate some bodies over others. Responding to an account 
of the black male body as sensual, Fanon replies: `I have never been able, without 
revulsion, to hear a man say of another man "He's so sensual! " ' (p. 201, emphasis 
in the original). Fanon invokes a legitimate bodily response in order to pathologize 
the bodily response of another, situating his body as properly revolted, and the 
body of the speaker as improperly aroused. Fanon's own gaze thus offers a 
homophobic scrutiny, catching out other bodies which betray their impropriety 
through illegitimate physical attributes. 
This is in no way to undercut the radical value of Fanon's account, and it 
certainly does not diminish the political efficacy of his work. Indeed, we must 
remember, as Diana Fuss has pointed out, that Fanon's homophobia is structured 
by a racist context in which the imputed sensuality of black men is a colonialist 
device for dismissing their rationality, and in which the imputation of sodomy 
functioned in colonialist discourse to image non-white peoples as morally and 
psychically undeveloped. Fanon's body politics is reactionary because it is a 
'Z See for instance Jonathan Dollimore, Sexual Dissidence, pp. 344-347; and Diana 
Fuss, Identification Papers pp. 141-165. 
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calculated response against a prior discourse. " Fanon's own account of how, when 
a body is marked as deviant by the gaze of others, it is thrown into a sense of 
corporeal disarray, is useful in determining the meanings of his own lacunae. 
Furthermore this account should not be seen solely as rendering objects of 
such a gaze as powerless victims since, as we have seen in Foucault, the 
designation of a body as unacceptable constitutes not only a trauma, but also a site 
of possible resistance, whereby the body may assert its very disorder as a form of 
rebellion. Commenting on the figuring of blackness as animality 
- 
as less than the 
order of the legitimate human body 
- 
Charles Johnson describes the possibility of 
such a response to white racism: 
The situation of the black-as-body possessing non-cognitive traits is not 
rejected in this most recent variation of cultural nationalism, but stood upon 
its head 
... 
`Yeah', I scream at my white friend in the Village, `we're 
naturally superior to you at sports. Uh huhn, and we satisfy our women 
better too! '. ('A Phenomenology of the Black Body', p. 131) 
And yet it would be wrong to assume that the existence of these processes 
that produce deviant bodies thereby implies that there is also a perfect body which 
some do in fact attain. Although this goal structures bodily apprehensions, no body 
is ever perfect. Fanon's own text bears witness to the multiple gazes which play 
over the body, by which approval from one quarter may be accompanied by 
condemnation from another. Although it is essential that we keep in mind how 
some bodily attributes are validated over others - white skin over black, manly 
rigidity over limp wrists (in men, at any rate), the continent over the incontinent - 
we must not forget the ways in which all bodies are marked as deficient. There are 
13 ' Fanon's resolutely masculine self-identifications, articulated through the 
abjectification of femininity and homosexuality, take shape over and against 
colonialism's castrating representations of black masculinity' (Diana Fuss, 
Identification Papers, 160). On colonial figurations of an effeminate and bisexual 
or homosexual racial other see Rudi C. Bleys, The Geography of Perversion: 
Male-to-male Sexual Behaviour Outside the West and the Ethnographic 
Imagination 1750-1918 ; and-Merl Storr, `The Sexual Reproduction of "Race": 
Bisexuality, History and Racialization'. 
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three principal areas of concern here. 
Firstly, bodies are experienced as deficient because the criteria for the 
perfect body are both inexhaustible and contradictory. While I have stressed our 
bodies' capacity for transformation, they are also always limited in their 
achievements, and faced by punitive regulatory standards of hygiene, beauty, health 
and behaviour, which they often fail to reach. However privileged whiteness is in 
the West, it is not enough just to be a white body, nor even a white male body, nor 
even a white male heterosexual body: any body is less than perfect because there is 
always more work to be done. " Is this a clean body ? An attractive body ?A 
healthy body ? 
Secondly, even to take on the work of improving the body plunges it into 
contradictions. A male body which gains praise for its musculature 
- 
such as those 
of Sylvester Stallone, Arnold Schwarzenegger, or Jean-Claude van Damme 
- 
may, 
in the very act of displaying its hyper-masculinity, come to evince a homoerotic 
context through its iconographic pose, a camp playfulness in its self-conscious 
over-signification of gender, or an unexpected femininity in its offering of itself up 
for erotic consumption. " All of which act as inappropriate signification to the 
heterosexual audiences for whom the performance is primarily intended. "' Thus for 
a body to be ` licit' or `successful' by one set of criteria may only serve to render it 
tainted or inadequate according to others. 
Lastly there is, as we have seen throughout these two chapters, a certain 
" See Kenneth R. Dutton, The Perfectible Body: The Western Ideal of Physical 
Development; and Mary G. Winkler and Letha B. Cole (eds. ), The Good Body: 
Asceticism in Contemporary Culture. 
" See Brian Caldwell, `Muscling in on the Movies: Excess and Representation of 
the Male Body in the Films of the 1980s and 1990s'; Yvonne Tasker, Spectacular 
Bodies: Gender, Genre and the Action Cinema; Steven Neale; ` Masculinity as 
Spectacle'; and John Stratton, The Desirable Body: Cultural Fetishism and the 
Erotics of Consumption, pp. 178-207. 
16 Conversely, as Eric Clarke and Matthew Henson note, there is also room for an 
increasingly explicit appeal by such bodies to gay audiences, as a sensible economic 
move on the part of Hollywood publicists ('Hot Damme! Reflections on Gay 
Publicity'). 
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discomfort about the fact of the body itself, whose materiality is always a source of 
anxiety. While the act of becoming a fully human subject relies on the mastery of 
body matter, the body never ceases to be matter, for all its Cartesian ambitions. 
The body thus remains a site of unease for even those subjects whose bodies are 
the most heavily ratified and endorsed. 
What is striking in these problems of body management is that the body is 
experienced as simultaneously self and other. It is on the one hand my self that 
from which I take my identity. Yet it is at the same time that against which I must 
struggle to define my identity when I am `held by the gaze to an unpleasurable 
identification' (TVW, p. 20). It is thus engaged in attempts to free itself from the 
inadequacy of its materiality, and to aspire to being the ground for a more perfect 
self. Silverman can thus refer to `the consequent self-hatred into which self-love 
constantly threatens to devolve' (TVW, p. 46), because even to succeed in 
valorizing the body momentarily is to do so by reference to a bodily ideal against 
which one must at some point be found lacking. The desire for that moment of 
jubilant assumption is the same desire which leads to self-hatred. 
Why should the body be a focus for such intense hatreds ? One answer is 
that the body is haunted by that primordial Discord into which it threatens to 
relapse. For Lacan, the fearful figure of the ` fragmented body' ('The Mirror 
Stage', p. 4) returns in dreams to haunt the subject. But Silverman refuses to see 
the fear of bodily collapse as a natural or innate response: 
Lacan suggests that it is `organic disturbance and discord' which prompts 
the child to seek out the form of the `whole body-image'. However, it 
seems to me that the reverse is actually true: it is the cultural premium set 
on the notion of a coherent bodily ego which results in such a dystopic 
apprehension of corporeal multiplicity. "(TVW, p. 21) 
While Lacan's reading of the bodily ego sees such emotions in terms of unresolved 
dread of the past bodily chaos, Silverman insists that the past body is rather the 
" Silverman's reference is to Lacan's ` Some Reflections on the Ego', p. 15. 
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figure of present values. What threatens the body is not a biological threat, but the 
threat that the proper body will take on the characteristics of the improper body. 
She stresses that the body image is produced through social interactions, inscribing 
it as flawed in culturally particular ways, motivated by social inequalities. 
Although Silverman offers her position as a deviation from Lacan, it is also 
the case that Lacan's account in fact invites such an interpretation throughout. It 
may be true that there are elements of his account which treat the growing sense of 
a separate body as a developmental process, a gradual acquisition of a more 
sophisticated and more accurate picture of the world in which the competing 
sensations of infancy give way to an organized sensorium which is said to both 
issue from, and make one aware of, the body. But Lacan is also more suggestive in 
his very hesitation to clarify where this sense of bodily integrity comes from. Lacan 
says that the infant which sees itself in the mirror `brings back an instantaneous 
aspect of the image' ('The Mirror Stage', p. 2) 
- 
thereby suggesting that this bodily 
image is itself already seen as integral. But he also refers to `the inexhaustible 
quadrature of the ego's verification' ('The Mirror Stage', p. 4) that takes place 
when the body-image provides the ego with the model for its own unity. 
`Verification' occupies a curious double-position, meaning both the confirmation 
of a truth already known (the ego thought of itself as integral before it encountered 
the mirror) and a truth that could not be known until that moment (the ego could 
not see itself as integral until the mirror verified the possibility). In effect, 
`verification' becomes a fiction 
-a truth which in fact could not come into being 
until imagined, and which did not precede the moment of its imagining. 
Similarly, at the same time as suggesting that the body automatically 
appears as unified, he also suggests that it is the body itself which unsettles this 
body-derived wholeness. There are thus two forms of bodily self-consciousness at 
work: awareness of the image of the body as integral, and of the sensory body as 
fragmented. The body operates in these accounts as both a guarantor of stability 
and the means of its perpetual deferral: 
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The fact is that the total form of the body by which the subject anticipates 
in a mirage the maturation of his power is given to him only as Gestalt, that 
is to say, an exteriority in which this form is certainly more constituent than 
constituted, but in which it appears to him above all in a contrasting size 
that fixes it and in a symmetry that inverts it, in contrast with the turbulent 
movements that the subject feels are animating him. ('The Mirror Stage', 
p. 2) 
Here the body appears both as `turbulent' and as the `contrasting' image to that 
turbulence; both discordant and `in a symmetry'; both in a `total form', a `Gestalt', 
and, by appearing as such, an `illusion' or `mirage' whose reality is chaos. Lacan's 
most telling phrase here is that this total body is `more constituent than 
constituted', which, in a typically Lacanian manner, proves more ambivalent the 
more we attempt to unravel it. For it might mean: this form of the unified body 
creates the subject, rather than itself being created 
- 
that is, the subject is a fiction 
but the unified body is not. Or it might mean the opposite: this form of the body 
produces the subject but is not itself fully or finally constituted through such a 
process 
- 
that is, it is a myth which enables a unified ego, but which is not itself 
fixed in the process. For Lacan, the unified body is both fact and fiction, both the 
real object which impels the subject into being and a fantasized creation which 
achieves its effect only through its being imagined. 
And yet before we assume that the body's chaos is any more of a reality, 
we should note that about this too he remains ambivalent. Lacan tells us that there 
is a `succession of phantasies that extends from a fragmented body-image to a form 
of its totality that I shall call orthopaedic' ('The Mirror Stage', p. 4), suggesting 
that none of these body images has the status of reality, but are only projections 
of psychological states. Lacan's account thus accords with Silverman's assertion 
that `the body does not exist even as a tenuous unity prior to its constitution 
through image, posture and touch. Indeed, it cannot even be said to be "in pieces", 
since that implies that once assembled they would add up to a "whole" ' (TVW, 






thus also enables a reading of the experience of the body as at all 
points socially produced. His argument, even as it offers us a developmental 
narrative, carefully refuses the possibility of locating an origin 
- 
even in a text 
whose entire focus is a single moment at which, supposedly, the constitution of the 
subject occurs. 
When Freud refers to the libidinal investment in physical sensation as `the 
way by which in general we arrive at the idea of our body' ('The Ego and the Id', 
p. 364), he might be seen as referring to the final realization of truth, the gradual 
cartographic achievement of an accurate depiction of the physical form. But if we 




fiction in the light of his 
own insistence on our complex libidinal investments, I suggest that we read `the 
idea of our body' as purely fictive. Moreover, a central part of that `idea of our 
body' is the presence of a potential chaos which it keeps in order 
-a chaos which, 
as Silverman stresses, is produced through the situations in which the body is 
located. The body is thus made meaningful through, and as the bearer of, the terms 
of the social order and the fears that haunt it 
- 
of collapse, of loss of security, of 
physical chaos, of a bodily subject which is no longer mappable. 
(iv) The Making of the Meaningful Body 
Mary Douglas's Purity and Danger has come to be seen as an exemplary 
work in the formulation of ideas of risk and danger to and from the body. Her 
structural anthropology has been extended to look at a dazzling array of body 
anxieties attesting to its ongoing usefulness: babies, bisexuality, puberty and oral 
sex all seem equally amenable to her method. "' Douglas enables us to see the zones 
1e For these uses of Douglas see, respectively: Anne Murcott, `Purity and 
Pollution:. Body Management and the Social Place of Infancy'; Jo Eadie, 
`Activating Bisexuality: Towards a Bi/sexual Politics'; Elizabeth Grosz, 
Volatile Bodies, ch. 8.; and Celia Roberts et al., ` "Going Down" : Oral Sex, 
Imaginary Bodies and HIV'. 
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of the body as patterns of social anxiety, with a particular focus on limits, margins, 
and points of exit and entry. I will be suggesting how her work can be 
strengthened by relating it to the issues within embodied politics that I have already 
raised, and finally I will show how it can help us to understand the function of 
fictions of bodily integrity. 
Douglas begins with the famous proposition that `dirt is matter out of 
place' (PD, p. 35). That is, substances, acts and persons which are seen as defiling, 
polluting or harmful acquire that character because they are not where they should 
be. This formulation then enables Douglas to analyse the cultural construction of a 
geography of hygiene, in which objects are assigned to particular locations 
(physical, temporal, conceptual) and barred from others. From such a position, she 
can then argue that `dirt is the by-product of a systematic ordering and 
classification of matter' (PD, p. 35). Whenever a particular aversion is expressed it 
is because a particular classificatory grid is at work, such that an object is defined 
as being in the wrong place. We might say that Douglas rejects biology in favour of 
semiotics: there are, she insists, no rational grounds to claims about what actions 
and substances are reviled and what are revered, rather they exist only as a function 
of their structural meaning. "' 
`Dirt' in this sense covers a wide range of objects, places and actions which 
are treated with aversion, and Douglas moves through muddy boots, corpses, 
sexual secretions and forbidden foods - objects which are treated with various 
degrees of revulsion. She traces this aversion to those objects and events which are 
anomalous to a system, whose presence threatens to disrupt symbolically the social 
order which classification maintains, and are therefore antithetical to the successful 
functioning of a particular society. For instance, she offers her famous analysis of 
" One ongoing debate around Douglas's work is whether she downplays the extent 
to which such demarcations may in fact be rational material calculations rather than 
symbolic- structures. For instance: are certain animals forbidden to be eaten because 
of their symbolic function, or because of their specific economic role in the 
maintenance of food supplies ? For an account of this debate see John O'Neill, 
Five Bodies, ch. 2. 
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the prohibitions from Leviticus regarding which animals could not be eaten, such as 
pigs, crocodiles, and eels. Behind these, Douglas discerns a classificatory system 
which constructs particular classes of animals as possessing definite characteristics: 
animals that fly are also classified having two legs; animals that are cloven-hoofed 
are also ruminants; animals that swim are also classified as having scales. This set 
of ideal animal-types is then confronted by certain anomalies: pigs and camels, 
which have four feet and are cloven-hoofed, but do not chew the cud; crocodiles 
and mice, which appear to have hands, but nevertheless walk on four feet; eels, 
which live in the water, but do not have scales. It is those certain animals which fall 
outside the classification systems that are designated unclean, because of their 
capacity to unsettle symbolic divisions central to a culture: `if penguins lived in the 
Near East I would expect them to be ruled unclean as wingless birds' (PD, p. 56). 
Developing her argument from this general proposition, she then moves to 
suggest that these divisions which generate the prohibition on disorder are not 
simply arbitrary, but encode survival strategies essential to a particular social order, 
representing the sites of social, sexual and economic tension which must be 
managed in order to guarantee social stability. The taboos of any culture are 
survival strategies, which stigmatize those who endanger the smooth functioning of 
any given social arrangement 2° For instance, Douglas offers a range of 
interpretations of accusations of witchcraft in different cultures. In each society, 
she suggests, the accusation may demonize an apparently different target 
-a 
neighbour who is an economic rival; a family member whose sexual liaisons disrupt 
rules of kinship and inheritance; a religious group who refuse to accept dominant 
religious practices (the Jews in medieval Europe) or a secular institution which 
refuses to endorse religious authority (the Catholic Church's resistance to the rise 
20 Douglas does not apply these later arguments to her initial example of Leviticus - 
but from her stress on the way that the prohibitions create a regular reinforcement 
of the power of Mosaic classification, we might surmise that the abhorrence 
attached to creatures which transgress religious classification results from their 
capacity to challenge the totalizing claims of religious authority. 
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of the civil authorities in France); a ruler who refuses to accept new social 
requirements. " But in every case such accusations target some individual or group 
within a community which violates, and therefore threatens to undermine or expose 
as arbitrary, its sexual, economic, or hierarchical conventions. Thus medieval 
European accusations against women manifest not an irrational dread of femininity, 
but a rational fear of single, sexually and economically independent women, whose 
presence is both anomalous (since they do not fit within the conventions of 
societies structured around a notion of a woman as dependent on a husband) and, 
in a very real sense, dangerous (since they challenge the conventions which have 
enabled that culture to function) (see Brian. P Levack, The Witch-Hunt in Early 
Modern Europe, pp. 154-159). Consequently while at one level Douglas refutes 
attempts to rationalize ritual - the Mosaic laws do not, she insists, forbid certain 
animals because they are genuinely unhealthy 22_ at another level she reintroduces 
the rational: every perceived risk is the expression of a genuine risk to the social 
order. 
I want to stress here that Douglas's account must, to offer its full efficacy, 
be taken in its strongest form (stronger, perhaps than that in which she herself uses 
it): there are no real dangers, only symbolic dangers. A `common sense' objection 
to this position is that some activities really are dangerous 
- 
and certainly are 
dangerous to the body. And yet such a claim hardly enables us to distinguish 
between the function of assertions that there are objective risks to the body 
involved in walking in front of trains, using heroin, and allowing HIV positive 
doctors to work with patients. The increasing visibility of the ideological force of 
each of my examples is meant to suggest precisely that all declarations of danger 
are situated within regimes of power/knowledge through which events are made 
21 For Douglas's various examples see Purity and Danger, pp. 102-113; Natural 
Symbols, pp. 110-125; and `Witchcraft and Leprosy: Two Strategies for 
Rejection'. 
22 Although, as Douglas notes wryly, `pharmacologists are still hard at work on 
Leviticus XI' (PD, p. 31). 
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dangerous. 23 If we recall the figure of St. Angela, her drinking of the lepers' water 
exemplifies how `danger' is a constructed and symbolic situation. She sees herself 
as in no danger, precisely because in her particular discursive regime those who 
swallow a leper's flesh are safer in their guarantee of eternal life than those who 
avoid it, who by doing so show an adherence to the temporal world which 
compromises their chance of salvation. " 
With her emphasis on danger as a form of disturbance, we might then say 
that what interests Douglas is mess: the epistemological untidiness of objects which 
do not fall within easy classification translates into the organic messiness of 
substances which provoke disgust. In particular, she is concerned with the 
relationship of these forms of mess to the body: as both disorderly and disgusting. 
It is, for instance, the body of the witch that both proves and intensifies the 
accusations 
- 
the marks and deformities that are taken as evidence of evil, the 
sexual contacts or other acts of bodily invasion which are the witch's most feared 
activities. Douglas argues that the human body `is a model which can stand for any 
bounded system. Its boundaries can represent any boundaries which are threatened 
or precarious' (PD, p. 115). As such it is a body that is always under the threat of 
pollution 
- 
which may become dirty through contact with other instances of dirt. 
As we have seen, `each culture has its own special risks and problems', the bodily 
correlative of which is that `to which particular bodily margins its beliefs attribute 
power depends upon what situation the body is mirroring' (PD, p. 121). Fanon's 
23 More recently, Douglas has resisted this line of thinking, saying of her work 
that `it is a bad joke to take this analysis as hinting that the dangers are imaginary'; 
she insists that the discourse of threat ` links some real danger and some 
disapproved behaviour, coding the danger in terms of a threat to valued 
institutions', and she appeals to the examples of famine and mortality rates (Risk 
and Blame, p. 29). But her own analyses problematize the definition of `real 
danger', even as they fall back on the concept. 
24 My position here has been partly influenced by the debate over whether anorexia 
should be read as 'an embodied strategy' that earns 
- 
albeit at a high price 
-a 
mixture of psychic and social gains (Elspeth Probyn, ` The Anorexic Body'); or as a 
condition which, viewed as physically damaging, if not fatal, can never be regarded 
as any sort of victory (Susan Bordo, Unbearable Weight, pp. 139-164; and Bryan 
Turner, ` The Talking Disease: Hilda Bruch and Anorexia Nervosa'). 
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analysis of the experience of the black body, for instance, may be read in this way, 
as the experience of a body that is radically anomalous to white culture: a body 
that is visibly human, articulate, and independent, but is not entitled to assert such 
attributes within the space of white civilization, and is therefore rendered as 
disordered, as what we earlier saw Fanon describe as `a hemorrhage that spattered 
my whole body with black blood'. 
Crucially, Douglas is not simply arguing here that the body is used as an 
abstract symbol, but rather that each of us experiences in our bodies the cultural 
categories that organize the society in which that body has been produced. Any 
social order is inscribed on the bodies of its members, who experience at the daily 
level of shame, disgust and discomfort a set of values mediated through the anxiety 
about how the body is at risk of itself becoming dirty, through contact with places, 
objects, or events that can render it polluted because they are problematic for the 
structure which that body symbolizes. 
Douglas's analysis therefore enables us to see how social problems are 
figured in terms of their problems for the body: such problems are manifested via 
the imagining of bodies whose presence cannot be accommodated, as bodies 
whose own physicality is disordered, and as sites on the body that are dangerous or 
abhorrent. Proximity to this disorder endangers whoever is near it, threatening as it 
does to disarticulate certain defining categories 
- 
hence the constant threats of 
pollution attributed to them. We should therefore ask of stigmatized bodies: how 
does a particular class of people come to be so problematic for a society that their 
bodies are imaged as dangerous and disgusting ? But we may also ask how in every 
body, certain practices or organs, particular sites of exit and entry, and specific 
bodily substances, carry the weight of the regulation of the social order within 
which they are located. 
I will consider some of the implications and limitations of Douglas's 
approach via her recent work on HIV and Aids. 5 In her essay `The Self as Risk 
21 The use of capitalization has been retained for HIV and not for Aids, in keeping 
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Taker: A Cultural Theory of Contagion in Relation to AIDS', Douglas offers a 
reading of responses to Aids based on her model of the social symbolization of the 
body. As we would expect, in this argument the body appears not as a physical 
object, but as a complex symbol for social anxieties which are played out through 
it. Aids is thus an exemplary instance of Douglas's formulation of the linking of 
`some real danger and some disapproved behaviour'. 
In Douglas's model there is a cultural core, those who are `well-endowed 
with symbolic and economic capital' (`The Self as Risk Taker', p. 107), whose 
professional status is secure, and whose beliefs and practices find themselves 
confirmed by the culture around them. But Douglas's failure to specify who this 
core is 
- 
we presume they are heterosexual, we guess they may be the middle- 
classes 
- 
will prove to be a point of difficulty in the terms of her analysis. Douglas 
argues that mapping out the views of this segment of society is the medical 
profession, whose status as guarantors of stable knowledge, and as the final 
arbiters of public health policy, is a function of their class-alliances with a group 
which values stability and tradition. But the security of this social position is 
achieved only by exclusions and boundaries: at the level of the nation, the 
community, and particular institutions. As long as those who are outside this core 
demand alternative structures, operate through alternative practices, and espouse 
alternative values, the security of this core is under threat, and these alternatives, 
and the subjects who embody them, must be excluded. 
Douglas then reads medical and popular accounts of the body 
- 
and 
particularly the body as under threat from HIV - as sharing the features 
appropriate to the situation of this group, whose cultural centrality is threatened by 
the disenfranchized and by dissident groups: `their idea of the body includes a weak 
immunity conferred by a double envelope, the body's own skin, and the 
with current medical practice. However, in quotations and titles I have retained the 
capitalization used in the original -a difference that is itself a marker of the degree 
to which the conceptualization of the phenomenon is changing. 
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community's skin' (p. 115). Hence both informed ` scientific' accounts and non- 
scientific lay accounts share a metaphorical language which mirrors a social 
situation: the fragile threatened body represents the community anxious about 
whether its boundaries too are permeable. The biological figuration of infection 
which accompanies this is ` miasma', a fear of infection by mere proximity or by 
contact with objects 
- 
such as glasses or toilets seats 
- 
that have been touched by 
the bodies of those who are (imagined to be) HIV positive. While such a position is 
recognized as scientifically inaccurate, it is nevertheless used even by the medical 
profession because of its capacity to symbolize the social anxieties which affix to 
certain abject constituencies: 
Miasma is an instrument of total rejection. The mere physical presence of 
the unwanted Other is dangerous. Their use of the same spaces and times 
and their breathing the common air is a menace to the rest of the 
community. The miasmic danger of AIDS is a reason for expelling foreign 
workers, restricting immigration, prohibiting sexually deviant practices, and 
of course, drugs. (p. 115) 
The image of a vulnerable body is thus a figure for the fears of a vulnerable 
community, and through its use the community asserts the centrality of what 
Douglas calls `a territorial community envelope' (p. 119), which defines as 
medically dangerous the presence of those groups whose social status is also 
problematic: foreigners, gay men, sex workers, intravenous drug-users. 26 
However, while Douglas stresses the ways that an understanding of the 
body is produced through socio-economic concerns about the stability of a 
particular class-fraction, other accounts of HIV/Aids and the body read these 
events differently. I want to consider two objections to Douglas's account, which 
complicate our understanding of the meaning of the body, while also building on 
her key arguments. Firstly, I will consider how the experience of the body might 
26 On the use of languages of health to demonize the socially marginal, see also: 
Sander Gilman, Disease and Representation: Images of Illness-from Madness to 
AIDS. 
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exist in a mutually constitutive, rather than merely reflective, relationship with 
material conditions; and secondly, I will consider the psychic dynamics which 
might also play a role in Douglas's example. 
The role of the imagining of the body in the Aids crisis has also been 
explored by Simon Watney, who suggests a different way of reading the role of the 
body in Aids discourse. For Watney, figurations of bodily disgust and bodily 
danger are a mobilization of anxieties about the body's desires. He suggests that 
HIV infection is imagined as an indicator that gay male bodies are at the most 
fundamental biological level different from heterosexual bodies, so that an unstable 
entity called `heterosexuality' is made secure via the supposedly stable figure of 
, the homosexual body': 
the very notion of a `homosexual body' only exposes the more or less 
desperate ambition to confine mobile desire in the semblance of a stable 
object 
... 
The social sight lines of sexuality are thus permanently tensed 
against `mistakes' that might threaten to undermine the fragile stability of 
the heterosexual subject. ('The Spectacle of AIDS', p. 79) 
Similarly, in the case of the conjunction of Aids and race, Cindy Patton has argued 
that while we should be alert to the ways that Aids has been used as a device for 
racist stigmatization, we should not make the mistake of treating racism as a 
concrete, if unequal, confrontation between ` races', conceived of as discrete 
entities that have some objective existence. Rather, HIV has enabled the myth of 
racially biological difference to be sustained by white subjects anxious to assert 
stable distinctions. ' Patton shows how through claims made about HIV, 
`sociobiologists have argued that race already stands as a marker for genetic 
propensity to behaviours which are related to HIV transmission' (Inventing AIDS, 
p. 113). Here, spurious claims about rates of infection and modes of transmission in 
so-called non-white populations enable the maintenance of the myth of a biology of 
27 For more general accounts of the problems in defining any biological grounding 
for notions of `race' see the essays in Sandra Harding (ed. ) The `Racial' Economy 
of Science, particularly Frank B. Livingstone, `On the Nonexistence of Human 
Races'. 
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absolute racial difference. "' In both cases, fears around HIV do not so much 
express existing differences as provide a new arena in which fictional differences 
can be (re)produced. 
What such accounts show is that missing from Douglas's description is the 
way that a bodily experience is a complex transcoding of different registers. The 
body image is part of the processes which ground the social, which determine the 
forms of its institutions and practices, and which therefore reproduce the social 
landscape which, in Douglas's account, they merely reflect. By structuring her 
account of Aids around the existence of a supposedly real group, which keeps out 
unwelcome aliens, Douglas reproduces, uncritically, the assumptions of her 
imagined cultural core: namely, that such an intact and separate group in fact 
exists. In her account there is a `centre community' which is `well-endowed with 
symbolic and economic capital' ('The Self as Risk Taker', p. 107), and which is 
thus secured by Douglas's own description as a real, integral, self-contained 
community. This reliance on a determining material situation is a recurrent problem 
in Douglas's work on the body, for it does not reflect on the difficulties of 
interrogating the interaction of the discursive and the material 
- 
although it 
certainly bears witness to them. 
I am suggesting that we should be more cautious in attempting to define 
such material situations. For Douglas's epistemological account of a certain 
cultural self-perception doubles as an ontological account of the objective 
economic existence of such a group. Her language of `enclaves' and `social 
divisions' ('The Self as Risk Taker', p. 108), while it functions as an apparently 
plausible description of a heterosexual world separated from a gay subculture, does 
not account for the fact that some of its members may be secretly gay or bisexual; 
or the fact that some of them may use prostitutes, or be prostitutes; or that they 
2! For an account of the mobilizations of racism within research on HIV see 
Richard and Rosalind Chirimuuta, AIDS, Africa and Racism. 
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may use or sell illegal drugs. 2' Following these other arguments on the meanings of 
Aids we should rather see such a group as a fantasmatic construction, produced by, 
rather than simply producing, accounts of itself as threatened. Like the body marks 
and body practices considered in chapter one, these fears produce a dream of social 
cohesion via one of bodily specificity, a dream played out through public policy 
and social interaction. It is thus a fantasy of bodily integrity which underwrites 
Douglas's own argument, constructing as it does a `centre community' free from 
homosexual desire, drug-use and foreignness, which can operate by keeping those 
elements outside itself. No such group exists. " Rather, it is an imaginary figure of 
cultural anxiety whose presupposition depends 
- 
as much for Douglas as for its 
members 
- 
upon the fantasy of the integral body which is invoked to defend it. 
This is not to reject the validity of Douglas's descriptions of the forms of 
thought about Aids, or the uses to which it is put 
- 
part of the power of her work is 
that it enables us to read the macro-events of material configurations as operating 
through the micro-events of the experience of bodily rituals. It is, however, to 
question the normative role that such an account plays. IV drug use and anal sex 
are not only dreaded because they metaphorically represent other sorts of invasion, 
but rather because of their real and imagined presence within those groups which 
would disavow them. It is only through these interdictions that heterosexuals and 
non-IV drug users can be imagined into being. We must therefore supplement 
Douglas's account of the body as `mirroring' a particular concrete situation, with 
one in which it in fact produces such situations. To return to Kafka's fable, we 
might now say that society does not so much etch its image onto the body, as has 
its own possibility produced when a body is etched into being in the form of a set 
of fantasies about the sort of society that such a body inhabits. 
" On the social sciences' uncritical reproduction of myths of discrete populations 
see Simon Watney, `Aids: The Second Decade: "Risk", Research and Modernity'. 
30 Such a reading of Douglas is indebted to the interrogation of epistemology found 
in Barry Hindess and Paul Hirst, Modes of Production and Social Formation, and 
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a 
Radical Democratic Politics. 
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But also, as well as complicating Douglas's account with the mutually 
constitutive role of the material and the discursive, it is important to see how 
instances of bodily anxiety are affected by psychic dynamics which are not simply 
particular to specifiable material situations. Leo Bersani's ` Is the Rectum a Grave 
?' argues that the associations of sex and death in the HIV pandemic are structured 
around anxieties about the autonomy of the subject which, while they are inflected 
by particular socio-historical conditions, are not reducible to them. Bersani, like 
Douglas, is interested in the construction of an `ideological body' (p. 209), but for 
him the fantasies and fears which produce it are not only an image of social 
inequalities, but also of the psychic disruptions of subjectivity. 
Bersani's account is based on what he describes as `the shifting experience 
that every human being has of his or her body's capacity, or failure, to control and 
to manipulate the world' (p. 216), an experience that is not only bodily, but that 
also marks the psychic attempt to maintain the ordered, controlled, and controlling 
self that is grasped in the mirror-stage. In particular, Bersani is interested in the 
ways that sex functions as a place where control may be lost: an instance of the 
body's control over its environment giving way to the body's submission to the 
intense sensations that overwhelm it, a temporary psychic collapse `into which the 
human organism momentarily plunges when it is "pressed" beyond a certain 
threshold of endurance' (p. 217). 
Bersani's invocation of `the human organism' and `every human being' sits 
uneasily with the position of bodily specificity that I have been arguing for, and 
perhaps, as with Lacan, we must read him as accounting for a particular cultural 
experience of the sexual. " His own texts waver on this, offering both this general 
narrative of the psyche, but also insisting that we must recognize these processes 
"A reading which he would strenuously resist. In The Freudian Body, Bersani 
traces the psychic dynamic of the sexual as the violent collapse of self back to 
Assyrian frescoes of the 9th 
- 
7th centuries B. C., to secure for his position a 
deliberate foothold in the earliest known cultural artefacts. For a historicist 
challenge to Bersani's work, see Jeffirey Masten, ` Is the Fundament a Grave? '. 
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as understood through the dynamics of gender, hence his use of `shifting' to mark 
the range of culturally specific ways in which this experience occurs. Thus while he 
is interested in a certain broadly trans-historical anxiety 
- 
that of the loss of 
identity 
- 
he also attends to history by arguing that in all societies we know, this 
loss of identity is associated with femininity. He stresses that the phallocentric 
`denial of the value of powerlessness' (p. 217, emphasis in the original) leads to the 
experience of the body's vulnerability being troped as its feminization: the body 
that becomes powerless is a body that is imagined as occupying the position of the 
socially disempowered. Terms like `phallocentric' and `patriarchal' thus bridge the 
gap between the psychically essential and the socially specific, by identifying a 
mode of social organization that has always produced such dynamics, while 
nevertheless leaving open the possibility that some sufficiently different form of 
social organization might transform them beyond recognition. 
Bersani argues that this notion of an overwhelmed and penetrated body 
and psyche has come to be seen as the dominant attribute of both women and gay 
men, who, in the patriarchal imaginary, are those subjects who yield up their claim 
to mastered subjectivity since `to be penetrated is to abdicate power' (p. 212, 
emphasis in the original). 32 The psychic significance of aversive declarations about 
the imagined dangers of gay male promiscuity and female prostitution is then not, 
as in Douglas's account, a marking of socio-economic differences, but rather a 
hostility towards sexual subjectivities which have come to be connected with `an 
unquenchable appetite for destruction' (p. 211)33 The psychic significance of the 
sexuality of the penetrated as symbolic of the collapse of the ego is joined with 
their social demonization as both victims and carriers of HIV. Consequently, the 
32 Bersani uses a cross-cultural survey of the meanings attached to sex between 
men to suggest that even where such sexual practices are not homophobically 
indicted, there is a general approval for the act of penetration and a general 
suspicion of the act of being penetrated ('Is the Rectum a Grave? ', p. 212). 
33 A similar argument might be made about the representation of drug use, 
envisioned as a constant assault on the body, pushing it past fantasized `natural' 
limits and into the realms of an ecstasy bordering on death. 
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symbolic self-destruction which penetrative sex has come to represent is 
transformed into the notion of sex work and gay sex as leading to biological 
destruction through Aids. The significance that attaches to sexual acts, and the 
body-boundaries that they disrupt, is therefore not simply a mapping of material 
divisions and economic inequalities 
- 
although, as Bersani stresses, it is always that 
as well 
- 
but is a general psychic fantasy of bodily dissolution figured through gay 
men and female sex workers. The consequence of this potent mix of the social and 
the psychic is that the 111V pandemic has ` literalized that potential as the certainty 
of biological death, and has therefore reinforced the heterosexual association of 
anal sex with self-annihilation originally and primarily identified with the 
fantasmatic mystery of an insatiable, unstoppable female sexuality' (p. 222). 
Bersani is careful to specify that these gendered dynamics affect the specific 
forms that psychic anxiety about self-integrity takes. But he also stresses that these 
dynamics are not simply the products of the material situations of patriarchal social 
organization. Rather, they are an inflection of those structures through psychic 
dynamics which pre-exist them. He thus demonstrates a tendency visible in all of 
these various accounts of the ways in which the body is made meaningful: the 
attempt to specify an original point for such a process 
- 
and in particular an origin 
for the point at which a desire for bodily integrity becomes paramount. Whether 
treated as an organic necessity, a psychic inevitability, or a product of particular 
material conflicts, they all invite us to determine a single governing force which 
produces this sense of an integral body. However, in bringing them together, I 
hope to have demonstrated the need to suspend such a line of inquiry. In place of 
this attempt to specify a before and after in the development of the desire for 
bodily integrity, I want to stress here again the importance of thinking of these 
fields as co-constitutive. If, as in Silverman's account, the psyche is mapped out 
through a bodily experience which is determined by practices which constitute the 
social values of those around that child, then the structure of the psyche is always 
already social. We must therefore seek to combine the body's capacity to both 
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symbolize and produce particular social situations with an understanding of the 
psychic dynamics with which such conflicts are interwoven: the attempt to produce 
an integral, ordered subjectivity through a body which experiences itself as also 
disordered and dis-integrated. "
In other words, these charged bodily locations are not simply the ascription 
by culture of meaning, with the body's openings and margins being granted 
significance. Rather, the body is the site of the (re)production of culture, a process 
in which it plays an active part. Even though the lines of pleasure, discomfort, fear, 
defence, and pride that are traced across the body are, as we have seen, the 
messages by and as which the body is grasped; and even though no portion of the 
body comes into consciousness except insofar as it becomes the site of an erotic 
cathexis or intersubjective struggle over meaning, it is also the case that at the 
same time the experience of embodiment provides the ground for the fantasies of 
integrity and vulnerability that are the terms in which culture is conceived. We 
must try to hold onto this double orientation: these states both are and are not 
the pre-existing material realities which the body mirrors. The earliest moments of 
the psychical mapping of an embodied self are, if not pre-social, at least para- 
social: developing in tandem with the socialization of the body, but contributing 
their own dynamics to such a process. 
It is essential that we think of these three domains 
- 
the psychic, the 
material, the discursive - as interrelated and mutually constitutive. Sue Best 
reminds us that we must not read such body-mappings simply as metaphors, in 
which the body is used to represent concepts, but rather as a result of the material 
forms that bodies take: ` ideas are not given primacy, they do not simply imprint 
passive matter but rather are entailed or entwined with body-matter' ('Sexualizing 
Space', p. 190). As a result, she argues, a body `is not simply compared' to other 
social formations, but is itself `integral to the production of these concepts' 
" Steve Pile makes a sympathetic attempt to extend Douglas's work in this 
direction (The Body and the City, pp. 185-187). 
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(p. 186). For Best this form of corporeal thinking entails a constant interplay 
between body and discourse in both directions. Hence we may say that since the 
material, discursive, and psychic forms of any given social order are not fixed, but 
must be continuously reproduced, they all remain dynamic, never finalized, but in a 
process of mutual influence on one another. 
Such a sense of the body's role as an active participant in the making of 
meaning is lacking in Douglas's account, in which the body appears as senseless 
matter which takes all of its meanings from culture. This is not to say that Douglas 
does not consider the extraordinary emotional intensities invested in the body. 
Indeed, the strength of her work is its capacity to account for these violent 
feelings. But these feelings emerge solely from the interpretative role of culture. 
Douglas's description of the body as a `natural symbol' suggests certain 
limitations: as a symbol, the body is merely a receptacle for meaning, used by 
culture. " Her description of the body itself is curiously flat, an affectless space 
onto which meaning is grafted, an approach most visible when, considering why 
the body should be such a privileged symbol, she suggests that `the structure of 
living organisms is better able to reflect complex social rituals than door posts and 
lintels' (PD, p. 114). Its importance then is treated by her more as a product of the 
useful fact of the body's physical complexity rather than of its own capacity to 
generate emotional conflicts. Absent is any sense that bodies are never without 
such emotional charges, having been marked from birth with fantasy and desire. It 
is therefore important that we read culture as written not onto an awaiting body 
but via a body which only comes into being through the injunctions of ordering 
cultural systems, even as culture only comes into being through the repetition of 
bodily dynamics. 
These accounts weave together a number of important bodily domains, and 
when juxtaposed we can see the problem of assigning priority to any one. While 
" Natural Symbols is the title of Douglas's second book on the body. For her 
defence of this view of the body see pp. xoci-xxxvii. 
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for Lacan the unified body seen in the mirror is the model for a unified self, it is 
simultaneously the case that paradoxically, the unitary self projects its own 
(imagined) attributes onto the body that is seen in the mirror. Similarly while, for 
Douglas, an ordered culture is mapped onto the body, it is simultaneously the case 
that the psychic fantasy of bodily order generates the illusion of stable social 
forms. Silverman's account helps to dissolve the opposition between these two 
accounts: the body comes into consciousness through processes which already 
invest it with meaning. It is not that the body is apprehended and then interpreted, 
but rather that the possibility of thinking about the body at all is achieved through a 
process of what we might call interpretative perception 
- 
or, if `interpretative' 
seems too intellectual a term to apply to the earliest stages of this process, 
evaluative perception (an awareness of the body which, as we have seen, is both 
conscious and unconscious). 
There is thus no neat sequence: from bodily disorder, through the cohesion 
of the mirror stage, and on to fully-fledged socially meaningful embodiment (a 
trajectory whose theoretical witnesses would run: Freud, Lacan, Douglas). The 
body is always the form through and as which culture elaborates itself, rather than 
which either precedes culture (as in Bersani) or which is preceded by it (as in 
Douglas). In all its physical activities and discursive deployments, the fact of a 
body is being thought out, its meanings being reconfigured. In such processes its 
flesh is always being identified as disordered, always being re-ordered in resistance 
to that. These are not two reactive processes alternating in dialectical fashion, but 
are mutually implicated, operating through one another. 
(v) A Body Without a Culture 
While I have insisted that it is processes of social production that create 
different bodies, the spectre of instinct perhaps remains to be exorcized 
- 
particularly in light of its difficult articulation within psychoanalysis. Are there 
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innate instincts which culture then transforms, or is it possible to sustain the 
argument that I am offering here, that every aspect of a body is not simply 
modified, but produced by the social situations of that body? At the most general 
level, Freud has argued that `it is impossible to overestimate the extent to which 
civilization is built upon a renunciation of instinct' ('Civilization and its 
Discontents', p. 286). Similarly, there is a broad trend within the sociology of the 
body which accepts that the body is socially regulated in different ways, but which 
argues not simply that in different cultures it is regulated to different ends, but that 
it is regulated to different degrees. Stephen Mennell, for instance, offers an 
historical account of social change from the Middle Ages to today, in which anger, 
appetite and sexuality are all `manifestations of affect over which people came 
gradually to be subject to increased pressures to exercise greater self-control' ('On 
the Civilizing of Appetite', p. 131). 
Exemplifying the persistence of this model, the key text for sociology in 
this area has been Norbert Elias's The Civilizing Process, an elaboration of the 
argument that there is an instinctual body which culture must bring under control. 
Elias's text is an extraordinarily thorough documentation of his claim, and it is 
worth considering here whether it can reasonably be disputed. For instance, 
analyzing the changes in table manners from the Middle Ages onwards, Elias notes 
that as civilization progresses, distinct changes occur. The more bodily aspects of 
eating are downplayed - spitting, picking one's teeth, sharing plates 
- 
and, 
importantly, the use of the knife diminishes: from an extravagant tool which is 
brandished, hacked with, and used to threaten other diners, it becomes a genteel 
artifact. Elias sums up the changes as follows: `the regulation and control of 
emotions intensifies. The commands and prohibitions surrounding the menacing 
instrument become ever more numerous and differentiated. Finally the use of the 
threatening symbol is limited as much as possible' (The Civilizing Process, p. 102). 
This language of limitation, prohibition and restraint clearly invokes the 
notion of a natural body, whose expression is curtailed. And it is a plausible 
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argument. Surely we can measure here the increases in restraint, the gradual 
dwindling of freedoms, the limitations on what practices may occur around the 
space of the dining table ? In his discussion of Elias, Turner notes how even the 
architecture of the dining room changes, as the spittoon and the vomitorium are 
banished (The Body and Society, p. 170). 
I am not disputing here the account that part of the avowed project of 
modernity is to tidy and order bodily activities: the documentation on this point is 
exhaustive and persuasive. "' However, the assumption that this is an encounter 
between a cultural order and a disorderly nature is misleading. In accounting for 
this shift in terms of an innate body which is restrained, we are only reproducing 
the terms of the discourse itself, whose project is precisely the instantiation of a 
language and a practice on the one hand of bodily disarray, and on the other of 
orders, schematics and discipline. Yet this is not a conflict between two opposed 
bodily states, each belonging to a historically distinct period; rather, both are 
aspects of a new bodily order which is maintained by the production of such a 
conflict. In what sense is the ` new body' more ordered ? In what sense does it 
make sense to see the ` old body' as disordered V All societies and all social 
situations' argue David Morgan and Sue Scott, `make their own particular 
demands upon the deployment of the body such that bodily performance is 
consistent with the requirements of time and place' ('Bodies in a Social 
Landscape', p. 14). 
We can approach this field in a different way by returning to Foucault, 
whose notion of the `repressive hypothesis' (HS, p. 10) allows another reading of 
these phenomena. Although Foucault's account is concerned primarily with the 
discourse of the sexual, I have tried to extend it beyond that, to show how such a 
language is part of a wider discourse of bodily control in which sexuality is only 
36 See Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World; Norbert Elias, The Civilizing 
Process; and Peter Stallybrass and Allon White, The Politics and Poetics of 
Transgression. 
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one element. Indeed, Foucault's emphasis on the history of the sexualized body is 
intended to achieve the function of alerting us to the ways in which the assumption 
that sexuality is the central feature of embodiment is itself an effect of regimes of 
power that we need to dislodge. 
For Foucault, bodily phenomena that are supposedly being repressed are in 
fact installed as part of a complex new arrangement of embodiment 
- 
whose 
regulation of the body is different from rather than greater than previous regimes 
of bodily production, and whose new practices of what Elias figures as `restraint' 
are themselves sites for possibilities of bodily pleasure. An account such as Elias's 
therefore eclipses three important facts: the presence of the orders and structures 
which organize the older, supposedly more instinctual, body-forms; " the bodily 
aspects of the pleasures that are deployed in the name of the supposedly more 
restrained new order; and the structured production of those practices that are 
supposedly being repressed. 
Following on from my arguments in chapter one, we must argue that what 
we see in Elias's account are two different forms of social regulation. The medieval 
use of the knife is in no sense natural, but is the product of a codified incitement to 
emotions: the knife must be carried, must be brandished. The table is a tightly 
regimented field in which certain conflicts are required, certain emotional displays 
expected. Vomiting and spitting are not `natural' bodily events which later culture 
banishes, but produced bodily events which culture has transformed in different 
ways 
- 
in his inventory of bodily differences Mauss recounts the story of a village 
where `people did not know how to spit' ('Body Techniques', p. 118). The 
requirements to restrain burping and farting, or to avoid spilling food, are in no 
way `more' repressive than the cultural requirements to eat to the point of 
" Although, at the same time, Elias also attempts to construct such an argument, 
but struggles to integrate it with his larger claims, expressing some uncertainty 
about whether the phenomena he is studying should be regarded as increases in 
social restraint, or merely as changes in the form of socialization (The Civilizing 
Process, p. 131). 
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vomiting. Turner describes these requirements by saying that `an elementary code 
was sufficient' (The Body and Society, p. 170) 
- 
but with Mauss and Foucault in 
mind, it is not clear that this code is, in its own way, any less elaborate than any 
other. 
The second Foucauldian objection is that it is not clear that the new 
domains of bourgeois civilization are any less of a site for the exercise of bodily 
pleasure. In his account of the role of the modem concern over masturbation, 
Foucault has argued that: `to intervene in this personal, secret activity, which 
masturbation was, does not represent something neutral for the parents. It is not 
only a matter of power, or authority, or ethics; it's also a pleasure' ('An Ethics of 
Pleasure', p. 376). At home, just as in medicine, sexology, psychiatry, and penality, 
, the power which took charge 
... 
set about contacting bodies, caressing them with 
its eyes, intensifying areas, electrifying surfaces 
... 
It wrapped the sexual body in its 
embrace' in `a sensualization of power' (HS, p. 44). If, with Foucault, we read the 
practices of authority and restraint as exercises in pleasure, then we must question 
the construction of a disorderly body coming under the sway of an ordering and 
disembodied civilization. Instead, we should see the practices of restraint as 
themselves a domain of bodily indulgence. 
Thirdly, Foucault has made us alert to the fact that the seemingly most 
taboo desires must in fact be socially produced 
- 
that the erotic, the transgressive, 
and the forbidden are central products of a given social order. Power does not 
simply forbid a presocial libido since, as we have seen, the different psychic forms 
that bodily pleasure takes are always already social. Rather, power produces 
pleasures that are regulated in the service of a particular social order. I want to 
stress here that this does not mean that certain types of speech or action are not 
repressed, but simply that repression is not the governing logic of power 
- 
instead 
it is only one tactic in the field of its deployment. 
Yet Foucault's own work seems close to invoking such an unsocialized 
body at times. After all, he envisions a world which is free from the injunction to 
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dwell on sexuality: `perhaps one day people will wonder at this' (HS, p. 157) he 
suggests `and what we now perceive as the chronicle of a censorship and the 
difficult struggle to remove it will be seen rather as the centuries-long rise of a 
complex deployment for compelling sex to speak' (p. 158). Similarly, he looks back 
to times when such structures of thought about sexuality might not have operated: 
One day in 1867, a farm hand from the village of Lapcourt 
... 
was turned in 
to the authorities. At the border of a field, he had obtained a few caresses 
from a little girl, just as he had done before and seen done by the village 
urchins round about him: for, at the edge of the wood, or in the ditch by the 
road leading to Saint-Nicolas, they would play the familiar game called 
`curdled milk'. So he was pointed out to the gendarmes, led by the 
gendarmes to the judge, who indicted him and turned him over first to a 
doctor, then to two other experts who not only wrote their report but also 
had it published. What is the significant thing about this story ? The 
pettiness of it all: the fact that this everyday occurrence in the life of village 
sexuality, these inconsequential bucolic pleasures, could become, from a 
certain time, the object not only of a collective intolerance but of a judicial 
action, a medical intervention, a careful clinical examination, and an entire 
theoretical elaboration. (p. 31) 
Whatever we may think about Foucault's invocation of this incident (which as one 
critic says, `today we would have to regard as a case of child sexual abuse 939 j its 
pastoral setting should not deceive us into thinking that Foucault is invoking a 
world before culture. Suren Lalvani reads this incident as the evidence that 
Foucault still `makes reference to prediscursive sexual energies and a materiality in 
his evocation of "bucolic" and "innocent" bodily pleasures that prefigure the 
introduction of regulative regimes' (Photography, Vision, and the Production of 
Modern Bodies, p. 32). " But the fact of this being, in Foucault's words, a 
3" Elizabeth Grosz, ` Experimental Desire: Rethinking Queer Subjectivity', p. 144. 
But Grosz's language here is curious: `have to' in what sense ? ` Have to' because 
now we know better, or `have to' because now prevailing sexual discourses 
enforce such an interpretation ? See also Teresa de Lauretis, Alice Doesn't, p. 94. 
39 Elizabeth Grosz makes a similar reading of the same passage, accusing Foucault 
of imagining this as an act that is outside power/culture ('Experimental Desire: 
Rethinking Queer Subjectivity', p. 144) 
. 
See also- Toril Moi, `Power, Sex and 
Subjectivity: Feminist Reflections on Foucault', pp. 96-97. 
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`familiar' and `an everyday occurrence' already signals that it is routinized, and the 
invocation of a `game' should remind us that for Foucault a game has been the 
predominant metaphor for the most structured of situations: `the word "game" can 
lead you astray: when I say "game" I mean a set of rules 
... 
It is not a game in the 
sense of an amusement: it is a set of procedures' ('Ethics of the Concern for Self, 
p. 445). 
While Foucault's example may be intended to assert the existence of a body 
which is not caught up in the particular scientia sexualis of the nineteenth century 
(which is compatible with Foucault's claim that such a mode of knowledge has a 
history that can be traced) or as asserting the existence of a body which is not 
exercising coercive force (which is compatible with Foucault's claim that while 
relations of power are inevitable, relations of oppression are not), neither of these 
constitutes a claim that this body is outside culture. Equally, although he imagines 
a future with `a different economy of bodies and pleasures' (HS, p. 159), 
Foucault's language does not suggest that such a world is any less coded 
- 
it still 
operates through an `economy' 
- 
only that it is coded differently. We may then, 
with Foucault, ask what the themes of purity, disgust and redemption can tell us 
about the possible consequences of different systematizations of bodily experience, 
but always with the proviso that `different' 
- 
or indeed `better' 
- 
cannot mean less 
socialized. 
We can thus summarize a Foucauldian analysis of the notion of a presocial 
body as follows: 
(i) There is indeed repression of certain aspects of the body. Although he disputes 
the treatment of repression as the primary form in which sexuality is treated in the 
West, there is no reason to assume that Foucault is arguing that there is no such 
phenomenon as an act of repression with the force of an injunction of disapproval. 
Foucault certainly sees power as involving a system of prohibitions 
- 
he simply 
argues that this is not a total account of power, for it is equally a system of 
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incitements. He makes the role of repression explicit, stressing that in the 
monitoring of sexuality `there was a policing of statements' which `almost certainly 
constituted a whole restrictive economy' (HS, p. 18). Foucault is clear on this 
point: `it is not a question of denying the existence of repression. It's one of 
showing that repression is always part of a much more complex political strategy' 
('An Ethics of Pleasure', p. 375). 
(ii) Such repression only takes place as an element of a system in which bodily 
pleasure is in fact encouraged. These prohibitions intensify and produce bodily 
pleasure, What the Victorians designated perversions were not simply expunged, 
but were `solidified' and `intensified' (HS, p. 48). Such a process is simultaneously 
in the service of power 
- 
reminding us that any bodily order is always a social order 
- 
and, as we saw in the previous chapter, may be deployed against it. 
(iii) There is another realm of bodily pleasure, which is that of those who exercise 
this apparently disapproving power: what Foucault calls `a sensualization of 
power' (HS, p. 44). The activities directed at repressing particular practices are 
sites of physical pleasure in themselves, and may therefore operate as sites of 
tension for the claim that the body is being transcended in such practices. 
In summary, we might say that what is repressed must first be produced 40 
The notion of repression that Foucault critiques is the `hydraulic' one advocated 
by, amongst others, Reich and Marcuse 
- 
that the body's natural and spontaneous 
energies are being pushed down by society. For Foucault what is pushed down 
(but never only pushed down) is a complex of bodily practices and desires that 
must always be thought of as socially determined. Foucault's work thus enables us 
I This had seemed a useful epigram by which to grasp Foucault's notion of power, 
but I was particularly gratified to find recently that Gilles Deleuze offers an almost 
identical summary of Foucault: ` power "produces reality" before it 
represses'(Foucault, p. 29). 
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to read social change as a series of historically different forms not of repression, 
but of the exclusion of practical possibilities. 
This is very much the position taken by Peter Stallybrass and Allon White, 
in The Politics and Poetics of Transgression, which offers a useful example of the 
possibility of deploying a model of social prohibition which does not involve the 
repression of a natural body. Stallybrass and White study the processes by which 
the practices of popular working class culture have been systematically 
marginalized by the bourgeoisie, the process by which `its feasting, violence, 
drinking, processions, fairs, wakes, rowdy spectacle and outrageous clamour were 
subject to surveillance and repressive control' (p. 176). The bourgeois revolution 
thus structures itself as a series of acts aimed at- organizing a chaotic body. 
But what is being repressed are historically specific class practices. What is 
being forbidden is not any innate bodily instinct, but rather those bodily activities 
which have come to be associated with spaces, occupations, and languages 
antithetical to the economic interests of the bourgeoisie. `What is in question' they 
insist `is not some abstract "repression of instinct" but the validating of one set of 
social practices over against others' (p. 197). In persecuting gypsies, closing down 
market fairs, training children in hygiene, or systematizing city-wide sewerage, the 
bourgeoisie are therefore not denying the spontaneously libidinal, but rather 
policing those bodily practices which are laden with `semantic material from 
cultural domains 
... 
extraterritorial to their own constructed identities as socio- 
historical subjects' (p. 196). 
I believe it would be precipitate to claim that this bourgeois history 
accounts for all forms of bodily disgust - indeed, as Tony Bennett has recently 
pointed out, much of the reception of Foucault during the 1970s and 1980s was 
problematic in its attempt to overlook his stress on the diverse and non-unified 
character of modern practices of power, and to refashion his writings as 
unwittingly offering a coherent account of a unified bourgeois state (Culture: A 
Reformer's Science, p. 63). But such a history does offer a particularly useful 
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illumination of the way that a symbolic grasp of the body is always enacted through 
a set of material practices. Like Doyle's reading of the attempt to master the body, 
Stallybrass and White show how such practices become linked to an attempt to 
transform this unruliness into order. They record, for instance, how the seventeenth 
century essayist Thomas Browne describes his own personal meditative practices 
aimed at transforming the physically disordered experience of tavern music into a 
new spiritual order: 
For even that vulgar and taverne musicke, which makes one man merry, 
another mad, strikes me into a deepe fit of devotion, and a profound 
contemplation of the first Composer; there is something in it of Divinity 
more than the ear discovers. (Religio Medici, quoted in The Politics and 
Poetics of Transgression, p. 198) 
Here, the bodily experience is both removed (`more than the ear discovers') but 
also remains indissolubly bound to it 
- 
Browne's new-found spiritual state is still a 
state of the body. Thus the attempt to hierarchize practices (contemplation 
elevated over merry-making) still implies a dependency, a connection which 
threatens to disrupt the dominant logic. 
What a Foucauldian reading adds to such an account is the possibility of 
considering how this then generates new bodily pleasures (which may be in the 
service of systems of domination, but may also undermine them), identifying how 
in the process of this ordering, modernity both remains endlessly productive of 
new bodily pleasures, and also generates and maintains those bodily practices 
which are supposedly excluded (even to the point of reactivating them in pursuit of 
the desired, but reviled, alternatives). But, as in Foucault's portrait of the 
confessional society, such a recognition of modernity's insistent bodily pleasures 
- 
which may of course include the reading of Burroughs or the watching of a horror 
film 
- 
does not make the body an automatic good; rather, it recognizes the ways 
that these different incitements to focus on the body produce embodied subjectivity 
in the service of domination. 
For out of these arguments we can see how the idea of the body as unruly 
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organic matter plays a crucial role in the maintenance of the modern social order. 
The fiction of organic pre-social energy both stigmatizes the social practices which 
might disrupt particular institutions (such as the bourgeoisie's need to exert control 
over certain sections of the population) and also justifies the presence of 
controlling technologies of surveillance. But more insidiously, this entire 
arrangement serves to confine our notions of transgression to those practices 
whose necessity is already contained within the dynamic of scrutiny and discipline. 
What the myth of the chaotic state within us serves to achieve is the occlusion of 
those altogether more dangerous bodily possibilities: not those which are imagined 
as dragging society back into some primal chaos, but rather those as yet 
unimagined possibilities that would take it forward into new, and more just, forms 
of organization. 
We can see why the notion of a libidinal body has such an appeal 
- 
indeed, 
as we have seen, Peter Dews regards it as the indispensable element in any theory 
of political liberation - since it may well seem that unless there is something to 
liberate, the concept cannot make sense. But as I have argued in chapter one, we 
should instead envision freedom as a future-oriented practice. In believing that we 
undergo a bodily repression which facilitates the operation of society we imagine 
either that in overthrowing this lies our liberation, or that in maintaining this lies 
our duty as citizens. But, inflecting Foucault's argument, my central claim here is 
that the construction of a presocial space is an extremely effective mode of power, 
by which practices which threaten a particular social order are brought under 
control, not least because insofar as they are required by the system which 
represses them, even in resisting such policing they will reinforce its very 
functioning. 
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(vi) The Use of Disorder 
I will conclude this section with a return to the primal Discord from which 
Lacan asserts the unified body emerges. Such Discord, we may now suggest, is a 
retrospective construct that is imagined as the subject defines itself as dependent 
upon a process of ordering. Indeed, by definition the infant cannot regard certain 
aspects of the body as threateningly disordered until a notion of bodily unity has 
begun to form, until the situation is generated in which there is a clash between the 
image in the mirror (imagined as unified) and the physical sensations of the body 
(imagined as disunified). 
I would suggest that there are three central concepts which define all these 
different notions of the unified body: form, integrity, and order. Perhaps these are 
the necessary conditions for the body to exist as an object 
- 
and perhaps there 
might be conditions in which the body will no longer be imagined as `an object', 
and can then do without them. I will not offer exhaustive definitions of these terms 
here, since it will be the goal of the remainder of this thesis to demonstrate the 
different meanings that these bodily states may convey, but I will offer a brief 
definition of each. Form is the shape that body matter may take: in order to count 
as a body, there must be a recognizable shape of limbs, torso, head 
- 
certain bodies 
are designated as approaching formlessness, requiring medical intervention to 
restore them to legitimate form" or even as approaching a state of formless 
matter, at which point they would presumably cease to be bodies at all. Once it is 
established as having a definite form, the body must then have integrity, which 
fixes it as a single object: for integrity is both a definition of bodily permeability (at 
what points other objects may enter into or exit from a body, what different objects 
" For an example of such a process see David L. Clark and Catherine Myser, 
'Being Humaned: Medical Documentaries and the Hyperrealization of Conjoined 
Twins'. 
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may and may not enter particular sites) and bodily unity (what may be detached 
from a body and what may be attached to a body). A body with form and integrity 
is, however, defined even further: as having a particular order amongst its 
constituent parts. Order is the condition of a body divided into regular and 
recognizable units, zones, and organs, with defined functions, and a definite set of 
relationships to one another and to the world they inhabit. 
We have seen how these terms are opposed to alternative values, so that 
the body is experienced as being the site of a conflict between order and disorder, 
form and formlessness, integrity and dis-integration. But, as I have stressed 
throughput, these concepts of formlessness and disorder are always regulated 
forms 
- 
the taboo animals in Leviticus are not examples of some inherently chaotic 
nature, but are rather objects mapped out by a very specific cultural grid: what 
walks on the earth / what flies; what has wings / what has no wings. Such entities 
are, as Pasi Falk says, `still conditioned by and related to those culturally 
constituted boundaries which are trespassed' (The Consuming Body, p. 2). They 
are rigidly defined and regulated - either in terms of their meaning or their 
materiality 
- 
by the culture which regards them as indefinable and unregulated. As 
such they are `formless' and `chaotic' only in the sense that these operate as terms 
which designate unwelcome forms and orders. The body which experiences itself 
as disordered must therefore be understood as an ordered body which is 
problematic for a given social system. And, as we have seen, this disorder may be a 
characteristic of the way in which the very materiality of the body is designated as 
extraneous to, but capable of being made amenable to, the cultural order of society 
itself. 
Douglas invites us to ask what bodily activities, organs, and substances are 
thought of as orderly, and which are though of as disordered, a distinction which 
amounts to: which are thought of as dangerous, and which are thought of as safe. 
Her work is extremely valuable in understanding the centrality of this aspect of the 
body, since at the heart of her analysis is the assumption of social systematicity. In 
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her account, the imputation of bodily danger `works because a community of 
believers has developed a consensus on the kinds of solidarity that will help them 
to cope collectively with their environment' ('Risk and Justice', p. 29). 42 As I have 
already indicated, the assumption of a single form of systematicity that is mapped 
onto the body needs to be replaced with the idea of multiple and contested 
systematicities, which the body generates as well as being that by which the body is 
experienced. This insistence on relating the experience of the body to social 
systems must always be connected, as in Foucault and Bourdieu, to the material 
systems by which such bodily experiences are enforced. At the same time, a 
psychoanalytical inflection of Douglas enables us to see how bodies are 
experienced 
- 
both consciously and unconsciously 
- 
in terms of their relationship 
to structures of order and disorder that found the possibility of subjectivity. 
Fanon's experience of his body as undergoing `an amputation, an excision, a 
hemorrhage' thus both mimes his location as outside the acceptable white 
European social order, while also suggesting the infantile fear of his own body 
matter's refusal to remain ordered. We must therefore always ask: for whom is a 
particular body safe, and for whom is a particular body dangerous ? 
With her stress on cultural consensus Douglas, as we might expect, prefers 
stability over chaos: `in a chaos of shifting impressions, each of us constructs a 
stable world' (p. 36). 43 Even though her own work diagnoses chaos as an effect of 
structure, it appears in this formulation as an independent state, prior to the 
formation of categories- Perhaps we might even venture to suggest that in making 
such a statement she is doing what Silverman shows we are brought up to do: she 
I2 We might see this as representing the functionalist strand in Douglas's structural 
anthropology: in her accounts, any society is functioning relatively efficiently, and 
whatever rituals it engages in are the necessary symbolic forms that maintain its 
stability. `It is part of our human condition' she tells us, as Levi-Strauss might also 
have done, ` to long for hard lines and clear concepts' (Purity and Danger, p. 162). 
" Such a formulation might remind us of the way that structural anthropology 
plays an important role in shaping Julia Kristeva's notion of the interplay between 
the joyful chaos of the semiotic chora and the necessary but restrictive order of the 
symbolic (see chapter four). 
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is thinking with her body 
- 
and in doing so, she naturalizes `chaos' as a function of 
her own corporeal perception of chaos as a real state, against which her body 
stands. Thus while I agree with Douglas that structure and demarcation are 
necessary for subjectivity, thought, discourse and society, her figuration of this as a 
contrast between order and chaos 
- 
the one within culture and the other outside it 
- 
is less tenable. If order is produced, then chaos is no less so: chaos is not the 
residue that precedes order and is left over after it but, as we have seen in my 
reading of Lacan, and as Douglas's own work suggests, is produced 
simultaneously along with the definition of an order. Each ` order' has its own 
`chaos'. 
We can therefore say that if the body is produced as order, we must always 
ask not only, as Douglas does, what form does it take, and what relationship does 
it occupy with that which cannot be accommodated by such an order, but also: 
how do such processes enable the very concept of `order' to operate ? And we 
may ask, as Douglas does, under what circumstances such a bodily disorder is 
dreaded, and under what circumstances it is welcomed. But, rather than reading 
such moments as indicative of an experience that affects an entire culture evenly, 
we must ask what she does not: what are the different consequences for different 
social groups of such dread and such welcomes ? 
At the same time, I agree with Douglas and Lacan that `the body' cannot 
be thought apart from an idea of form, order and integrity. As Butler has argued, 
the body as a distinct and integral object may be one of `those constructions 
without which we would not be able to think, to live, to make sense at all 
... 
which 
have acquired for us a kind of necessity' (Bodies That Matter, p. xi). Although it is 
always precipitate to declare any principle constant, or transhistorical, it is also 
important to recognize that the psyche has its own laws and histories which are not 
simply those of culture. Although her account insists that different 
conceptualizations of the body accompany different regimes of inequality, 
Silverman alerts us to the need to retain a sense of the dynamics that accompany 
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such change. Criticizing attempts to produce an account of the historical relations 
between the gaze and the various media which incarnate it (painting, the camera 
lucida, the cinematic camera) she suggests that it is a mistake to use `an exclusively 
historical lens' to analyze this subject, since this position `fails to discern that the 
camera derives its powers to coerce and define through its metaphoric connection 
to a term which is much older than it'. Such an approach `neglects to distinguish 
what is socially and historically relative about the field of vision from what persists 
from one social formation to the next' (TVW, p. 131). Thus even the most 
scrupulously historical account of the changing boundaries of the body must 
consider psychic structures which, if they change at all, change at a different pace. " 
Against this assertion of the necessity of such an ordering of embodied 
subjectivity, we must also ask: to what extent is such a body unavoidable ? 
Discussing the way that subjectivity takes place through identification with images 
both of one's own body and of culturally validated bodies around it, Diana Fuss 
has noted that metaphors of rigidity, stability and hardness prevail in this field. 
`Identification' she argues `is a phallicizing process' (Identification Papers, p. 48). 
As phallic, this subject is clearly the product of a particular, and limiting, social 
order: patriarchy. But whether it is possible to have instead a non-phallic notion of 
unicity, or a non-unified notion of subjectivity, or a non-subjectified notion of self, 
is beyond the limits of this thesis 
- 
and, I would suggest, certainly beyond the limits 
of human thought at the moment (postmodernism, technoculture, and ecriture 
feminine notwithstanding). It is possible to argue that we are coming to the end of 
the era of such subjects, and approaching the time of the 'posthuman', a time of 
bodily configurations so radically different as to inaugurate a new order of being. " 
" For an attempt to mediate between what. is historically contingent (the 
`construction of subjectivity') and what is psychically inevitable (the ` constitution 
of the subject') see Charles Sheperdson, `The Role of Gender and the Imperative 
of Sex'. 
"See Judith Halberstam and Ira Livingston (eds. ) Posthuman Bodies; N. 
Katherine Hayles, `The Life Cycle of Cyborgs: Writing the-Posthuman'; and 
Margrit Shildrick, ` Posthumanism and the Monstrous Body'. 
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But so-balled posthuman figures such as cyborgs remain defined by the anxieties 
about their ruptured boundaries and compromized integrity. As such they are sites 
of sustained assault on integral subjectivity, but remain within its logic, which is 
already the logic of an assaulted body. Even those bodies which might seem to 
have left traditional notions of order and integrity behind, as we shall see in the 
work of Burroughs and Cronenberg, are bodies that stage a negotiation between 
the culturally defined domains of bodily order and bodily chaos, rather than ones 
that transcend such defining concepts altogether. My preference is therefore to 
hold onto precisely this tension between what sorts of bodily mappings and 
orderings are necessary and what are not. Even if we argue that some version of a 
sense of bodily integrity is foundational for subjectivity, what may vary is the 
meaning and experience of a body's apertures and limits, a body's relationship to 
what fal's outside it, the conflicts within the cultural categories through which it is 
established, the material situations that such notions of order help to secure, and 
the meanings of bodily disgust within those. 
(vii) RFading Repulsion 
Given the tenacity with which such disgust secures regimes of inequality, 
our logical next question is to ask: how can we reconfigure our sense of our bodies 
so that they are no longer dominated by such experiences of their own materiality ? 
How is it possible to speak back against these other forces that set the terms of our 
understanding of our bodies ? In the second and third parts of this thesis I will 
consider texts that resist or challenge various dominant conceptions of the body. In 
dojng so I will not be assuming that there is any one overriding conception of `the 
body' at work, or any single primary locus of power (such as race or class) which 
defines the experience of embodiment. Rather, to speak back against instances of 
power aver the body is to engage with numerous bodily fictions, deployed through 
a range of discursive sites, by varying constituencies and for different ends. 
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We might think here of two political strategies that have predominated: that 
of recocing previously despised and illegitimate bodies as in fact attractive and 
legitimate (Gay is Good, Black is Beautiful); and that of embracing the shock of 
the despised body for representing an alternative set of values which, in a political 
sense, a horrified normalcy is right to find threatening (a position exemplified by, 
for instance, Queer Politics). The two sets of work which I explore in the second 
part of this thesis might easily be 
- 
and indeed often have been 
- 
taken to exemplify 
just such strategies. `I've often thought there should be a beauty contest for the 
insides of bodies', says one of the protagonists of David Cronenberg's Dead 
Ringers (1988), sentiments which would seem to echo those of the director, who 
says: `most people are disgusted 
- 
like when they watch an insect transform itself. 
But if you develop an aesthetic for it, it ceases to be ugly. I'm trying to force the 
audiencf to change its aesthetic sense' (Alan Stanbrook, ` Cronenberg's Creative 
Cancers', p. 56). Similarly, William Burroughs has been taken as a defiant advocate 
of the unacceptable: the unapologetic titles of his semi-autobiographical fictions 
Junkie and Queer, his refusal to sanitize sex, disease, or addiction; his apparent 
pleasure in graphic accounts of violated and unruly bodies. This has been read as a 
strategy of resignification, which celebrates the terrifying revolutionary potential of 
repulsive bodies (Kendra Langeteig, `Horror Autotoxicus in the Red Night Trilogy: 
Ironic Fruits of Burroughs's Terminal Vision'). 
ýIowever, following the trajectory initiated by my reading of Foucault in 
chapter pne, I will be taking a rather different route through each body of work. 
Given that there is no simple `outside' to power, I will be asking: how is it possible 
to resist from within ? Rather than studying texts that attempt to take the body out 
of the realms of disgust, I am interested in texts that exacerbate bodily disgust. 
These texts are situated firmly within discourses of abhorrence: texts nauseated by 
the images that they construct, and which expect their audiences to be nauseated 
too. But in articulating this nausea, they manage at the same time to question and 
fracture it: to mock, interrogate, and unsettle its social functions. Even as they 
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speak repulsion, they demonstrate that a critique of the logics which sustain, and 
are sustained by, such repulsion, can nevertheless be yvrought out of even the most 




William Burroughs and the Invasion of the Body 
Chapter Three 
Fantasies of Physical Possession in 
the Naked Lunch Quartet 
All monopolistic and hierarchical systems are basically rooted in anxiety. 
William Burroughs, The Soft Machine (p. 143). 
(i) Introduction 
Although there is a substantial body of work written by William Burroughs, 
and although much of it makes use of extreme bodily imagery, there is a group of 
four texts in which the interrogation of various forms of abject matter, disorderly 
bodies, and repulsive corporeality takes centre stage. In this section I shall be 
concentrating on the four texts by William Burroughs that constitute the Naked 
Lunch Quartet: The Naked Lunch, ' The Soft Machine, The Ticket That Exploded, 
and Novq Express (first published in 1959,1961,1962 and 1964 respectively). ' 
' American editions are titled Naked Lunch. Critics have typically followed the 
designation used by the country in which they are writing or the edition which they 
are using, hence my own use, of The Naked Lunch. 
2 Henceforth abbreviated to NL, SM, TTE and NE. I shall also be using material 
from The Job (first published in 1970), a collection of interviews with Burroughs in 
which he reflects back over the period in which he wrote these texts. While I am 
grouping-the four texts together, as some other critics have done (see for instance 
John Tytell, Naked Angels, and Eric Mottram, William Burroughs: The Algebra of 
Need, who both call it a `tetralogy') it is worth remembering that not all readers of 
Burroughs divide the texts in this way. Edward Halsey Foster sees SM, TTE and 
NE forming-the first of Burroughs's subsequent rilogies (Understanding the 
Beats, pp. 165-166); Jennie Skerl similarly places The Naked Lunch on its own, 
with the later texts as a self-contained trilogy, while nevertheless offering a larger 
grouping in which `all of Burroughs's novels from Junkie to Nova Express 
constitute a major series of novels based on his experience as an addict' (William 
Burroughs, p. 48). Robin Lydenberg sees The Naked Lunch as standing on its own, 
as a work that sets out the analysis of a problem to which the `Nova Trilogy' 
provides a solution (Word Cultures, p. 19) Perhaps, as Jeff Bryan does, it is best to 
read the texts both ways : 'the_ Nova-Trilogy consists of The Soft Machine, The 
Ticket That Exploded, and Nova Express. With Naked Lunch they comprise the 
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Without wishing to elide their differences, I shall be arguing here that these four 
texts form a sustained reflection on Burroughs's central concerns: the production 
of the human subject in conditions of domination, and the possibilities of freedom 
from such a condition. In particular, they are concerned with social power as it is 
expressed through its impact on the body. More than his other work, the quartet is 
fuelled by a hatred of the forms that bodies take and prioritizes the rendering of 
such body matter visible in order to engage the reader's perception of their own 
embodiment. I shall not be offering a biographical account of Burroughs's role in 
the production of these texts. ' I will, however, be concerned to document 
Burroughs's own account of the goals of his writing, since his strongly didactic 
voice is such a marked feature of these texts and also of their critical discussion. 
Moreover, I shall argue that these texts' most rewarding engagement with 
embodiment emerges through the relationship which they have to the polemical 
voice that argues through them. 
Due to their persistently experimental form, and because of the shift that I 
am making here from conventionally theoretical texts to ones more usually 
designated `literary', it is worth spending some time providing both a provisional 
map of the texts for the reader and indicating what reading practices I intend to use 
here. 
The Naked Lunch is composed of a series of what Burroughs calls 
Naked Lunch Tetralogy' (`William Burroughs and His Faith in X', p. 79). In the 
end, perhaps these different attempts to formulate how to organize the texts should 
be seen as indicative of the difficulty of situating the work within such categories. 
`All my gooks' as Burroughs often says, `are all one book' (quoted in Philip 
Mikriammos, ` The Last European Interview', p. 16). 
3 For biographies of Burroughs see Barry Miles, William Burroughs: El Hombre 
Invisible; Ted Morgan, Literary Outlaw. The Life and Times of William S. 
Burroughs; and Graham Caveney, The `Priest' They Called Him: The Life and 
Legacy of William S. Burroughs.. Burroughs's letters from the period in which he 
wrote much of the material that forms the basis for the quartet are collected in The 
Letters of William S. Burroughs: 1945 
- 
1959. For two indispensable guides to 
material by, and of relevance to, Burroughs, see Michael B. Goodman, William S. 
Burroughs: An Annotated Bibliography ©f his Works and Criticism, and Michael 
B. Goodman with Lemuel B. Coley, William S. Burroughs: A Reference Guide. 
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`routines'. As described by David Glover, the routine is `a sketch, a kind of 
exaggerated or highlighted burlesque with vivid theatrical qualities, originally 
devised to be read aloud or acted out before others 
... 
with a strong oral 
dimension, reflecting the Beat preference for public performance' ('Utopia and 
Fantasy in the Late 1960s: Burroughs, Moorcock, Tolkien', p. 197). 4 These are 
narrated by a range of different speakers, some identified and some not; some of 
these narrators are anonymous and omniscient, others are themselves distinctive 
characters within a routine. There are twenty-two such sections, each self- 
contained, although certain characters (Lee, Carl, Doctor Benway) and places 
(Interzope, Tangier, Mexico) may recur. Some are brief and relatively 
straightforward narratives 
- 
although their material ranges from the mundane to the 
surreal (for instance, `Coke Bugs' recounts the meeting of two junkies, Joe and the 
Sailor, in a bar; whereas 'Hassan's Rumpus Room' describes in detail a sex-party 
involving various alien life-forms). Others contain strings of apparently 
unconnected phrases and sentences (such as the concluding section `Atrophied 
Preface: Wouldn't You ? '). Many sections contain a mixture of the two, alternating 
between the realist language that Burroughs adopted from hard-boiled detective 
stories (pnd in which he wrote his two earlier novels Junkie and Queer), and more 
disordered linguistic material. ' 
The Soft Machine takes a similar form, comprising 18 sections, many of 
which are routines again - often focusing on journeys in contemporary Central and 
4 As Jeffrey Dunn suggests, the routine was also developed as a seduction strategy: 
a witty, provocative, and complex demonstration of Burroughs's own skills which 
he developed as a means of maintaining the attention of men he had fallen in love 
with (`William S. Burroughs and Technologizing Literary Studies in the Industrial 
Age', pp. 183-186). It is in this form that Burroughs describes the routine in the 
semi-autobiographical Queer: ` he invents a frantic attention-getting format which 
he calls the Routine: shocking, funny, riveting' (p. 12). 
Given Burroughs's idiosyncratic prose, all quotations have been carefully 
checked. Any apparent spelling mistakes or irregularities of grammar are in the 
original texts. Where I have used an ellipsis, it is marked [... ]. All other ellipses are 
Burroughs's own_ So toG all italicization and capitalizations areas Burroughs uses 
them, unless indicated otherwise. 
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South America and journeys by time travel into the pasts of those subcontinents. 
This, and the two texts that follow it, are partly derived from unused material from 
the manuscript of The Naked Lunch (Jennie Skerl, William S. Burroughs, p. 48). 
However, in an important stylistic shift Burroughs now starts to use material 
produced by the ` cut-up' and `fold-in' methods he developed with the Swiss- 
Canadian painter Brion Gysin following their meeting in 1959 (Ted Morgan, 
Literary Outlaw, pp. 321-325). Modelled on Dadaist experimentation, " Burroughs's 
cut-ups involve, as the name suggests, cutting up pre-existing pieces of text, and 
arranging them 
- 
through a mixture of chance and intention 
- 
to form new texts. 
The fold-in involves taking two pages of text, folding them in half and then placing 
them side by side, with the lines of text aligned, to produce a new text that can be 
read across the lines. Burroughs also regularly combined the two: for instance, 
two cut-ups might be typed out and then folded into one another. 
Although critical evaluation of these practices ranges from the devout to 
the dismissive, ' Burroughs himself seems always to have spoken of them with the 
utmost seriousness. In their collaborative collection of cut-ups and associated 
theoretical material, The Third Mind, Burroughs and Gysin published an essay by 
Gerard-Georges Lemaire, locating their work in a line- from Gertrude Stein, 
6 Brion Gysin contributed to a 1935 exhibition by the Surrealist Group, alongside 
Max Ernst, Salvador Dali, Rene Magritte, and Man Ray, before Andre Breton 
ordered his drawings to be removed from the exhibition (Jeffrey Dunn, `William S. 
Burroughs and Technologizing Literary Studies', p. 255). Burroughs indicated his 
willingness to place himself in such a lineage when in 1958, at Allen Ginsberg's 
suggestion, he received a kiss from Marcel Duchamp ` in a symbolic passing of the 
mantle from the great French surrealist to his contemporary American successor' 
(Ted Morgan, Literary Outlaw, pp. 290-29 1). Although Burroughs is not named 
in it, Daniel Cottom's analysis of surrealism, `Purity', argues for the centrality to 
the movement of many of the concerns to be found in Burroughs: the attempt to 
overturns stifling regime of truth (p. 175)_and to free the body from language 
(p. 185); the problems of designing a manifesto to bring down society which does 
not rely on charismatic prophets (pp. 192-193); and misogyny (pp. 191-192). 
7Belief in the efficacy of the cut-ups as aesthetic and political strategies is argued 
by Jeff Bryan, ` William Burroughs and his Faith in X'; David Ingram, `William 
Burroughs and Language'; and Michael Skau, ` The Central Verbal System: the 
Prose of William Burroughs'. A sceptical dismissal is offered by-Laszlo K. Gefin, 
`Collage Theory, Reception, and the Cutups of William Burroughs'. 
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Raymond Roussel, and James Joyce, and welcoming `the Burroughs machine, 
systematic and repetitive, simultaneously disconnecting and connecting 
- 
it 
disconnects the concept of reality that has been imposed on us and then plugs 
normally dissociated zones into the same sector' ('23 Stitches Taken', p. 17). 8 
The cut-ups that appear in Burroughs's writings from The Soft Machine 
onward4 draw on a mixture of conventional literary sources (Shakespeare, T. S. 
Eliot, Rimbaud), popular culture (science-fiction and detective serials from 
magazines), non-literary materials (newspapers, government bulletins, medical 
manuals), and also both Burroughs's own work and those of his friends and 
collaborators. At some points Burroughs has described cut-up and fold-in 
techniques as simple adjuncts to a controlled writing process: `In using the fold-in 
method I edit, delete and rearrange as in any other method of composition [... ] 
What does any writer do but choose, edit and rearrange material at his disposal ?' 
(The Thfrd Mind, p. 96). But at other points he acknowledges the random nature of 
the choices made 
- 
both in terms of the material selected to be cut, and also in 
terms of which selections finally saw print (The Job, pp. 29-31). Similarly, 
Burroughs has written of The Naked Lunch that `I was just typing it out and giving 
it to Beiles9 with the idea that when we got the galley proofs I could decide the 
final order. But he took one look at it and said leave it the way it is. So it was just 
really an accidental juxtaposition. And the book was out a month later' (quoted in 
M. Skau, ` The Central Verbal System', p. 412, n. 19). 
Although I do not wish to analyze the cut-up practices in detail here, they 
nevertheless mark a number of important concerns in Burroughs's writing. Firstly, 
Burroughs claims a democratic effect for them, both because the cut-up is a 
'After writing the quartet, Burroughs came to regard his experiments with more 
hesitation. Although cut-up materials appear throughout his subsequent work, in 
1972 he noted ofSM, ITE and NE that `I feel that in all those books there was too 
much undifferentiated cut-up material' (quoted in Jennie Skerl, William 
Burroughs, p. 76). 
9 Sinclair Beiles was a poet whom Burroughs met in-Tangier-and who contributed 
to Burroughs's and Gysin's Minutes to Go. 
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practice available to all people, and because it refuses to respect the status of 
sanctified art: 
Fill a page with excerpts. Now cut the page. You have a new poem. As 
many poems as you like. As many Shakespeare Rimbaud poems as you like. 
Tristan Tzara said: `Poetry is for everyone'. And Andre Breton called him a 
cop and expelled him from the movement. Say it again: `Poetry is for 
everyone'. Poetry is a place and it is free to all cut up Rimbaud and you are 
in Rimbaud's place. (The Third Mind, p. 31) 
Secondly, Burroughs places these practices in a political context, claiming that the 
scrambling of words into unpremeditated forms liberates their producer and their 
reader from the rules of thought and language which they have acquired. The cut- 
up thus marks his belief that true freedom is achieved through practices that distort 
the substance of consciousness, language 
- 
and, as we shall see, the body 
- 
beyond 
recognition. Thirdly, at his more enthusiastic moments, he also claims supernatural 
efficacy for them: they may predict the future or bring about unexpected events 
(The Job, p. 28). They are thus a reminder of his faith in language to effect extreme 
psychological and social, and even physical change. 
At the same time as noting the distinctiveness of the cut-up sections, it is 
also worth noting their resemblance to so much material in The Naked Lunch 
which is not cut up: composite and mis-spelt words, arbitrary punctuation, 
unfinished sentences, and apparently random strings of words, do not suddenly 
appear in Burroughs's work with the advent of the cut-up technique 
- 
although in 
the case of these later texts they are produced by a particular method and they 
increase in number. The practice should thus be seen as a development in a project 
which was already underway in his writing: to create an accurate picture of the 
world, unbound by those conventional linguistic rules whose function, Burroughs 
argues, is to limit perception in such a way as to maintain existing social 
structures. 10 
10 One crucial context for the logic of Burroughs's style is thus the Beat movement, 
whose writing practice centred on attempts to express truth unspoilt by 
conventional language (see John Clellon Holmes, ` Unscrewing the Locks: The 
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The Ticket That Exploded contains twenty-one sections, with a higher 
proportion of cut-up material. It presents a conflict between two mythological 
organisations: the Nova Mob, a group of alien criminals intent on enslaving the 
earth by means of addiction, and the Nova Police, an interstellar agency whose 
duty is to capture and try them, thereby liberating the people of Earth. Nova 
Express consists of much shorter sections, forty two in number. It takes up the 
mythological environment of The Ticket That Exploded and depicts a war of 
resistance against the Nova Mob, replaying in various 
- 
and again, often cut-up 
- 
versions their final overthrow, without, crucially, ever depicting the world that 
might come after it. 
In all four texts, narratives begin only to be abandoned and never 
concluded, characters recur without any obvious connection between their 
Beat Poets') 
. 
Although Burroughs distances himself from the movement, saying `I 
don't associate myself with it at all, and never have, either with their objectives or 
their literary style' (The Job, p. 52), the literary historian will find such a claim 
unconvincing. In his 1952 roman ä clef, Go, John Clellan Holmes defines beat as `a 
weariness with all the forms and conventions of the world' (quoted in Paul George 
and Jerold Starr, ` Beat Politics: New Left and Hippie Beginnings in the Postwar 
Counterculture', p. 195). Beat draws its resistance to social control and its 
weariness with the world from its adoption of the language, style, attitudes and 
cultural forms - particularly jazz - of the black hipsters of the 1940s (George and 
Starr, ` Beat Politics', p. 191), a position exemplified by Norman Mailer's `The 
White Negro'. Beat follows a recurrent pattern of bohemianism, the adaptation of 
Romanticism to the urban, technological, and commercial landscape of the late 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries: `the notion that every human's potential should 
be allowed to develop freely; adoration of the "primitive"; the celebration of 
fraternity, the beauty of nature; wanderlust and the lure of the exotic; the 
transformative power of art; free love; the quest for intense experience; and above 
all, living uncorrupted by bourgeois materialism and unrestrained by bourgeois 
convention' ('Beat Politics', p. 190). While such a list bears obvious affinities to 
Burroughs, it also brings out a number of his deviations from such a model: 
although his sexually explicit writing is enabled by the beat tradition of the 
celebration of the body, he uses such possibilities to indict, rather than celebrate, 
bodily activities; his visions of fraternity see male camaraderie as destructive as 
often as it is redemptive; the ` exotic' and the ` primitive' do indeed function in 
Burroughs as objects of fascination, but more often they operate as sites of threat 
and terror. For an account of Burroughs as the inheritor of the Romantic literary 
tradition 
- 
language having a power of social and spiritual transformation, faith in 
transcendence through the imagination 
- 
see Duncan Wu, `Wordsworth in Space'. 
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different appearances, events take place in locations that are never specified, 
conversations occur between unidentified speakers, incidents are described whose 
events are never mentioned again. These texts are therefore not novels (although 
they are often called such both by Burroughs and by writers on his work), but 
perhaps should rather be considered as collections of units 
- 
perhaps prose 
poems"- whose overall form is not linear but which may, on some occasions, 
(appear to) develop truncated narratives across several such units. As Burroughs 
says: `You can cut into The Naked Lunch at any intersection point' (NL, p. 176). 12 
We should then read these texts as an assemblage of verbal material, which 
we may choose to read in terms of narratives, characters, and incidents, but which 
we should also read precisely not on such terms. Rather, we should read them as 
an open literary space, in which meanings may appear as effects of the reading 
experience, and which seeks to generate particular perspectives on the world 
through a variety of literary strategies. To analyze those generated perceptions will 
be one goal of these chapters, reading them in terms of the vision of bodily 
invasion that they strive to bring about in their reader. On the other hand, this body 
of writing should also be considered as a cultural artefact produced under 
determining ideological and material conditions. Burroughs's picture of the body is 
not so much unique, as it is a particularly intense crystallization of the anxieties 
about the social production of the embodied experience which I have outlined so 
far: what does it mean for a body to retain or lose its purity and its coherence ? 
(ii) The Body Under Attack 
Drawing together two of the central figures of this thesis, Gilles Deleuze 
writes: ` "Control' is the name Burroughs proposes as a term for the new monster, 
"A suggestion made to me by my supervisor, Judith Still. 
12 At the same time, some critics have argued for a linear reading of either the 
quartet or of individual texts: see for instance William S. Stull, The Quest and the 
Question: Cosmology in the work of William S. Burroughs, 1953-1960'. 
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one that Foucault recognizes as our immediate future' (`Postscript on the Societies 
of Control', p. 4). The linkage of the two makes sense, for it certainly seems that 
Burroughs's texts, like those of Foucault, offer an analysis of domination in terms 
of both discourse and bio-power: control achieved through language, and control 
achieved through the materiality of the body. " Before exploring these two domains 
in detail? I wish to outline some of the key dynamics of this Burroughsian 
perspective on power, and the role of language and the body within it. 
These four texts are, as so many critics have noted, marked by an 
awareness of the particular susceptibility of the body to physical influences. Such 
influences make the body a docile worker or obedient slave: `the subject is far 
enough along with the treatment to accept punishment as deserved' (NL, p. 33), ` I 
recall this one kid, I condition to shit at the sight of me. Then I wash his ass and 
screw him' (NL, p. 36). But, more alarmingly, they also transform the very material 
of the body. 
They rolled on the flower bed crushing out clouds of odor 
- 
color fingers 
through his larval flesh feeling along his fish spine 
- 
Spasms shook his body 
and green erogenous slime poured from glands under his gills covering the 
two bodies with a viscous bubble 
- 
softening flesh and bones to jelly 
- 
He 
sank into the client 
- 
Spines rubbed and merged in little shocks of electric 
pleasure 
- 
He was sucked into other testicles 
-A soft pearly grotto closed 
around him pulsing tighter and tighter 
- 
He melted to sperm fingers 
caressing the penis inside 
- 
Quivering contractions as he squirmed through 
pink tumescent flesh to a crescendo of drumbeats shot out in a green flare 
falling into slow convolutions of underwater sleep 
- 
(7TE, pp. 71-72) 
We can recognize in this passage the key attributes of bodily disorder which I have 
already enumerated as points of particular anxiety in imagining the body: the loss 
of the body's independence from others; the loss of the body's physical integrity; 
the transition from ordered solid to formless liquid; the invasion of the body by 
external objects. The bodily disorder is heightened by the impossibility of 
" Scott Bukatman makes a similar linkage: ` "Me perfection of power, " Michel 
Foucault wrote, "should tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary". Or, as 
William Burroughs observed, "A functioning police state needs no police" ' 
(Terminal Identity, p. 3 8). 
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identifying exactly what biologies are represented here: what process takes place 
when `he melted to sperm fingers' or `he was sucked into other testicles' ? Should 
we read the orgasmic language of melting as literal or metaphoric ? To whom does 
`the penis inside' belong 
- 
and what, and whom, is it inside ? Is it inside the body of 
another, or is it an internal organ ? This sense of bodies without identifiable order 
is heightened by the uncertainty of the repeated pronoun: does ` he' refer always to 
one particular character, or at different points to different characters ? 
The body of such a scene is marked by four features which recur in the 
representation of the body in Burroughs's writing: invasion, transformation, abject 
material}ty, and bodily susceptibility. The invasion of the body is so central to 
Burroughs's representation of corporeality that, as Arnold Weinstein has observed 
`the structure may be played out in terms of drugs, sex, disease, or ideology, but 
the structure remains the same: the opening of the body by a foreign object' 
('Freedom and Control in the Erotic Novel: the Classical Liaisons Dangereuses 
Versus the Surrealist Naked Lunch', p. 35). The use in the above extract of passive 
and intransitive verbs ('sank', `melted'), or verbs where the body is the object 
(`shook', `covering') are characteristic of Burroughs's prose, and its location of 
the body as a site of powerlessness in the face of the action of others. The foreign 
object that enters the body renders it, as Weinstein says, `open': opened by other 
influences, but also expressive of its own material openness to invasion. The next 
sentencc in the text reads `Shifting dominion of the other inside', which might be 
said to encapsulate the notion of embodiment at work here: something `other' finds 
its way `inside' the body so as to effect `dominion'. 
Secondly, we see what Ihab Hassan calls `the spontaneous transformation 
of the human body into lower forms of life' ('The Subtracting Machine: The Work 
of William Burroughs', p. 12). This scene is a stage in a process in which a human 
body gradually becomes amphibian in response to sexual stimulation and alien 
technology. The transformation of the body into the sub-human (`larval fingers', 
`fish spine', `gills') and finally towards `underwater sleep' marks the 
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transformation into marine life. 
But more particularly 
- 
the crucial third feature of such scenes 
- 
the body is 
changed not only in the direction of lower forms of life, but also in the direction of 
abject matter. As the process begins, we are told that `Bradly could feel stirring 
response in the liquid medium of his body' (TTE, p. 70), rendering the body already 
close to a material form imagined as a devolution away from solid matter, and 
marking again the body's own betrayal of its autonomy. The outpouring of `green 
erogenous slime', the softening of bones into jelly and the moment of ejaculation, 
which here seems to transform the matter of the entire body into semen (as indeed 
in some points in Burroughs's writing it does) is the transformation of the body 
into viscous organic material. Mary Douglas has observed that such matter is 
peculiarly disturbing to systems where the body is thought of as integral and self- 
contained (PD, pp. 37-38), and we may think of this spectacle of bodily liquefaction 
as one in which the distinctness of the corporeal self 
- 
and the possibility of a 
distinct identity which is predicated upon that 
- 
becomes lost. Hence Burroughs's 
nightmare of domination is represented by `the Liquefaction programme' which 
`involves the eventual merging of everyone into One Man' (NL, p. 120). 
Put perhaps most importantly, the erotic context of the passage renders this 
not simply the violation of an unwilling body, but the response of one body to 
stimulation by another. At times, this may be an involuntary physical response 
- 
it 
is often bard to tell, as in the scene above where the word `client' introduces an 
element of economic necessity into the encounter. The various outpourings and 
physical changes make the body complicit with, rather than merely a victim of, the 
forces that transform and invade it. This scene is thus already marked by the 
particular feature of Burroughs's bodies which will concern me in this chapter: the 
capacity of the body to demonstrate from within a response to what invades from 
without, so that the hostile forms of power which grasp, penetrate and transform 
the body, seem not to be dominating a victim, but to be acting on bodies which 
collude with, and even solicit, their intervention. Dominating the bodies of his 
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victims, Dr. Benway remarks `some times a subject will burst into boyish tears 
because he can't keep from ejaculate when you screw him' (NL, p. 36) 
- 
and the 
tears are as much an involuntary bodily act as the ejaculation. "' 
`The Land of the Free' declares one of Burroughs's visitors to America, ` is 
really free and wide open for any life form the uglier the better' (NE, p. 10). These 
are texts in which planets, nations, minds, and bodies are open to entry, and in 
which power is conceptualized as the capacity to enter and transform the body of 
another: `Invade. Damage. Occupy' is the creed of the forces of control (SM, p. 6). 
However, where Foucault imagines the possibilities of limited but creative 
resistance, Burroughs envisages the possibility of the total withdrawal from a 
system of power, in favour of a new relationship to both language and the body. In 
a testimony to the possibility of salvation, Burroughs is interested in the experience 
of cure: the introduction to The Naked Lunch begins ` I awoke from The Sickness 
at the age of forty-five, calm and sane, and in reasonably good health except for a 
weakened liver and the look of borrowed flesh common to all who survive' (NL, 
p. 9). With the heightened sense of freedom evoked by `awoke', and the powerful 
adjectivgs `calm and sane', this statement marks the possibility of absolute escape 
from thq condition of invasion and possession. In 1956 Burroughs had undergone a 
programme of treatment for his heroin addiction at Dr. John Dent's clinic in 
London, involving the administration of the morphine derivative apomorphine. '3 As 
Jenny Skerl notes, he was quick to locate this event within his own mythology 
(William S. Burroughs, pp. 32-34), so that in these texts aomorphine becomes the 
miracle substance which will cure any addiction or possession: `Peoples of the 
earth, you have all been poisoned [... ] Apomorphine is the only agent that can 
"Alfred Korzybski, the linguist whose work strongly influenced Burroughs, 
discusses physical reactions to language in terms of the body's involuntary control, 
arguing that when humans see symbols `the majority of humans identify the symbol 
with actualities, and secretions very often follow' (Science and Sanity, p. 196, 
emphases in the original). 
" See Ted Morgan, Literary Outlaw, pp. 257-258. Burroughs gives an account of 
his treatment in The Job, pp. 139-158. 
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disintoxicate you and cut the enemy beam off your line. Apomorphine and silence' 
(NE, p. 6). 
The linking of this physical mode of salvation to silence is a recurrent 
tactic, for matching the desire to purify the body of contamination is a desire to 
purify the mind of discourse. Just as we are subject to physical invasion, we are 
also subject to the control of language. When ` Dr Paine of the Space Center in 
Houston' praises astronauts who `aren't ashamed to say a prayer now and then' 
Burroughs responds: 
Is this the great adventure of space ? Are these men going to take the step 
into regions literally unthinkable in verbal terms ? To travel in space you 
must leave the old verbal garbage behind: God talk, country talk, mother 
talk, love talk, party talk. You must learn to exist with no religion no 
country no allies. You must learn to live in silence. Anyone who prays in 
space is not there. (The Job, p. 21) 
Space here operates as the site for the possibility of a place beyond discourse, with 
silence its defining - and most hopeful - feature. And elsewhere, imagining, again, 
power as operating through an eradicable discourse, he locates power within the 
magical books in the possession of the boards of multinational conglomerates, and 







p. 51). Hence for Burroughs the opposite of freedom is language 
- 
defined here as 
the medium by which thought is constrained. 16 
But even as it asserts a cure, the text undermines this apparent certainty. In 
describing his awakening into health, Burroughs's body is marked by a `weakened 
liver' (tl}e sign of a body once invaded) and by `the look of borrowed flesh'. The 
semantic ambivalence of that phrase is crucial: does it mean flesh that looks as if 
16 Susan Sontag and Ihab Hassan have argued that Burroughs is part of a tradition 
of `literatures of silence' which offer freedom through the suspension of 
interpretation (Ihab Hassan `The Literature of Silence'; Susan Sontag, `The 
Aesthetics of Silence'). Robin Lydenberg extends this argument to a reading of 
Burroughs's work as an attempt to escape from meaning and towards a 
`materiality of absence'T in-Which the world appears as it is, undistorted by 
language (Word Cultures). 
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someone has borrowed it, used it, and now returned it ? Or flesh that looks as if he 
has had to borrow it in order to exist ? In either case, the flesh stands apart from 
the subject 
-a substance that can be transferred, moved: a point of vulnerability, 
since it can be traded amongst different owners. Even while he asserts ownership - 
either through reclamation or through temporary loan 
- 
the possibility of borrowing 
flesh marks its instability: the flesh is no guarantee of stability or safety for the 
subject who inhabits it. Even its apparently metaphorical status ('the look of 
borrowed flesh') offers no distance in a set of texts in which the body is so often 
literally borrowed. 
Salvation from the forces of control is thus precarious. For instance, the 
Nova Police are not always the most reliable of saviours. We are told that they are 
`galactic shock troops who never colonize' (TTE, p. 81) and that `the Nova Police 
have no intention of remaining after their work is done' (NE, p. 51). Yet the need 
to deny such a possibility only raises it: these forms of resistance repeatedly need 
to differentiate themselves from the corrupt doppelgängers from which they are so 
hard to distinguish. In a move which we will find repeated in these texts 
- 
and 
much debated by their critics - Burroughs's dreams of salvation remain heavily 
marked by traces of that which they resist. 
There are four distinctive types of body invader in these texts: junk, " 
parasites, the virus, and language. Although these four terms operate as distinct 
substances, with their own peculiar features, the terms often appear in 
combinations like `the junk virus' (NL p. 11) or slide from one to the next, so that 
Burroughs moves swiftly from `My basic theory is that the written word was 
17 'Junk is a generic term for all habit-forming preparations and derivatives of 
opium including the synthetics' (The Job p. 149), the best known of which are 
morphine and heroin. Burroughs's use of the term, with its connotations of waste, 
is central to his construction of substances that enable domination as being 
absolutely without redeeming value: `I have heard that there was once a beneficent 
non-habit-forming junk in India. It was called soma [... ] If ever soma existed the 
Pusher was there to bottle it and monopolize it and sell it and turned it into plain 
old time JUNK' (NL, p. 10). 1 have therefore chosen to retain the term. 
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actually a virus' to a definition of a virus as `a cellular parasite' (The Job, p. 12). 
Such interchangeability suggests their broadly similar operations: to invade and 
control the body via its materiality. Such a vision recognizes the constant social 
intervention that takes place through and upon bodies, and the extent to which this 
produces subjects amenable to the demands of various oppressive institutions. The 
military, industry, the medical profession, psychiatry, white culture, bureaucracy: 
all of these are indexed at various points in the quartet as the beneficiaries of a 
scrutiny and manipulation of our bodies, and Burroughs uses a language of purity 
to urge us to detach ourselves from those malign forces. 
However, my concern here is not with the specific social institutions which 
Burroughs attacks. Rather it is with the general figuration of the meaning of `the 
body' which subtends this attack. What meanings are we offered for our bodies in 
the course of this call to liberate them ? In analyzing the discourse surrounding 
each of Purroughs's four key body invaders, I will argue that while Burroughs 
apparently designates each one as an exterior and invasive force, he also imagines 
each as the inevitable consequence of the nature of the body itself. Moreover his 
designated means of resisting these invaders (which include: silence, apomorphine, 
the Nova. Police, the cut-up technique) will also prove again and again to be 
difficult to separate from that which they oppose. Thus rather than imagining a 
body under siege and in need of protection, he imagines a body which must be 
transcended altogether since both its materiality, and the means of saving it, prove 
too dangerous. 
(a) Junk 
Burroughs imagines junk as an invading presence taking up residence in the 
body, a resident whom he calls `my old friend Opium Jones' (The Job, p. 151). This 
inhabitant shapes and controls the body it possesses: `I never took a bath. Old 
Jones don't like the feel of water' (The Job, p. 151). But apomorphine `evicts' 
Jones in a kind of exorcism: `I boiled him in hydrochloric acid. Only way to get 
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him clean you understand layers and layers of that grey junk rooming-house smell' 
(The Job, p. 152). 18 The image of junk as physically dense ('layers and layers'), and 
existing as a pervasive smell suggest its capacity to penetrate and possess, the 
impossibility of escaping from it. Throughout these texts, it is junk that is the 
recurrent image for the susceptibility of the body to domination and its pliability as 
a metaphor for dependency provides Burroughs with a single formula for all forms 
of social control: `Junk is the mold of monopoly and possession 
... 
Because there 
are many forms of addiction I think that they all obey basic laws' (NL, pp. 10-14). 
By making the body a slave to its addiction, junk traps the body in a network of 
control, the economy of supply by which the addict has access to it. In particular 
the junky is at the mercy of the pusher: `waiting on the Man... "What can we do 7' 
Nick said to me once in his dead junky whisper "They know we'll wait 
... 
" Yes, 
they know we'll wait' (SM p. 5). But it is the hold of junk on the body in particular 
that concerns Burroughs, for 
- 
as in his account of apomorphine treatment 
- 
the 
body is not free until `metabolically cured' (NL, p. 13), and it is this capacity of 
junk to achieve control via the biology of the body that is central to my argument 
here. 
Like the ` verbal garbage' which threatens to contaminate the adventure 
into space, junk is useless: `What is more UNNECESSARY than junk if You 
Don't Need it? ' (NL, p. 15). We might observe that this is the very force of the 
word `junk' - to denote the useless, the wasted, the unwanted. Dead to the world 
and whispering, the junky is the site of a fading or emptying out of subjectivity: `If 
a friend came to visit - and they rarely did since who or what was left to visit -I sat 
there not-caring that he had entered my field of vision 
-a grey screen always 
blanker and fainter' (NL, p. 12). Imaged as a physical absence, or deterioration, the 
"At a purely factual level, hydrochloric acid refers to the chemical origins of 
apomorphine: `the compound apomorphine is formed by boiling morphine with 
hydrochloric acid! (NL, p-1-1)- Contrasted- with the lingering 
_ 
`junkrooming house 
smell', the association of apomorphine with acid strengthens its caustic, cleansing 
properties. But at the same time, its origin from within morphine already-indicates 
a dubious connection to which I shall return. 
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junky is a subject who has less of a body than others. Burroughs's addicts have 
`flesh that fades at the first silent touch of junk' (NL, p. 22), and the ` cancelled eyes 
of junk' (NL, p. 88), telling us that `I am forgetting sex and all sharp pleasures of 
the body' (NL, p. 63). Although the junky's body is saturated with raw need, s/he is 
simultaneously disconnected from desire, ` a ghost in the morning sunlight, torn 
with disembodied lust' (NL, p. 58). 
But junk is also the source of another bodily state. On the one hand, junk 
induces a state of fading, a waning of affect; on the other, it induces craving 
- 
the 
need for junk: `the terrible urgency of that blind seeking mouth' (NL, p. 21), `his 
eyes burned in a hideous dry hunger'(NL, 52). The addict detached from the body 
is thus also the possessor of (and possessed by) a particular type of body: one 
which affirms its organs, and their insistent materiality. "' John Vernon has traced 
Burroughs's catalogue of dismemberments, the coming to life of individual body 
parts, the transformation of inert objects into living organisms and vice versa, 
arguing that we see in them a body separated into individual units, each with its 
own independent existence. But the overall effect, he insists, is that of a dead and 
wasted body, whose organs have no function or purpose except addiction, the 
drive that has rendered them mere tools for the fix (The Garden and the Map: 
Schizophrenia in Twentieth-Century Literature, pp. 95-97 and pp. 104-105). 
Because each part of the body has a life of its own, the body has become mere 
matter, since without any overarching consciousness to unify its components the 
embodied subject has lost what is taken to be the distinctive attribute of the human: 
the autonomy of rational agency. As Margrit Shildrick argues, to be defined as 
being more under the control of one's body is to be defined as less fully an agent, 
19 Christopher Meyer argues that Burroughs also offers the possibility of a third 
state in which the body's libidinal energies are no longer paralyzed by pleasure, as 
in the case of the addict on junk, nor enslaved to need, as in the case of the addict 
without junk, but released into a frenzy of withdrawal in which `the tightly 
regulated system of maintenance breaks down to allow for an unpredictable release 
of forces that have been carefully controlled and repressed' ('The Psycho- 
pharmacology of Everyday Life: William S. Burroughs and the Narcotic Regime'). 
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unable to follow the path of rational calculation that modernity defines as the 
standard of full subjectivity (Leaky Bodies and Boundaries, pp. 26-27). 
Such a material body returns us to the associations of waste and junk since, 
in its invocation of bodily material, Burroughs relies on the associations of the 
material body with death and excrement, on the notion of a body which is itself an 
item of waste-matter. Littered as they are with carrion, sewage, and mold, 
Burroughs's landscapes remind us of a bodily corruptibility whose icon is the 
junky: `Iris 
- 
half Chinese and half Negro 
- 
addicted to dihydro-oxy-heroin 
- 
takes a 
shot every fifteen minutes to which end she leaves droppers and needles sticking 
out all over her. The needles rust in her dry flesh, which, here and there, has grown 
completely over a joint to form a smooth green brown wen' (NL, p. 101). 
As Avital Ronnel has argued in her study of the place of addiction in 
western philosophy, the hostile representation of the addict `posits the body as the 
no-return of disposability: the trash-body, pivoted on its own excrementality' 
(Crack Wars: Literature, Addiction, Mania, p. 58). 20 Hence, she suggests, drug 
use is imagined as that process by which `the body proper regains its corruptible, 
organic status' (p. 7). It is as if to become too corporeal is also to become dead, 
since the body itself functions ultimately as the sign of the corpse: the inert matter 
which we revivify during our lives, but which will collapse upon our death. This 
frightening aspect of embodiment acts as a perpetual brake on the possibility of 
affirming the body through its material pleasures and pains. Rather than acting as 
signs of intensity or enlightenment 
- 
as the use of opium does in Romanticism 
- 
the 
drug addict's enslavement to the body seems to signify their becoming nothing but 
materiality itself and, as such, signifies death. 
One reason for the horrific association of junk, then, is that the junky has 
20 More politically, as Ronnel reminds us, we might also want to note the way that 
in the twentieth century's dominant discourses on drugs, the junky is denounced 
socially as a waste of time, resources and money 
- 
as one who is outside the care of 
society. Burroughs, while hostile to these stigmatizing discourses, also uses much 
of their imagery to make his case for the destructive character of addiction. 
151 
had those supposedly defining human characteristics of will, independence, and 
rationality usurped by the demands of the body. We might even say that junk 
effects a shift back from social desire, to physical need. As Ronnel quips: `the 
distinction, so rigorously maintained in the Hegelian Lacan, between need and 
desire, may be a luxury of the sober' (p. 135). For the addict, what is desired is also 
that which is bodily necessary for survival. The junky is no longer the Lacanian 
adult, who is constituted by frustrated desire, but the child, who needs only 
immediate physical gratification, and whose needs can in fact be met by a purely 
physical act. Where in Lacan's formulation desire is forever deferred and 
unsatisfied, the junky has reached that enviable state of the child whose mouth can 
be entirely filled by the maternal breast. Z' 
The junky's body is thus the sign of a double, and contradictory, 
colonization of the subject by their corporeality: they have been taken over by 
bodily hunger, and they have been restored to a sense of bodily bliss. They are 
overwhelmed by the sensations of their body and as such they are closer to inert 
matter. In both cases, it is the body itself that is at fault. " As if in recognition that 
this final responsibility lies with our bodies, Burroughs attempts to recruit the body 
against addiction: `on a deep biological level your body wants to be cured. Junk is 
death and your body knows it' (The Job, pp. 150-51). But at the same time 
addiction is a risk of almost any substance in Burroughs, as if the very biology of 
the human body were primed for dependency. We find `flesh addicts' (TTE p. 45), 
`control junkies' (TTE, p. 108), ` orgasm addicts' (TTE, p. 14). The junky's body 
becomes the incarnation of addiction: `I have a place where I can slip the needle 
right into a vein, it stays open like a red, festering mouth, swollen and obscene 
... 
21 An analysis of addiction in terms of infantile regression is offered in Neal 
Oxenhandler, `Listening to Burroughs' Voice', pp. 136-138. 
u Derrida notes that at certain points both pro- and anti-drugs rhetoric share the 
investment in a fantasy of an original natural body. Such a body is viewed either as 
destroyed by the invasion of drugs and restored only through detoxification; or as 
alienated from itself by capitalism and restored to its originary biological unity only 
through intoxication ('The Rhetoric of Drugs: An Interview', pp. 14-15). 
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The body knows what veins you can hit' (NL p. 62). It is the body that colludes 
with the substances that addict and ensures their efficient possession. Hence 
Burroughs's war on junk is a war on access, an attempt to strengthen the borders 
which these substances too easily cross. Indeed, so prone is the body to take its 
pleasure that even the supposed ultimate weapon of cleansing, silence, can become 
addictive (NE p. 124). 
For Burroughs then, junk serves to suggest that invasion takes place at the 
level of the body, and that the body is all too easily invaded. The phrase which 
captures the need of the addict 
- 
`In the words of total need: "Wouldn't you? " Yes 
you would' (NL, p. 10) - might as well be that of the body's tendency to fall prey 
to junk in the first place: `those become addicts who have access to junk' (SM, 
p. 137). What we find as raw need in the junky is a tendency already present in 
everyone before they become subject to addiction. Hence the borderline between 
addict and non-addict grows thinner, with junk as the substance which exposes not 
so much the radically separate biologies of sickness and health, but the unexpected 
proximity of the two. 
Moreover, as Avital Ronnel and Frank McConnell have both argued, drug 
use also has an unsettling affinity with literature: the external substance which, 
when absorbed, alters consciousness. " For McConnell the Romantic construction 
of a new sense of the expansion of consciousness which is claimed for poetry, is 
coupled with the equally Romantic interest in the use of opiates ('William 
Burroughs and the Literature of Addiction', pp. 673-675). For Ronnel, the 
delirious solaces of the text are imagined in the language of the opiate, as when 
Madame Bovary's pharmacist, Homais, ` has offered Emma the unlimited use of his 
library, inviting the addicted neighbour to mix pharmaceuticals and literature' 
(Crack FVars, p. 131). So too Burroughs's texts offer such headily narcotic 
pleasures as extended transcripts of his own hallucinatory experiences with the 
drug yage in South America. Much of his audience thus creatively rewrite his work 
u Derrida makes a similar argument in `The Rhetoric of Drugs: An Interview. ' 
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so as to engage with it less as the condemnation of the addict's state, than as the 
recreation of that narcotic bliss for the reader's pleasure (David Glover, `Utopia 
and Fantasy in the Late 1960s: Burroughs, Moorcock, Tolkien', p. 195; Frank 
McConnell, `William Burroughs and the Literature of Addiction', pp. 673-674). 
The figure of the pusher in the quartet is the one who holds court over those he 
supplies, the "marks" who shiver with withdrawal and cold, attentive on his every 
move or word 
- 
and we may glimpse in Victor Bockris's extraordinary description 
of Burroughs's devotees, the figure of the pusher who is the unmentioned 
intertext: ` Everybody who approached him did so with such a mixture of reverence 
and fear that they were often shaking and unable to speak' (With William 
Burroughs: A Report from the Bunker, p. xiii). 
(b) The parasite 
Burroughs writes: `The soft machine is the human body under constant 
siege from avast hungry host of parasites' (SM, p. 130). These texts are full of 
entities which invade a host body and take up residence within it, while still 
maintaining 
- 
yet also distorting 
- 
the biological functions of that body. Parasitism 
serves here as the defining model for all relationships of domination: from `the 
parasitic excrescence that often travels under the name "Police"' (NE, p. 5 1), to 
the creatures that inhabit Burroughs's rivers and swamps 
- 
while in the Biologic 
Courts of Nova Express, a parasitic relationship constitutes `the classic case 
presented to first year students' trying to learn ` the intricacies and apparent 
contradictions of biologic law': 
Life Form A arrives on alien planet from a crippled space craft 
- 
Life Form 
A breathes `oxygen' 
- 
There is no `oxygen' in the atmosphere of alien 
planet but-by invading and occupying Life Form B native to alien planet 
they can convert the ` oxygen' they need from the blood stream of Life 
Form B-[... ] Health and interest of the host is disregarded (NE, pp. 133- 
134). 
The primacy oftliis model of manipulation is marked by its rendering as an abstract 
154 
model: the legal use of the present tense, the representative `Life Form A' and 
`Life Form B', and the quotation marks around `oxygen', where the word stands in 
for any and all biological necessities that might become sites of a conflict of 
interest. The parasite extends the model of control established with junk, while 
cementing even more firmly its bodily connotations. Like junk, the parasite is an 
invader of human biology, but this time is itself biological, repulsively organic. It 
serves to heighten in Burroughs's reader a distrust of biological processes, and to 
present them as dangerous and destructive. 
At one point we are asked: `You notice something is sucking all the flavor 
out of food the pleasure out of sex the color out of everything in sight ?' (NE, 
p. 75). Lydenberg points out that this general diminution of the world can be traced 
back to the parasitic entities who live off it (Word Cultures, pp. 40-41). Its draining 
away 
- 
or, as in the case of `Life Form A', redirection 
- 
of the will and energy of 
the host, makes the parasite usefully emblematic of the conditions that define the 
meaning of freedom for Burroughs: nothing is more dreaded than the loss of 
autonomy of the subject ('the parasites occupy brain areas', SM, p. 130), whose 
own body is no longer under their control, but under the control of someone else. 
At the same time, this controlling aspect of the parasite also helps to 
encode it as inferior to the host, as that which depends on hosts who are 
themselves independent. The sense of the lesser taking over the greater thus 
enables both the possibility of escape 
- 
just as the addict can kick a habit, the host 
can expel a parasite - but also acts as an indictment of those who have allowed 
themselves to become thus inhabited. Like all these forms of control, the parasite 
survives by being ignored, so that as long as some force `kept you from wising up 
to the sexual parasite' (TIE, p. 109) it can go on operating, with `wising up' as the 
activity which both promises imminent freedom, and as that which marks the 
failure of the host to grasp their real situation. 
Since it is a lack of resistance or scrutiny which grants the parasite the 
opportunity to pass unnoticed within, the parasite may function as a metonymic 
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signifier for the host's own shortcomings. When we are told of addict/pusher the 
Sailor that `when he moved an effluvia of mold drifted out of his clothes' (NL, 
p. 53), the moldy man appears as repulsive and useless as the mold that encrusts 
him. Like it, he is parasitic 
- 
living on the subjects of economy of junk. We might 
then say that the parasite discloses the nature of the host it inhabits: that in 
Burroughs, we each get the parasite that we deserve. 
Undermining our decisions, distorting our desires, the parasite in effect 
serves as Burroughs's call for a self of absolute autonomy, untainted by any trace 
of an otherness that has passed from without to within. Burroughs thus imagines a 
body which could be cleansed of invaders: 
crab parasites of the nervous system and the grey cerebral dwarf made their 







You can't'. (TTE, p. 66) 
These parasites are expelled by a `blast of silence' (TTE, p. 66), which removes 
and silences them. They are like the ` verbal garbage' which Burroughs wants to 
keep out of space, like all these figures of the unnecessary which saturate these 
texts. Aý we commonly assume: the parasite needs its host more than the host 
needs its parasite. And yet, like the junky coming off junk, that scream of `you 
can't' might come from the host as well as the parasite, the anguish of liberation. 
If, as Burroughs says of addiction, `of course the addict does not "want" to be 
cured 
... 
since it is precisely the centers of "wanting" that have been taken over by 
the drug' (SM, p. 135), then the same complicity is as true of parasitism. The 
parasite is thus that which undermines the possibility of a pure desire which 
originatgs solely from an uncontaminated self. 
As such, Burroughs' s construction of parasitism figures any contact 
between separate entities as a situation of risk, in which the desires of the one 
threaten always to undermine the purity of the desires of the other. Between self 
and parasite there is no hope of reciprocity, co-operation or love: `There are no 
good relationships - There are no good words' (TTE p. 67). What seems like co- 
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operation soon becomes domination. `First it's symbiosis, then parasitism' (TTE, 
p. 68). This impossibility of a good relationship between bodies becomes the 
foundation of Burroughs's paranoia. Against any possibility of benign contact, the 
parasite stands as the dangerous consequence of getting too close. In these texts 
proximity is always dangerous, precipitating infection or devouring. These 
unstable, flowing, viscous bodies cannot stay apart. We thus return to the 
nightmare vision of the liquefactionists where individual identity is lost in 
collectivity, the state that Burroughs urges us to avoid at any cost. 
In this world where everything threatens to converge into that dreaded 
substance `Undifferentiated Tissue' (NL, p. 110), Burroughs is the prophet of 
differentiation and separation: 
Hospital smells and the wooden numbness of anaesthesia 
- 
He saw his body 
on an operating table split down the middle 
-A doctor with forceps was 
extracting crab parasites from his brain and spine 
- 
and squeezing green fish 
parasites from the separated flesh (TTE, p. 67) 
The body must therefore be opened up so that safe and dangerous materials may 
be identified and separated. And yet, as with the junky, the biology that we 
discover is itself close to waste matter, its vivid materiality coded as possessing a 
corporeal affinity with these invaders. In the course of this parasite-destroying 
operation, details of physical change include ` the stretching membrane of skin 
dissolves', `Magnified sperm drifted through water tape in silent explosions', 
`gristle vaporizes': are these bodily materials also being removed in the process of 
eliminating parasites ? Sperm, skin, blood, the spine, eyes: the lives which these 
organs and substances acquire in the quartet makes the entire body seem a 
composite of parasitic creatures on whom we have come to depend. Making the 
component parts of the body themselves into parasitic entities makes the body's 
most basic biological processes suspect: what is necessary and what is merely being 
performed for the convenience of the parasite ? Like hapless Life Form B, we are 
oblivious to the extent to which our normal functions are merely responses to 
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parasitic occupiers. 
Thus our biology may itself be the cause, not simply the victim, of these 
infections. Just as the junky is cured only until he tastes junk again, `other parasites 
will invade sooner or later' (TTE p. 68) because, like the junky, the body is always 
receptive to the parasite. The space cleared away remains always inviting, a hole at 
the centre of the subject as well as in the surface of the subject: 
the candiru is a small eel-like fish or worm about one-quarter inch through 
and two inches long patronizing certain rivers of ill repute in the Greater 
Amazon Basin, will dart up your prick or your asshole or a woman's cunt 
faute de mieux, and hold himself there by sharp spines (NL, p. 47) 
This internal vacancy, complete with openings which signal its offer of a place to 
occupy, is the receptive space which the parasite seeks out. We are thus physically 
receptive to invasion because of the very structure of our bodies. It is their 
weakness that makes us unable to maintain autonomy. 
The body is further indicted since the invading parasite takes over the 
functions of the body, to the extent that we can no longer know which activities or 
organs of the body are `ours', and which are those produced by the parasite: 
The realization that something as familiar to you as the movement of your 
intestines the sound of your breathing the beating of your heart is also alien 
and hostile does make one feel a bit insecure at first. (TTE, p. 43-44) 
The most basic organs of the body are thus rendered parasitic themselves 
- 
preying 
upon a free soul by requiring it to follow their rhythms and service their needs. 
But while Burroughs may assert a fantasy of originary independence, 
against which parasitic incursions can be measured, his texts seem also to work in 
another direction. When Steven Shaviro writes his polemical `Two Lessons from 
Burroughs', the first of these is that the body itself is nothing more than a series of 
parasitic entities living in communion, while DNA might be seen as nothing more 
than a virus that occupies our cells and uses them for its own replication. If 
Burroughs figures such everyday biological processes as breathing and the beating 
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of the heart as convenient adaptations, made by the body on behalf of a parasite, 
then we are left finally with the possibility that there is no originary uncontaminated 
body. Rather, the coming-into-being of corporeality is itself a series of 
negotiations between parasites. As Eric White has argued, `the human body is an 
evolutionary assemblage', a composite of genes, cells and organs which may, 
parasitically, depend on one another, but which should not necessarily be regarded 
as serving the interests of the host body which they produce (' "Once They Were 
Men, Now They're Land Crabs" : Monstrous Becomings in Evolutionist Cinema', 
p. 252) 2t 
The function of `parasite' as a literary trope bears out this reading of the 
implications of Burroughs. Deconstructive criticism has famously deployed the 
parasite as a useful instance of the failure of apparently straightforward cases of 
stigmatiFation to successfully constitute themselves as separate from that which is 
stigmatiTed. J. Hillis Miller takes the claim that deconstruction is parasitic on `the 
obvious or univocal reading' of a text ('The Critic as Host', p. 278), and argues 
that parasitism is the necessary form of criticism 
- 
or indeed of writing itself. Robin 
Lydenberg quotes Miller with some approval, as sharing Burroughs's vision of a 
parasitic universe: 
When Miller asks, `can host and parasite live happily together, in the 
domicile of the same text, feeding each other or sharing the food ? ', one 
may hear the same. tone as in Burroughs's ironic question: `Would you 
offer violence to a well intentioned virus on its slow road to symbiosis? ' 
Burroughs sees all relations as a `symbiosis con' masking the parasite's 
intention to survive at the expense of the host. (Word Cultures, p. 133) 
But while for Burroughs this parasitic chain indicates an undesirable state which 
must be overthrown, for Miller such parasitism is rather the enabling condition of 
speech and thought. Lydenberg, like Burroughs, enlists the critique of parasitic 
inevitability as a condemnation of speech and thought 
- 
ofa logocentric 
conspiracy in which the restrictions of language need to be overthrown to make 
11 A position in biology particularly associated with the work of Lynn Margulis. 
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way for some state that is not compromised by their incursions. But Miller's point 
is altogether more subversive: he does not hold out for a separate space to which 
we may retreat in order to escape from parasitic relationships. Rather, he insists 
that the denunciation of a parasitic relationship is no more than an attempt to 
conceal the necessity of the parasite-structure. 25 
Indeed Burroughs's texts would seem to make the case argued by Miller 
rather better than they do that urged by Lydenberg, for his texts are themselves 
parasitic: they, as Miller says of Shelley's ` The Triumph of Life', are `inhabited 
... 
by, a long chain of parasitical presences, echoes, allusions, guests, ghosts of 
previous texts' ('The Critic as Host', p. 284). Who, we might ask, nourishes 
whom? Is Burroughs feeding off Eliot, Rimbaud and Shakespeare 
- 
or are they 
feeding off him, kept alive by his citation of them ? Or, in the case of The 
Wasteland, by his citation of their citations ? The voice which accuses parasitic 
presences of damaging the subject is a voice which is both a parasite itself, and 
riddled with other parasites. 
If the call to expel the parasite is thus made by texts which are themselves 
such exemplary instances of parasitism, then it is hard to regard the parasite as 
being as disempowering as Burroughs argues. Instead, the texts seem to 
demonstrate that a subjectivity which speaks of itself as clean-but-contaminated, or 
integral-but-invaded, is in fact enabled to exist only by those processes which it 
denounces. The more that we accept the strength of Burroughs's denunciation, the 
less parasitism itself seems to be irredeemable, since his texts are strong precisely 
by virtue of their invasion. It thus seems to be the case that critique and resistance 
originate less from a point outside occupied territory, than from the conditions that 
themselves result from invasion. 
u Miller begins his essay by quoting M. H. Abrams, who attacks deconstruction as 
parasitic. But Abrams - surely a hostage to fortune here 
- 
makes this claim by 
quoting Wayne Booth's description of deconstruction as parasitic, thereby himself 
inaugurating a chain of feeding which-is-very the: parasitic process which he 
denounces. 
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(c) The Virus 
Alongside the parasite, another alien organism enters into the body: the 







Fever... St Louis Encephalitis' (TTE, p. 22). In this landscape of twitching, 
suppurating, ejaculating, leaking, gasping bodies, the physical transformations that 
result from more conventional viruses such as hepatitis ('you notice your eyes are a 
little yellower than usual', SM p. 140) blend into the other bodily transformations I 
have charted, so that the body seems to be the site of a constant infection. Any 
aspect of human life might thus be diagnosed as an instance of a viral symptom, 
even speech - `Try to achieve even ten seconds of inner silence. You will encounter 
an organism that forces you to talk' (TTE, p. 43). 
Within the representation of bodily invasion that Burroughs produces, the 
virus operates as an image of total disgust: ` an unwanted guest who makes you 
sick to look at is never good or beautiful' (The Job p. 190). Its effectivity as a unit 
in Burroughs's writing is partly that it enables a language of disgust: at the 
symptoms that an infected body exhibits, at the unseen changes it makes within the 
body, at its own repulsive matter: `Virus of rage hate fear ugliness swirling round 
you waiting for a point of intersection and once in immediately perpetrates in your 
name some ugly noxious or disgusting act' (NE, p. 73). The idea of a body infected 
by viruses generates the necessary disgust to motivate human change 
-a change 
that must take place at the level of the body for it is insofar as we are bodies that 
we are suited to the requirements of the virus, which needs us `to be an animal, to 
be a body. To be a body that the virus can invade [... ] To be more animal bodies so 
that the virus can move from one body to another' (The Job, p. 202). 
The virus has key connotations that make it suitable for Burroughs's 
representation of compromised identity. Firstly the virus originates from outside, 
and is lodged within us. The discourse of viral infection therefore requires, as 
Donna Haraway suggests, a notion of an integral and separate body in order to 
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function: in order to define a virus, we must also postulate an originary uninfected 
body ('The Biopolitics of Postmodern Bodies: Constitutions of Self in Immune 
Discourse'). At the same time, the particular characteristic of a virus is that it 
replicates itself throughout the body by means of the body's own conduits, 
materials, and replication processes. It enters from outside but becomes 
coterminous with the material inside the body. Consequently the virus is both 
absolutely Other and, at the same time, inextricable from our own corporeality so 
that, in Jean Baudrillard's definition of `viral hospitality', between us and it `there 
exists a total symbiosis and a radical incompatibility' (The Transparency of Evil, 
p. 162). Thus even as it confirms the possibility of a body fundamentally separate 
from and opposed to infection, the figure of the virus confounds that possibility by 
conjuring the image of a body whose own physical functioning is already suited to 
the spread and perpetuation of the virus within itself. Moreover, in its replication of 
itself throughout bodies, the virus is an apposite image for the loss of individual 
identity: viral infection makes one body much like another, stricken with the same 
symptoms and riddled with identical viral organisms. When the Nova Police 
interrogate an invader called the Virus Power it describes how: `our virus infects 
the human and creates our image in him' (NE, p. 49). 26 The end result is a string of 
humans who are identical to one another, mere copies of an originating viral 
identity. The virus thus compromises the self-willing, autonomous agency that 
Burroughs seeks to reclaim for humankind, while also enabling the concept of its 
restoration. 
Like all these substances, the virus engenders a crisis of permeability and of 
disgust. In all these ways the idea of the virus functions in a similar manner to that 
of junk and of the parasite: to define the body as the site of a biological invasion 
which usurps the body's functions to such an extent that the routine functioning of 
26 Perhaps then, behind the virus, there lurks the commodity. See David Ayers, 
`The Long Last Goodbye: Control and Resistance in the Work of William 
Burroughs'; and Timothy S< Murphy, 'Wising Up, the Marks. 
, 
Amodernism in the 
Work of William S. Burroughs and Gilles Deleuze'. 
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the body itself becomes the form of social control. Consequently viral infection 
blurs the lines between three sets of bodily processes: harmless `natural' biological 
processes; biological processes that, although natural, have been appropriated by 
bodily invaders for their own ends; and bodily processes which are produced solely 
by viral invaders. Once under threat from the virus, it becomes impossible to trust 
any biological process. Having established these recurrent features of pollution in 
the preceding sections, I do not propose to repeat those similarities here, but rather 
to consider how Burroughs's language of health and treatment enables his 
construction of a bodily cure. 
Arthur and Marilouise Kroker have suggested of modern society, that `if 
the body is marked, most of all, by the breakdown of the immunological order, this 
also indicates, however, that there is a desperate search underway for technologies 
for the body immune' (`Panic Sex in America', p. 15). So too Burroughs's fear of 
the body's failure to defend itself generates the drive to find ways to protect it, so 
that the denunciation of the virus enables a language of medical intervention, 
whose promise is freedom: ` Poverty, hatred, war, police-criminals, bureaucracy, 
insanity, all symptoms of The Human Virus. The Human Virus can now be 
isolated and treated' (NL p. 136). 
And yet health also operates in these texts as the tool of domination. Dr. 
Benway, con-man and torture expert, proposes a plan for total control: 
The subject must not realise that the mistreatment is a deliberate attack of 
an anti-human enemy on his personal identity. He must be made to feel that 
he deserves any treatment he receives because there is something (never 
specified) horribly wrong with him. (NL, p. 31) 
There is a moment of curious self-reflexivity here. For is not Burroughs precisely 
the diagnostician of the ` horribly wrong' in humanity ? The purveyor of precisely 
that paranoia which renders Benway's subjects easy prey to `the naked need of the 
control addicts' (NL, p. 31) ? In a world where any treatment might be an excuse 
for an attack on the- body, Burroughs's own-narrative, of invasions, infections, 
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visitors, parasites, diseases and pollution might be seen as itself a dangerous and 
all-encompassing tool of power. 
And indeed, in a sense it is precisely that, in that these texts seek to 
overpower their readers. What Burroughs requires these narratives to do is to 
produce a model of dirt which is as total as the power which they aim to uproot. 
Insofar as, for Burroughs, power is total, so must resistance be. Hence it is 
imperative to find fors of diagnosis which call us all to cleanse ourselves `because 
there is something 
... 
horribly wrong'. David Porush has summed up Burroughs's 
world-view with this defnition of paranoia: `paranoia is a sort of epistemology 
gone wild' (The Soft Machine: Cybernetic Fiction, p. 107, emphasis in the 
original). He discerns in Burroughs the need to investigate every aspect of the 
human society and the body, inquiring into all their attributes, and offering a malign 
diagnosis for each. But where Benway's health crisis is `never specified', 
Burroughs specifies excessively 
- 
which may in the end have the same effect. The 
unremitting insistence that the institutions and habits of modem society are viral, 
parasitic and addictive sustains the urgency of the assault upon them. We might 
then say that the concept of the virus operates in these texts as an agent of panic, 
underwriting as it does an entire cellular economy of invisible danger. 27 To the 
extent that it acts as the explanation for every ill in these texts (and the extent to 
which other writers have taken it up beyond them) the warning against viral 
infection is then a viral figure itself, invading every possible site of discourse to 
replicate itself there, blending in to other pre-existing discourses of diagnosis, and 
27 That a would-be healer should peddle forms of knowledge that make the body a 
slave to paranoia is a suitably Burroughsian irony. After all, in his catalogues of 
possible addictions, we find also the possibility of being addicted to an opposition 
to addiction: `take Bradley the Buyer. Best narcotics agent in the industry' (NL, 
p. 26-27) who, with his addiction to his routine police contacts with addicts `comes 
to look more and more like a junky'. Similarly, Ronnel remarks that `to get off 
drugs or alcohol (major narcissistic crisis), the addict has to shift dependency to a 
person, an ideal, or to the procedure itself of the cure' (Crack Wars, p. 25). Such a 
shift in investment might make sense of the particularly insistent way in which 
Burroughs's calls for cure and redemption seem to echo the most corrupt figures 
of domination in these texts. 
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reproducing itself through their channels. 
So too we might want to suspect the medical role that Burroughs 
appropriates to his own diagnosis. However scathing it is of the use of medicine as 
a tool of oppression, Burroughs's own diagnosis still maintains that we cannot 
distinguish between treatment and mistreatment except by appealing to a better 
understanding of the body. Burroughs has described The Naked Lunch as 
illustrating ` some kinda redemption through knowledge of basic life processes' 
(The Letters of William Burroughs: 1945 to 1959, p. 375) 
- 
but again, how different 
does this make him from Dr. Benway who declares: `I'm a scientist. Apure 
scientist' (NL, p. 39) ? Burroughs's appeal to `basic life processes' uses biology to 
mark the good from the evil, where a model that is true to life, in the service of life, 
is positive 
- 
the model, of course, that Burroughs claims for his own analysis. But 
the quartet itself reminds us that the exhortation to health and cleanness, to well- 
being and recovery, pulls the subject into an array of interventionist technologies. 
The offer of a promised land just the other side of illness which opens The Naked 
Lunch, might usefully be set here against Foucault's observation that `a 
normalizing society is the historical outcome of a technology of power centred on 
life' (HS, p. 144). 
We should therefore locate Burroughs's own language of health within the 
larger horizon of a language of medical embodiment. As Foucault has argued, 
modern medicine conceives of the body as a space open to the gaze of the clinician 
(The Birth of the Clinic). Exposed to this medical gaze, the body is a mass of 
spaces and organisms which become fully knowable to the expert who documents 
them, and whose power is secured by the capacity to describe the processes of the 
spread and impact of a disease. Burroughs thus deploys a terminology weighted 
with authority over the body: to name its illness and to promise a cure is to 
constitute the body as the object of a discourse to which it is forever indebted. 
Forms of biological remedy are therefore crucial for Burroughs in 
imagining the biology of the body as a site of struggle. Apomorphine, for instance, 
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is used to argue the case for the biology of drug addiction: ` apomorphine acts on 
the back brain to regulate metabolism 
... 
it is the only known drug that acts in this 
way to normalize a disturbed metabolism' (The Job p. 153). Or more politically: 
`apomorphine precisely activates the resistance centers' (The Job, p. 148). Yet the 
fact that, as we saw earlier, it is derived from morphine marks an affinity between 
disease and cure: biological integrity is only to be achieved through the same sorts 
of processes and substances that first compromised that biology. It is thus 
necessary that Burroughs asserts that it `is completely non-habit forming' (The 
Job, p. 153) so that, like the Nova Police, its resemblance to the dangers that it 
opposes is noted even as it is forcefully denied, raising doubts in the mind of the 
reader even as s/he is being reassured. 
Just as apomorphine is that contradictory substance, a non-addictive 
morphine derivative, Burroughs also comes up against the question of whether a 
virus is inherently dangerous, or possibly beneficial. His decision is that `it seems 
advisable to concentrate on a general defense against all virus' (The Job p. 190). 
And yet his own strategies for liberation remain curiously viral. The cut-ups which 
are advocated as terrorist strategies involve feeding one language or text into 
another, so that it becomes inextricably mixed, insinuated within the very 
sentences, a process which when used by the enemy is ` like a virus in that they 
force something on the subject against his will' (The Job p. 185). 
The stated goal of his own cut-ups is to intervene `so that the subject 
liberates his own spontaneous scanning patterns' (The Job p. 185). Like the junky's 
rediscovered health, the subject free from viral influence recovers an inherent state. 
Yet the medical models at work thus occlude the viral logic of Burroughs's own 
texts: for in the viral work that his texts perform, is his desired product not a new 
mode of embodied subjectivity riddled with his own infectious devices ? Despite 
the appeal to a natural state awaiting liberation, the cured body is not a natural 
body, but one produced, like the bodies that Burroughs's despises, through viral 
strategies of his work. Their aggressive proffering to the reader of languages of 
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purity ask us to seal our bodies against invasion, to keep our distance from others, 
and to eject acquired behaviours that conflict with a fantasy of originary purity. 
That is: to reorganize our bodies in ways urged upon us by Burroughs. In 
foregrounding this propagandist element of the texts, we therefore see in them the 
acknowledgement that any bodily state is itself only a response to a controlling 
presence 
- 
and that ` freedom' is the name not for a state outside viral infection, 
but rather for the particular disease that Burroughs carries 23 In their attempt to 
return the body to integrity, the texts seem to suggest that any form of subjectivity 
is achieved by the generation of identities, bodily states, and psychic structures 
which have their roots in viral infection. Just like the invaders he opposes, the 
slogan of Burroughs's work might be: ` our virus infects the human and creates our 
image in him'. 
(d) Language 
These models of bodily invasion interlock with Burroughs's indictment of 
language, which works on similar principles to those established in my analysis of 
these other three invaders. `The word itself may be a virus that has achieved a 
permanent status with the host' (The Job p. 190), argues Burroughs. Similarly the 
word is junk 
- 
useless and addictive, cutting us off from the world 
- 
and parasite 
too. In one of his anti-evolution myths Burroughs draws all four terms together in 
his description of the transition from ape to human: 
Ip the pass the muttering sickness leaped into our throats, coughing and 
spitting in the silver morning [... ] We waded into the warm mud-water. hair 
and ape flesh off in screaming strips [... ] when we came out of the mud we 
had names [... ] And the others did not want to touch me because of the 
28 For readings of Burroughs which see his urgings as altogether more ironic and 
self-mocking see: John Guzlowski, `The Family in the Fiction of William 
Burroughs'; Anthony Hilfer, `Mariner and Wedding Guest in William Burroughs' 
Naked Lunch'; and Michael Leddy, ` "Departed Have Left No Address": 
Revelation/Concealment Presence/Absence in Naked Lunch'. While these readings 
are persuasive in terms of their textual analysis, I would argue that the status 
accorded to the figure of Burroughs and his pronouncements suggests that the 
overall effect of his writing is to affirm, rather than undo, their status as prophecy. 
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white worm-thing inside but no one could refuse if I wanted and ate the 
fear-softness in other men. The cold was around us in our bones [... ] And 
some did not eat flesh and died because they could not live with the thing 
inside. (SM, p. 127) 
Here, the acquisition of names, infection, parasite and substance-dependency are all 
linked together. 
As I have already pointed out, language is a recurrent site of control in 
Burroughs. However, language appears not simply in the form of a discourse 
which commands thought, but as a material force which orders and organizes the 
body itself. For Burroughs, the impact of the word is threefold: firstly, within the 
quartet, language is productive of materiality itself 
- 
words have concrete effects 
on the body, not merely triggering responses in it, but making it real, writing it out 
through arrays of typewriters; 29 secondly, as a result of his commitment to a 
radical individualism, language is condemned for enforcing a shared perception of 
the world onto all its users (Ihab Hassan, `The Literature of Silence: From Henry 
Miller to Beckett & Burroughs'30); lastly, like the parasites which drain away the 
life of the hosts, the word is the entity that drains the life of the world, since it 
substitutes mere signs for any real contact with that world. " The need to attain 
freedom from the controlling effects of language is offered by Burroughs as the 
19 His account of language draws heavily on the work of Alfred Korzybski, who 
argued for a `neuro-semantics' which relates language to its biological effects on 
the human organism (Science and Sanity, p. 19-34). Thus Korzybski, in a phrase 
that could have come directly from Burroughs, can say `present day 
totalitarianisms were built by the dumping on the human nervous system of such 
terms as "communism", "bolshevism" etc. ' (Science and Sanity, Introduction to 
the Second Edition, p. liii), where the linguistic `terms' are themselves the source 
of a biological change, which in turn produces social movements. 
3° Hassaa repeats his account of Burroughs 
- 
that he belongs to an honourable 
tradition of sceptical hostility to language and culture, but fails because he cannot 
imagine a creative alternative 
- 
in most of his subsequent writing on contemporary 
fiction. See for instance: Paracriticisms: Seven Speculations of the Times, pp. 140- 
141 and passim; The Dismemberment of Orpheus: Toward a Postmodern 
Literature, pp. 259-251 and passim. 
3' Again, Burroughs draws heavily on Korzybski here: ` an object or feeling, say, 
our toothache, is not verbal, is not words. Whatever we may say will not be the 




rationale for his cut-up experiments. In an enthusiastic endorsement of Burroughs's 
claims, ýeffBryan has argued that: `the cut-up exposes meaning that could not 
have been preplanned, or foreseen. Therefore the meaning is beyond any 
controlling force, and brings us closer to what we really are, and what a thing may 
really mean' ('William Burroughs and His Faith in X', p. 84). 32 
And yet this adversary of language is the one who declares: `Now I, 
William Seward, will unlock my word horde' (NL, p. 180). The invading horde of 
language surges like the organic tides which wash through the texts: ` a tidal river, 
carrying forms of survival armed with defences of poison slime, black, flesh rotting, 
fungus, end green odors that sear the lungs and grab the stomach in twisted knots' 
(NL, p. 163). The caustic tide, both horde and hoard, figures the most organic, 
destructive, and adversarial force as the most inward and secret 
- 
locked away to 
be opened up. Rather than being any sort of positive prophetic discourse, this word 
horde appears elsewhere, more true to its origins in Beowulf, as `Word Hoard', in 
a section of The Naked Lunch titled `The market' (pp. 96-99). Burroughs lampoons 
a series of religious prophets as con-men and addicts, who make the same 
declaration that he makes at the close of the book: `And now I will unlock my 
Word Hoard' (NL, p. 98). Invoking again the hoard/horde pun, when his audience 
responds `I do fear it much', the generic prophet declares: `nothing shall stem the 
rising tide' (NL, p. 98). For the audience of this show, the unstoppable tide of 
language leads back to infection, conquest and waste: `I tell you when I leave the 
Wise Men I don't even feel like a human. He converting my live orgones into dead 
bullshit' (NL, p. 98). On the one hand the language that invades the body corrupts 
it, and on the other the noxious substances which invade the body trickle or surge 
out in the form of speech. As `rising, tide' and as hoard/horde, language is a hostile 
32 More sceptically, Laszlo K. Gefin has insisted that the meaning imputed to a cut- 
up is not spontaneous or free, but `culture bound and historically determined' ('Collage Theory, 
- 
Reception, and the. Cutups of William-Burroughs', pp. 98-99). 
Gefin argues that the social role and psychological effect of a cut-up is far more 
strongly related to its marketing and packaging, than to any inherent properties of 
its formal textual features. 
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organic substance, allied to other forces of control. 
At its most extreme this control project does not simply invade the body, 
but produces the body: ` It is composed of thin transparent sheets on which is 
written the action from birth to death 
- 
Written on "the soft typewriter" before 
birth' (TTE, p. 119). The body is produced by and as writing, a determined text 
spat out by machines, no more than an effect of word and image: ` The human body 
is an image on screen talking' (TTE, p. 133), but saying only the lines that have 
been scripted for it already. `Shut the whole machine off urges Burroughs (TTE, 
p. 132). For him, word and image are linked together as those things which freeze 
and limit existence: `word begets image and image is virus' (NE, p. 48), whereas 
`apomorphine is no word and no image' (NE, p. 48). The project to `blanket the 
world in silence' (NE, p. 39) thereby stands as the bridge to the other side, beyond 
word and image, and also as a return to an edenic state before infection. 
The possibility of attaining such a state of liberation relies on the reclaiming 
of language away from its current controllers: `Why not rewrite the message on 
"the soft typewriter" ?- Why not take the board books and rewrite all message ?- 
Why not take over the human body right down the middle line ?' (TTE, p. 120). 
But if rewriting is a form of freedom, he is also clear throughout the quartet that 
such tactical uses of language are only a prelude to dispensing with language 
altogether: 
Lovers exchange tapes 
- 
You understand nobody has to be there at all - So 
why ask questions and why answer ?- Why give orders and why make 
speeches ?- Why not leave your tape with her tape and dispense with 
sexual contact ?- And then ?- Since no one is there to listen, why keep 
running the tape ?- Why not shut the whole machine off and go home ? 
Exactly what i intend to do (TTE, p. 125) 
Such an account encapsulates in miniature Burroughs's attitude to language: 
contain it, manipulate it, break up its patterns, and finally renounce it: 
`Communication must be made total. only way to stop it' (TTE, p. 124). 33 
33 1 want to retain this stress on the necessity of the elimination of language from 
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The suggestive example of the release from a sexual encounter, enabling situations 
in which `nobody has to be there' links freedom from words back to freedom from 
the body. Explaining the goal of his cut-ups, Burroughs says `Words 
- 
at least the 
way we use them 
- 
can stand in the way of what I call nonbody experience. It's 
time we thought about leaving the body behind' (The Third Mind, p. 2). 
(iii) The (Im)Possibility of a Cure 
There is a strong tradition in work on Burroughs which reads all of the 
bodily changes which I have outlined above as an allegory for the degeneration of 
human society: a critique of humanity's descent into the sub-human, which is 
accompanied by a call for a revolution which will overthrow this process. 34 Adam 
Meyer, following Burroughs's references to Franz Kafka, takes these images as an 
allegory of the dehumanization of a species 
- 
like Gregor Samsa's transformation 
into an insect (` "One of the Great Early Counsellors": The Influence of Franz 
Kafka on William S. Burroughs'). While for Tony Tanner, ` this idea of matter 
returning to lower forms of organization is at the heart of Burroughs's vision 
... 
The brain taken over by the anus is only a paradigm for all the low forms of life 
which devour higher forms. So, humans become animals, then vegetables, and 
finally minerals: warm blood reverts to frozen metal' (City of Words, p. 118). But 
Tanner's designation of the assumed superiority of the higher over the lower, and 
of consciousness over matter, should alert us to the social hierarchies encoded in 
`high' and `low', `consciousness' and `matter', and should prevent us from simply 
this vision, in contrast to Lydenberg's argument that the texts merely advocate the 
possibility of becoming free to use language with impunity (and immunity) (Word 
Cultures). 
34 John Ciardi similarly reads the destruction of the body as one of the most 
memorable (and, ultimately, most moral) horrors of surrealistic writing' in its 
`depiction of the destruction of depraved men by their drug lust' (`The Book 
Burners and Sweet Sixteen', p. 22), and in a similar vein Mary McCarthy argues 
that `these metamorphoses, of course, are punishments' (`Burroughs's Naked 
Lunch', p. 38). 
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endorsing such a position as a legitimate lamentation over social decline. The 
inhabitation of these bodies by `crab parasites' and `fish parasites' (TTE, p. 67), or 
by a `cerebral dwarf (TTE, p. 68) suggests bodies filled with the grotesque 
contents of debased materiality: the evolutionarily prior and the deviant, those 
bodies whose materiality bars them from full human subjectivity. Which is to say: 
bodies and bodily-features designated as socially unwelcome as a result of those 
forms of power that benefit from the hierarchical organization of bodies. 
It would therefore be easy to read Burroughs's desire for purification as 
amounting to a desire to redeem the materiality of the body. We might thus view it 
as nothing more than an agglomeration of, variously: a bourgeois repulsion at 
bodily differences of working class culture; a racist hatred of the attributes 
constructed as the animality of the body and defined by the white body's assumed 
transcendence of them; and a masculinist loathing of the body's feminized qualities, 
its poro%1s, labile, liquid properties. But the force of Burroughs's work is not to 
locate some bodies as infected, as against other bodies which are licit. Rather it is 
to insist on the materiality of the body as undesirable in itself. His vision of 
degeneracy locates it in all bodies. Rather than conceiving of a body which might 
overcome these failings and thereby using this fear of bodily disorder to define the 
possibility of an orderly body, what distinguishes Burroughs's texts is their 
absolute failure to generate the possibility of imagining such an integral or ordered 
body. I want therefore to argue that these texts are more than an outpouring of a 
desire to cleanse and order the body. Rather, while they do indeed constitute an 
extended attempt to diagnose what it is in the body that must be purged, this is an 
attempt which reveals to us finally the impossibility of such an enterprise and which 
also depicts the full complexity of the body's social production as it does so. 
Rather than celebrating some purified body, the final effect of the texts is then to 
refute the possibility of an ideal body. 
In order to see this, we need to read these bodies as the dramatization of 
the fact that all bodies 
- 
albeit to different degrees 
- 
are marked by their proximity 
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to reviled substances: their liquid outpourings and labile organs rendering them 
not ordered; their openings to introjects and substances making them not integral; 
their lack of defined borders, their capacity to shed old matter and acquire new 
matter, making them lacking in form. " But what I will argue Burroughs enables us 
to see with particular clarity is the all-pervading anxiety that ensues from the 
attempt to cleanse the body of such impurities 
-a cleansing which culminates in the 
desire to dispense with the body itself. Although Burroughs talks in terms of the 
removal from the body of its invaders, I will argue that in fact his texts register the 
awareness that our bodies can never get cleaned up without being cleaned away 
- 
because, as the quartet demonstrates, these things that seem external are in fact 
indistinguishable from the body. And that is, I will be suggesting, because they all 
stand in for the very materiality of the body itself. 
As we have seen, the body, for Burroughs, is marked by its vulnerability, 
with the quartet constituting a call for its cleansing and defence. But in spite of the 
urgent prophetic tone of the texts ('These are conditions of total emergency. And 
these are my instructions for total emergency if carried out now could avert the 
total disaster now on tracks' NE, p. 6), their imagined project (to cleanse the body) 
and their imagined means (cut-ups, apomorphine, silence) are both caught up in 
contradictions and self-defeating tensions. This is not to say that we should read 
Burroughs looking for a Romantic poet-prophet figure and then criticize him for 
failing to offer us a useful or practical vision, as so many writers on him have 
done. 36 Rather, it is to ask how the particular insistence with which he represents 
bodily matter might be used to suggest fractures and resources for resistance in 
these larger discourses of bodily disgust. I want to suggest here that there are two 
"All of these are. those attributes of the body which Julia Kristeva has analyzed 
under the sign of `the abject', and whose relation to Burroughs I shall explore in 
detail in the next chapter. 
36 See for instance David Ayers, `The Long Last Goodbye: Control and Resistance 
in the Work of William Burroughs'; Ihab Hassan, `The Subtracting Machine: The 
Work of William Burroughs'; and David Lodge, `Objections to William 
Burroughs'. 
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features of these texts that provide such a perspective on attempts to engage with 
the problems of the exercise of power through embodiment: the inevitability of the 
body's succumbing to invasion and the problematic form taken by attempts to 
resist it. 
The recurrence in Burroughs's writing of bodily penetration suggests the 
opennesss of the body to intrusion, the impossibility of sealing it against invaders. 
But, this vulnerability 
- 
whether in the form of a predisposition to addiction, a 
physical response to arousal, or even the physical capacity to be penetrated 
- 
are all 
present in the matter of the body itself. The form of the body renders it vulnerable 
in ways that cannot easily be dismissed. `Word flesh group relying on rectum' 
(7TE, p. l 11), we are told, because the rectum, as the site of intense pleasure and a 
point of possible penetration, marks for Burroughs the body's own physical 
structure and response as one that is always already prepared for the forms of 
control which Burroughs describes 37 
Burroughs's dream of a cure to this world situation leads, as we have seen, 
towards empty space and silence: `time to look beyond this rundown radioactive 
cop-rotten planet. Time to look beyond this animal body' he urges (The Job 
p. 137). That familiar linking of power and the body's waste ('cop-rotten') with an 
invaded biology ('radioactive') makes the body itself the transcendable horizon. 
Too sick to be habitable, too infected to be cured, too dirty to be clean, the body 
which served as the impetus for this redemptive project ends up as the obstacle to 
its completion. And in these texts he insists that it is an obstacle because of its 
" Burroughs's use of the image of anal sex between men as a trope for invasion 
and domination is often mentioned (indeed, a reader could hardly fail to miss it): 
see for instance Clive Bush, ` An Anarchy of New Speech', p. 124; Edward Foster, 
Understanding the Beats, p. 169; Ihab Hassan, `The Subtracting Machine', p. 7; 
Catherine R. Stimpson, `The Beat Generation and the Trials of Homosexual 
Liberation', pp. 380-382; Arnold Weinstein, ` Freedom and Control in the Erotic 
Novel'; and John Vernon, The Garden and the Map, pp. 94-97. But one cannot 
help but feel that there is a homophobic delight in many of the commentators on 
this particular symbol, as if only too glad to see sex between menbeing presented 
as the epitome of loveless violence and exploitation. 
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biology: 
I would say that free men don't exist on this planet at this time, because 
they don't exist in human bodies, by the mere fact of being in a human body 
you're controlled by all sorts of biologic and environmental necessities. 
(The Job, p. 37) 
Control is imagined in the quartet as the body's Pavlovian susceptibility to pleasure 
and pain, with the body caught simultaneously between threats of abuse and 
promises of delight, so that between the two `sex and pain form flesh identity' 
(TTE, p. 98). Those who have bodies are thus ` collaborators with word with flesh, 
traitors to all souls everywhere' (TTE, p. 129). Similarly, in a recurring phrase, 
when Burroughs wants to designate the moment of the fall of the human subject 
into control he asks: `what scared you all into time ? Into body ? Into shit ?I will 
tell you: "the word" (NE, p. 4). The naming which fixes the human subject does so 
by locating it within a solid body, imagined as excrement and waste. As we have 
seen, Burroughs envisions the possibility of the absolute ejection of all of these 
invading substances: `out out out the whole fucking lot of you' (TTE, p. 104). As 
Cary Nelson has suggested, that call for eviction resonates with the depiction of 
the world as excrement: the world has been `sold out to shit forever' (ITE, p. 106), 
and, like shit, can be expelled. The text is a form of enema, designed to shift the 
world from a place of degeneracy and corruption (as imaged in Burroughs's 
excremental vision) to one of cleanliness and redemption: in Nelson's memorable 
phrase `scatology becomes eschatology' ('The End of the Body: Radical Space in 
Burroughs' p. 127). 38 
In their reliance on a language of purity and pollution, the insistent calls for 
cleansing would seem to invoke the possibility of cleaning up the body, but in fact 
lead to the call for the body to be cleaned away altogether. I have suggested 
throughout this chapter that these body invaders are themselves described in terms 
" For RobinLydenberg. 's-Derridean analysis of Burroughs'simagery of digestion 
and constipation see Word Cultures, pp. 143-155. 
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which renders them like, rather than alien to, the body. And this proves entirely 
appropriate for texts that rely on the fantasy of a non-corporeal consciousness 
which, because it is the only form of consciousness free from material restraint, is 
the necessary form of Burroughs's libertarian ideal. Within such a framework 
corporeal characteristics must necessarily be conceived of as the most limiting and 
damaging of attributes. This in turn means that the forms taken by the ` invaders' of 
the body do not figure the threats to our independence as coming from outside but, 
because their own characteristics are those of bodily processes, serve to disclose 
rather that the final identity of these threats is the body itself. Because the material 
form and the biological needs of the body are complicit with systems of control and 
domination, it therefore follows that a purified body is an oxymoron. The forms of 
bodily invasion which Burroughs imagines represent a disgust at the ways that the 
body itself is experienced as an invasion of independent subjectivity: a mass of 
organs that follow their own logic, an assemblage of needs and desires that are not 
under our conscious control, and a network of physical properties that have been 
produced by external forces in order to make the body docile and obedient. The 
acuity with which Burroughs diagnoses the body's production only serves to bring 
out how incompatible embodiment is with his vision of absolute independence. 
Consequently we may say that it is only because of his determination to find such 
independence that the texts are able to explore so carefully how the body is socially 
produced. And it is only because this exploration is so careful that the texts refute 
dreams of bodily purity, offering instead bodies that are absolutely impure. 
Unsettling the attempt to cleanse the body, we find the human body in 
Burroughs both the source of the desire for these contaminating substances and 
their very double. So it is not simply the case that the body needs to be purified, for 
at times the invasion has so thoroughly conditioned the body that it must be 
entirely annihilated in order to be free. At one point the quartet's viral enemies 
explain how `we first took our image and put it into code [... ] This code was 
written at the molecular level' (NE, p. 49). This viral image takes hold at the most 
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basic level of the body and in order to prevent escape from its hold `it was 
important all this time that the possibility of a human ever conceiving of being 
without a body should not arise' (NE, p. 49). Like silence, this clearing away of the 
very matter of the enemy takes us into new realms, figured as places of absolute 
absence, and hence cleanliness. Burroughs can serve to illustrate the inevitable 
conclusion of all cleansing projects: protracted warfare not simply with dirt, but 
with the conditions of being that make dirt possible at all. That is, with the body 
itself. 
Nothing but an absolute purging of the infected world will satisfy 
Burroughs, whose image of the redemption of the world is that of its absolute 
destruction: `The whole structure of reality went up in silent explosions' (TTE, 
p. 30). While Mary Douglas is interested in the ways by which anxiety is managed 
- 
the rituals that neutralize the fears which bodily margins and body matter symbolize 
- 
Burroughs lets those anxieties have full rein. The quartet thus articulates the 
intensity of the horror with which the body is regarded, and which cannot be 
allayed by ritual purification. These texts enumerate the features of the body which 
make it an object of profound discomfort for a subjectivity based on integrity, 
form, and order: that it is open to penetration; that its shape is unstable; that its 
matter is responsive to external stimuli; that it has impulses not amenable to 
rational self-control; that it bears an affinity to waste matter 
- 
and, more 
unsettlingly, may itself shift to waste matter all too easily (death, the spilling of 
blood, excrement, ejaculation). 
One approach to such an obsession with purity would be to read these 
bodily dangers as figuring other social dangers 
- 
for instance, the incitement to 
bodily pleasures generated by the rise of media advertising (John Tytell, Naked 
Angels: The Lives and Literature of the Beat Generation, p. 116). But reading 
Burroughs makes it clear that we must go beyond any reading of bodily anxiety as 
primarily a metaphor for other social phenomena. The constant return of the texts 
to non-fictional materials, and in particular their use of autobiographical and 
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journalistic material, refuses to locate this language solely in a fictional domain. "' 
Given that Burroughs provides, in interviews and associated writings, an insistence 
that his arguments are an accurate description of the workings of power, we are 
encouraged to read the body as in the grip of precisely these forms of invasive 
control: `I have frequently spoken of word and image as viruses' he states, `and 
this is not an allegorical comparison' (The Job, p. 201). Thus, as a number of 
determinedly literalist readings of Burroughs have argued, the language of 
parasites and addiction is more than a series of apt metaphors: in Lydenberg's 
deconstructive account, language is a logocentric parasite which drains away the 
liberty of its users (Word Cultures); for Timothy Murphy, capitalism is a viral 
process which renders all its workers identical units and finally draws them into a 
single biological mass-entity (`William Burroughs Between Indifference and 
Revalorization: Notes Toward a Political Reading'); for Eric Mottram the modem 
state really is run by those addicted to power (William Burroughs: The Algebra of 
Need); and for Deleuze and Guattari, Burroughs's body whose organs imprison 
and dominate it is a physical reality which must be escaped (A Thousand Plateaus: 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia, pp. 150-151). "' 
Indeed, with the benefit of a Foucauldian perspective on the body we can 
see that the body is not simply used as an experiential model for the social relations 
of any given society because it is a useful symbol or metaphor. Rather, the 
imagining of social anxieties in terms of the body is a consequence of the material 
forms of social control which are indeed absolutely dependant upon the body. 
Because power is secured through the regulation of bodies, those bodies are in a 
79 It is, of course, possible to read these features in the opposite direction: a 
postmodern account of this cutting up of genres would stress their rendering of 
autobiography and journalism as no less fictional than ` officially' fictional modes of 
writing. See Brian McHale, Postmodernist Fiction, pp. 166-170. 
' David Ayers offers an opposite interpretation: that Burroughs's work is 
politically vitiated because concepts such as parasitism and addiction are purely 
metaphorical, and are offered at the expense of any concrete social analysis of the 
real mechanisms of power ('The Long Last Goodbye', p. 224 ). 
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very real sense a site of risk and danger, both to those in power and to those who 
are its targets. The anxieties about the forms that body matter might take are 
themselves part of a network of material practices by which a social order is 
maintained. Bodies thus constitute a genuinely material threat to any given social 
order, since they will not only or always be shaped to follow the dictates of that 
order; but the body also constitutes a threat to each embodied subject since it is 
precisely the site on which domination is exerted and which follows such acts of 
control. 
Insofar, then, as the texts cannot imagine a purified body, they are enabled 
to represent the necessity that our embodied forms are derived from any of the 
particular instances of power that we might resist. We must then read bodily 
anxieties not simply as encoding other social tensions, but rather as a recognition 
of the ways in which the body is shaped and ordered by social processes 
- 
and 
remains fundamental to their organization. By placing Burroughs in such a context 
we can see that he develops two lines of anxiety about the ways in which the body 
functions. Firstly, he rehearses a number of anxieties about the necessity for bodily 
purity, which are derived from oppressive institutions of bodily scrutiny and which 
bear traces of the particular sites of discursive practice through which they have 
been developed 
- 
such as bio-medical discourse and socio-sexual hygiene. But 
secondly 
- 
and almost contrarily 
- 
he voices anxieties about the effects of such 
body-coptrolling technologies: he is repelled by bodies that are controlled or 
commanded. His particular horror is thus a welding of both a conventional 
stigmatization of the body and a resistant dread of the practices which such 
stigmatization serves to legitimate. However much his hatred at body material 
derives from those oppressive practices that generate a dread at bodily disorder, it 
is those very practices, and their consequences, that such a hatred serves to 
condemn. These texts, raging against the parasite, the virus, and junk, are thus 
enabled by their own parasitic dependence upon, viral contamination by, and 
unshakeable addiction to, the languages of the institutions that they denounce. And 
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this is not to repeat the language of purity by denouncing the quartet as 
`contaminated': rather it is to show how a voice constructed out of such materials 
is in no way necessarily doomed merely to repeat them. 
This takes us to the next central tension in Burroughs's work. Just as it fails 
to imagine the pure body which his project supposedly requires 
-a failure which, I 
am suggesting, is productive rather than limiting 
- 
so too he fails to imagine 
strategies of resistance in terms that would separate them from what they oppose. 
And here too, the failure is productive: both because it reminds us that we may 
fashion resistance even when absolutely constructed by hostile forces, and secondly 
because it offers a model for making creative use of imagery of bodily impurity. 
The second crucial tension in these texts, then, is the difficulty of differentiating 
between the technologies of liberation and those of domination. Burroughs's 
paranoia operates by an immense metonymic energy which reduces all events, all 
limits and all power to a single malign force opposed to a single absolute freedom. 
Susceptible to the most direct 
- 
but also the most banal 
- 
of total critiques, such 
`conditions of total emergency' can be opposed only be a message of `Total 
resistance' (NE, p. 6). Thus we have on the one hand the creation of a `them 
against us' situation, where evil has a relation of total Otherness to good, and 
where the dirty and the clean could be totally separated and destroyed 
- 
like Opium 
Jones being evicted and then boiled in hydrochloric acid. But at the same time this 
paranoia results in an implication of everything in the conspiracy to dominate: 
language, evolution, the body, sex, life. `Death is orgasm is rebirth is death in 
orgasm is their unsanitary Venusian gimmick is the whole birth death cycle of 
action' (TIE, p. 45). The ` gimmick' of domination, the alien con-trick imposed 
from the outside, encompasses `the whole', for the goals and effects of each part of 
this equation are identical. 
And while the enemy can be marked as `unsanitary' and lined up for 
cleansing, a vision of such total saturation makes resistance seem very precarious. 
In a world where the solution to the Nova Mob is the Nova Police, where the cure 
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for morphine addiction is derived from morphine, where the way to resist our 
infection with images is to splice images into the enemy, all hope rests on solutions 
which occupy that interstitial place where they cannot simply be separated from the 
enemy 
- 
so that even silence can become an addiction. As we have already see, in 
the case of each invading substance Burroughs's own writing would seem to share 
the characteristics that he denounces. The implacable hostility with which 
Burroughs draws the line comes up against its own uneasy resemblance to what it 
is fighting. 
His own ambiguous allegiance to the forms which he denounces is also 
mirrored in the writing of his critics. Michael Skau, referring to Burroughs's 
splicing in of cut-up material, tells us that in cut-ups the text `is violated by the 
intrusion of an alien phrase' ('The Central Verbal System' p. 407). Similarly, Cary 
Nelson describes Burroughs's language in terms of parasitism: `internalizing 
Burroughs' language, the reader finds it incompatible with his own speech. Yet the 
novels have entered the reader's experience: their language now exists in my body' 
('The End of the Body', p. 130). Similarly, in these texts which advise of the 
necessity of silence we find the sinister figure of the Old Doctor, summoned by the 
Board to pacify restless addicts: 
So the louder they scream and the harder they push the stronger and cooler 




And then they are quiet 
- 
They got nothing more 
to say and nothing to say it with 
- 
You've taken it all all all you got it ? 
(Good, save it for the next pitch) 
- 
So there they stand like dummies (they 





cold mineral silence. (TTE, p. 107) 
The numbed silence of placid slaves thus haunts Burroughs's own vision of silence 
as a mode of liberation which he, another authoritative speaker, delivers to his 
audience. Indeed Burroughs's friend Alen Ansen quotes this passage, following it 
with the remark: `this passage 
... 
could serve as a description of the effect 
Burroughs can have on people' ('William Burroughs: A Personal View', p. 49). 
It is, of course, possible to attempt to resolve or mitigate- these apparent 
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contradictions. Cary Nelson offers one common position amongst readers of 
Burroughs: that Burroughs recognises his limited complicity, but treats it as a 
necessary tactic: `although Burroughs engages in a self-defeating paradox 
- 
using a 
defective instrument for redemptive purposes 
- 
he chooses the only conceivable 
solution' ('The End of the Body: Radical Space in Burroughs', p. 128). David 
Ayers offers another, suggesting that Burroughs's texts simply come up against the 
harsh limitations of the real, which his texts cannot accommodate: we cannot do 
without bodies or language ('The Long Last Goodbye: Control and Resistance in 
the Work of William Burroughs'). But rather than attempting to resolve the 
contradiction, or to pass judgement upon it as a flaw, it seems more productive to 
me to insist on the impossibility of its resolution 
- 
to argue, as Pierre Macherey 
insists, that we must ask not how a work contradicts itself, but rather what is 
signified by the contradiction which it is itself unable to interrogate (A Theory of 
Literary Production). To look to the texts for a resolution of this contradiction is 
to avoid confronting it, and therefore to avoid an analysis of what we can learn 
from its insolubility: its illustration of that uncomfortable necessity which I shall 
call con. Ititutive possession. 
(iv) Constitutive Possession 
What this insolubility represents is the impossibility of effecting the act of 
Cartesian transcendence by which the material world can be abandoned. 
Burroughs's work is thus a testimony to the impossibility of its own project not 
because it is a fact that defective tools are somehow inescapable, nor because it is 
simply evading an uncomfortable truth. Rather, its insoluble contradiction emerges 
because such Burroughsian concepts as parasitic possession or viral contamination 
are not so much restrictive structures that can be resisted, but rather are the form 
of embodied subjectivity itself. And the quartet, rather than being lacking in some 
way, is itself the best witness to this fact. Against Burroughs's libertarian vision of 
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an isolated, autonomous subject, free from possession, I would therefore set the 
form taken by Burroughs's own political interventions, which show how the 
production of any embodied state is always a result of forces acting on and within a 
body. Although we might use concepts such as `inside' and `outside' to designate 
what is proper to the body, and what is apart from the body, in fact every bodily 
state is attained only through the transformation of the body by what is supposedly 
outside it: the body is always possessed by that which is experienced as other. 
What does it mean to talk of the body as possessed by otherness in this 
way? Dissonance between my perception of who I am, and what my body is and 
does is by no means uncommon. From such everyday instances as the forced smile 
of the employee" to the supposedly more extreme instances of transsexuality, `my' 
body often seems to be obeying the rules, and shaped by the dictates, of forces 
other than my own desire or self. It is to some extent this process that Marx 
designates `alienation': that process by which one part of my life is made alien from 
me, is made into the possession of some other, or by which some other takes 
responsibility for that which is mine (my labour power, my emotions, my body). 
As we have seen, this is partly because the body is moulded by so many 
different forces, so that an embodied subject is thus torn in several directions: 
towards the behaviour urged by a particular institution that employs us, towards 
the behaviour urged by the family in which we were raised, towards the behaviour 
urged by a central and traumatic childhood incident, towards the behaviour urged 
by certain genes, towards the behaviour urged by a drug (prescription or 
otherwise). But it would, I think, be quite wrong to insist that some of these states 
are original or natural, while others are imposed. If my body is torn between the 
impulse to smile at a customer, and to spit in their face in frustration, this is simply 
because more than one set of behaviours has been made available and appropriate 
to me, by means of more than one process of socialization 
- 
all of which are 
" On the regulated bodies of employees, see Erving Goffinan, The Presentation of 
Self in Everyday Life 
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experienced as different bodily options. The very possibility of subjectivity is itself, 
then, an effect of the alien, just as the physical fact of my being is made possible by 
those other forces that act upon me, to shape musculature or to organize my 
cellular structure. In a very real sense my flesh and my emotions are not `mine', in 
that they all have an origin which is not `me': at any given moment `I' am the 
endpoint of these processes, more than I am their originator. 
What Burroughs's texts recognize are the problems that result from the fact 
that subjectivity itself is predicated on instances of possession. If, as we saw in 
chapter two, the subject comes into being only through a psychic tracing of the 
body 
- 
an act by which the body also comes into being 
- 
then subject and body are 
marked by their inscription: not in the sense that there is a writing of a structure 
onto their pre-existing raw physical and psychic material, but rather because the 
possibility of such an embodied subjectivity comes into existence only in the form 
of a site of inscription performed from elsewhere. Like the messages of the soft 
typewriter, the body is indeed possessed: by its sensations, and the meanings which 
those sensations have; by the designations of its parts and activities as licit and 
illicit; by the social demands that shape its musculature, its bone structure, its 
posture; by the technology that augments, reorganizes, and supplants its flesh. "' 
While Burroughs dreams of the possibility of evicting these inhabitants of 
the body, his images of possession and invasion are in fact figures for the events 
that are constitutive of the process by which the body comes to exist physically, 
and by which the body is made an object of psychic comprehension and investment. 
We are indeed possessed by our bodies, and our bodies are indeed possessed by 
others: but there never was a point where the body was not possessed in this way. 
To be embodied is to be possessed. 
The only way of living with this process is to recognize the need for some 
uneasy rapprochement between the forces by means of which I exist: to move from 
alien-ation, to being an alien nation. While I may experience alien-ation from `my' 
42 My thinking here has been strongly influenced by Pheng Cheah's `Mattering'. 
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body, its composite form can nevertheless go on functioning. The conflicts and 
dissonances, while at times unpleasant and even debilitating, do not prevent my 
body as a whole from operating. Although 
- 
and we shall return to this in the next 
chapter 
- 
some would argue that a disunified subject is paralyzed, " if we look at 
the entire body-in-society, we find neither political paralysis nor total submission. 
While I jiave insisted that we think in terms of both the possession of the body, and 
the multiplicity of possessing forces, such an argument does not mean that what 
possesses us cannot be deployed by us 
- 
indeed, possession is as much the enabling 
condition of any politics as it is the situation against which politics struggles. " In 
the case of Burroughs, the persistent recognition that acts of invasion are 
constitutive of, not merely supplementary to, embodied subjectivity, may be a 
source of horror, but it also produces texts which depict the conditions of 
embodied subjectivity with unusual candour. With their constitution of a single 
authoritative diagnostic position, which depends on winning over his audience to 
accept the stigmatization of (our own) bodily substances, we might well say of his 
texts, as he does of the systems of power which he confronts: `All monopolistic 
and hierarchical systems are basically rooted in anxiety' (SM, p. 143). But it is an 
anxiety that produces resistance at the same time as submission. If these texts 
loathe the materiality of the body, they also bear witness to it in a way that, as was 
so visible on its first publication, scandalized a culture invested in its Cartesian 
divorce. " As such they demonstrate the way in which the loathing of the body 
43 See for instance Terry Eagleton, The Illusions of Postmodernism, pp. 86-91; and 
Jane Flax, Thinking Fragments, pp. 216-221. 
" Pheng Cheah offers a useful account of the process of possession in relation to 
the intertwining of nationalism, fundamentalism and feminism in Islamic states, in 
which competing instances of possession by various ideological and discursive 
practices produce political struggles, rather than merely being that against which 
political struggle is directed ('Mattering', pp. 135-137). 
41 On the censorship of The Naked Lunch see Michael B. Goodman, Contemporary 
Literary Censorship: The Case History of Burroughs's Naked Lunch; and Thomas 
J. Main, `On Naked Lunch and Just Desserts'. A collection of the Times Literary 
Supplement's outraged correspondence on The Naked Lunch is appended to the 
Paladin edition, and can also be found in Jennie Sker1 and Robin Lydenberg (eds. ), William Burroughs at the Front: Critical Reception, 1959-1989. 
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may be used against a society that is invested in such a loathing 
- 
and ultimately, 
how the insistence on materiality that Burroughs's own loathing of materiality 
enshrines acts against his own attempts to imagine disembodied consciousness. It 
may then be that these texts are at their most political when they refuse to make 
the case that their author urges. 
The political triumph of these texts, then, is that they defeat Burroughs's 
own attempts to imagine transcendence and in its place suggest that impurity is a 
condition of embodiment. In doing so they demonstrate how the deployment of 
bodily dread may lead both to pragmatic oppositions to sites of authority (we may 
denounce the ways that our bodies have been manipulated by the government or 
the police) and also to a radical affirmation of bodily materiality. I mean 
`affirmation' not in the sense that it makes our bodies any more comfortable to live 
with, but rather in the sense that it affirms their absolute necessity in the face of the 
fantasy of the body's disposability. And insofar as the body exists only as a 
product, as the site of jostling forces that coerce, command, and constitute us, 
what is equally necessary is the inescapable fact of our being woven out of such 
practices and beliefs. They are embedded in our muscles and organs, in our 
postures and our shapes: in the bodily practices by which we maintain the social 
order and in the bodily metaphors by which we make sense of it. That these texts 
affirm such a position precisely by setting out to deny it is itself a reminder of the 
ceaseless productivity of speaking with the voices that one also opposes. At a time 
when `political' literary criticism functions too often by its self-righteous exposing 
of the writings of others as being complicit with systems of authority, or as 
unwittingly shoring up destructive ideological positions, Burroughs is the 
necessary corrective: there is no alternative to absolute contamination 
- 
but equally 
there is no reason to assume that such contamination makes the opportunities for 




The Politics of (A)Social Bodily Disarray 
(i) Introduction 
This chapter emerges out of my dissatisfaction with the ways in which the 
body' in general, and Burroughs's representations of the body in particular, have 
been viewed as staging a defiant celebration of materiality in the face of the 
totalitarian repression of disembodied culture (a position which, I should perhaps 
acknowledge, I had originally taken when approaching Burroughs). It is axiomatic 
within much modem Critical Theory that we should be united in our resistance to 
such dominant and dominating philosophical tendencies as logocentrism, 
Cartesiapism, and phallocentrism. Such conceptual frameworks enshrine self- 
sufficient meaning over the instability of signification revealed by deconstruction; ' a 
self-present ego over the misrecognitions and divisions in the subject highlighted by 
psychoanalysis; ' masculinist values of rational disembodied consciousness over 
more emotional and fragmentary forms of knowledge which feminism points out 
have been denigrated as `feminine'; and absolute truth over the relative and 
' See for instance Marcus Doel, `Bodies Without Organs: Schizoanalysis and 
Deconstruction'; Vicki Kirby, Telling Flesh; and Margrit Shildrick, Leaky Bodies 
and Boundaries, pp. 91-113. 
4 See for instance Joan Copjec (ed. ), Supposing the Subject; Diana Fuss, 
Identification Papers; and Kaja Silverman, The Threshold of the Visible World. 
' See for instance Alison M. Jaggar and Susan R. Bordo (eds. ), 
Gender/Body/Knowledge: Feminist Reconstructions of Being and Knowing; and 
Toril Moi 
, 
`Representation of Patriarchy: Sexuality and Epistemology in Freud's 
Dora'. 
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contested local truths towards which postmodern genealogy guides us. ' Tensions 
and conflicts between and within these perspectives notwithstanding, they share a 
broad agenda of challenging the myth of a certain culturally sanctioned idea of well- 
ordered subjectivity, and replacing it with a notion of subjectivity as contingent, 
conflictpal, and decentred. I want in this chapter to consider some of the problems 
of such an admittedly appealing refutation of the value of order, in relation to the 
ways in which such a challenge has been taken to be enacted through the body, and 
to ask how successfully Burroughs's writings can in fact accommodate such critical 
approaches. 
Burroughs has often served as a recruit in this war: his texts seem to 
exemplify a refusal to adhere either to the dictates of culturally legitimate behaviour 
(his homosexuality, his drug use) or to aesthetically legitimate writing techniques. 
Rather, they seem to depict a world of constant flux and transgression. In 
particular, he has been claimed for this project because of the ways his texts seem 
to stress the violent materiality of the body. ' When Burroughs writes `A 
coprophage calls for a plate, shits on it and eats the shit, exclaiming, "Mmmm, 
that's my rich substance" ' (NL, p. 43), Carol Loranger treats the scene as the 
` See for instance Judith Butler, `Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the 
Question of "Postmodernism! "; Donna Haraway, ` Situated Knowledges: The 
Science Question and the Privilege of Partial Perspective'; and Jean-Francois 
Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. More sceptically, 
see Jane Flax, ` The End of Innocence'. 
5 Another figure often recruited to such arguments is Mikhail Bakhtin, and in 
particular his Rabelais and His World, whose distinction between the ` grotesque 
body' produced by the folk traditions of `a second life outside officialdom' (p. 6), 
and the orderly, isolated, classical body of officialdom, would seem to offer just 
such a model of bodily insurrection against cultural oppression. Bakhtin himself is 
clear, however, that for the modern world such bodily images have been robbed of 
their power by the bourgeois individualization of bodily experience: `they are 
fragments of an alien language 
... 
which at present conveys nothing but senseless 
abuse' (p. 28). He also insists that his own separation of the two categories is an 
artificial one, and that in practice `the two 
... 
experience various forms of 
interaction: struggle, mutual influence, crossing and fusion' (p. 30). 
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triumph of a purely material self over the attempt to impose a licit and socially 
meaningful identity. Against the orders of culture, the coprophage `recognizes his 
own shit as 
... 
self-generated, self-expressive, utterly concrete. By eating it he 
reaffirms his possession of his self, entering a state of true freedom' ('The 
Transcepdent Postmodem: Noise and Free Agency in the Novels of Thomas 
Pynchon and William Burroughs', p. 327). For Steven Shaviro, Burroughs's bodies 
are the proof that biology refuses to follow the laws of ideology ('Two Lessons 
from Burroughs'). When Deleuze and Guattari want to declare that their utopian 
Body Without Organs is a lived possibility it is Burroughs whom they cite (A 
Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 150). His texts would seem 
to remind a repressive culture of those rejected bodily practices and functions 
which it would prefer not to mention since they disrupt its logic. 
In the same way his recurrent use of the imagery of the chaotic body would 
seem to flout the ordered and stable society symbolized by a well-ordered body, 
and the stable self that comes with it. When John Tytell celebrates Burroughs as a 
writer who has ` tried to redeem our repressed fears and desires' (Naked Angels: 
The Lives and Literature of the Beat Generation, p. 123), his choice of verb is 
telling. For if the texts are said to `redeem' what has been despised about the body, 
surely it is equally true that in such a formulation the body is assumed to redeem us: 
it is our experience of the corporeal (as the raw, the unsocialized) which will save 
us from the constrictions of the social. 6 
Faced with the Cartesian assumption that the mind is a unified, self-aware, 
coherent and disembodied site of rationality, the unruly body would seem to 
exemplify all that is non-self-identical, dispersed, fluid and irrational. There is thus a 
6 For similar readings of Burroughs's work, see Christopher Ames, ` Calling for 
Ketchup in Burroughs and Pynchon'; and Allon Jonhston, `The Burroughs 
Biopathy: William S. Burroughs' Junky and Naked Lunch and Reichian Theory'. 
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tradition within Critical Theory which takes the body to stand for what is outside 
of, antithetical to, or unintelligible for, culture. Thus in Thinking Through The Body 
Jane Gallop writes of the body as that which is ` not already rationalized and 
subordinate to discourse' (p. 19), telling us that `the body is enigmatic because it is 
not the creation of the mind' (p. 18). Discussing the ways in which stereotyping 
diminishes the irreducible individuality of each person, Roland Barthes says `the 
stereotype is that emplacement of discourse where the body is missing, where one 
is sure the body is not' (Roland Barthes, p. 90). ' In such assertions the body comes 
to act as the sign of an escape from the rigidities of discourse and the social 
institutions which organize and are organized by discourse. 
Such arguments begin from the assumption that the dominant feature of 
subjectivity is that `the subject is the subject. Alone it stands. And in no need of 
skin, flesh, face or fluid. Body it never is. Bodies are the enemy of the subject' 
(Marcus Doel, `Bodies Without Organs: Schizoanalysis and Deconstruction', 
p. 230). It therefore follows from such a view of subjectivity that to insist upon the 
significance of the body is to unsettle the foundations of the subject and of the 
culture that shores it up. Hence the term `the body' serves as a sign for a space that 
is not simply outside culture, but which is antithetical to it: whose violence, 
sexuality, and scandalous biological processes disrupt the norms of discourse, 
psychic regularity, and economic practicality. 
This politicizing of the body functions to exacerbate the tension of that 
particular split which Kaja Silverman describes as `perhaps the most radical of all 
subject divisions - the division between meaning and materiality' (The Acoustic 
Mirror, p. 44). If the body is to be recruited as partisan, then it is so that it might 
' On Ba; thes's use of the body as the route to effect an escape from culture see 
Jonathan Culler, Barthes, pp. 91-100; Jo Eadie, `  "To Say How We Are Moved": 
Reading the Body of/in/with Roland Barthes'; and Leslie Hill, `Barthes's Body'. 
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serve in the confrontation between an intelligible social order and a realm which has 
no inherent intelligibility. At stake would then seem to be the triumph of meaning 
over matter or that of matter over meaning 
- 
with the latter option being a pleasing 
prospect if we have come to regard meaning as tyrannical. " 
How well does Burroughs fit with such a notion of the body ? Although I 
have suggested that his texts do indeed affirm various non-traditional notions of 
embodiment, I have also stressed that they depend heavily on the sorts of hostility 
towards the body that we here see him recruited to oppose. In this chapter, I wish 
to ask what is lost when we make his work a celebration of those bodily states that 
it is so disgusted by. I will consider whether an affirmation of bodily disorder is 
always a useful political strategy, and whether in fact Burroughs's work suggests 
that it may rather be a suspicion of bodily order that can enable our politics. And 
where Loranger, Shaviro, and Deleuze and Guattari read Burroughs as affirming a 
bodily alterity that subverts a set of dominant philosophical concepts, I shall 
suggest that his work is altogether less sanguine about the possibilities of using the 
body as a revolutionary resource 
- 
and is perhaps more useful as a result. 
Burroughs's texts certainly recognize that certain groups in particular 
regard the body as dangerous and repulsive, and that this accompanies a desire to 
control and pathologize bodies which flaunt their socially illicit materiality. In the 
quartet, a particular scorn is reserved for those who loathe the body, and it is their 
fate to be humiliated or destroyed by its most extreme manifestations. In a science- 
fiction scenario, the military commanders who warn their troops against the 
It may also be, as Terry Eagleton has argued, that this re-turn to the body is part 
of an attempt by postmodern theory to infuse theory with the specificities of the 
personal and the concrete world of the material 
- 
that the body is a theoretical 
palliative, reassuring us that our high theory has not lost touch with real life (The 
Illusions of Postmodernism,. pp. 69-75). Rather than exacerbating the conflict 
between meaning and materiality, the body then becomes in Critical Theory a way 
of solving it. 
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temptations of sex with alien organisms 
- 
`You boys going to stand still for this ? 
Being slobbered down and shit out by an alien mollusk ?' (TTE, p. 11) - end up 
victims of those same creatures, driven insane by sexual hunger: 
As I write this I have barricaded myself in the ward room against the 2nd 
Lieutenant who claims he is `God's little hang boy sent special to me' that 
fucking shave tail I can hear him out there whimpering and slobbering and 
the Colonel is jacking off in front of the window pointing to a Gemini Sex 
Skin. The Captain's corpse hangs naked at the flagpole. (7TE, p. 12) 
Similarly those who find the body's biological functioning so unpredictable that 
they wish to dominate it end up being swamped by it: `Americans have a special 
horror of giving up control, of letting things happen in their own way without 
interference. They would like to jump down into their stomachs and digest the food 
and shovel the shit out' (NL, p. 170). The desire to control the unruly body thus 
ends up as the immersion in body matter, its uncertain consequences indicated by 
the ambiguous image of the shit-shoveller: in seeking to be in control of the body's 
waste matter, they have ended up being overwhelmed by it. 
However, it would be wrong to assume from this that Burroughs therefore 
wants us to simply affirm or celebrate the body as an act of resistance against such 
authoritative loathing. At the same time as critiquing the pathologization of 
unconventional bodily pleasures, his position would also seem to be that it is 
precisely because the body can be made into such an object of loathing that we 
must dispense with it. The body is too convenient a resource for power to exploit - 
we are too easily programmed by revulsion, embarrassment, and shame, which 
makes us ripe for manipulation. Whoever has the power to shame, Burroughs 
suggests, is in the position of God (The Job, pp. 19-20). That the army officers so 
easily descend to `whimpering and slobbering' may well mock their hatred of the 
slobbering `sex skins' that seduce their troops. But it also reveals such apparently 
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unruly bodily practices as in fact complicit with the lines of military authority. For 
even in this bodily anarchy the second lieutenant still has power over the private 
barricaded into his dormitory, and the Captain still occupies the place at the top of 
the flagpole. Similarly, while the image of the would-be shit-shoveller at first 
suggests the impossibility of entering one's own digestive tract in order to oversee 
its progress, placing the body beyond the reach of power, on reflection we see that 
such an intervention in biology is clearly entirely possible: drugs, dietary plans, 
rhythms of eating, induced vomiting, exercise, laxatives and enemas are routinely 
used to speed up, or slow down, the passage of food through the body. 
It is a recognizable feature of satire that in order to achieve its mockery it 
must retain elements of the scenes that it satirizes: one thinks of images like the fool 
or animal crowned as a king at the medieval carnival. Read as satire, an image like 
the colonel's skin hung from the flagpole ridicules authority (the national flag) by 
associating it with the repulsive (the flayed skin). But Burroughs goes further than 
this, to suggest the messy body's association with authority: even flayed skin may 
be given a place of status or prestige and sanction the hierarchical system of 
prestige as it does so. These are not simply grotesque satires, but ambivalent 
images in which body matter 
- 
including its most visceral, excremental, and sexual 
aspects 
- 
is not simply an unthinkable or `enigmatic' otherness which must be 
repressed, even though the texts resound with the efforts of repressive authority to 
exercise control over it. Rather, alongside this, the representation of even the most 
apparently anarchic of biological states reveals the body's complicity with forces of 
domination that operate through, rather than simply against, such states. 
I regard this particular contradiction as central to Burroughs's work. In the 
last chapter, I considered this ambivalence about the body as indicative of the 
problems of attempting to imagine bodily transcendence; here I wish to use it as a 
way of approaching the question of the usefulness of deploying ` the body' as a sign 
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for a realm of experience outside the domination of culture, by drawing on one 
theorist whose work has been taken as central to such a line of thinking: Julia 
Kristeva. In particular, I am interested in Kristeva's focus on the split in the subject 
between a desire to transcend the body and the necessity of inhabiting it: a tension 
that she describes as `impossible, irreconcilable, and, by that very token, real' 
(Powers of Horror, p. 120). In terms of this thesis, Kristeva also offers a useful 
development of the model for embodied subjectivity and its representation that I 
have outlined in chapters one and two. She extends the Lacanian account of a body 
constructed as under the threat of disorder by emphasizing the psychic 




of body matter. Her work also 
makes a useful comparison with the Foucauldian account of the ordering of the 
body by social structures through her insistence that the body is a site both of 
resistance to power and disciplining by power. 
Kristeva offers ways of understanding the ambiguity of Burroughs's images 
of bodily disgust: both dreaded and desired, both in the service of power and 
resistant to it, both a defiant expression of a marginalized aspect of human 
subjectivity and an alien matter that has colonized the human subject. Such an 
ambivalence is all the more important because in two striking applications of 
Kristeva's work to Burroughs, this ambiguity has been erased from both writers. 
Robin Lydenberg quotes Kristeva to lend weight to her argument that Burroughs's 
writing derives from `a focus on that which threatens the seamless unity and 
autonomy of the symbolic body' (Word Cultures, p. 141), and figures it as the 
realization of the Kristevan ` semiotic' or pre-verbal anarchy (pp. 171-172). For 
Kendra Langeteig, Burroughs's characters are a celebration of carnal chaos and, 
punning on the title of the work by Kristeva that will be central to this chapter, she 
suggests that `Burroughs invests them with the annihilating "powers of horror" that 
stalk the imagination' (`Horror Autotoxicus', p. 160), empowering them as chaotic 
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bringers of destruction to a stifling social order through their terrifyingly unruly 
bodies. For neither critic is there any sense that either Burroughs or Kristeva might 
in fact be doing something other than prescribing as a remedy for all ills a disorderly 
body which is the source of spontaneous revolutionary values. 
(ii) Kristeva and the Abject Body 
The central focus of Kristeva's theoretical work is the process by which the 
infant becomes a subject through its entry into culture, and the consequences 
(personal and social) of that process. She is concerned with what comes before that 
threshold, how early physical and psychic states persist into adult life, and how 
literary texts attempt to engage with such states. In response to her inquiry into 
these territories, there have been four recurrent criticisms of Kristeva's work, often 
regarded by her detractors as being so damning as to invalidate her entire 
theoretical project' They are: that Kristeva posits an unproveable pre-linguistic 
origin to subjectivity, which is in fact more a fantasy of her own ideological position 
than any psychic truth; that in so doing, she represents as biologically immutable a 
series of psychic states that are in fact culturally specific; that she misreads the 
relationship between aesthetic and socio-political revolution by assuming that 
textual transgressions constitute a substantive challenge to the social order; and 
finally, that she reifies the relationships of men and women to culture, and to each 
other, in such a way that women are robbed of agency, and men become the 
privileged agents of revolutionary praxis. 
I See for instance: Judith Butler, Gender Trouble, pp. 79-93; Ann Rosalind Jones, 
'Julia Kristeva on Femininity: The Limits of a Semiotic Politics'; Eleanor 
Kuykendall, 'Questions for Julia Kristeva's Ethics of Linguistics'; Gayatri Spivak, 
'In a Word: Interview', p. 17; Jennifer Stone, 'The Horrors of Power: A Critique of 
"Kristeva" '; and Allon White, 'L'Eclatement du sujet: The Work of Julia 
Kristeva'. 
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These first two objections will be addressed in later stages of this chapter, 
but I want briefly to address the third and fourth objections now, since there will be 
no later possibility to do so. In a sense, this thesis has its own easy way of 
circumventing the final objection: I am not making any claims for the adequacy of 
Kristeva's theorization of female agency. My reading of Burroughs will show how 
her work can be usefully coupled with his texts precisely because of her recognition 
of the problems of embodiment for male writing. Whether Kristeva is as useful in 
reading texts by women writers is another question, which I leave open here. As to 
the issue of textual revolution, I would certainly agree that Kristeva's work does 
not often consider the precise social mechanisms by which textual innovation can 
lead to social innovation, preferring as she does to leave such assertions to be taken 
on trust. ' But, as this chapter hopes to demonstrate, it is possible to relate 
textuality and representation to larger political struggles in ways that actualize their 
revolutionary potential. If texts have a politics, it lies in the way that their readers 
use them 
- 
and it is perhaps in a piece of work like my own that we can build a 
bridge between formal textual features and the political struggles whose subjects 
might respond to the possibilities generated in such texts. 
How might we start to make such connections between Burroughs, 
Kristeva, and embodied politics ? Influenced by the linguist Alfred Korzybski, one 
of Burroughs's central claims is that `there are certain formulas, word-locks, which 
will lock up a whole civilisation for a thousand years' (The Job, p. 49), chief 
amongst which are `the Aristotelian "either-or" 
- 
something is either this or that' 
(The Job, p. 48) and `Aristotle's is of identity : this is a chair. Now, whatever it may 
10 On the avante-garde contexts for this hope of textual radicalization, see Leslie 
Hill, `Julia Kristeva: Theorizing the Avant-Garde ? '; and Suzanne Guerlac, 
`Transgression in Theory: Genius and the Subject of La Revolution du langage 
poetique'. 
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be, it's rot a chair, it's not the word chair, it's not the label chair' (The Job, p. 49). " 
Such linguistic functions are part of what Kristeva calls the ` thetic' aspect of 
subjectivity: the state based on logic and maintained through the syntactical rigours 
of language. " The thetic consists of two operations: an act of denotation, by which 
particular objects are named and identified; and an act of enunciation, by which a 
subject-position is produced from which such utterances may issue (Revolution in 
Poetic Language, henceforth RPL, pp. 54-56). Like Burroughs, she views such 
stabilization of identity as suspect, since the thetic position entails a reduction of the 
heterogeneity of the psyche. Such a position has been made most familiar within 
studies of Kristeva through her opposing terms ` semiotic' and `symbolic': the one 
being the chaotic pre-verbal space experienced by the child, the other being the 
linguistic structure which orders subjectivity (RPL, pp. 19-106). These overused 
terms will not play a part in the following discussion, but have been central to 
debates about Kristeva. 13 Whatever the merits of her much-used, and much-reviled, 
terms, the speed of their dissemination within Critical Theory suggests the appeal of 
the formulation of a rigid imposition on an essentially free and pre-cultural psyche. 
But it is the very appeal of such a position that I wish to explore here: what if, in 
our apparent eagerness to accept a notion of the body's resistance to order, we 
overlook these insistent warnings from Burroughs 
- 
that at its most apparently 
chaotic, the body still follows the contours of authority ? Is it possible to recognize 
" On Burroughs's use of Korzybski's ideas, see David Ingram, ` William Burroughs 
and Language'. 
12 Kristeva's concept of the thetic derives from her reading of Edmund Husserl. See 
Michael Payne, Reading Theory, pp. 171-176. 
19 See for instance: Josette Feral, ` Antigone or the Irony of the Tribe'; Toril Moi, 
Sexual/Textual Politics pp. 161-173; Kelly Oliver, Reading Kristeva: Unraveling 
the Double-Bind; Michael Payne, Reading Theory, pp. 165-183; and Allon White, 
'L'Eclatement du sujet: The Work of Julia Kristeva'. Despite this persistent 
interest, Jacqueline Rose has suggested that it is `the least useful aspect of 
Kristeva's work, even though it is the concept for which she is best known' (`Julia 
Kristeva 
- 
Take Two', p. 154). 
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the body's capacity to subvert regimes of propriety, while still being aware of its 
dubious allegiances to domination ? 
To what extent, then, does Kristeva regard the body as outside the social 
order? In her book Powers of Horror (henceforth PH), Kristeva defines a process 
which she calls `abjection', a process by which the subject attempts to split itself 
away from the acknowledgement of its corporeal existence. Kristeva is proposing a 
universal process in the constitution of subjectivity, based around exclusions 
charged with horror. " She is particularly concerned with the corporeality of this 
horror: the way in which abjection involves disgust at the body, and particularly 
- 
for reasons which we will come to later 
- 
at the female body. Her arguments offer a 
way of understanding the unsettling potential of body matter, through mapping out 
abjection as a perspective on the body produced by a symbolic order which 
attempts to stand outside that body. But, we shall see, it is also a set of feelings 
which the body develops long before it can speak. 
The abject is a part of ourselves 
- 
and particularly of our bodies 
- 
which we 
cannot be rid of, but which has been excluded or prohibited: it may take the form of 
culturally stigmatized body material (excrement, menstrual blood, spittle), or it may 
appear as an everyday substance whose viscosity or porousness reminds us of our 
own bodily material. Like Fanon's analysis of his own blackness, it is that part of us 
which is so far excluded from a definition of legitimate subjectivity that the 
recognition of its presence in our bodies places our sense of integrity and existence 
under threat. The body thus becomes a repository of organs and substances 
"`I have sought in this book to demonstrate on what mechanism of subjectivity 
(which I believe to be universal) such horror, its meaning as well as its power, is 
based' (PH, p. 208). Similarly, although she accepts that different forms of language 
may construct different forms of subjectivity, she nevertheless insists that she will 
only go so far as to locate any given symbolic system as `a possible variant, within 
the only concrete universality that defines the speaking being 
- 
the signifying 




if not antipathetic 
- 
to the subject. A `German practitioner of 
Technolpgical Medicine' suggests in The Naked Lunch that `The human body is 
filled up vit unnecessitated parts', and calls for a body with `lebensraum like the 
Vaterland' (NL, pp. 145-146). The fascistic connotations which Burroughs gives to 
the desire to clean away `unnecessitated parts' of the body remind us that abjection 
is a violent process, whose condemnation of the body is intimately tied to social 
hierarchies which designate certain bodies as less valuable than others. 
Although the abject is excluded, it perpetually fascinates us. But it can never 
quite occupy a place in our world since it has been excluded in order that that 
world make sense. Consequently the abject `draws me toward the place where 
meaning collapses' (PH, p. 2), where systems of order, with their clear boundaries, 
cease to hold power. The abject thus defines a zone of experience that is antithetical 
to the social order and which erodes its dominant values. Through abjection, the 
subject is founded by systematic exclusions, and yet, as if conscious of the void left 
by those exclusions, we are drawn to the abject matter that marks them, finding it 
`as tempting as it is condemned' (PH, p. 1). The abject is not simply that which we 
repress or deny, for it persists: `excluded but in a strange fashion: not radically 
enough for a secure differentiation 
... 
and yet clearly enough for a defensive 
position' (PH, p. 7). We can loathe the abject but cannot separate it from us, it will 
not be brushed off. It clings, but it is too disgusting to ever be accepted as a part of 
us 
- 
`to each superego its abject' (PH, p. 2), that loathed presence which enables the 
superego to effect a narcissistic version of the self: a self which is pure and a body 
which is clean. 
The abject thus has a double effect. On the one hand it stabilizes the subject, 
since it provides a structure to enforce our sense of distance from rejected body 
matter; on the other, it destabilizes the subject since it is the ever-present reminder 
of those excluded bodily forms which we might also be. As such, it may well seem 
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that the body is opposed to ordered subjectivity. And texts such as Burroughs's 
quartet Yvould seem to verify this by their hostility towards its open, porous 
qualities: that is, all the ways in which corporeality refuses to follow a conventional 
logic of identity. If we think of the analysis of Burroughs made in the previous 
chapter, we can see how Kristeva's theory of abjection might be used to 
demonstrate that although Burroughs seems to want to mark off the alien 
substances from the clean body, the disgust attached to those substances is a 
product of our tortuous relationships with our own bodies. Reviled substances 
originating within our flesh serve as the model for all impurity. As such, he is 
compelled to condemn it and plan its elimination: the strength of the voice which 
speaks in the quartet is sustained by its conviction of its own purity, which in turn 
depends on its capacity to name, diagnose and expel the abject. 
Moreover, abjection extends the argument about constitutive possession 
that I m*de in the previous chapter. Victor Burgin defines abjection as `the means 
by which the subject is first impelled towards the possibility of constituting itself as 
such' ('Geometry and Abjection', p. 115). This curious phrase suggests some of the 
problems of thinking about abjection and its relationship to subjectivity. It makes no 
sense to speak of a subject that can be ` impelled towards' its own constitution, as if 
it preceded its own existence. " Rather, we should speak of the subject as that 
which comes into being as abjection takes place. Before it, there is ` no subject or 
personality, merely an unstable and provisional "beating out" (frayage) of certain 
pathways' (Allon White, 'L'Eclatement du sujet: The Work of Julia Kristeva', 
p. 70). Consequently, subjectivity emerges because of a series of demarcations in 
which bodily matter is declared taboo, with each stabilization of the subject 
iS Kristeva encounters similar problems, describing how `discrete quantities of 
energy move through the body of the subject who is not yet constituted as such' 
(RPL, p. 25). 
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accompanied by acts of abjection which simultaneously render the subject unstable. 
The subject comes into being only by a process which makes it a subject-under- 
threat and a subject-needing-to-expel. In the process that brings it into being, it 
requires the fantasy that within its body is matter that is not its own, and from 
which it can separate itself Building on Kristeva's account, we might even go so 
far as to say that one definition of the subject is: that psychic construct which 
maintains itself through attempts to expel unwanted parts of itself. Subjectivity is 
thus predicated on the experience of possession 
- 
of defining oneself as an integral 
body by attempting to expel parts of the body that are designated alien presences. 
Kristeva at one point defines the abject as: `a possession previous to my advent' 
(PH, p. 10) The subject thus comes into being only as the always already inhabited 
- 
contaminated by what it wishes to expel, invaded by what it regards as alien. 
Such an account would certainly seem to promise a challenge to society 
issuing from the body, with Burroughs staging a futile resistance to its presence. 
His loathing of embodiment can be read as symptomatic of abjection, with his 
attempts to dismiss it proving unsuccessful. The body thus seems to stand as that 
unstable material which cannot be attacked with impunity, since it always promises 
to subvert the identity of its assailant. Such a promise appears borne out by 
Kristeva's insistence that the abject frustrates and undoes the possibility of a unified 
identity. If at the level of fantasy we imagine that unwanted body-substances are 
not in fact part of ourselves, at the same time we recognize that they do belong to 
us, and are never finally able to accept their separation. While abjection is the 
precondition for the narcissistic construction of a super-ego, we can never fully 
believe in such an image, for at the same time abjection spoils it: `abjection is 
therefore a kind of narcissistic crisis' (PH, p. 14) 
- 
that is a crisis for narcissism, a 
crisis for the image of the perfect self which is created. Abjection is thus a process 
of prohibiting what will not be prohibited, rejecting what will not be rejected - or 
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rather, of prohibiting that which is prohibited but still refuses the prohibition, and 
which is wholly rejected but still refuses to go: `the abject is perverse because it 
neither gives up nor assumes a prohibition, a rule, a law; but turns them aside, 
misleads, corrupts; uses them, takes advantage of them, the better to deny them' 
(PH, p. 15). 
Thus what is abjected in this way does not simply become an external object 
which we regard with horror. In the object, says Kristeva, we encounter homology: 
a structure of differentiated entities (myself and the object) which enables me to 
construct a secure self. The object is separate from me, as I am from it. But the 
abject is never quite separate from me, and as such undermines the distinctions 
which enable meaning to operate and selfhood to be sustained. The most extreme 
example of this, argues Kristeva, is the corpse. In the corpse we encounter 
everything that has been excluded from our bodies 
- 
all the mess and waste 
- 
put 
together as a body. The border by which we separate death and decomposition 
from ourselves has been pushed inwards by the excluded waste until it is ` a border 
that has encroached upon everything' (PH, p. 3) 
- 
and `how can I be without 
border? ' (PH, p. 4). Without the border, the self cannot maintain its separateness. 
Hence that crisis which we see in Burroughs, where the entire body must be 
rejected because it has been abjected, is analogous to that state described by 
Kristeva as the end point of a gradual process whereby the entire body, part by 
part, gradually acquires the characteristics of those specific body substances which 
are most strongly abjected: `such wastes drop so that I might live, until, from loss 
to loss, nothing remains in me and my entire body falls beyond the limit 
... 
It is no 
longer I who expel, "I" is expelled' (PH, p. 3-4). 
Here too Burroughs would seem to bear out such arguments, for although 
he attempts to define and reject abject matter, his own self-advocated values 
constantly resemble what is abjected. As I have argued, Burroughs's fierce 
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denunciation of a state of invasion relies on a series of indicted enemies whose 
methods and characteristics always have an uncanny resemblance to his own. 
Abjection is a structure that mocks us, because we constantly find that what we 
designate as the most odious will in fact prove to be inescapably bound to us. 16 
It is important that the abject does not just disgust or repel 
- 
it also 
fascinates and lures us. What seems particularly fascinating in the abject is that it 
offers us a promise of destruction, and not just individual destruction but 
- 
like 
those anomalous objects that intrigue Douglas 
- 
the dissolution of an entire cultural 
system which makes sense only through its exclusion. The abject thus violates both 
the integrity of the subject's identity 
- 
thereby rendering identity untenable 
- 
and 
along with that identity, the logic that subtends it. Hence it would appear to be a 
plausible reading of Kristeva to argue that the body is the site of the loss of integral 
subjectivity 
-a discordant site where meaning collapses, self-sameness comes 
undone and unified consciousness is disrupted. And the fact that Burroughs's 
encounter with abjection ends up undermining his own attempts to assert his 
distance from the body would seem to bear out the political capacity of abject 
matter to disturb any social system which attempts to dispel it. 
But Burroughs also offers us a very different perspective on abjection, 
which challenges such an optimistic reading of its power to subvert, and one that 
will enable us to take Kristeva in a very different direction. In The Soft Machine a 
16 In arguing this Kristeva seeks to use abjection as a means of understanding social 
and political acts of exclusion and stigmatization 
-a concern which her more recent 
work has extended to issues of racism and nationalism (see for instance Strangers 
to Ourselves). Kristeva's thinking should therefore be seen as an inquiry into how 
our relationships to our bodies determine social thought. As such, her focus on the 
instability of the exclusions required for abjection is necessarily a political argument 
about the impossibility of ever completely expelling stigmatized social groups and 
practices from the collective psyche of the nation state. For evaluations of 
Kristeva's attempts to extend her work in these directions, see Nöelle McAfee, 
`Abject Strangers: Towards an Ethics of Respect'; and Norma Claire Moruzzi 
`National Abjects: Julia Kristeva on the Process of Political Self-identification'. 
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traveller, Carl, narrates the story of his journey to a South American village, Puerto 
Joselito. Its inhabitants are in stages of decay, `eating handfuls of dirt and trailing 




each living alone and cultivating his little virus patch' (SM, p. 64). Some of those 
Carl meets, he later finds, are already dead, and the earth they eat is the remains of 
the graves out of which they have dug their way. They thus cross the line between 
life and death 
- 
just as the town crosses the line between the civilization above the 
surface of earth, and the raw matter below it: `the town and its inhabitants were 
slowly sinking in wastes and garbage' (SM, p. 62). 
On an unstable border, rotting away, riddled with viruses and death, Puerto 
Joselito is the abject city, the place of bodily waste and wasted bodies, while its 
sexualized connotations are heightened by a cutup phrase that occurs at the end of 
the chapter: `Puerto Joselito is located through legs' (SM, p. 69). The town is thus a 
site of both repulsion and desire, for however repulsive, the place also attempts to 
appeal to Carl, as he walks past a series of ritualized sexual tableaux, in which 
sweat, semen, excrement and blood leak from ruptured bodies. Towards the end of 
the chapter the words `suffocating town, this. ways to bury explorer' (SM, p. 69) 
appear, echoing the narrative progress by which Carl is slowly buried by the text, as 
the rituals occupy ever more space on the page at his expense, until the signifier 
`Carl' is simply an occasional word mixing with the others. The visit to Puerto 
Joselito thus mimics the process by which the abject is disavowed, but finally 
triumphs. At first active verbs are associated with Carl, which position him as 
distant observer, unattached to the events he witnesses: `Carl could see people on a 
board walk' (SM p. 63). In particular, it is the repeated word `walked' that marks 
his detached progress through the geography of abjection: `Carl walked through 
footpaths of a vast shanty town' (SM, p. 66), `Carl walked along a long line of penis 
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urns' (S/l'f, p. 67). " But eventually the active verbs become passive, and he is lost in 
abjectio{i: `Carl is taken by the centipede legs and pulled into flesh jelly dissolving 
bones' (SM, p. 69). 
Before his final dissolution, Carl faces the first of his many trials of bodily 
disorder when he visits an official called `The Commandante'. There again the 
verbs associated with him turn from active to passive, as `an assistant 
... 
removed 
Carl's clothes in a series of locks and throws' (SM, p. 64) and the Commandante 
attempts to reshape his body from male to female: 
The Commandante spread jelly over Carl's naked paralyzed body. The 
Commandante was moulding a woman. Carl could feel his body draining 
into the woman mould. His genitals dissolving, tits swelling as the 
Commandante penetrated applying a few touches to face and hair 
- 
(jissom 
across the mud wall in the dawn sound of barking dogs and running water 
-) 
Down there the Commandante going through his incantations around Carl's 
empty body. The body rose presenting an erection, masturbates in front of 
the Commandante. Penis flesh spread through his body bursting in orgasm 
explosions granite cocks ejaculate lava undersea black cloud boiling with 
monster crustaceans. Cold grey undersea eyes and hands touched Carl's 
body. The Commandante flipped him over with sucker hands and fastened 
his disk mouth to Carl's asshole. He was lying in a hammock of green hair, 
penis-flesh hammers bursting his body. Hairs licked his rectum, spiraling 
tendrils scraping pleasure centers, Carl's body emptied in orgasm after 
orgasm, bones lit up green through flesh dissolved into the disk mouth with 
a fluid plop. He quivers red now in boneless spasms, pink waves through his 
body at touch of the green hairs. 
The Commandante stripped Carl's body and smeared on green jelly 
nipples that pulled the flesh up and in. Carl's genitals wither to dry shit he 
sweeps clear with a little whisk broom to white flesh and black shiny pubic 
hairs. The Commandante parts the hairs and makes incision with a little 
curved knife. Now he is modeling a face from the picture of his novia in the 
Capital. (SM, pp. 64-65) 
"In a subsequent chapter, `Last Hints', Carl appears again as the emblem of one 
who tries to pass unscathed through abjection, with the repeated verb this time 
being ` descended', a descent that once again leads to his disappearance (SM, pp. 71- 
73). 
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On the one hand, the text seems intended to encourage the reader to 
identify with Carl, and to enjoy the disordering of the body that takes place. In that 
sense it is an extremely efficiently crafted erotic scene. It follows the conventional 
erotic writing practice of enumerating different erogenous zones as an invitation to 
the reader to objectify (by desire) and/or empathize with (by identification) the 
bodies that are depicted. " In the course of the paragraph we move swiftly along the 
chain of key words: genitals, tits, erection, penis, hands, mouth, asshole, rectum, 
nipples, pubic hairs. Even though in each case the body part undergoes an 
unsettling change (for instance the genitals are `dissolving' and the nipples are made 
of `greep jelly'), the transformations are consonant with the erotic conventions of 
the representation of orgasm: liquefaction, loss of control, and loss of sense of time 
as marked by repeated use of present participles. Even the familiar Burroughsian 
imagery, rather than indicating dangerous biological changes, may be read as a 
mixture of the hallucinations that accompany heightened states of sexual arousal, 
and conventional metaphors for sexual pleasure, interspersed with other phrases 
that may be no more than new metaphors for orgasm: `penis flesh spread through 
his body bursting in orgasm explosions granite cocks ejaculate lava under a black 
cloud bailing with crustaceans'. 
The passage evokes a range of sensory experiences in order to elicit a 
cathexis from the senses of its reader: visually it enumerates colours (`he quivers 
red now', `grey undersea eyes', `pink waves', `green jelly nipples', `shiny black 
pubic hair'); while the kinesthetic (the senses of touch and movement) is aroused by 
' As Diana Fuss suggests, we must always be prepared to think the occurrence of 
both, rather than accepting the traditional psychoanalytic assumption that one either 
identifies with or desires for (Identification Papers, especially pp. 11-14 ); we must 
also as Marjorie Garber says, recognize that gender and sexuality are no bar to such 
processes, with men and women, whether gay, lesbian or straight, identifying with 
and desiring bodies of any and all sexes (Vice Versa: Bisexuality and the Eroticism 
of Everyday Life). 
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the text's deployment of a vocabulary of sensation: moulding, draining, swelling, 
flipped l#m over, licked, scraping, quivers. In its engagement of these tactile senses 
it also relies on the coupling of opposed sensory experiences, moving between 
words variously associated with heat (lava, boiling) and cold (crustaceans, 
underse4); softness (hair, tendrils, fluid, waves) and hardness (granite, hammers). 
Its alternation between these opposing sensory experiences acts as a kind of 
inventory of the kinesthetic. Its aim would seem to be to generate an array of forms 
of pleasure that would give every reader some point of erotic access to the 
scenario, while miming through its disconnected syntax the sensory and cognitive 
confusions of orgasm. 
But Burroughs is quick to complicate such a response. Carl responds curtly: 
`Most distasteful thing I ever stand still for' (SM, p. 65). Carl's phrase is one that 
recurs in these texts - first appearing in The Naked Lunch, when an addict uses it of 
the sexual demands made of him by a narcotics agent. It indicates an assertion of 
power by its various speakers, who, while they have submitted to some act by 
standing still, may safely ridicule it afterwards after they have survived it. " The 
addict who uses it first does so in a safe environment, joking with his friends: ` Later 
the boy ý. s sitting in a Waldorf with two colleagues dunking pound cake. "Most 
distasteful thing I ever stand still for", he says' (NL, p. 27). 0 If these texts 
constantly encourage distaste as a mode of resistance, it is perhaps because such an 
emotion represents the restrained and contemptuous tones of the discriminating 
critic, drawn from a distinctly bourgeois vocabulary: not retching or livid, but 
merely shocked, like the detachment Carl later shows towards the erotic rituals. To 
19 See for- instance the time traveller who infiltrates and then destroys a Mayan 
priesthood: `In order to accomplish the purpose I prostituted myself to one of the 
priests 
- 
(Most distasteful thing I ever stood still for)' (SM, p36). 
20 As if in recognition of its centrality, the phrase appears on that fragmentary 
summary of Burroughsian themes and devices, the back cover of the Paladin edition 
of The Naked Lunch. 
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find something `distasteful' is not to be overwhelmed, but to position oneself as 
superior, As such it expresses that attempt to distance oneself from the body which 
defines abjection, but also, because of its politicized associations as a tactic of 
resistance and survival, acts as a reminder that there may be moments where it is 
our interests to adopt such a distance from the abject. 
Carl then strengthens his rejection of abjection by an effort of will which 
does not derive from his compromised corporeality: `Carl made words in the air 
without a throat, without a tongue' (SM, p. 65). They are words uncontaminated by 
the body's materiality, existing only through the will of the speaker. The final part 
of this rejection of the bodily chaos that he has undergone comes when, asserting 
his intention to overcome this bodily disruption through the medical models so 
beloved by Burroughs, his effort results in the words: `I hope there is a Farmacia in 
the area'. " What we might initially have seen as a moment of delirious jouissance is 
now rendered as pathology. The heavily eroticized transformation of Carl's body 
then becomes read differently: it is an indication of the pleasure that may be 
involved in experiences which destroy us. Deliberately seductive, it exposes our 
capacity to be enthralled by the pleasures of a dominated body 
- 
indicting the ways 
in which our bodily pleasures have been constructed for us so as to render us 
submissive. ' 
We might want to dismiss Carl as another of those despisers of the body 
21 Unfortunately for Carl, Puerto Joselito is so lost to abjection that it offers no 
medical salvation. The pharmacist turns him away: `He clanged an iron door and 
the sign Farmacia fell off the boat and sank in black ooze' (SM, p. 65). 
22 Edward Foster records Burroughs's hopes that these forms of writing might wear 
out the appeal of the erotic (Understanding the Beats, p. 170); David Lodge 
suggests that Burroughs's sexual imagery is constructed so as to be non-erotic (The 
Modes of Modern Writing, pp. 35-38) 
- 
but, caught up in the reversals central to 
this passage, he also accuses Burroughs's writing of making us attracted to the 
violence which is depicted by eroticizing it ('Objections to William Burroughs', 
p. 207). 
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whom Burroughs ridicules, his Germanic name linking him back to the ` German 
practitioner of technological medicine' from The Naked Lunch. In keeping with 
Burroughs's use of Germany to signify a fascistic order and cleanliness, the 
Commandante apologises to Carl for the squalor of Puerto Joselito: ` you must 
forgive my staff if they do not quite measure up to your German ideal of spit and 
polish' (SM, P. 64). But it would be a mistake to read Carl's resistance as being 
ridiculed 
- 
primarily because it is depicted as a positive opposition to attempts to 
violate his freedom, all the more heroic because it is doomed to fail. The town is 
envisioned as a space of repeated attempts at control and domination, of which 
Cares assault at the hands of the Commandante is only one example. Throughout 
the town, priests, puppeteers, con-men, and pimps attempt to recruit Carl for forms 
of physical transformation which require that he become abject: physically, in the 
sense of becoming liquid, infected, or decaying; psychically, in the sense of giving 
up any sense of clear self-definition; and, crucially, politically, in the sense of 
occupying a position of submission 
- 
to be a sacrifice, a prostitute, or a meal. For 
Burroughs, to be abject is to be enslaved 
- 
since, after all, the social correlation of 
abject matter is with those who are politically powerless: to be socially 
disenfranchized is to be socially abjected. It is no accident that the Commandante's 
expression of his power over Carl is to attempt to turn him into a woman: to push 
him from a position of social equality to one of social inferiority. It is the abject 
body th4t bears the signs of social submission and the clean body that retains 
power, as with the endangered employee who begs for his job with the words: 
`Please Boss Man, I'll wipe your ass, I'll wash out your dirty condoms, I'll polish 
your shoes with the oil on my nose' (NL, p. 28). 11 
In an instance of what Homi Bhabha has termed `sly civility' ('Sly Civility'), it is 
in declaring his inferior situation that the speaker mocks his superior: in declaring 
his own willingness to perform the abject task of cleaning up the dirt of his 
employer, the employer's own body is exposed as equally repugnant. 
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The attempt to elicit from the body an expression of its own abject matter 
then stands as an act of domination: it is an attempt to make the body vulnerable. 
Similarly, psychic disorganization is also a liability 
- 
it is only Carl's capacity to 
maintain a sense of his identity that preserves him. Equally crucial to survival in 
Puerto Joselito is the ability to distinguish oneself from other substances, to define 
one's own body as integral, and to maintain a distance from the fascination of 
losing oneself in states of disorganization. Also, Burroughs suggests, we need to be 
able to recognize how our desires may be constructed against our best interests, 
encouraging us to submit to the pleasures of our own violation 
- 
secured here once 
more through the body's biological susceptibility to control, represented in Carl's 
case by reference to the brain's `pleasure centers'. All of which is to resist the 
psychic dynamics generated by the appeal of the abject. The abject now seems not 
to promise a liberating access to a repressed corporeality so much as to invite us to 
surrender our capacity to resist domination. If abjection generates a crisis in the 
subject, we should not assume that freedom lies in resolving such a crisis in favour 
of the substances or activities that have been abjected. Rather, we must recognize 
the necessity of sometimes reasserting their rejection. Against Langeteig and 
Lydenberg, I would suggest that Burroughs's work in fact amounts to a constant 
reminder that the abject's unsettling of our borders, and disruption of our 
relationship to our sense of self, may not always be a route to new freedoms. 
Such an analysis of the experience of abjection, as offered by the quartet, 
seems particularly astute. It recognizes that a sense of bodily integrity and psychic 
wholeness may facilitate social action. `The human body' as Kristeva says: 
is not a unity but a plural totality with separate members that have no 
identity but constitute the place where drives are applied. This dismembered 
body cannot fit together again, set itself in motion, or function biologically 
and physiologically, unless it is included within a practice that encompasses 
the signifying process. (RPL, p. 101) 
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That is, without the ordering that language provides by socializing corporeal matter 
into a unified body, we are unable to take any actions at all. 
In the same way, as we have seen, the quartet also recognizes that the body 
is not a space outside culture, but rather is thoroughly acculturated 
- 
and that the 
abject is not therefore a location outside the social order, but rather always within 
it, and hence able to serve its needs as well as oppose them. For instance, Margrit 
Shildrick offers a suggestive account of the medical monitoring of the body by the 
UK's Department of Social Services, showing how the questionnaires required in 
applications for Disability Living Allowance rely on the destruction of any sense of 
unity in the bodies of those scrutinized. Applicants face a process of questioning 
that reduces their bodies to a catalogue of disfunctions, wounds and leaks, whose 
final goal is to render the subject a catalogue of bodily deficiencies, by which they 
are placid within the finer control of a system which has catalogued their entire 
physical functioning, and weakened their sense of autonomy and dignity in the 
process (Leaky Bodies and Boundaries, pp. 50-56). To be rendered abject may thus 
be to be rendered more thoroughly, and more conveniently, pressed within a 
network of power relations. To dismiss Burroughs's view of abjection as a mode of 
social control as no more than a reactionary attempt to stave of the revolution in 
subjectivity promised by the abject, would be to ignore the alternative political 
reading of abjection which he offers. We might then contextualize these texts' 
expressions of repulsion by situating them within their vision of power as enabled, 
rather than threatened, by the abject experiences which it generates. We might read 
their warnings against contamination not as defences against change, but as 
defences against the disruption of independence by acts of domination which are 
materialky dispersed through even apparently abominated body processes, and 
which maintain their grip through the general recuperation of bodily disorder as a 
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mode of oppression. Faced with the prospect of dissolving identity in the abject, we 
could then recall the words of a street prostitute in The Naked Lunch: `When some 
citizen start telling me about his cancer of the prostate or his rotting septum make 
with that purulent discharge I tell him: "You think I am innarested to hear about 
your ho; nble condition ?I am not innarested at all"' (NL, p. 103). 
V. risteva too views abjection with some suspicion. In spite of the appeal of 
reading Powers of Horror as a celebration of the abject's resistant potential, any 
attempt to claim that her writings offer a delirious celebration of the body would 
have to ignore Kristeva's own position as a psychoanalyst. In her account, 
immersion in abjection is not a positive escape from social repression, but a 
traumatic clinical state, whose survivors Kristeva recounts working with (PH, 
pp. 46-48). Thus, even while Kristeva recognizes the cost to the individual, in terms 
of their pelf-hatred of their own corporeality, and the cost to a society in terms of 
its demonization of social groups associated with the body, she also insists that 
abjection is a necessary process. This assertion of the necessity of a process of 
separation and rejection from disorder and otherness might make us query the 
possibility of constructing a liberatory politics out of such a position. 24 It would 
seem to demand that we never move too far outside the dominant psychic and 
discursive structure that we inhabit. Jacqueline Rose has argued that as a practising 
analyst, Kristeva has a very strong hold on the need for a subject to be able to 
24 See for instance Kelly Oliver, Reading Kristeva, pp. 120-131; and Paul Smith, 
`Julia Kristeva Et Al.; or, Take Three or More'. We might even say that Kristeva's 
thinking has come in two phases: the first being her insistence on politics as an 
anarchic negativity which ruptures the symbolic order; the second on politics as the 
necessity of integrating negativity within the symbolic order. It is thus as common 
to find her being criticized for advocating a politically unfocused anarchism (on the 
basis of the texts from her first phase), as it is to find her condemned for 
advocating a conservative rapprochement (on the basis of the texts from her second 
phase). In such a narrative, Powers of Horror might be the mid-point between the 
two phases. 
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operate in the world 
- 
to be functional according to the current social order ('Julia 
Kristeva 
- 
Take Two' ). ' But the need to achieve some sort of mental health, or 




line between change 
and stasis, challenge and complicity. 
Although she does not pose it in these terms, Kristeva seems quite aware of 
this problem, displaying it in all its conflicts via her deliberately problematic reading 
of Celine. In the final chapters of Powers of Horror she reads in his Nazism ` a 
delirium that literally prevents one from going mad' (PH, p. 137, emphasis in the 
original). Through its rigid demarcations, its adherence to authority, and its phobic 
anti-Semitism, Nazism is a means of sustaining order for the subjectivity of its 
adherents, so as to prevent the collapse which the abject may produce, a strategy to 
`thwart the disintegration of identity' (PH, p. 136). These are what Kristeva 
describes as `the benefits that accrue to the speaking subject from a precise 
symbolic organization' (PH, p. 67) 
- 
the benefits of stability, coherence, 
intelligibility: identity and meaning. These are benefits linked always to the integrity 
of that organization, and with it of the body. Such a position is also useful in 
underst4. nding Burroughs. As we have seen, Burroughs produces an unremitting 
critique of the institutions of multinational capitalism: its xenophobic nationalism, 
its routinizing medical procedures, its systematic production of desire, its reliance 
25 For Rose, this informs Kristeva's insistence on the need to articulate political 
demands in a form which is recognizable by 
- 
which must also mean at least partly 
complicit with - the current regime of power. In her explicitly political interview 
`Woman Can Never Be Defined', Kristeva holds out for feminism a double 
orientation: to be able to accept situationally necessary political moves, while 
always looking towards a future where the subject might be rethought, because 
`there can be no socio-political transformation without a transformation of subjects' 
(p. 141). To political moves conducted within (as they must be) current systems of 
meaning and domination, Kristeva says `it's better than nothing, but it's not exactly 
right either' (p. 141). In that sense Kristeva's political project is to explore how far 
a demand issuing from within this symbolic order can push the limits of that order 
without falling into insanity. 
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on addiction. But he does so by recruiting hostility towards bodily fragility and the 
porousness of identity 
- 
that is, by deploying discourses that are already central to 
the system that he hopes to subvert. In a Kristevan reading 
, 
we should not simply 
dismiss these deployments as politically retrograde, but rather see them as the 
necessary reliance on given conceptual structures which we should expect in any 
would-be revolutionary text 26 For it is only these structures 
- 
the logics of distaste 
- 
that enable abjection to be written, and thereby enable these texts to lament the 
occupation of the body. 
Burroughs is able to explore abjection not because he is somehow free from 
social restraints, but because he speaks from a position so thoroughly constituted 
by such dominant discourses of bodily repulsion that he is able to negotiate his 
fascination 
- 
criticizing the body's abject attributes rather than revelling in them. 
For both writers, the abject body is to be kept at a distance in order to preserve 
particular forms of embodied subjectivity that have their value: those that enable a 
distinct identity, able to preserve its integrity, and modelled not on the porous or 
the fluid, but on the preservation of solidity. 27 The abject body may well be, as both 
Burroughs and Kristeva suggest, a challenge to certain rigidly organized modes of 
subjectivity. But they both insist that we also recognize its dangers, attesting to the 
26 We might compare this with Barthes: ` there are those who want a text (an art, a 
painting) without a shadow, without the "Dominant ideology"; but that is to want a 
text without fecundity, without productivity, a sterile text (see the myth of the 
Woman without a Shadow). The text needs its shadow: this shadow is a bit of 
ideology, a bit of representation, a bit of subject: ghosts, pockets, traces, necessary 
clouds: subversion must produce its own chiaruscuro' (Roland Barthes, The 
Pleasure of the Text, p. 32). 
27 We might think here of Luce Irigaray's argument that identity is always thought 
in relation to solids, rather than fluids ('The "Mechanics" of Fluids'). My 
suggestion here is that however much the thinking of identity as fluid may have 
been marginalized, it also remains central to the processes of control. Perhaps 
where Irigaray suggests that the failure to think about fluidity is a proof of its 
subversive aspect, in fact the refusal to think about fluidity is a ruse for evading the 
recognition of its central role in technologies of power. 
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complexity of the experience of embodied social domination. It is not simply the 
case that a socially licit and integral body confronts a socially illicit and disorderly 
body: rather, the disorganized, invaded, and abject body is itself a tool of social 
control. Burroughs demonstrates the necessity for a suspicion of the abject body, a 
disgust at its malleability, and a resistance to its disruption, in order to resist the 
invasive technologies of power that benefit from abjection. 
Once again, it is useful to consider the role that constitutive possession 
plays here. Since, for Burroughs, possession may be resisted, he insists that it is 
also possible to transcend the abject body altogether. But for Kristeva abjection is 
inescapable 
- 
an argument which I have tried to suggest the quartet also makes, 
even as Burroughs argues against it. So while Burroughs usefully shows how 
power may operate through abjection, in spite of the delirious pleasures that 
accompony the loss of self-proper identity, Kristeva enables us to see that the 
response to such a fact should not be an attempt to escape abjection, but rather to 
negotiate a provisional relationship with it. At times, abjection may well facilitate 
the forms of servitude described by Burroughs 
- 
but at other times it is also the 
source of their disruption. Social control operates both by discourses of integrity 
and of dis-integrity; both by hatred of invasion and by the incitement to receptivity; 
both by inviting us to stigmatize the body matter of others, in the name of our own 
purity, and by encouraging us to identify with abject body matter and thereby 
classify purselves as social detritus. The abject body may therefore at times be a site 
of contrpl and at other times a mode of resistance. 
Burroughs's texts are models of such a process: they reject and despise 
abjection, while also ridiculing the desire for purity; they denounce the abject while 
engaging us in its pleasures. We should not regard this as a problematic 
incoherence in Burroughs, nor try to resolve this tension in favour of either 
element, either by phobically affirming the need to avoid abject matter or by 
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ignoring his desire for transcendence so as to celebrate him as a redeemer of 
despised corporealities (although given the psychic investment in the irreconcilablity 
of these positions, we should not be surprised if we often feel pulled to do one or 
the other). Instead, the psychic inevitability of being caught up in these oscillations 
between fear of and desire for both the pure and the abject becomes in Burroughs's 
writing a political resource. In the landscape of the quartet we cannot transcend the 
abject body since possession is the only form that subjectivity can take. But nor can 
we simply embrace the abject as an affirmation of the socially and psychically 
margins}, since it also acts as a means of subjugating us to bodily invasion. 
ýuch a conclusion is not necessarily comfortable if we are hoping that 
Burroughs will offer a political remedy for the disgust which maintains social 
inequalities, since his texts would seem to end up endorsing its necessity. To what 
extent, then, is it possible to write a liberatory politics from within such 
comprop ised territory ? My treatment of Burroughs up to this point in the chapter 
has focused on the more general issues of abjection and its relationship to power. 
As an illustration of the more particular ways in which Burroughs's treatment of 
abjectiop may relate to questions of oppression and resistance, I propose to look at 
how his treatment of gender negotiates this confrontation between the necessity to 
question normative thinking about the body and the need to use such thinking in 
order to resist strategies of power. 
(iii) Gendering Abjection 
Kristeva reads abjection as intimately connected with gender, because it 
derives from the child's experience of the maternal body. 28 We have already seen, in 
Z' For another instance ofhow this might be used to analyze cultural images, see 
Barbara Creed, The Monstrous-Feminine. Creed uses Kristeva's terms to analyze 
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the analysis of Lacan's ` The Mirror Stage', how psychoanalysis conceives of the 
subject as emerging out of the organization of bodily heterogeneity. Kristeva too is 
concerned with placing antipathy towards body matter within such a traditional 
psychoanalytical narrative, but she returns to the biological origins of the body. 
Because abjection is a process driven by the need for a distinct ` I' which separates 
itself by means of expulsion, she traces the origins of abjection in the infant's 
experience of fusion with the maternal body (PH, pp. 12-15). Her argument here 
reveals her determination to return the psychoanalytic theory of the subject to its 
most biological moments. She insists that we account for the ways that subjectivity 
is formed not only out of the social organization of drives, but out of the biological 
rhythms and conflicts that originate with the body not only before it enters the 
symbolic order, but even before birth (PHpp. 56-63) 29 Thus the particular 
intensification of fiustration which take place around the infant's interaction with 
the maternal body are important for Kristeva because they are the point where the 
very corporeality of abjection is established: it is in this bodily conflict between two 
organisms that the body of an other, and its hold over my body, come to be so 
dreaded. The emotions generated by this relationship thus form the basis for those 
other sites of abjection which Kristeva documents 
- 
from Cline's anti-Semitism to 
the everyday physical disgust at the skin formed on hot milk. 
The child must struggle both to differentiate inside/outside, and 
pleasure(pain - two borders which can never be easily established in the mother- 
images of monstrous femininity in the horror film. The major limitation of Creed's 
position, and one which this chapter tries to avoid, is that because she treats 
abjection_solely as a process by which the female body is demonized, Creed is 
obliged to explain all instances of abject bodies with reference to an image of abject 
femininity. Her work thus evades issues of monstrous masculinity, or of demonized 
race and class antagonisms, even when they are central to the films that she is 
studying. 
29 Following my arguments in Part One, we should remember that such biological 
phenomena are themselves social products even before birth. 
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child dyad, for `the subject will always be marked by the uncertainty of his borders 
and of his affective valency as well' (PH, p. 63). The emotional uncertainty results 
from the fact that the child both loves the mother because it needs her, and hates 
her because she cannot satisfy it. `Want and aggressivity', Kristeva argues, `are 
chronologically separable but logically coextensive' (PH, p. 39). That is, although it 
makes sense to say that we want before we are frustrated, in the practical realm of 
experience the two are inseparable. The other uncertain relation to the maternal 
body is the blurring of the inside/outside border, the difficulty the child has in 
defining itself as separate, and `the subject's fear of his very own identity sinking 
irretrievably into the mother' (PH, p. 63). 
This relationship, simultaneously conflictual and fusional, sets up the 
particular resonances which will define how the body is viewed as a result of the 
process of abjection. The fact of our biological connection to another body, and the 
intimate bodily experiences which accompany growing up (such as breast-feeding, 
toilet training, learning to eat nicely) are the sites around which these first mixed 
feelings cluster 
- 
all of which link back to `the desirable and terrifying, nourishing 
and murderous, fascinating and abject inside of the maternal body' (PH, p. 54). 
Abjection thus focuses on body matter since it is the matter of the body, the needs 
of the body, and the presence of an other body, which are the ground of our first 
struggles. In Elizabeth Grosz's summary: `it is a response to the various bodily 
cycles of incorporation, absorption, depletion, expulsion, the cycles of material 
rejuvenation and consumption necessary to sustain [the subject] itself yet incapable 
of social recognition and representation' ('The Body of Signification', p. 88). 
We must immediately recognize the limitations of such an account of 
maternity 
- 
not least its construction of a single, monolithic maternal narrative. 
Kristeva's description ` seems curiously abstract, caught 
... 
in the conceptual system 
she wants to destabilize rather than open to new input from actual mothers facing 
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the socio-economic realities of childrearing or from the history of changing 
ideologies of motherhood' (Ann Rosalind Jones, `Julia Kristeva on Femininity: The 
Limits of a Semiotic Politics', p. 63). We may well question Kristeva's reading of 
the figure of the abject mother in the Old Testament (PH, pp. 99-106) or 
Sophocles's Oedipus dramas (PHpp. 84-86), as if the particular child-rearing 
practices of those cultures were identical to our own, entailing identical psychic 
crises. " 
One recurring charge against Kristeva has been that she is so wedded to the 
conventional model of the bourgeois heterosexual nuclear family that founds 
psychoanalytic thought, that she unwittingly shores up its institutions since she is 
unable to see them as historically contingent. It is certainly a charge that much of 
Kristeva's writing would seem to bear out. An interview with Elaine Hoffman 
Baruch includes the following exchange concerning feminism's calls for a change in 
the parenting roles of fathers: 
[Kristeva: ] Up to the present, in the division of sexual roles, the mother 
takes care of the child, the father is further away. The father represents the 
symbolic moment of separation. 
[Baruch: ] And you feel that should be retained ? 
[Kristeva: ] If we do what they call for, that is, if the fathers are always 
present, if fathers become mothers, one may as well ask oneself who will 
play the role of separators. 
(Julia Kristeva: Interviews, pp. 118-119) 
so On the difference that non-white non-bourgeois contexts might make to 
psychoanalytical accounts of the roles of mothers and fathers in the child's psychic 
development, see Elizabeth Abel, `Race, Class and Psychoanalysis ? Opening 
Questions'; and Jane Flax, Thinking Fragments, pp. 164-178. For more general 
attempts to integrate psychoanalytic insights with historically specific 
configurations of the family see David Sibley, ` Families and Domestic Routines: 
Constructing the Boundaries of Childhood'; and Valerie Walkerdine, `Subject to 
Change Without Notice'. 
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Psychoanalytic assumptions about the primacy of the mother, and the consequent 
need for separation via a distant father figure, make Kristeva reluctant to 
countenance a more complete break from these institutions. " It is true that she does 
invoke history in accounts such as those of the changing role of women in 
`Women's Time' or of the different ways in which the problem of the maternal 
body is negotiated through history in Powers of Horror. Yet such accounts co-exist 
with an uncritical faith in the persistence of certain psychic dilemmas, which is 
perhaps enabled by a view of history that Spivak has called `banal historical 
narrative' On a Word: Interview', p. 17) 
- 
that is, one in which claims for some 
forms of change are nevertheless held to operate in relation to certain unchanging 
psychic problematics, mapped onto simplistic metanarratives of the changing stages 
of societies conceived in essentially monolithic terms. 32 
Perhaps the most acerbic attack on Kristeva along these lines comes from 
Jennifer Stone, who responds to Kristeva's work with the charge that `she does not 
" As Ann Rosalind Jones has suggested, this may also in part derive from 
Kristeva's dependence on structuralism, and structuralism's problems with 
conceptualizing culture in terms of its diachronic movement, rather than as a 
synchronic set of relationships ('Julia Kristeva on Femininity: The Limits of a 
Semiotic Politics', p. 68). 
32 As a defence against such charges of naivete, we should consider Kristeva's 
About Chinese Women. Although this text has been repeatedly taken to task as 
orientalist and exoticizing (Margaret Atack, `The Other: Feminist', Lisa Lowe, 
`Des Chinoises: Orientalism, Psychoanalysis and Feminine Writing'; Kelly Oliver, 
Reading Kristeva, pp. 134-135; and Gayatri Spivak, ` French Feminism in an 
International Frame'), its central goals are to argue that the Oedipal experience is 
absolutely historically specific, and to map out the possibilities of a non-Oedipal 
matrix of gender, desire and the body which might be found in cultures whose 
social arrangements for child-rearing are organized differently than those in the 
West. If Kristeva's failure here is that she produces two monolithic accounts of `the 
West' and `the Orient', her attempt to chart their psychic differences is at least an 
honourable attempt to write a genuinely historicist psychoanalysis. Moreover, we 
should remember that Kristeva opens the text by acknowledging that her views 
must inevitably be ` a western vision' (p. 16), shaped by her own historical 
relationship to nationality. 
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apparently realise that 
... 
she has invented this wonderful abject terrain in language. 
There is no such space as abjection, it is nothing more than a discursive effect' 
('The Horrors of Power: A Critique of "Kristeva" ', p. 43). 33 Stone insists that 
Kristeva's analysis simply identifies a series of observable social phenomena (male 
anxiety ibout women's bodies, imperialist constructions of the non-white body) and 
then misleadingly constructs a model of the human psyche which treats such 
phenomena as immutable psychic structures, rather than as historically specific 
effects of a given social order. 
And yet, as Jacqueline Rose has argued, even if the power that Kristeva 
accords the maternal body may be derived from such sources, her work is an 
important analytical narrative precisely because of the tenacity of those very 
emotions for us. Responding to Stone, Rose comments with some scorn that 
`unlike some of her most violent detractors 
... 
Kristeva at least knows that these 
images ire not so easily dispatched. It is not by settling the question of their origins 
that we can necessarily dismantle their force' ('Julia Kristeva 
- 
Take Two', p. 157). 
Rose insists that we sidestep the question of whether the dread of the 
maternal body lies in an infantile experience or in the problems of biological 
reproduption within capitalist relations of economic production, and that we use 
Kristeva instead as a guide to the persistence of those fantasies, and the role that 
they play in the subject's relationship to language. Kristeva's account remains a 
persuasive description of one important way that children perceive the maternal 
body and its impact on the adult psyche, in spite of the fact that primary care by a 
biological mother is not the only way in which children are raised. To argue this is 
33 Judith Butler makes a similar point about the semiotic: `How do we know that 
the instinctual object of Kristeva's discourse is not a construction of the discourse 
itself? ' (Gender Trouble, p. 88). Kristeva herselfgoes to some lengths to 
acknowledge the difficulties of choosing to `borrow an ontologized term in order to 
designate an articulation that antecedes positing' (RPL, p. 239, n. 13) - but Butler 
makes no reference to her discussion of this problem. 
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to insist that we read psychoanalytic theory not simply as an accurate map of 
subject 
- 
although I would insist that much of it is accurate 
- 
but rather, as I have 
tried to suggest throughout this thesis, as a discourse that is a potent description of 
the subject to the extent that it shares in, and thus lays bare for us, the assumptions 
of the culture that produces it. Indeed, we could extend Rose's argument to argue 
that even if Kristeva's view of the centrality of the maternal body to every social 
formation is a fantasy, it is precisely the tenacity with which she pursues her fantasy 
that discloses its truth for us. Kristeva's psychoanalytic account of history is in that 
sense a more insightful narrative precisely through its errors, when compared with a 
rational account like Stone's which, while more accurate in an empirical sense, errs 
in its willingness to ignore the potency of emotion by virtue of treating it as 
explained away by history. Kristeva's text thus suggests, through its very inability 
to read texts other than through its own preoccupations, the psychic structures by 
which, here and now, the maternal body underwrites a conceptualization of 
femininity structured primarily through the experience of the heterosexual nuclear 
family. We might even say that the most interesting aspect of Kristeva's account is 
that it reminds us that the accumulated symbolic capital of the bourgeois nuclear 
family still defines the psychic life of even those who do not participate within it. 3a 
Consequently her work on abjection remains useful for a reading of Burroughs, and 
for that matter Cronenberg, even though these arguments might make us wary of 
using it to read other texts not embedded in the modern Western context which she 
shares with them. Abjection is thus one of those overdetermined concepts that 
psychoanalysis is so marked by: simultaneously an objective insight into the 
34 This might also be a rejoinder to Judith Butler's argument that Kristeva 
marginalizes lesbians through her stress on maternity (Gender Trouble, pp. 79-93). 
Against such a reading, I would suggest that it is precisely Kristeva's stress on the 
fact that currently all women must deal with the consequences of being treated as 
potential mothers which is relevant to those women who are not. 
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fundamental dynamics of the psyche, an unselfreflexive universalization of a 
particular socio-historical obsession, and a fantasy which is the most useful tool for 
analyzing the culture out of which it is produced. That it can be all three at once is 
what makes it such a rich resource for a discussion of embodied subjectivity 
- 
as 
well as being somehow particularly appropriate for the discipline most insistent on 
the possibility of one's holding several contradictory positions simultaneously. 
We see a demonstration of the strengths and weaknesses of Kristeva's 
particular reading of maternity when we consider her alongside Burroughs. At first 
sight Burroughs proves exemplary for Kristeva's account of abjection as a dread of 
the female body 
- 
not only in the sense that those attributes of the body which he 
finds most repulsive are those typically regarded as feminine, but also in his 
representations of the female body itself. The female body repeatedly appears in his 
writings as a dangerous and threatening presence 
- 
and it is a truism of writing on 
him that his texts are saturated by an unselfreflexive misogyny focused on the 
female body, insofar as his images of the female body would seem to conform to 
dominant abjecting conceptions of the feminine. Thus Catherine Stimpson argues: 
`his dislike of the female body is cause, effect and sign of his contemptus femnnae. 
He finds female sexuality a universe of fluids, mucus, holes and growths' ('The 
Beat Generation and the Trials of Homosexual Liberation', p. 384). 5 In support of 
such a reading we might consider the following details of the quartet. 
Burroughs deploys the female body as part of the gradual transformation of 
the world into bodily properties, which is a sign of its defeat 
- 
of its relentless 
reduction to base matter. A city in need of rescue has its dire state of invasion and 
decay marked by being named `Cuntville USA' and is run by `self-appointed 
33 See also Edward Foster, Understanding the Beats, p. 23; John Guzlowksi, ` The 
Family in the Fiction of William Burroughs', pp. 19-21; Robin Lydenberg, Word 
Cultures, pp. 167-172; and Ted Morgan, Literary Outlaw, p. 582. 
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controllers of "the Rotting Kingdom"' (TTE, p. 104), whose subjects are said to 
suffer from `American upper middle-class upbringing with maximum sexual 
frustration and humiliations imposed by Middle-Western matriarchs' (TTE, p. 105). 
Maternal power is thus associated with a control over the male body, maintained 
through that body's conditioned responses of shame. 6 The semantic flexibility of 
`matriarchs' 
- 
able to include mothers and wives, older sisters and aunts, 
grandmothers and women in positions of authority 
- 
images women as a dictatorial 
community who restrict freedom at every turn, ruling over the ` shattered male 
forces of the earth' (NE, p. 59). Strengthening this connection to domination, 
women appear as purveyors of those substances that compromise independence: 
`the nurse moved around the lawn with her silver trays feeding the junk in 
- 
We 
called her "Mother" 
- 
Wouldn't you ?' (NE, p. 32). The maternal body is thus the 
body of addiction, marking the impossibility of escaping cycles of biological 
dependency. 
In `The Case of the Celluloid Kali' (SM, pp. 42-49), a pastiche of `hard- 
boiled' detective fiction, Burroughs deploys the image of the femme fatale from the 
genre in which, as described by Frank Krutnik, she expresses the male dread of the 
consequences of female power and sexuality (In a Lonely Street: Film Noir, Genre, 
Masculinity, pp. 42-44 and passim). Here, the figure draws together cannibalism, 
male sexuality, and physical invasion into a series of images of male vulnerability to 
female power. As the narrator follows his case, his contacts take him through 
human 1}istory, envisioned as a history of matriarchal control. One tells him: `Why I 
was a dancing boy for the Cannibal Trog Women in the Ice Age. Remember? All 
that meat stacked up in the caves and the Blue Queen covered with limestone flesh 
36 Burroughs amplifies on this view of women in The Job, pp. 116-118; see also his 
interviews in Victor Bockris, With William Burroughs: A Report from the Bunker, 
pp. 41-51. 
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creeps into your bones like cold grey honey 
... 
that's the way they keep them not 
dead butparalyzed' (SM, p. 43). 
The defining image of paralysis presents the female body as an invasive 
presence, before which males are passive victims awaiting consumption. In a scene 
marked heavily by the ` mucus' and `holes' of Stimpson's description, the witness 
describes being ` paralyzed with this awful gook the Sapphire Goddess let out 
through this cold sore she always kept open on her lips' (SM, p. 44). The narrative 
then shifts to the present where we encounter her modem form: `This cunt 
undulates forward and gives me the sign and holds out her hand "I am the 
Countessa di Vile your hostess for tonight" 
- 
She points to the boys at the bar with 
her cigarette holder and their cocks jumped up one after the other' (SM, p. 48). The 
narrative thus figures human history as the repetition of forms of female control, 
whose dominance centres 
- 
albeit in different ways 
- 
on the exploitation of the male 
body, which, whether as food or sexual flesh, appears as little more than raw 
corporeal matter, or `meat'. 
As well as being a source of inflexible authority, the female body is figured 
as a weapon in the arsenal of evil, an intentionally deployed pollutant. The enemy 
possesses `bottled female smells' which can be released as `ancient evil odors on 
trade winds' (7TE, p. 100). Elsewhere, a maternity ward in a hospital seeps 
`nameless female substances, enough to pollute a continent' (NL, p. 60). The female 
body is harked in these texts by its size and omnipresence, its capacity to be 
everywl}ere and to dwarf those whb resist it, its ability to make men reliant upon it: 
as such it reworks the child's primal view of the mother's body. The positioning of 
women in these texts always locates the female body in a cathartic narrative: one in 
which it is exposed in order to permit the reader to be purged of its appeal. 37 The 
37 Similarly, Kristeva argues that Aristotle's aesthetics of catharsis are produced by 
an attempt to represent abjection in such a way as to transcend it (PH, p. 28). 
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reader is imagined as one of those male victims of matriarchy, whose devotion to a 
domestic world symbolized by women must be broken. 38 
In all these ways the quartet clearly derives much of its outraged energy 
from conventional structures of male anxiety. But to point this out is, in a sense, 
intellectually redundant: it achieves no more than declaring that Burroughs proves 
something that we already knew 
- 
that men consolidate their power over women 
through fear and disgust. Can we rather ask what Burroughs might have to say that 
is new or unsettling? Can we claim that Burroughs's representations of the 
gendered body have several persuasive political points to make ?I want to offer 
three avenues of thought which might make us view Burroughs's representations of 
women in a different light. In each case, I have highlighted the awkwardness of the 
term `misogyny' to preserve its ambivalence: on the one hand, I will be arguing that 
Burroughs draws on, and adheres to, a conventionally misogynistic position; on the 
other, I will be suggesting that his use of such imagery of the female body as 
overpowering, abject and grotesque derives from other, and more interesting, 
sources than an uncomplicated desire to preserve male power. s9 
a) `Misogyny' as Hatred of Material Bodies 
Firstly, we should note that if the female body is depicted as a site of 
devouring and pollution, so too is the male body. Stimpson's description of the 
female body imaged as `a universe of fluids, mucus, holes and growths' is hardly 
38 A possibility which Burroughs goes on to imagine in his later texts The Wild 
Boys, Port of Saints, and Cities of the Red Night, which feature outcast 
communities of all-male revolutionaries. 
39 Other work in this direction has been offered by Edward Foster, who suggests 
that Burroughs's misogyny is part of an attack on conventional notions of 
heterosexual love (Understanding the Beats, pp. 23-24); Robin Lydenberg, who 
reads it as an attack on the reproductive role allotted to women under patriarchy (Word Cultures, pp. 167-170); and Catherine Stimpson who sees it as enabling 
Burroughs to affirm his homosexual identity ('The Beat Generation', pp. 382-384). 
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any less true, as we saw in the last chapter, of the male body. It too devours and 
engulfs, invades and corrupts, infects and swamps. It too is composed of flesh that 
compromises the independence of those it touches. Indeed, one of the most striking 
images of submission in the quartet confronts Carl as he walks through Puerto 
Joselito: 
Carl walked a long row of living penis urns made from men whose penis has 
absorbed the body with vestigial arms and legs breathing through purple 
fungoid gills and dopping a slow metal excrement like melted solder which 
forms a solid plaque under the urns standing about three feet high on rusty 
iron shelves wire mesh cubicles joined by cat walks and ladders a vast 
warehouse of living penis urns slowly transmuting to smooth red terracotta. 
Others secrete from the head crystal pearls of lubricant that forms a shell of 
solid crystal over the red penis flesh. (SM, p. 67). 
These creatures face a range of fates. Some are massaged to the point of death by 
multiple orgasm; others, encased in crystal, are put on display in the Crystal Hall of 
Fame; v chile some are `covered with terracotta and baked in red brick ovens by the 
women Who pull the soft red meat out with their penis forks and decorate house 
and garden with the empty urns' (SM, p. 67). Leaking, paralyzed, put on display, 
and reduced to no more than meat, these creatures have no control over their 
destiny gr over their materiality. The essential signifier of male superiority has 
become the signifier of male materiality 
- 
and therefore passivity. The image of the 
body-as-penis/penis-as-body mocks the status traditionally given to the penis: 
whether used to decorate a house or placed in a museum, the men whose bodies 
have undergone this transformation gain prestige only through their destruction. 
The organ taken to define the male body thus becomes that which renders it 
ridiculous 
- 
and also abhorrent. It renders the male body a mass of flesh. While in 
this case the male body appears as passive flesh, for which abjection is a form of 
submission, it may also appear as aggressive or dangerous. For instance, while for 
the urns, semen forms a crystalline prison, elsewhere it appears as invasive or 
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corrosive: `Reminds me of an old friend of mine [... ] He used to go around with a 
water pistol shooting jism up career women at parties. Won all his paternity suits 
hands down. Never use his own jism you understand' (NL, p. 95). Burroughs's 
sense of the dangers of male biology also appear in the recurrent image of the male 
rectum, gt some points the signifier of the vulnerability of the male body but at 
others of a dangerous hunger as threatening as any vagina dentata: ` he's got a 
prolapsed asshole [... ] If he's a mind to it he can drop out a piece of gut reaches 
from his office clear over to Roy's Beer Place, and it go feelin' around lookin' for a 
peter, just afeelin' around like a blind worm' (NL, p. 106). 
Such representations of the male body break radically from the two 
dominant notions of the male body, namely: men as rational possessors of 
disembodied consciousness, whose bodies are occluded or ignored, and men as the 
proud possessors of bodies which they have shaped and which they use (David 
Morgans `You Too Can Have a Body Like Mine: Reflections on the Male Body 
and Masculinities'). 4° If, as Grosz suggests, male power is partly dependent on the 
veiling of `the unspoken and generally unrepresented particularities of the male 
body' (kB,, p. 198), which enables men to present themselves as unencumbered by 
40 The discourses of male embodiment are curiously contradictory. As we have 
already been, in order to assert superiority over women men claim greater 
transcendence from their own bodies. But at the same time, the discourse of 
masculinity centres on its physicality: men are supposedly stronger, faster, more 
brave, more sexual, than women. Perhaps the crucial difference is that men are 
imagined as in control of their bodies, while women are imagined as being 
controlled by their bodies. Men regard their bodies as instrumental 
- 
to be used and 
deployed in a rational, calculated way; women are imagined to be guided by bodily 
impulses which they cannot control. On the other hand, of course, another 
discourse represents men as animals at the mercy of their instincts and women as 
the bearers of culture whose bodily impulses are weak and easily kept under 
control, so that women are the preservers of virtue. The difficulty of locating 
masculinity comfortably within these contradictory discourses is evident in, for 
instance, the fact that the attempt to celebrate the male physique runs into particular 
problems, since the celebration of masculinity qua physique, by emphasizing the 
embodiment of the male, runs close to feminizing him. See chapter two, p. 94. 
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materiality, then these texts refuse to collude with such a myth. But they also refuse 
to enshrine the notion of the male body as heroically muscular, paternally 
protective, or potently phallic. Burroughs's radical move then is that his 
representations of female monstrosity function not to separate women from men as 
being more corporeal, more porous, or more threatening, but rather to subsume the 
differences under a shared physical composition. To be male or female is to be 
equally composed of abject matter and therefore equally dangerous to others and 
equally at risk of being possessed. 
It would, of course, be possible to argue that the underlying dread of 
corporeal materiality results from the fact that body matter is gendered feminine 
over and above any of its particular appearances as a penis or male rectum. We 
might argue that these body parts are imaged as dangerous because of their 
resemblance to the abjected maternal body 
- 
and that if Burroughs renders the male 
body abject, he does so by feminizing the phallus. While it is of course possible to 
say that the penis urns are abject because they leak, and leaking is necessarily 
defined as feminine, or that the prolapsed asshole is horrific because it is an orifice, 
and that `orificiality' is necessarily defined as feminine, this would seem to be only 
a very partial account of the texts. Such a reading would have to proceed from the 
assumption that matter is always and only gendered as feminine, rather than 
considering the lengths that Burroughs goes to to image forms of flesh that are 
abject in the very ways in which they are most conventionally masculine: their 
erectile rigidity; their determination to fertilize; their predatory sexual hunger. 
Burroughs's texts demand that we extend Kristeva's account of abjection to see 
that while abject flesh may often be gendered female, there also exists an entire 
vocabulpry of the abject male. Such a vocabulary 
- 
and the more primal emotions 
that found it 
- 
originates not in an imitation of female body matter, but in a fear of 
the malleability of the body which emerges alongside the forms that embodied 
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genders may take, and is as central in shaping the meanings of gender, as the 
meanings of gender are in shaping it. 
These texts then lend fuel to the argument that the maternal origin of 
abjection, which Kristeva stresses, is a culturally specific psychic configuration 
-a 
particular anxiety generated by certain child-rearing arrangements which place the 
burden 9f care on the biological mother. This is not to say that we should adopt 
the position that discomfort at one's own materiality is only an emotion which the 
subject develops once they have entered into the discourses of gender, as Stone 
suggests. Rather, I would suggest that we accept Kristeva's argument as a 
demonstration that while we do experience birth as a corporeal fact in conflict with 
the disembodied domain of language, we should also regard the degree to which 
language is taken to be disembodied as a variable phenomenon 
- 
variable both 
across history and across the different segments of any culture. Equally variable is 
the degree to which it is the mother's body that forms the object of a child's 
emotional ambivalence. We need to supplement Kristeva's account by asking what 
other early experiences might render body matter repellent. Rather than assuming 
that the maternal body inaugurates the fear of corporeality we might, if our enquiry 
were less determined by our own culturally specific assumptions about maternity, 
locate abjection as an effect of the dynamics of touch between siblings or between 
father and child; as embedded in the designs of architecture and in the ways a child 
is cleaned; or produced through the ways in which the bodily aspects of childcare 
are distributed amongst a community or across hierarchical lines of race and class. 
In such ways all the meanings of embodiment, beyond simply those of gender, may 
be inscribed onto a body by a network of other bodies and surroundings within 
which the infant is placed. 
We should also, rather than focusing primarily on an assumed infantile 
origin for abjection, insist that subsequent discourses of corporeality play as great a 
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role in its production 
- 
such as the corporeal language of racism, or the faith in 
evolutioi as the gradual ascendancy of the human spirit over its animal matter. 
When `the District Supervisor' asks a promising employee `now kid what are you 
doing over there with the niggers and the apes ? Why don't you straighten out and 
act like ý white man' (SM, p. 107), it marks the process of abjection as one which 
may be produced via many different forms of hierarchically privileged embodiment, 
with the child's experience of the mother not necessarily the most potent, and with 
early childhood experiences not necessarily being foundational. "' 
I do not propose to elaborate on the range of mechanisms involved in such a 
process of subject-formation. I only wish to insist that Kristeva's account of 
abjection should be read as a detailed reading of one element of bodily discomfort, 
rather than, as she argues, the account of its defining factor. To use Burroughs to 
expand cur sense of abjection is important since, as we have already seen, Kristeva 
has been criticized for her failure to historicize these bodies of which she speaks: in 
her texts women represent maternity and corporeality, while men represent 
separateness, rationality, the symbolic order. 42 Burroughs insists on the materiality 
of the male body, depicting in detail its biology in order to show its failure to 
transcend the material real. In doing so, these texts restore the biological parity of 
sexed bodies that is missing from Kristeva. Where Kristeva seems to re-emphasize 
the different relationships to the- symbolic order of men and women, Burroughs 
critiqueq the assumption that men have a greater distance from biology. Moreover, 
41 Kristeva's own treatment of Celine's anti-Semitism, for instance, seems wanting 
in this area, insisting as it does that his anti-Semitism derives from the fact that 
Judaism symbolizes for him a parental relationship which she treats as the source of 
such prejudice (PH, pp. 178-180). 
42 Kristeva's maintenance of this model of gender results from the fact that she 
retains a Lacanian model of the development of the subject, insofar as she envisions 
a demand from the paternal Law to relinquish the maternal body, and infantile 
polymorphous perversity, and to take up a place as a speaking subject alienated 
from that earlier state. 
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he also challenges, by ridicule, the dominant notion of a phallic body as either 
heroic, sexually potent, or erotically attractive. Instead it leaves the male body 
abject. 
b) 'Misogyny' as Critique of Gender 
A second way to complicate Burroughs's ` misogyny' is to argue that it is 
part of his general concern to level out notions of power and to critique the 
interpersonal exercise of power to the same extent as the institutional. Thus the 
daily exchanges of hostility, shame, coercion, and abuse that constitute human 
relationships are equally central objects of his scrutiny. Read in this way, we may 
see Burroughs as concerned with the particular ways in which gender roles offer 
women ppportunities to exercise power destructively and aggressively. Rather than 
treating the distribution of gender roles between men and women as operating 
solely for the advantage of men and at the expense of women, Burroughs takes 
what we might perceive to be a more Foucauldian route, reading the institution of 
gendered male-female relations as a site of shifting and coercive power relations, 
exercized by all parties. " While it is clearly the case that interactions between men 
and women are structured by male power, feminism has also been concerned to 
document the ways in which they are places where women may make use of the 
inequalities of race, class, age or disability to make their own equally destructive 
moves. But what is of interest in the quartet is its insistence not only on the way in 
which gender inflects such instances of power, but also the ways in which even 
" Such aposition is, of course, `Foucauldian' in the sense that-it seems to me to be 
the necessary model entailed by Foucault's theories of power, rather than in the 
sense that Foucault himself advances a consistent theory of gender along these 
lines. That Foucault's own work in fact fails to regard gender dynamics as 
sufficiently autonomous has been suggested by Toril Moi, `Power, Sex and 
Subjectivity: Feminist Reflections on Foucault', and Larysa Mykyta, `The 
Obscuring Clarity of Reason'. 
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within tlýe inequalities imposed by gender roles, and even without such other forms 
of institutional power in place, it is not always the case that men are the only ones 
capable of inflicting damage. "' 
When Carl (a different Carl ? the same Carl ? the text makes no attempt to 
help us 4ecide this) attends `the Ministry of Mental Hygiene and Prophylaxis', and 
is required to leave a deposit of semen, it is the specifically female power to shame 
him that he confronts 
`Something wrong? ' said the nurse indifferently. She was holding a 
glass of water out to him. She watched him drink with aloof contempt. She 
turned and picked up the jar with obvious distaste. 
The nurse turned to him: `Are you waiting for something special? ' 
she snapped. Carl had never been spoken to like that in his adult life. `Why 
no 
.... 
' `You can go then, ' she turned back to the jar. With a little 
exclamation of disgust she wiped a gob of semen off her hand. Carl crossed 
the room and stood at the door. 
`Do I have another appointment ?' 
She looked at him in disapproving surprise: `You'll be notified of 
course. ' She stood in the doorway of the cubicle and watched him walk 
through the outer office and open the door. He turned and attempted a 
as One much-debated phenomenon of recent years has been what Cynthia Fuchs 
refers to as the phenomenon of the `whiny-whiteboy' (` "Beat Me Outta Me": 
Alternative Maseulinities'). This is the phenomenon of those most privileged in the 
social scale 
- 
middle-aged, white, able-bodied, middle-class, heterosexual males - 
lamenting their powerlessness at the hands of those whom they in fact possess 
power over, but whom they perceive as intimidating them. Its narrative of 
victimization is played out in films such as Disclosure (1994) and Falling Down (1992), and should be resisted as politically retrograde and intellectually 
unsubstantiated. But it is not necessary to adopt such a speaking position in order 
to critigpe the ways in which women may be enabled to exercise power in 
damaging ways. Indeed, I would suggest that a thorough reading of the impact of 
gender on social well-being would require that we look at how a fundamentally 
patriarchal organization of gender nevertheless generates particular moments, 
spaces, and forms of interaction by which some women damage some men. For 
accounts-of Falling-Down see Richard Dyer, White, pp. 217-223; and John Gabriel 
`What Do You Do When Minority Means You ? Falling Down and the 
Construction of "Whiteness" '; on Disclosure see Joanna Brewis, ` What's Wrong 
with This Picture ? Sex and Gender Relations in Disclosure'; on contemporary 
formations of male privilege see Fred Pfeil, White Guys: Studies in Postmodern 
Difference and Domination. 
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jaunty wave. The nurse did not move or change her expression. As he 
walked down the stairs the broken, false grin burned his face with shame. 
(NL, p. 153) 
At the intersection of the personal and the institutional, Carl's meeting with the 
nurse is governed by the official power enshrined in cubicle, office, and stairs 
- 
the 
markers that the nurse is allied to an institution that derives its power from the fact 
that before its medical gaze every subject is reduced to a knowable and malleable 
volume of body matter. But his discomfort may also be related to the ways in which 
the encounter mobilizes the dynamics of gender. 
Semen, as several writers have noted, is a site of particular symbolic 
ambivalence: it is both celebrated as indicator of potency and source of life, and 
marginalized as an abject bodily product. Grosz suggests that much of this 
ambivalence stems from the way that it marks the unacceptably `feminine' fluidity 
of the male body (VB, pp. 198-202 ). It is also the case that an anxiety adheres to 
the destination of semen: when ejaculated inside a vagina it fulfils a culturally 
sanctioned role that elevates its status; but deposited elsewhere it may be seen 
merely as biological detritus 
- 
the excessively valued body matter translated 
promptly into valueless waste (Celia Roberts et al., ` "Going Down": Oral Sex, 
Imaginary Bodies and HIV', pp. 114-115). 
When the nurse regards his semen with contempt and then wipes it away 
with disgust, she confronts Carl with the fact of these unwelcome properties of his 
body 
- 
tjie abjection of semen and with it the implicit abjection of his entire body. 
She is pprticularly well placed to generate such a reaction being both (as nurse) 
representative of disembodied authority and (as woman) representative of 
corporeality. We might then suggest that the particular anxiety that she provokes is 
a result of the fact that she, more than anyone else, recognizes the corporeality of 
the man, since she represents that corporeality herself. Her confrontation with Carl 
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is underlined by his recognition that he, like her, is a body. 
§imone de Beauvoir has suggested such an antagonism over male 
corporeality is one feature of a distinctively female hostility towards men. "' 
Beauvoir suggests that the violence of gendered relations is centred on a struggle 
over the right to transcend a limited material existence in which women, refused the 
chance of transcendence, are forced to take pleasure in limiting men's exercise of it. 
Woman, suggests Beauvoir: 
wishes to deprive man of his projects, of his future. She triumphs when 
husband or child is ill, weary, reduced to mere flesh, appearing then to be no 
more than one object among others, something to be- cared for efficiently, 
like the pots and pans. The heavy, fleshly hand on the sick man is intended 
to make him feel that he, too, is but a fleshly thing. (The Second Sex, 
pp. 485-486) 
We should not be surprised by the recurrence of the figure of the female nurse in 
the quartet, since she combines these two dangerous roles and thereby enacts that 
uncomfortable confrontation that marks the antagonism of gender: like the male 
doctors, her gaze transforms the body into malleable and limited flesh; while as a 
woman, she reminds men of the material body that they hope to disavow. 
Equally central to her power is Carl's assumption that she will make the 
situation easy for him. Carl's `jaunty wave' and `false grin' assumes her 
reassurance: that she will perform the role of assuaging his anxiety about his body - 
a role wiich, to his obvious distress, she refuses to play. His inability to escape this 
knowledge 
- 
that he knows that she knows 
- 
is indicative of a second recurrent 
feature of male-female interaction. Central to the dynamics of interpersonal 
'S We might note that The Second Sex (19491 is roughly contemporaneous with The 
Naked Lunch (composed in the late 1950s), and we may see both as analyzing a 
particular moment in gender relations in the West Which has persisted beyond the 
post-war environment, even if it was experienced then with particular intensity. 
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relationships within patriarchy is that the emotional labour of daily life is undertaken 
by women (Victor Seidler, `Men, Heterosexualities and Emotional Life'). That is, 
women are expected to make the domestic, interpersonal, and emotional spheres 
- 
including relationships, sex, and conversation 
- 
effortless for men. 46 Since women's 
role is tq make those situations unproblematic for men, it follows that men rarely 
develop the skills to ensure that they themselves manage those situations in ways 
that satisfy them 
- 
relying either on women's silently coerced support or on explicit 
threats and sanctions (financial, physical) to guarantee that support. However this 
leads to a situation in which, whatever the considerable risks of non-co-operation, 
women pre in a position to withdraw the support which men are used to, often 
leaving men bewildered, disempowered, or hurt, and rarely with the skills to 
analyze the sources of those emotions. " The intensity of Carl's response to this 
failure to receive the expected reassurance (`the broken, false grin burned his face 
with shame') marks just such an interaction. 
We might want to dismiss this as no more than a trifling degree of 
unhappiness, for which the benefits of being male more than compensate. We might 
also insist that the difficulty that men might experience in such situations is the 
result of their adjusting to a burden of truth (about, for instance, their bodies) and 
46 As economic changes bring women out of marriage and into the workplace, that 
obligation is then transferred to the emotional aspects of paid work: preventing 
conflicts-in offices, reassuring angry male clients, taking notes and making tea. All 
the labour that enables the economic lives of men to run smoothly and which itself 
has little recognition. 
" See for instance Lynn Chancer, Sadomasochism in Everyday Life, esp. pp. 42-67; 
and Wendy Holloway, `Heterosexual Sex: Power and Desire for the Other', p. 138. 
Such uncertainty is a response which, as Lynne Segal notes, may quickly be 
transformed into compensatory aggression or violence (Straight Sex, pp. 248-249). 
This dynamic of domination, hatred, dependency, and anxiety about an autonomy 
that can never be attained, has led several writers to treat gender as an instance of a 
Hegelian master-slave dialectic. See for instance Beauvoir, The Second Sex; and 
Jessica Benjamin, `Master and Slave: The Fantasy of Erotic Domination'. 
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independent responsibility for their emotional lives which they should indeed learn 
to manage, and which women should not be obliged to ease for them. Or, to take 
such an argument further, that the deployment of such limited forms of power is a 
necessary survival strategy, or justified act of revenge, for women whose power is 
otherwi$e limited. Or indeed, that it is men's construction of a system governed by 
such logics that in turn leaves them in a situation which then causes difficulties for 
them, and that it therefore ill becomes them to lament it. These are not positions 
that Burroughs ever considers; and to the extent that Burroughs and his readers 
regard his project as a substantive political critique of power relations, this 
constitutes a serious lacuna. However, for all their accuracy these positions miss the 
problem of the misery of everyday life that Burroughs focuses on: the daily 
experiences of humiliation and defeat that shore up a system of social coercion. 
When Carl returns to the clinic for the results of his test, he is subjected to an 
interrogation which seeks to unearth, punish and cure traces of homosexuality in 
him. Placed in the context of this final examination, the nurse's actions become part 
of a gradual process that has worn away his confidence in himself and his capacity 
to determine the meanings of his own body. Whether or not they constitute part of 
an intentional strategy by the Department is, in an important sense, neither here nor 
there. For the sequence depicts the way in which daily incidences of shame and 
distress contribute to an overall loss of confidence and autonomy. To write these 
off as mere effects of larger structures is thus to refuse to face power in all its 
manifestations. 
The case of Carl and the nurse, presented as it is in realist prose, is the most 
straightforward example of an analysis of male-female interaction as an expression 
of damaging female power. To map the monsters of the texts onto such concrete 
social dynamics is harder, but nevertheless Burroughs's writing here repeats these 
central male vulnerabilities, transforming these sites of everyday risk into scenes of 
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terror and physical danger. " For instance, as we have seen, his representations of 
gender conflict centre on paralysis, on male incapacity to deal with female power. 
Images of female monstrosity thus accompany images of male passivity, in which 
men find themselves unable to act because women have either rendered them, like 
Carl, abject and therefore powerless; or because they provide indispensable 
addictivg substances 
- 
which often, like the ` awful gook' that oozes from the 
Sapphire Queen's cold-sore, occupy an ambiguous position combining nutrition and 
poison. In much the same way, Burroughs's maternal imagery of the nurse-mother 
as supplier of junk, or of female drug-dealers like `Salt Chunk Mary' (SM, p. 86), 
also ackpowledges the role of women as providers of reassurance. "' It images 
woman as the source of contentment and complacency 
- 
the creator of a home life 
that is comfortable, or a street-life that is anaesthetized. Burroughs relates such 
imagery to the role of the mother in the nuclear family, envisioned by him as one of 
Pavlovian conditioning: to supply the promise of happiness, accompanied by the 
threat of its withdrawal, thereby establishing a gendered dynamic which can never 
be left behind. SO The capacity of the female body to enchant, overwhelm, or devour 
48 Although he is interested in power relations between men and women, and 
between men, Burroughs shows no interest in the quartet in power relationships 
between women. 
49 Other recurrent image of women are as landladies ( `Mrs. Murphy's rooming 
house' appears several times in The Soft Machine), teachers ('trained with Ma 
Currie in the little blue schoolhouse [... ] taught me everything I am', SM, p. 81), or 
wealthy patrons (NL, 107-108). In all cases the scenes are again determined by the 
woman'p capacity to provide or withdraw emotional and physical comfort. Behind 
Mrs. Murphy's call of `Will you be settling your account today Mr. Jones ?' is the 
threat of eviction (SM, p. 82). 
so For a discussion of Burroughs's treatment of. parents as the origins of a system of 
punishn}ent/reward conditioning, see John Z. Guzlowski, ` The Family in the Fiction 
of William Burroughs'. For a biographical reading of the resistances to order and 
control of Burroughs, along with his fellow Beat writers Jack Kerouac, Allen 
Ginsberg, Neal Cassady and Gregory Corso, in terms of their responses to their 
respective dysfunctional fanuilies, see Paul S. George and Jerold M. Starr, ` Beat 
Politics', pp. 197-204. 
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men relates the experience of gendered interaction back to the family and to the 
childhood experiences of inferiority which, Burroughs insists, prepare the subject 
for a life of submission. Again, I would suggest that this means that a critique of 
dispersed forms of social control leads Burroughs to the necessity of a hostility 
towards women. His critique is directed at the particular forms of power accorded 
to 
- 
or indeed, forced on 
- 
women within a patriarchal social structure, even if we 
might want to argue that such forms of power work also in the interests of men. 
The other aspect of male-female relationships that interests Burroughs and 
which underlies his extreme images, is sex and love, which again is a nexus of 
mutual hostilities. In the middle of an erotic scene in The Ticket That Exploded, a 
voice interrupts, urging us to `maintain alertness in the sex act and not be taken in 
by the sex agents of the enemy who move to soften you up with sentimentality and 
sexual frustration to buy ersatz goo of their copy planet' (TTE, p. 61). It is the 
sexed body that succumbs to the abject `goo' of desire, and which thereby impels 
us to accept the ` ersatz' promise of a viral `copy planet' produced by the enemy. 
Similarly, the imagery of sexual dependency, such as the involuntary erections that 
follow the Countess di Vile, suggest that male sexuality is constructed as a form of 
mechanistic dependency. Since desire is experienced as outside of conscious 
control, the responses of the male body are a mark of its failure to have power over 
itself 
- 
and as such a sexual response to a female body is as much a sign of loss of 
autonomy as is the sexual response to death by hangings' 
Whether imaged as an artificial biological condition or as the ` ersatz goo' of 
romance, love is opposed here to autonomy, since the state of love is one of a wish 
51 This is not to say, of course, that Burroughs sees male sexual arousal as innate, 
natural, and therefore uncontrollable 
- 
since the message of these texts is that it is 
implanted and controlled. In that sense, again, he offers a critique of a conventional 
construction of male sexuality as involuntary and therefore always beyond 
reproach: rather, it is involuntary because it is under the control of others, and is 
therefore always a legitimate object for critique. 
239 
to please the other, and a surrendering of one's own desires in favour of following 
their whims. Love, suggests Barthes, is that state in which every action of the 
beloved `will bring me some new occasion for subjugation' since the beloved `is 
assigned to a superior habitat, an Olympus where everything is decided and whence 
everything descends upon me' (A Lover's Discourse, pp. 82-83). A cutup of the 
lyrics of love songs that Burroughs offers in The Ticket That Exploded emphasizes 
the subservience of the lover to the object of their desire: `On my knees i hoped 
you'd love me too [... ] Please don't be angry [... ] Don't know how i'll make it, 
baby' (TTE, pp. 39-40). Again, it is a commonplace within misogynist discourse that 
romance `unmans': that it encourages emotions incompatible with aggressive 
masculinity. But Burroughs never offers that conventional image of an independent 
male ensnared for life by the wiles of female romance. Rather, he treats sex as, 
again, a place of mutual damage: `all human sex is this unsanitary arrangement 
whereby two entities attempt to occupy the same three-dimensional co-ordinate 
points giving rise to [... ] endless sexual conflict' (TTE, p. 45). Even though there 
may be problems with Burroughs's sidelining of the coercive inequalities that 
structure such encounters, there remains something particularly incisive in his 
insistence that romance is merely the pretext by which both men and women have 
power over each other and enter into a series of manipulative strategies in order to 
gain a misplaced sexual satisfaction. 52 
52 Burroughs's suspicion of heterosexual relationships does not lead him - in the 
quartet at any rate 
- 
to imagine a homosexual utopia (although there have been 
attempts to appropriate the quartet to such a tradition; see for instance Greg 
Woods, Articulate Flesh, pp. 41-42). Burroughs makes it clear that he views all 
forms of sexual desire as both ridiculous and dangerous. In The Naked Lunch, one 
routine imagines a group of female prostitutes employed to seduce sailors who have 
taken up sex with men, and envisions all the different sexual possibilities and body 
parts depicted in the scenario as equally undesirable (NL, p123). For an interesting 
reading of the sole extended scene of heterosexual sex in the quartet as a possible 
utopia, see Jeffrey S. Dunn, `William S. Burroughs and Technologizing Literary 
Studies in the Industrial Age', pp. 142-150. 
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Via the critical aspect of such imagery these texts thus lay bare the 
destructive apparatus of gender relationships within a modern patriarchal society, 
even as they deploy conventionally misogynistic imagery. To say that these are all 
in fact astute observations on gender relationships is not to say that such limited 
opportupities for harm constitute a form of equal power in society. Whether 
Burroughs adopts such a position himself is more problematic. Although his use of 
terms like `matriarchy' suggest as much, it is also true that situations in which 
women are in control, or exercising power abusively, are far outweighed in the 
quartet py those in which men exercise such power. Whatever the vehemence of his 
satires on female dominance, the overall effect of the texts is to represent this as a 
relatively minor part of a larger system of social suffering. To read the texts in this 
way is to do no more than recognize that Burroughs's concern to challenge all 
instances of physical, economic, and emotional violence between humans requires 
that he look at the damage that women may be capable of inflicting in their 
interactions with men. Although, as Jane Gallop suggests, `it is difficult to think of 
women as disadvantaged and forceful at the same time' (Feminist Accused of 
Sexual «arassment, p. 70), we can do so by thinking in terms of what Rosina 
Perelberg calls `the power of the weak': those particular forms of power which, she 
points out, are exercised by those who are denied institutionally legitimated 
authority (`Equality, Asymmetry, and Diversity: On Conceptualizations of Gender', 
pp. 43-45). Such power is available for certain constrained uses, and within such 
constraints may have very strong effects 
- 
but the extent to which it is always 
located outside institutional authority limits the range of effects that it can have. 
To look at women's uses of power to damage men is thus not to dismiss the 
atrocities of male power, but to say that within the institution of gender a war of 
emotional, financial, sexual, and physical brutality goes on between all participants 
which makes Burroughs's images of female monstrosity consonant with his general 
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opposition to all those who deploy power over the bodies of others. 53 
c) `Misogyny' as Empathy 
Finally, we should remember that to envisage the body as abject is not only 
to see it as dangerous, but also, for Burroughs, to lament its enslavement. In that 
sense, the images discussed above may also be read as signs of the colonization of 
women's bodies by forces outside them. This is certainly not an area that the 
quartet avoids, and the male figures of authority in his texts share a desire to 
dominate and abuse women : `A pimp [... ] leans in through the Country Club 
window. "Visit the House of David boys and watch the girls eat shit. Makes a man 
feel good all over. Just tell the madame a personal friend of mine" ' (SM, p. 68). The 
speech contains a series of features which recur throughout the texts as instances of 
strategies which sustain destructive authority: that patrician site of male power the 
Country Club, the appeal to a repressive fraternal solidarity (`boys'), the patriarchal 
biblical connotations of the ` House of David', and the atmosphere of secret 
networks which retain privilege ("just tell the madame a personal friend of mine"). 
By structuring such an scene around such familiar instances of authority Burroughs 
would seem to regard its misogyny with the same hatred as he does all desires to 
brutalize other human beings. Elsewhere we meet Iris, who at first seems the 
s' We might also follow the politics of Burroughs's hostility towards the female 
body in two other directions. In his comparison of Burroughs's work with 
Alexander Pope's The Rape of the Lock, Tom Bowden suggests that femininity 
acts in the modem world as a trope for commodification: the adornment of the 
female body may thus operate as a defining instance of the take over of the body by 
the values and practices of commerce ('Postmodem Pope: The Rape of the Lock; 
or, Have a Nice Day'). Alternatively, we might regard Burroughs's hostility 
towards the female body as an attack on the ways that an idealized notion of female 
virtue has underwritten projects of political repression 
- 
such as the figure of `Lady 
Liberty' in the USA. In either case, it may always be difficult to disentangle an 
attack on a particular symbolic use of the female body by modem capitalist societies 
from an attack on women themselves. 
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epitome of the abject female body when `she makes some flat, factual statement 
relative to her own person. "My asshole is occluding. " "My cunt got terrible green 
juices. " '(NL, p. 101). But her bodily state proves not to be an expression of an 
innate female monstrosity, but rather to be the result of Dr. Benway's 
experimentation. Her commodified body follows immediately after a routine 
featuring another commodified female body in which a boy, told by his father `I 
want you to go to a good whore and get a piece of ass off her' returns to tell his 
father that 'I switch my blade and cut a big hunk off her ass, she raise a beef like I 
am reduce to pull off one shoe and beat her brains out. Then I hump her for kicks' 
(NL, pp. 100-101). Again, it is the brotherhood of male complicity (father and son), 
at whose violent desires the female body is violated. 
Such reductions of the body to a piece of meat rely on our hostility towards 
various recurrent symbols of abusive power within the quartet 
- 
such as the medical 
establisl}ment and the client who assumes absolute power over the body that he has 
purchased for sex. If Burroughs's texts are misogynistic, they therefore do a very 
poor job of rendering men any less repellent than their female monsters. Perhaps, as 
Catherir}e Stimpson suggests, there is even a welcome levelling of the inequalities 
of gendgr in Burroughs's treatment of the monstrous female. For she ceases to be 
the cultural instance of the most extreme horror 
- 
as Kristeva suggests she is - and 
`in his baroque landscapes, she is merely one grotesque amongst others' ('The Beat 
Generation and the Trials of Homosexual Liberation', p. 392). 
Burroughs's ` misogyny' thus follows a curious route - for however much it 
would seem to loathe the female body, it does so in order to assault the conditions 
under wjiich women are oppressed: the female body as dangerous because it is 
required to reassure men of their anxieties; the female body as material because it is 
like, rather than unlike, the male body; the female body as repellent because it has 
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been invaded and controlled. His texts, once more, exceed the programmatic 
politics ghat they reach for, offering a critique of patriarchal gender roles which, if 
hardly feminist, nevertheless shares a number of important goals with feminism. The 
representation of the female body as monstrous is thus required by, and productive 
within, the quartet's critique of power, rather than merely being an unwelcome 
instance of patriarchal prejudice 
- 
even though at the same time it is just such a 
prejudice. " 
But more than this, we should also see the ambiguity of this writing as a 
problem of the writing of abjection. To identify body matter as abject is always to 
be caught up in the logic of condemnation and disgust, and to be complicit with the 
social processes that maintain such distinctions. That these texts nevertheless turn 
the abject body into a political weapon suggests that abjection is not only a process 
in the service of the construction of a physically regulated integral subject. The 
representation of the abject body may be turned back against the system that 
produces it so as to indict that system. In my reading of these texts we see three 
powerful strategies of politicized abject writing: revealing authority's investments in 
keeping the body vulnerable to control; indicting the ways in which one body may 
threaten and coerce another; and exposing authority as itself repulsively material. 
To render authority abject is to expose it, to seek to shame that authority, and to 
provide its victims with a position from which to reject it. And yet the power of 
such attacks relies on the intensity of the repulsion that resides in abjection, on its 
hatred of bodily forms not comfortably complicit with a purified social order. As we 
see in Burroughs'streatment of gender, to. construct the body as abject in order to 
sa Eric Mottram offers another reading of Burroughs's `misogyny': that insofar as 
he develops Korzybski's rejection of any form of strictly dualistic thinking, he 
regards the entire apparatus of gender as a divisive and simplistic imposition onto 
the human species (William Burroughs: The Algebra of Need, pp. 167-175). My 
thanks to Jamie Russell for drawing my attention to this aspect of Burroughs's 
thinking about gender. 
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put it to such uses will always bring the text back into the ambit of dominant 
discourses of bodily disgust: a ridiculing of the male body for being unable to 
control its penis, a repulsion at the female body for daring to overwhelm the male. 
(iv) No Way Out: Abject Politics 
That Burroughs's writings should make such an exemplary case for the 
impossibility of making easy separations between the progressive and the 
reactionary, the liberating and the imprisoning, is particularly fitting, for his texts 
are full of reminders of the futility of trying to position oneself outside the system 
one resists. Writing of inevitable complicities, he tells us: `To speak is to he, to live 
is to collaborate' (NE, p. 7). Language, that which seems to offer us a means of 
participating in these struggles, serves only to bind us more firmly into the hands of 
our opponents. Language is spoken not, as we might hope, as an expression of, but 
rather at the expense of, our independence. 
Again, it is instructive to read him alongside Kristeva. Burroughs's central 
formulation comes close to 
- 
while diverging in some crucial respects from - 
Kristeva's formulation of the impossibility of finding in language some satisfying 
separation from the childhood terrors of the abject body. Her equivalent claim is 
that `we speak only of anguish' (PH, p. 42): that language itself is always spoken at 
the painful cost of cutting away our connection to the maternal body. What the two 
formulations share is that while language seems to empower us, it is also a form of 
alienation 
- 
not exactly from any originary self, but rather an alienation because it 
produces a self whose coherence is its limitation. Burroughs's warning that `to live 
is to collaborate', again marks an affinity with Kristeva's sense of perpetual 
constraint and defeat in the conflict between different registers of subjectivity. 




always to push life into extreme untenable situations' (NE, p. 7). But for Kristeva 
the ` extreme and untenable' situations into which language forces us are not to be 
escaped, but rather must be lived with, their impossibility the necessary condition of 
our being speaking subjects. If the Nova Mob, with their stifling logics and doxic 
proclamations are an embodiment of the thetic itself, and the conflicts, separations 
and wars which the games of language set in motion, then Kristeva laments their 
intolerable necessity ('we speak only of anguish'), while Burroughs condemns any 
form of collaboration with them ('to speak is to lie'). 
$o if for Kristeva the two form an irresolvable contradiction, on which we 
are all c{ucified, unable to let go of our bodies so as to enter fully the symbolic 
order, but equally unable to renounce language and return to the pre-verbal, for 
Burroughs the two form an unholy alliance, language and the body working 
together to imprison us. This move enables Burroughs to achieve what Kristeva 
cannot 
- 
to propose a realm that is entirely beyond this current state. Where Powers 
of Horror presents history as a constant struggle to live with this division of the 
subject, Burroughs reads history as the constant repetition of a cycle which must, 
and can, be left behind. For Kristeva a radical future can be no more than one in 
which the subject can acknowledge the insolubility of its contradiction rather than 
trying to repress it (PH, p. 87-89) 
- 
for Burroughs it is ` time to look beyond this 
rundown radioactive cop-rotten planet' (The Job, p. 137). 
There is, then, a fundamental philosophical incompatibility between the two. 
Burroughs conceives of freedom in absolute terms: freedom from any interference 
or constraint. Hence matter, language, and biology are all limitations on freedom. 
The processes of abjection in particular constrain freedom, since they produce both 
the most vulnerable bodily forms (the corporeal locations that are abjected) and the 
most rigidly constrained (the phobic body that abjects) leaving us in what 
Burroughs calls `body prison' (NE, p. 141). Kristeva, on the other hand, views 
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freedom as relative 
- 
in terms of limited gains that may be made, momentary 
disruptions of the established social, psychic, and linguistic order. " Since, in her 
account, subjectivity is necessarily a process of restraint, of the ordering and 
production of the body in particular ways, and could not take place by any other 
means, rejection of such norms in the name of absolute freedom makes no sense. 
Conversely Burroughs, who views such a form of embodiment as a destructive 
compromise, could never agree to the necessity of accepting such a body, since it is 
to surrender the possibility of freedom over to the forces of domination. 
His texts, however, bear witness to the impossibility of any such absolutely 
independent subjectivity, insisting as they do that the subject is always produced by 
its interrelationship with other forces. As we have seen, his representations of the 
body derive from a precarious welding of incompatible positions, at war over the 
status of the abject. His texts are thus themselves a site of abjection: at one point 
rejecting the abject matter that enables them to be written and at another rebelling 
against the purity that they advocate. Even as his proclamations would seem to set 
him against Kristeva, we might still say that his texts follow her own lines of 
thinking: in a Kristevan sense, they speak their own anguish, locked in their own 
insoluble conflict, but producing more effective political critiques because of that. 
Since they are so contradictory, their political critique is rarely coherent and instead 
moves to indict one instance of power after another, without ever formulating a 
stable position 
- 
anything that might constitute a manifesto. In doing so, they create 
ss It is perhaps misleading to make such sweeping generalizations about Kristeva's 
notion of politics. Certain of her writings 
- 
`Women's Time', `Woman Can Never 
Be Defined' 
- 
are much more focused on the dramatic social changes that feminism 
has achieved. At the same time, her stress on the need to protect the psyche from a 
loss of the established boundaries which ward off insanity seems to me to entail a 
view of politics as cautious and as an arena for limited change. As Toril Moi 
suggest 
- 
without any apparent irony 
- 
what defines Kristeva's view of change is 
that whatever may take place, the final goal must be one in which `anarchy will be 
avoided' (The Kristeva Reader, p. 188). 
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perhaps the only approach which can adequately analyse the ways in which power, 
itself equally contradictory, acts on bodies. 
I began this chapter by considering the proposal that bodily disorder was a 
way of challenging the logic of unity that constrains the subject. But if power itself 
functions through a disorganized body, then disorganization (under the sign of the 
unruly body) is not guaranteed to be an effective form of resistance. A hatred of 
disorder may then function as an attempt to free the body from the exercise of 
power over it. Authority and resistance would seem irredeemably complicit, 
speaking as they do with each other's voices 
. 
But this does not mean that texts 
such as Burroughs's are somehow ineffectual. Rather they demonstrate that 
political critique may be potent even though contaminated by what it resists. This 
may offer us a new way to make use of Kristeva's insistence on the necessity of 
abjection. Rather than either accepting her diagnosis of the psychic inevitability of 
the abjection of body matter, or condemning her argument as a post facto 
justification of an unwelcome political situation, we may instead accept abjection as 
a process which may facilitate our becoming resistant subjects. Wherever abjection 
originates from, and however unhappy we may be with some of its sources, it is not 
simply an unwelcome intruder, but is a part of the conditions that enable our 
resistant subjectivity. Indeed, Burroughs's writings are at their most effective not 
when they succeed in separating themselves from the objects of their critique, but 
when they are most caught up with them, so that the ambivalent political effects of 
these texts are a reminder of both the value and the costs of choosing to make use 
of repulsion rather than seeking in some way to renounce or redeem it. 
Always already possessed, the body cannot be thought outside these logics 
of purity and pollution: we construct our positions out of the pull towards those 
two states. But rather than trying to adopt either one as the grounding of a political 
critique, we can only accept the necessary contamination of whatever position we 
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adopt, recognizing that even though this deprives us of any solely exterior language 
with which to critique authority, it also provides us with a more multiple language, 
which can adapt itself to the different strategies necessary for opposing. Rather 
than regarding our speech as being necessarily collaborative, and therefore fatally 
flawed, we might make the most of that compromise by deploying a language of 
bodily purity against attempts to render our bodies abject, and a language of bodily 
disorder against attempts to render our bodies clean. If we want a text which is 




Revolution from Within: 
David Cronenberg and the 
Possibilities of Bodily Insurrection 
Chapter Five 
Shivers : 
Race and Class in the Imperilled Body 
(i) Introduction: Situating Cronenberg 
`This is a fusion of several things together: me and Burroughs for one 
thing', says David Cronenberg of his 1991 adaptation of Naked Lunch (Chris 
Rodley, Cronenberg on Cronenberg p. 163), a film which marks only the most 
obvious sort of fusion between the two and which follows a long recognition of 
Burroughs's influences on Cronenberg. ' Indeed, it may be necessary to justify 
devoting space to both bodies of work when s6 much criticism readily assumes 
that, given their apparently similar subject matter and Cronenberg's statements of 
Burroughs's influence, the two offer virtually identical perspectives. ' However, it is 
my intention here to suggest that these two bodies of work form radically different 
engagements with the consequences and strategies involved in representing body 
matter and disgust. Moreover, it is precisely the difference between the two that 
interests me: for where Burroughs treats the body as the vector only of control, so 
) See for instance Christopher Sharrett, `Apocalypticism in the Contemporary 
Horror Film' pp. 101-102; and Amy Taubin, `The Wrong Body'. Supporters of 
Burroughs largely despise Cronenberg's heterosexual 
- 
if not homophobic - version 
of Burroughs's text. See Richard Dellamora, `Queer Apocalypse: Framing William 
Burroughs'; Timothy Murphy, `William Burroughs Between Indifference and 
Revalorization: Notes Toward a Political Reading'; and Andrew Parker, `Grafting 
David Cronenberg: Monstrosity, AIDS Media, National/Sexual Difference. ' For a 
transcript of a meeting between Burroughs and Cronenberg, see Lynn Snowden 
`Which is the Fly and Which is the Human? `. 
2 See for instance Scott Bukatman, ` Who Programs You ? The Spectacle of 
Science Fiction'; Peter Morris, David Cronenberg: A Delicate Balance, pp. 29-30; 
and Steven Shaviro, ` Two Lessons from Burroughs'. 
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that resistance can He only in escaping it altogether, for Cronenberg the body's 
materiality holds out the promise of being deployed in productive, if risky, forms of 
resistance. Nor am I simply arguing that in their differences Burroughs defines a 
`problem' to which Cronenberg is the ` solution'. While I do indeed view 
Cronenberg as exploring abject materiality in a way that sees potentialities in it 
which Burroughs struggles to find, we might equally say that Burroughs's 
pessimism about the body enables him to maintain a critical interrogation of the 
body which is more muted in Cronenberg's work. This section of my thesis will 
therefore not attempt links, connections, or sustained comparisons 
- 
although I will 
raise some of these in my conclusion. Rather, it will pursue the question of what 
sorts of politics might be fashioned from the ordering and disordering of bodies, via 
the particular forms which it takes in a selected portion of Cronenberg's work. 
cronenberg has directed a group of films in which, from his first 
commercial feature in 1976, Shivers, through to his most recent film Crash (1996), 
bodies are imaged as a source of social disruption and personal anxiety. ' At the 
same time, the body is an object of fascination, whose capacity to disturb is 
desirable even as it is dreadful. I will be concerned in this thesis with three of 
Cronenberg's films 
- 
Shivers, The Fly (1986) and Rabid (1976), the last of which 
forms a conclusion tö the thesis as a whole. All three are commercial horror 
features, located more specifically within the sub-genre of `body horror'. `  Over the 
s He has also directed films in which that concern with the visceral body is muted (The Dead Zone, 1983), or altogether absent (Fast Track, 1979), and a range of 
material for television. For accounts of Cronenberg's life and the production history 
of his work see Chris Rodley (ed. ), Cronenberg on Cronenberg; and Peter Morris, 
David Cronenberg: A Delicate Balance. 
`I discuss the history of the body horror genre and its relevance to Cronenberg in 
chapter six. I do not consider The Brood (1979) or Videodrome (1982). This is 
both a practical decision 
- 
reasons of space necessitate excluding some of his body 
horror features 
- 
and also because, as I worked on those films, I did not find that I 
could use them to add substantially to the arguments generated by Shivers, The Fly, 
and Rabid. 
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last ten years Cronenberg's work may be said to have decisively breached the 
boundaries of the horror genre with M. Butterfly (1993), while he has also written 
and directed works whose concern with horrifying bodies take place in films that 
might not otherwise be called body horror, in terms of their iconography, their 
narratives, their commercial status or their intended audiences: Dead Ringers, 
Naked Lunch, and Crash. 
I will not be offering an auteurist account here, in the sense of treating these 
films as offering a unique vantage point on the body, since what interests me in 
Cronenberg's work is rather how it relies on common discursive tensions in the 
representation of abject body matter. ' These films chart a thoroughly conventional 
catalogue of those organs, activities, postures, and substances which render the 
material of the body problematic for a culture in which the body is figured as both a 
valued natural resource and a disgusting risk to one's status as civilized. But taken 
together, the films also offer a particular emphasis on the material conditions that 
produce such disgust, the ways that its different forms are all equally cultural, and 
the power relationships in which the body is located. If this effect is not in any 
straightforward way authored by their director, it is nevertheless a distinctive 
property of his work. 
Why begin by looking at Cronenberg in terms of race and class ?I want to 
use Cronenberg's work to show how the stigmatization of particular bodily 
substances, parts and activities, always takes place within a network of discourses 
which are socially specifiable. In particular I would situate myself as part of the 
recent move to reclaim Cronenberg from the largely humanist criticism which has 
championed him as an exposer of social artifice in the name of a general celebration 
of `the body', regarded in such accounts as an authentic presence that is the victim 
s Also against an auteurist reading of Cronenberg, see Colin McArthur, `Counter- 
Introduction: Limits of Auteurism'. 
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ofa repressive culture. " In its place, this more historically motivated criticismtries 
to locate the abject matter of Cronenberg's films as exemplifying particular forms 
of modem bodily anxiety, ' which are rather more specific than what David Chute 
describes as `some vestigial kernel of mistrust in our relationship with our own 
bodies' ('He Came From Within', p. 37). I want to turn these films back against 
such a formulation 
- 
to ask of such a claim: who is being spoken about through the 
term `our' ? Which bodies experience mistrust ? What is it that they mistrust ? And 
what can be done with those feelings ? 
(ii) Clean Bodies 
Cronenberg's first commercial feature film, Shivers, became an object of 
some notoriety when, in 1975, Canadian film critic Robert Fulford, writing under 
the pen name Marshal Delaney, argued that the Canadian Film Development 
Corporation should not have funded the making of the film in his provocatively 
titled article: `You Should Know How Bad This Film Is. After All, You Paid For 
It'. 8 Outraged at its perceived violation of certain standards of morality, aesthetics, 
national prestige and taste, Fulford's response was to call for the film's sanitary 
6 An approach exemplified by the essays in Piers Handling (ed. ), The Shape of 
Rage: the Films of David Cronenberg, and which Cronenberg encourages in 
interviews (see Chris Rodley (ed. ), Cronenberg on Cronenberg). 
' Steve Shaviro's The Cinematic Body is an interesting case, which appraises 
Cronenberg in an analysis based on Deleuze and Guattari, but remains wedded to 
general claims about the meaning of `the body' as if such an object were static, and 
. 
experienced in one way by all embodied subjects. 
8 Sadly, I have been unable to obtain a copy of Fulford's original article, which is 
discussed in Rodley, Cronenberg on Cronenberg, pp. 51-52; and Morris, A Delicate 
Balance, pp. 68-73. For Cronenberg's own account of how Fulford's article 
impacted on his personal life, and the legend of how it lost him his accommodation, 
see David Cronenberg, `The Night Attila Met the Anti-Christ, She Was Shocked 
And He Was Outraged'. 
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elimination (Morris, David Cronenberg, pp. 68-74). Given that Shivers's concern is 
with repression, liberation, hygiene and order, it seems almost too obvious to state 
that its reception is caught up in the dynamics which it interrogates. A cheerfully 
deconstructive reading might cast the film as itself a part of a horror narrative 
- 
whether as the unclean monster that is attacked, or as the hapless victim who is 
pursued. But what seems more to the point is the extent to which the film whittles 
away at those very terms, asking what price we pay for the fact that `liberation' is 
not a term generated spontaneously by the oppressed, so much as one defined and 
bequeatied to us by the most powerful constituencies of the social hierarchy. 
Instead, therefore, I want to suggest that the film's interrogation of the limits of 
liberation leads us not to affirm it as other to a criticism such as Fulford's, so much 
as to place it as all the more firmly consonant with 
- 
but therefore, as we shall see, 
X11 the more insidiously undermining of 
- 
the stigmatizing voice that would name 
and eradicate it. 
The narrative of Shivers covers a period of less than twenty-four hours, and 
recounts the spread of a parasite through the luxury apartment block Starliner 
Towers. The parasite is an artificial organism produced by Dr. Emil Hobbes and 
offered is a remedy for humanity's over-cerebral condition: `Man is an animal who 
thinks too much', Hobbes's business partner Rollo Linsky reads in the deceased 
doctor's notes, `an over-rational animal that's lost touch with its body and its 
instincts'. Hobbes's notes call the parasites `a combination of aphrodisiac and 
venereal disease that will hopefully turn the world into one beautiful mindless orgy'. 
The film then follows the attempt, and eventual failure, of Linsky, and Starliner 
Towers's resident doctor, Roger St Luc, to avert the spread of the parasite, and 
charts the gradual transformation of the residents into bodies which desire nothing 
except sex. The film ends with the residents leaving the block to take the infection 
out into Toronto. 
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At one crucial point, St Luc's lover and assistant, Nurse Forsythe, begins to 
narrate, q dream she has had: 
Roger, I had a very disturbing dream last night. In this dream, I found 
myself making love to this strange man. Only I'm having trouble, you see, 
because he's old and dying, and he smells bad, and I find him repulsive. But 
then he tells me that everything is erotic, that everything is sexual. You 
know what I mean ? He tells me that even old flesh is erotic flesh, that 
disease is the love of two alien kinds of creatures for each other 
- 
that even 
dying is an act of eroticism. That talking is sexual. That breathing is sexual. 
4nd I believe him. And we make love beautifully. 
As Forsythe finishes speaking, she opens her mouth to reveal a parasite crawling 
out of it, reaching towards St Luc: he strikes her, rendering her unconscious, and 
then binds her mouth to keep the creature inside. 
The alternation between close-ups of Forsythe's increasingly impassioned 
face, moving arms and neck, and St Luc's unchanging face and immobile torso, 
structures the scene in terms of the tension between two performances, which 
encode q key dynamic of the film 
- 
the confrontation between two modes of 
physicality. If, as Lucy Fisher has argued, the shot/countershot pattern is one which 
typically positions the woman as the object, not the initiator, of the look that passes 
between the two parties (Shot/Countershot: Film Tradition and Women's Cinema), 
tJxm St Luc's violent act brings to the fore the implicit power relationship embodied 
by that cinematic structure. As if to cement this, the shooting generates a 
discrepancy of status by positioning St Luc above Forsythe, so that while one shot 
looks up to him, the completing shot looks down to her. We may then read this as a 
confrontation in which the audience is invited to read his action as the fulfilment of 
visual logic of the scene: his mastery, her submission. By silencing her speech, and 
sealing her mouth, he puts a stop to the narrative by which she attempts to assign 
their positions, to determine the form of their relationship, averting the moment of 
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sexual upion between them which would act as the climax of her sexual narrative, 
by realizing in the flesh the claims of her story. 
But at the same time, his performance also compromises any position of 
mastery. His movement throughout the film is rigid, with his hands often noticeably 
failing to co-ordinate with his attempted postures of authority, gesturing helplessly, 
and his voice often mumbling or inaudible! Throughout the film, as Peter Boss has 
noted: 
our engagement with him is limited in terms of actual screen time and by the 
camera strategy used to convey his presence to us: typically, he is 
anticipated rather than accompanied by the camera; framing is usually in 
long-shot to medium, and rarely close-up, and subjective angles are 
rejected. (`Death, Disintegration of the Body, and Subjectivity in the 
Modem Horror Film', p. 128) 
Conseqlfently, the contrast between them may also be read in Forsythe's favour. 
Her voice has passion, its volume and tone modulating, while her body stretches 
and her eyes widen. The sound and image make her an object of fascination, while 
St Luc's practical beige clothes, his silence, and his impassive face, make him 
almost lifeless, so that the shot/countershot structure accentuates her cinematic 
vitality fiver the torpor of his performance and physical appearance. " That her 
speech occupies a full ninety seconds of screen time without interruption locates it 
in a position of power, so that St Luc's silencing of Forsythe may then be read less 
the expression of a superiority which the scene endorses, than an assertion of a 
superiority that the scene has systematically denied. " 
It would perhaps be foolish not to credit this at least partly to the problem of 
using poor actors and sound technology in order to meet the constraints of a low- 
budget film. Nevertheless, the overall effect is to diminish St Luc's appeal for the 
audience throughout the film. 
10 Similarly, earlier in the film Forsythe undresses provocatively while St Luc, 
unmoved, continues to make a business call on the telephone. 
11 For other readings of St Luc's compromised position see William Beard, ` The 
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We may therefore say that this event is posed as the conflict between two 
bodily styles, heightened also by their contrasting clothes (Forsythe has changed 
into a sleeveless black evening dress; St Luc still wears the suit he put on for 
work): one fluid, seductive, hedonistic; the other rigid, aggressive, ascetic. It is the 
difficulty of deciding how this contrast functions, and which set of terms it is 
attempting to privilege, that I want to explore here, since it concerns a bodily 
conflict which I will argue is embedded in the racial and class logics that produce 
the film, and whose tensions it so suggestively explores, perhaps nowhere more 
clearly than through the way in which this contrast of bodies is mirrored in the 
design of the building. 
Cronenberg's concern with an austere geography has long been recognized, 
but it has typically been read as a visual detail symbolizing the undesirable restraint 
of the environments in which his films are set. 12 Summarizing its presence in 
Cronenberg's work, William Beard says: `in these works society 
... 
is presented as 
believing itself to be rational, ordered, coolly functional, under control. These 
qualities are signalled by architecture and decor, by the social behaviour of the 
characters and by the ambitious optimism of the high priests of modern society, the 
scientists' ('The Visceral Mind', p. 3). Such a description obviously fits well with 
the image of St Luc that I have described, and Starliner Towers is indeed just such 
a rational, functional space. However, using the theoretical positions I have 
discussed in chapters one and two we can argue that the film not only uses 
Visceral Mind' pp. 19-20; Robert MacMillan, `Shivers 
... 
Makes Your Flesh Creep' 
p. 15; and Michael O'Pray, `Fatal Knowledge', p. 10. 
12 See for instance John Harkness, `The Word, The Flesh and David Cronenberg', 
pp. 91-92; and Robert MacMillan, `Shivers 
... 
Makes Your Flesh Creep! ', pp. 14-15. 
The harsh, spacious, eerie settings have also been seen as Cronenberg's attempts to 
rework traditional gothic elements in his cinema: see Wayne Drew, `A Gothic 
Revival: Obsession and Fascination in the Films of David Cronenberg', p. 19; and 
Robert Haas, ` Introduction: The Cronenberg Monster: Literature, Science and 
Psychology in the Cinema of Horror', pp. 4-5). 
258 
architecture as a visual metaphor, but also diagnoses the ways that the physical 
environment moulds the bodies and body images of its users, so that Starliner 
Towers is constructed as a form of bodily geography, whose contours provide a 
psychic pattern for the bodies of the inhabitants and also sustain the physical 
practices that maintain the physical shape of these bodies, rather than simply being 
expressive of them. 
The building is marked firstly by a concern with enclosure and separation. 
Situated on an island, reached only by a narrow bridge, the building is separated 
both from the nearest city, and from the Canadian mainland. " The film opens with 
an advertisement for the block, in which a voice-over account stresses its 
independence and physical isolation ('the noise of the traffic of the city might as 
well be a million miles away'), where the car park offers `a space reserved for you', 
and residents of the block can be `secure in the knowledge that it belongs to you 
and your fellow travellers alone'. The action then begins as a couple drive up to the 
block and, jokily, negotiate access past the security guard, who marks yet another 
boundary. Inside the building, new boundaries are in place, those of the individual 
apartments whose closed doors we see in endless rows down shots of corridors. 
Island, building, apartment: this series of Russian dolls that constitutes the space of 
the film ends with the most intimate sealed space 
- 
the body. The bodies that inhabit 
such a domain are structured by the visual language of closure and containment 
which dgfines the building. 
Hobbes's parasites enter the body through any opening available to them - 
visible at one point beneath the flesh, passing from throat to throat during a kiss. 
But their most graphic victim is Nick Tudor, a resident of the building, whose 
stomach bulges with the creatures living inside him and who retches up parasites 
into sinks, toilets, and off balconies 
- 
until finally we see one push itself out from 
13 The building's real location is the equally suggestively named Nuns' Island. 
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between his lips. With its unseemly behaviour and unruly materiality, Nick's body 
thus violates the precepts of the well-ordered and well-demarcated space he 
inhabits. But Nick is also marked by other, less spectacular, violations: we soon 
find that he is having a secret affair with Annabel Brown, which marks his domestic 
marriagc as a space whose security has been breached, while his wife is close to 
being seduced by their next-door neighbour, Betts. This series of bounded spaces 
therefore produces inhabitants who are both required to keep within the bounds of 
their proper spaces, and yet situated within spaces whose boundaries are 
permeable. The film stresses the porousness of both the body and the spaces on 
which it is modelled: just as Nick Tudor's name is punningly pronounced `two- 
door', so too we see the parasites passing through the access-points of these 
architectural spaces 
- 
entering the building through a drain or leaving an apartment 
through a letter-box. When one parasite crawls up through the plug of a bath, and 
then into the vagina of the woman using the bath, the doubling of the two apertures 
bears witness to the mutual implication of bodily and architectural geographies. 
Hence, in binding Forsythe's mouth, St Luc exemplifies the logic of the space in 
which the film unfolds: guard the spaces of exit and entry. We may therefore read 
the particularly graphic trauma of parasitic invasion as a signifier of the 
environment's investment in neatly maintained bodies. When we see Nick in his 
kitchen, having disordered its contents, broken its appliances, and covered its 
surfaces in blood, the moment of textual excess should be read as deriving its 
meaning from its defiance of the corporeal logics of deportment and containment 
already in place in the building. His internal body matter has been expelled onto its 
surfaces, so that the lines of demarcation that define Starliner Towers are seen as 
under attack. 
Alongside this stress on containment, as we have already begun to see, this 
corporeal logic is also one of order. Annabel Brown, the parasites' first victim, is 
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described by the apartment manager as a `very civilized young lady' who `never 
complained about anything', an apparently docile body who fits the ideal 
requirements of the block and the civilizing society that it regulates. The line of 
orderly residents seated in the surgery queue; Forsythe at work preparing food; 
Janine Tudor making breakfast; the unnamed waiter pushing his trolley down the 
corridorp: these are docile bodies in Foucault's sense, actively pursuing the tasks 
required by this domain, and aware of the spaces within which they belong and the 
movements which they must make. But the images of routinized work also prepare 
for the reappearance of those characters after they have been entered by the 
parasite. Once infected, they no longer respect these other borders, pushing 
through the doors which once acted as secure boundaries, and into the bodies 
whose integrity those barriers underwrite. The soundtrack of laughs and screams - 
often indistinguishable, often unlocatable within the labyrinth of corridors 
- 
and the 
change in performance to deliberately slouched postures of hyperactive movement, 
marks the end of the sanctioned bodily forms demanded by Starliner Towers. 
The narrative device of these docile bodies being systematically breached 
enables the text to indicate the constitutive role that architecture and decor plays in 
the structuring of the body, the way that bodies are fitted by and for the spaces they 
inhabit and the routines that they perform there. Walls whose white paint easily 
shows marks, doors that are always locked, barriers between apartments, security 
guards: the bodies moulded by such a domain are both physically and psychically 
marked by the requirement for containment and docility. What I want to emphasize 
here is the way that these structures of containment are essential for defining the 
form that such docility takes. Here, a body which is porous becomes defined as one 
that cannot be ordered. A porous body is one that does not follow the regulations 
of this environment. The structuring of sealed spaces thus figures the body as a 
place in need of ordering 
- 
in need of having its borders shored up so that it does 
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not viol4te the logic of Starliner Towers. Those events which indicate that its 
borders Fe indeed porous are the ones to be most dreaded. Consequently, the 
space of the body becomes vulnerable simultaneously to threats of invasion from 
without and disruption from within. But 
- 
and this is the ambiguity of Hobbes's 
parasites 
- 
the threat from without is always figured as dangerous because of its 
potential to activate a dangerous presence within the body. Certainly with their 
pulsating, organic appearance they look as much like organs of the body 
- 
which 
would, Rollo says, have been their intended medical function 
- 
as they do objects 
that are alien to it. 
As the reader will, I hope, recognize, Cronenberg's work is here following 
similar contours to that of Burroughs 
- 
is, in a sense, inhabiting it and being 
moulded by it. It in a similar way, he insists that the symbolic weight of the 
imperfections that accrue to the body render it forever suspect, Shivers's marked 
diversiop away from Burroughs is, as we shall see, to draw attention to, rather than 
to evade, the impossibility of solving such a tension. It is the very insistence of the 
alien disturbance within the residents that constitutes the alien disturbance within 
the film, preventing Shivers from merely duplicating the Burroughsian edifice that 
sustains it. 
When the film opens with its commercial celebration of Starliner Towers, 
the series of slides display the facilities which the building offers. Strikingly absent 
from the shots are bodies themselves. These are empty rooms, empty beds, empty 
kitchens. These spaces, supposedly designed for bodily activity, are in fact so 
pristine that they can accommodate only the most regulated of bodies. The body is 
admissible only if it can merge with their precise functioning, and not disrupt it. But 
such a logic already situates the body as a threat which, in need of taming, is 
therefore always a risky presence. If, as Douglas says, the body may act as a model 
for bounded systems, what we see here is the way that the construction of the body 
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as permeable (unable to keep temptations out, unable to hold passions in) then 
makes it a problematic model, unable to secure a sense of bounded and ordered 
subjectivity (an instability which, I will be stressing later, may in fact be as much 
about the instability of the architecture of the building as it is about the body). 
This environment therefore has a dual role: to define for each body what it 
can and cannot do, how it may and may not move, what it should and should not 
look at (a geographical map of bodily operations); to define for each subject what 
its body means, and how to feel about it (a semiotic grid of bodily significances). In 
Douglas's terms, we can therefore see how the building itself operates through a 
bodily metaphor of smoothly functioning components, securing its identity: it is 
itself the ideal body, whose perfection none of the real fallible bodies inhabiting it 
can ever match. But at the same time, that bodily model is undermined because in 
depending on an image of the body as ordered and controllable, it generates the 
possibility that these bodies may also be disordered and uncontrollable: if the 
bodies of the residents may fail to match up to the ideal, perhaps we shall eventually 
see that the ideal itself cannot sustain its own perfection. 
Shivers thus enacts the bodily dynamic which I have mapped out 
throughout this thesis: the integrity of a subject is threatened by the presence of 
intimate bodily improprieties. While the extent to which the film endorses the fear 
of that threat remains to be decided, what is more certain is that it relies on the 
construction of a strong antithesis between the two bodily states. The architectural 
space is opposed to, and incompatible with, the new bodies that inhabit it. And 
those improper bodies 
- 
of both parasites and residents 
- 
seem constructed so as to 
evade any narrative sympathies. In terms of the residents' bodies, Nick Tudor's 
manic, aggressive, performance, with his eyes bulging and his mouth slobberng 
blood, culminates in a sexual assault on his wife which leaves her in tears; Betts's 
seduction of Janine Tudor is heavily referenced as horrific through the casting of 
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the well7known European horror performer Barbara Steele as Betts; " infected 
residents are seen through hotel door spyholes, distorted threateningly by the lens; 
and the frighteningly overwhelming weight of the crowds who break through doors 
is accompanied by a harsh soundtrack of screams that makes for uncomfortable 
listening, As for the parasites, their appearance as pulsating brown slug-like forms, 
coated with blood, accompanied by discordant crashes of music, and wounding 
characters with whom our narrative sympathies have been aligned 
- 
an entire cluster 
of them, for instance, grips hard onto the amiable Rollo's face and have to be torn 
off with pliers 
- 
constructs them for us primarily as fearful. How can we account for 
the extraordinary fear that circulates around these bodily events ? Robin Wood's 
`An Introduction to the American Horror Film' 
, 
with its unremitting hostility 
towards Cronenberg's imagery of bodily disgust, has the distinction of being one of 
the first serious critical engagements with Shivers, and although it now seems 
unconvincingly schematic in its analysis nevertheless offers a useful way into the 
question. " 
Wood bases his critique on a reading of horror derived from Freud, by way 
of Marcyse, in which political oppression and psychic repression go hand-in-hand, 
to prodqce a society of orderly but neurotic subjects. Wood's much-anthologized 
essay argues that, as a genre, horror enacts a conflict between those forces that are 
both socially and psychically licit ('normality') 
, 
and those that are both socially and 
psychically illicit ('the monster'). Wood then divides horror films into those that are 
progressive (in which normality is recognized as coercive and the unleashed forces 
are seen as redemptive) and those that are reactionary (in which normality is upheld 
14 On the impact of the casting of Steele, see William Beard, `The Visceral Mind', 
p. 21; David Hogan, Dark Romance: Sexuality in the Horror Film, p. 178; David 
Sanjek, `Dr Hobbes's Parasites: Victims, Victimization and Gender in David 
Cronenberg's Shivers', pp. 65-66; and Wayne Drew, `A Gothic Revival', p. 19. 
Chapter seven of Hogan's Dark Romance offers an overview of Steele's career. 
'S Wood repeats and extends his argument in `Cronenberg: A Dissenting View'. 
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as benigp and the unleashed forces are seen as evil). Shivers is placed firmly in what 
Wood cells `the reactionary wing' (p. 215) since it `presents sexuality in general as 
the object of loathing' (p. 216). In his reading of Shivers, Starliner Towers is 
presented to its audience as being overtaken by a disaster, and as such carries the 
political message of an indictment of sexual liberalism. 
But while Wood is surely right when he says that Shivers figures sexual 
desire as disgusting, he has failed to consider that this may in fact be the most 
important point that the film makes: the association of sex and disgust cannot be 
banished in an environment where the body is the focal point for so many concerns 
with different types of mess. Hence I will suggest that Cronenberg's film is 
interesting precisely because rather than offering any palliative for the disgust that 
attaches to certain bodies, it offers an exploration of the various meanings of that 
disgust 
- 
an exploration that is at its most incisive precisely because it exacerbates 
the conf'ict between realms of bodily order and disorder so as to expose their 
implacable hostility towards one another. But at the same time it is too reductive to 
read this as only a text about sexual disgust 
- 
rather, I would suggest, sex is only 
one of a number of problems in the management of bodies. "' The power of sex to 
disturb lies in its invocation of the amenability of the body to improper practices - in 
which sexual impropriety is not necessarily the most significant instance. I suggest 
then that Wood's approach paralyses the debate on a number of levels. On the one 
hand it renders all physical activity sexual and so diverts critical attention away 
16 It may be useful to consider Foucault's The History of Sexuality here, part of 
whose project is to recount the gradual shift away from a general concern (in 
ancient Greece and Rome) with a variety of possible disorders in the body, to a 
Christian focus on sex as the defining site of bodily disorder. For other readings of 
horror in which all bodily fears are fears of the sexual, see David J Hogan, Dark 
Romance: Sexuality in the Modern Horror Film, especially pp. 286-290 on 
Cronenb_erg; James B. Twitchell, Dreadful Pleasures: An Anatomy of Modern 
Horror, makes a similar argument about horror in general, without addressing 
Cronenberg in particular 
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from the other meanings of bodily disorder. " On the other it leads to endless 
rebuttals of Cronenberg's disgust at the sexual by critics wishing to reclaim him for 
a humanist agenda in which his films explore `primal organic terrors' (Owen 
Gleiberman, `Cronenberg's Double Meanings', p. 39) or should be read so that 
`sexuality seems like a metaphor for human nature' (Robert Macmillan, ` Shivers 
... 
Makes Your Flesh Creep', p. 15). This critical discourse, while it may accurately 
identify the centrality of bodily anxiety in these films, fails to locate those fears 
within any particular culture: the body is essentially discomforting and always for 
the same reasons. '' In its favour, Wood's Marcusean account of psychic repression 





account of how the body is produced under capitalism. 
I remain unconvinced that we should read this as a film in which images of 
sexual disgust are activated as an exploration of unchanging anxieties about the 
frailty of the body"- both because it privileges the experienced frailty of certain 
constituencies (there is no one frailty of the body, but only different symbolic 
frailties for different groups whose authority is imperilled), and because it turns us 
away from the material question of how bodies are in fact rendered frail to different 
degrees through their material situations. Thus while I am happy to accept that 
much horror addresses social anxieties about sexuality, and that much of it 
addresses fears - such as age and disease - that, for particular social constituencies, 
have come to acquire the character of the seemingly immutable problems of 
17 Which seems an unfortunate and unnecessary consequence, since Wood's general 
outline of a theoretical model locates sexuality solely as one site of oppression 
within a multidimensional picture of social conflict (pp. 199-200). 
18 It also takes up Cronenberg's own account of his work, in which he resolutely 
refuses to admit that there might be any cultural specificity in his representation of 
the body: `It's an examination of what is universal about human existence' (in Chris 
Rodley, Cronenberg on Cronenberg, p. 127). 
19 The argument offered by David Chute in `He Came From Within', p. 38. 
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embodiment, I remain wary of attempting to define any single social origin for these 
images. The parasites are amenable to a number of different readings, some of 
which I shall pursue here, and this critical flexibility originates precisely because 
`the body' is not located in a single discourse but is constituted out of many. I do 
not think that it is problematic that any account of body politics deals only with a 
limited number of such body discourses 
- 
indeed, the overdetermining terms ` race' 
and `class' in my title should be read as indicating precisely such necessary 
limitations 
- 
but it is also important to recognize that such critiques of particular 
bodily anxieties should not be offered as overarching claims about `the body' as a 
general human problem. What I am concerned to do is to shift away from the 
general claims of Cronenberg's work as dramatizing ` the explosive unconscious 
forces that lie within everyone' (William Beard, ` The Visceral Mind', p. 2) and 
towards a consideration of the specific forms of power that might find this 
particular conjunction of bodily possibilities so disturbing, while at the same time 
making connections between different anxieties in order to demonstrate their 
complicities and contradictions. The most pertinent question would then be: can we 
specify more precisely what different mix of cultural tensions is being signified 
through the abjection of particular types of body material and bodily behaviour in 
this text ? 
(iii) Bodily Improprieties / Improper Bodies 
Shortly before he too is assaulted and infected, we see the unnamed security 
guard reading a book, entitled Nurse in Arabia. It seems planted there to make us 
think of the film's other nurse, Forsythe, and to ask ourselves what country she is 
in. If her logical location is `Nurse in Canada', the book's title may point to the 
racial dynamics which underpin the film. For in its invocation of Arabia, the title 
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recalls the racist fantasies of threat and danger reworked in a cinematic tradition 
exemplified by films such as The Sheik (1921) and Harem (1985). The white 
woman in Arabia is a woman in danger, and her professional status here as nurse 
explicitly distances her from those racialized others who, in the scenario that we 
might imagine attending on such a title, would be figured as uncivilized, 
uneducated, and, in contrast to the caring role of a nurse, unfriendly. The 
conjunction of the two terms, posed here on the lurid cover of a cheap paperback, 
form a striking parallel with Forsythe's situation. At the most obvious level she too 
is a nurse in an environment of sexual danger, but the racial connotations of the 
book title guide us towards an analysis of the racialized elements in that 
environment. 
It will not be my argument here that the film's figuration of `Arabia' 
constitutes a specifically orientalist moment, in the sense of a set of associations 
that are specific to the Western construction of an exotic East, along the lines 
suggested by Edward Said's Orientalism. Rather, what interests me here is the way 
in which the film constructs an undifferentiated whiteness through its invocation of 
a non-white sexuality which is defined only by its being not-white, rather than being 
defined in its geographicallcultural specificity. This is not to attempt to homogenize 
racism, since racism also operates by means of a range of specific discourses in 
which differently constituted races are stigmatized in very precise ways. 20 Rather it 
is to argue that alongside this, racism operates through a refusal to specify - an 
invocation of a generalized racial otherness in which `non-white' is an effective 
category precisely because it represents the general form of all non-white others. 
As Richard Dyer reminds us `trying to think about the representation of 
whiteness as an ethnic category in mainstream film is difficult, partly because white 
20 See Robert Young, Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Practice; 
and Kernan Malik, The Meaning of Race. 
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power sccures its dominance by seeming not to be anything in particular' (`White', 
p. 141). This is a caveat that extends beyond mainstream cinema, and is particularly 
important in the case of Shivers. Dyer's point is that cinematic images, discourses, 
and practices specific to white cultures, are routinely described as not being 
ethnically specific, and it is therefore the responsibility of a politically focused 
criticism to draw attention to these features as white. " In the case of Shivers, I will 
argue that it is important that we do not therefore erase race by reading this as a 
representation of a change in `humanity' or in 'people' 
- 
as the disruption of what 
Beard c4lls 'everyday contemporary lifestyles' ('The Visceral Mind', p. 18) 
- 
but as 
a changq that takes place in a community of white people. 
At the most obvious level, all of the featured residents of Starliner Towers 
are white 
- 
as indeed are all non-residents with speaking parts: the security guard, 
Rollo, Nick's secretary. The film marks their whiteness through their language, for 
while the residence is traversed by various dialects and languages, this is no 
postmodern display of endless difference: the languages are all European and the 
cast list marks the characters' Germanic, Anglophone, and Francophone origins 
(e. g. Guilbault, Parkins, Sviben, Olive). But whiteness is also an insistent visual 
motif of the film I have already stressed how the environment of Starliner Towers 
demands both order and integrity: there is a third term central to its representation 
of the civilized body, and that is cleanliness. The intrusion of the parasites is 
visually pignalled by the trails of blood that they leave on the white surfaces of the 
buildings on the porcelain of the toilet; inside the bath; down the walls of the rooms. 
Nick and Janine's bathroom is constructed as a space of white objects (toilet, 
bathroom, walls, tiles, sink) brightly lit by fluorescent lighting, which visually 
"For other attempts to render whiteness visible, 
. 
see. Diana.. Jeater, 'Roast_Beef and 
Reggae Music: The Passing of Whiteness'; and Vron Ware and Les Back, 
`White/Whiteness'. Dyer has developed the work from his seminal article in the 
book White. 
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echoes other clean, square spaces throughout the film: St Luc's hygienic surgery or 
the luminous cavity of the fridge in front of which Nick's body is sprawled. His 
tangled limbs and lolling head contrast with the regular arrangement of straight 
lines and ordered food that is behind him, marking the space of whiteness as the 
space of order, while the darkness that surrounds and accentuates the white square, 
positions it as a space under siege, whose light pushes some small way into the 
darkness around it before fading. 
Food, medicine and ablution are drawn together as practices of cleanliness, 
whose goal is the production of white environments, achieved by the banishment, 
destruction, and re-ordering of substances which dirty them. Emphasizing this 
concern with purity, we also have a lengthy scene set in the laundry room, where 
the rituals of the measuring out of powder indicate the steady project of purging. 
As-the scene progresses we see, across the white wall at the back of the room, a 
long red trail of blood, to indicate the desecration by the parasite of this pristine 
territory. Moreover, while the brown parasites have been taken as resembling body 
organs or faeces, 22 what has not, to my knowledge, been commented on is the 
implicit racial dynamic in having white residents struggling to keep brown bodies 
under cgntrol. 
White is the colour of domestic hygiene, and the process of civilization is 
represented here as the process of keeping things white. But the effect of this 
insistent whiteness is to underline the metaphor of the change as one of cultural 
regression. The shock of the residents' transformation relies on their being the 
representatives of white civilization, for whom this `going native' is a transgression 
of the lines of their collective racial identity. The whiteness of the lowers and its 
furnishings are thus analogous to the bodies of the inhabitants, part of the process 
22 See for instance David Sanjek, `Dr Hobbes's Parasites', p. 60; and Robin Wood, 
`Cronenberg: A Dissenting View', p. 129. 
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of geographical subjectivization which I outlined earlier. But this whiteness will not 
survive: the trails of blood left by parasites, Forsythe's bloody handprint left on a 
wall after touching a corpse, Nick's blood smeared across the kitchen. And in this 
annihilation of the whiteness of the walls, we see the annihilation of the whiteness 
of their inhabitants. 
Writing in 1897, one Victorian explorer gave this account of the white 
presence in Africa: `I have been increasingly struck with the rapidity with which 
such members of the white race as are not of the best class, can throw over the 
restraints of civilisation and develop into savages of unbridled lust and abominable 
cruelty. 'P Sander Gilman has pointed out that imperialist narratives stage blackness 
as both an alien otherness which supposedly has no affinity with whiteness, and also 
as a site of possible doubling 
- 
for instance tropes of degeneracy and atavism 
picture blackness as, in evolutionist accounts, the possible site of the origin of the 
white race, and, in alarmist warnings of western social decay, as the image of the 
future of a degenerate white civilization. 24 Gilman's work is scrupulous in its 
distinctions between the ways that different racisms (American, European; 
nineteenth century, twentieth century) with different targets (black, Jewish) have 
their owi specific dynamics and languages, all of which are complexly inflected by 
class and gender. But he also stresses `the interrelationship of images of difference' 
by which for instance, `the categories of "black" and "Jew"... became 
interchapgeable at one point in history' (Difference and Pathology, p. 35). His work 
thus argpes for a central dynamic of difference by which white' culture constructs 
racial others as the sexualized embodiment of a fear of their own bodies so that, as 
in his formulation of the construction of white European masculinity, `the "white 
23 Sir Harry Johnston, quoted in Patrick Brantlinger, ` Victorians and Africans: The 
Genealogy of the Myth of the Dark Continent' (p. 213). 
24 See his work `Black Bodies, White Bodies'; Difference and Pathology: 
Stereotypes of Sexuality, Race and Madness; and The Jew's Body. 
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man's burden" thus becomes his sexuality and its control, and it is this which is 
transferred into the need to control the sexuality of the Other' ('Black Bodies, 
White Bodies', p. 256). 25 
Similarly, Robert Reid-Pharr has suggested that as white people we ask 
ourselves the question: `what do we think when we fuck? ' ('Dinge', p. 41). His 
answer is that we think about whether we are black. Reid-Pharr argues that 
`blackness is indeed the "always already" lurking in the netherworld of the white 
consciousness' (p. 41), so that white sexuality is haunted by the fear that its sexual 
desire signals the descent into the realm stigmatized as animalistic black passion: for 
the white man, Reid-Pharr says, `desire is the process by which he might lose 
access to his whiteness' (p. 43). 
Shivers charts the gradual waning of whiteness as the transformation of 
ordered bodies into disordered bodies 
- 
asexual bodies into hypersexual bodies. The 
whiteness of the walls is compromised 
- 
and with it the whiteness of sunlight and 
daytime, as the film marks the eclipse of white restraint through the gradual 
transformation of day into night, the (white) time of work and restraint into the 
(black) time of atavism and sex. 26 The collective whiteness of these bodies is thus 
mapped pnto a structural anxiety about blackness, and about the loss of their 
membership of civilization. 
There are two black performers in the film. The first is the nameless menial 
25 See also- Rudi C. Bleys, The Geography of Perversion; and Barbara Omolade, 
`Hearts of Darkness'. This connection between the hidden `truth' of sexuality and 
the hidden racial origins of the white subject is also visible in the idea of `fetishism' 
as both ý sexual and a racial phenomenon, which, at both the level of cultural 
development and individual sexual development, white people have seen themselves 
as both transcending/evolving from and threatened by a return to: see Anne 
McClintock, `The Return of Female Fetishism and the Fiction of the Phallus'; and 
Alasdair Pettinger, `Why Fetishism T. 
76 On the figuration of the meeting of the racial identities of white and black as that 
of light and darkness, see Patrick Brantlinger, ` Victorians and Africans' pp. 197- 
198. 
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(who appears in the cast list only as `Garbage Room Man') whom we first see 
crouching under the security guard's desk, repairing some portion of it. If his 
posture already marks his marginality, his being ` below' the white figures in terms 
of status, this relation returns with more force when we see him for a second time, 
when he attacks St Luc in the basement. Located in the basement, the black figure 
is also tl}e worker, and his geographical location as below the habitations of 
privilege marks him as both their economic foundation, whose work enables their 
luxury, and the psychic foundation, whose repression enables their cleanliness. In a 
graphic literalization of the violence of such power relations, St Luc grabs a 
crowbar and beats him to death. 
But having been killed by St Luc, the nameless black man appears in the 
film for a third time, attesting to the particular difficulty in erasing him. Forsythe, 
looking for St Luc, has also come down to the basement 
- 
the place where her 
infection will eventually be disclosed 
- 
and calls his name. As she turns a corner, the 
words `Roger' are met not by a glimpse of her lover, but by the body of the dead 
janitor: running into the room in which she expects to find the one, she falls instead 
over the body of the other. The sudden juxtaposition of the white doctor's name 
with the black janitor's body facilitates a reading of doubleness in which she does 
not so much fail to find St Luc, but rather finds the truth of the one whom she was 
looking for: the murdered black body on whose brutal regulation St Luc's ordered 
white subjectivity relies. 
The second black performer is similarly confronted by St Luc at a crucial 
moment. Her character, like that of the other black performer, is nameless. She 
comes out of a room, struggling with a man. From her attempts to escape, and his 
uncoordinated violence, it is clear that he is infected, and she is not (yet). St Luc 
raises hisgun, as if considering- either saving her by killing her assailant, or shooting 
both of them. Instead, he turns away and moves on, going to the aid of his friend 
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Rollo. This marks the moment in the film when he recognizes his powerlessness 
- 
when, given his single real opportunity to make a difference by saving someone, he 
turns away. If at one level his refusal marks the relative worth of the black woman 
(no effort will be expended on her behalf), at another it suggests the particular 
suggestiveness of the black body: she is already relegated to the order of sexuality 
and barbarism, beyond help because in a sense she is already on the other side of 
the racial line of civilization. " St Luc's refusal to go to her aid, and his decision 
instead to attempt (but fail) to help Rollo, marks his alliance with whiteness, as 
opposed to the black figures against which St Luc is defined 
- 
the racial others that 
he manages in order to manage himself. St Luc's resistance to infection is no 
guarantee of his success, and his increasingly incompetent attempts to save the 
residents again compromise his standing as hero. Finally, he leaves the building, 
crossing the line with whose demarcation the film began. He runs up the slope 
outside the building, and is about to disappear into the darkness. But this 
environment is already heavily coded in terms that have come to be associated with 
the infected residents. Between the organic presence of grass, and the dark of the 
night, we might already suspect this location to be less than welcoming. Just as he 
is about to disappear from sight, St Luc backs down the slope, and we see that the 
residents are no longer inside the building, but rise over the edges of the lawn, out 
of the dark (to which they now belong), accompanied by an indecipherable 
murmuring, and shuffling with an almost prehistoric simian gait. " They force St 
Luc back into the building, and down into the swimming pool, where Forsythe 
gives him the kiss that the film has so far never shown. Gilman records how white 
27 In a still from the original set, the half-naked performer is wearing different props 
that highlight her construction as primitive/savage: heavy loops of wooden beads 
and large hooped earrings (Rodley, Cronenberg on Cronenberg, p. 46). 
28 Intertextually, it is also a quotation of a similar scene in George Romero's Night 
of the Living Dead. Cronenberg comments on this quotation in John G. Harkness, 
`David Cronenberg: Brilliantly Bizarre', p. 16. 
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fears of plackness focus repeatedly on `the swamp', an image which unites a series 
of significant racial tropes: blackness as prehistory, blackness as nature, blackness 
as feminized (Difference and Pathology, p. 99 and pp. 194-195). The final descent 
into the pool would seem to push this evolutionary decline back to its furthest 
point: the return to the ocean, with all the bodies merging into an indistinguishable 
sea of protoplasm. St Luc's final conversion then seals the submergence of white 
civilization beneath the flood of water and bodies. 
And yet it is in this moment that we also see the film unsettling its own 
dominant imagery. For in its watery evocation of baptism does it not become 
possible that it is the ` St' who must be saved by the sinners, and that it is perhaps 
whiteness that must be washed clean away ? While the force of the film as, 
generically, a horror text, lies in its evocation of the vulnerability and destruction of 
a comminity, St Luc's ambivalent location within the narrative suggests, 
conversely, that we should welcome the destruction of white culture's stifling 
conformity. Whiteness is here figured as an overly ordered ethnicity, which 
produces subjects deprived of many bodily pleasures, and for whom the threat of 
change iý also the promise of freedom. In his own account of the film, Cronenberg 
argues that `to me, those people have been liberated' (David Chute ` He Caine From 
Within', p. 37), regaining a physicality that has been withheld from them. But this is 
still to read the text within its racial dynamics, for as Gilman has observed, the 
black body has often `represented sexual expression untrammelled by the repressive 
conventions of European society' (Difference and pathology, p. 120), an exotic 
object which embodies freedom for its white audience precisely insofar as it 
connotes the pre-social, the natural, the child-like. The black body's capacity to act 
as a site pf pleasure for the white imagination therefore inflects - but nevertheless 
depends upon 
- 
the terms which maintain white supremacy. If the residents of 
Starliner Towers 
- 
and indeed Canada as a whole 
- 
are to be ` liberated', this utopia 
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is imagii}ed only within the terms of a racist dynamic in which white culture is the 
subject of the liberatory discourse and black culture can figure only the vehicle for 
our salvation 
- 
the price for which is that black subjects feature only marginally, and 
always so closely allied to a pre-cultural chaos as to reaffirm the threat that they 
pose to, and their essential incompatibility with, the white culture that speaks about 
them. 
This analysis of the racial dynamics of the text should not be taken as 
claiming that the film is, in any straightforward sense `racist': it is not, after all, as if 
we have the option of not deploying the codes of bodily meaning through which 
our understanding has been constructed. Shivers is an attack on whiteness that 
issues from within whiteness and which must therefore necessarily conceive of the 
destruction of whiteness in the very racialized terms that produce blackness as 
horrific. At the same time as indicating so clearly the limitations of such a project in 
terms of its construction of the meanings of race, it still illustrates the possibility of 
deploying a given understanding of the body against itself. From within the white 
body's horror of its racial other, come the possibilities of grasping at the horrific 
force of whiteness itself 
But the full scope 
- 
and the even fuller limitations 
- 
of such a critique will 
only emerge if we recognise that race never takes place on its own. I want also to 
argue that the film enables us to extend this brief account of racial dynamics into 
new areas, . as an important reminder that the body is always a nexus of interests, 
rather than only ever serving one type of power relation. 
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(iv) Hobbes's Bodies, or: Why Are White People So Afraid of 
Shopping ? 
Although, as I have stressed, `the body' must always be treated as a 
particular body, what we see in Shivers is that it is also the case that any given body 
is hauntcd by the possibility that other forms of body might manifest through it. The 
white body's fear of becoming black suggests a bodily mutability, in which the flesh 
is open to sudden transformations. And I mean this not only in the sense that the 
meaning of these bodies changes, but also that their physical form alters: their 
behaviours and postures, their voices and pleasures. The figuring of the invasion of 
the parasite grounds these alterations in the biology of the body 
- 
an act which does 
not simply make the body a metaphor for other social relations (such as race), but 
reminds us that it is through the regulated materiality of bodies that these 
differences are maintained. 
This would concur with my reading of embodiment in chapters one and 
two: the form of an achieved body is maintained through a process of both psychic 
identifications and physical states, which are never final or conclusive. We might 
say that the body image is only ever a commitment to the embodiment of an ideal, 
whose maintenance over time is never guaranteed. We must then consider the 
child's jubilant grasp at the mirror as a position that is always under threat, and 
which seeks constantly to renew itself through environments that facilitate the re- 
routing of bodily activity through socially sanctioned forms. ` Chaos' is not an 
object with invariant features 
- 
any more than is ` disgust' 
- 
but is rather the 
particular type of chaos or disgust needed to sustain a particular type of social and 
bodily order. 
In-the face of such claims, Cronenberg_'s figuration of the-parasites as a 
purely bodily phenomenon, who replace the socially limited forms of desire with a 
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more expansive biological lust, might seem like a regressive step which attempts to 
escape tie socialized condition of desire by dreaming of a purely biological desire 
uncontaminated by the social. But in spite of the weight of the coding of the racial 
atavism of these bodies, Cronenberg's text pushes in other directions as well which 
take the film beyond a simple celebration of the rescuing of whiteness from itself 
through bodily joy. As I have already suggested, the biology of the parasites 
operates as a reminder of the human biology through which social norms are 
incarnated. But they are also an artificial biology, engineered in Hobbes's 
laboratory, a reminder that the body is not given, but is manufactured. When he 
describes Hobbes, Rollo tells us that `he had a genius for one thing, and that was 
getting grants'. Hobbes makes spurious research applications, so that he can live on 
small grants from wealthy companies, a description which is very close to that of 
the paraýites which he is developing 
- 
as Rollo says: `it takes a little blood for itself 
once in 4 while 
- 
what do you care ? You got enough 
- 
you can afford to be 
generous'. 
We can therefore see the parasites not simply as enabling a reclamation of 
the natufal, but rather as an expression of Hobbes's own location - his parasitic 
location within the bodies of other institutions. As such they constitute not a return 
to natural material, but rather the imposition of a particular conception of the body. 
This coercive element of bodily becoming is confirmed when, as Forsythe narrates 
her dreafn, she duplicates the violence of Hobbes's own journals: both the old man 
who instructs her, and the words that she attempts to impress on St Luc, make a 
claim on what the body is, offer an assertion of how it should behave, and deliver 
an analysis of its biology. The pedagogical and authoritarian tones of both 
proclamations ('Man is an animal who thinks too much', `He tells me that even old 
flesh is erotic flesh 
... 
And I believe him' ) highlight the power relations at work 
through the language: these are not simply descriptions, but attempts at conversion. 
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Ejsthe dream is realised in the form of her attempt to infect St Luc, the violence of 
the attempt is suddenly made visible. 
It therefore seems that alongside a narrative of regression, and the return to 
nature, there is a narrative of artifice, production and technology 
- 
in which the 
biological changes are not the unleashing of a natural predisposition, but acts of 
enforced cultural change. "' While it might seem as though Cronenberg's vision 
deploys a vision of the white body as overcivilized, and in need of a (racialized) 
regression, Shivers also offers an account of the body as that which is always the 
target of cultural pressures, from which some pure bodily state can never be 
rescued. I want to argue that if we pursue this thread, we must think again about 
the architecture of Starliner Towers, and think again about how the body seems to 
be constructed by this space. 
Cronenberg's own account of the building is suggestive here. Speaking of 
the experience of making Shivers, he tells an interviewer: `Living on Nuns' Island 
we all wanted to rip that place apart and run, naked, screaming through the halls' 
(Rodley, Cronenberg on Cronenberg, p. 50). Such a desire seems, I suggested at 
the start of this chapter, to be antithetical to the environment. As in Foucault's 
account pf the prison, it is the revolt of the body against the materiality that it 
encounters. But as I suggested there, resistance is not simply some spontaneous 
bodily force that challenges repression. Rather, resistance is always an exercise of 
power enabled by the situation which is resisted. It may therefore also be that the 
desire to transgress the environment is itself produced 
- 
not simply by some 
external force opposed to that environment, but by the very contours of that 




scientific experiments on women's bodies result in consequences that 
have much more to do with the female body as a site of disgust than with male 
science as a source of horror' (Lianne McLarty, ' "Beyond the Veil of the Flesh": 
Cronenberg and the Disembodiment of Horror', p. 236). 
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apparently lifeless domain, a point suggested by another account he offers: `I lived 
there when I was doing the film, as did most of the crew, and it drove us crazy. It's 
a totally planned, sterile environment' (David Chute ` He Came From Within', p. 37, 
emphasis in the original). The syntax suggests the possibility that the physical 
exuberance of the crew is not simply a resistance to the place, but is generated by 
that place, so that the environment plays an active part in the process by which `it 
drove us crazy'. Just as the prison produces delinquency, perhaps we might see 
Starliner Towers as producing sexual anarchy. This is of course to read against the 
narrativ of the film, in which the sexual change is the product of the parasites. But 
there is more than enough evidence to suggest that the film connects this sexual 
revolt to the very materiality of the apparently repressive structure, so that in its 
contoured geographies Starliner Tower produces erotic bodies even as it restrains 
them. That is to say, chaos is produced and positively invested by the process of 
ordering. 
While it may indeed be ` planned' and `sterile', the environment of Starliner 
Towers is more ambiguously coded in the film. As Nick leaves his apartment he 
goes to the lift, a location which serves as a convenient alibi for his visit to Annabel 
since in its sheer multiplicity of stops the other occupants of the lift cannot know 
which floor he is going to. When Brad Parkins goes to the doctor and informs him 
that he too has been having an affair with Annabel, the first image is a momentary 
flashbacý to her door, its sudden redness marking her sexualized habitation at the 
centre of a network of affairs enabled by the anonymity of the block. The proximity 
of the residents thus facilitates the illicit erotic liaisons amongst them, which are 
already functioning extremely effectively before the arrival of the parasites. 
boon these spaces will become more explicitly sexualized, as encounters 
take place-in the. territories which they make available. The gym lockers become a 
sexual maze in which bodies are entangled by the opening and closing of doors, and 
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limbs push through the wooden slats. The plush red carpets mark a blood-like trail 
throughout the building. The swimming pool becomes a place of sensual pleasure, 
the white floors a place on which bodies may stretch and writhe. As the camera 
ceases its static framing of the block, it winds up staircases and peers around 
corners, so that we now see that this is an architecture that incites. The camera 
reworks the corridors that were formerly places of containment into zones of 
incitement: potentials for voyeurism emerge through the peepholes in the doors; the 
lift is an erotic space that confines people too closely together; the manager's office 
becomes the ideal place for an orgy. 
"Vhile we could read these actions of the residents, and interventions of the 
camera, as subversions of the intended use of the environment, it is as important to 
consider how the desires played out in these spaces act also as the bodily form 
demanded by these spaces. Violent desire is here not the return of the repressed, 
but a copsequence of the environment which is in some way necessary to its 
function, so that Hobbes's parasites, rather than introducing an alien element into 
the territory, are in fact the narrative alibi for the film to expose the eroticism which 
already proliferates in the bodies that inhabit such a geography. That the 
geography of Starliner Towers is already one of desire suggests that bodily pleasure 
is not simply an envied absence, but rather a structural requirement. So while at one 
level the film marks the absolute transformation of the residents, at another it 
merely recounts the elaboration of the logic that already defined their lives. 
This is a possibility that the film offers us in its opening sequence, a series of 
slides advertising Starliner Towers. Over them we hear the voice of the manager, 
Merrick, inviting the viewer with an ever-increasing spectacle of pleasure and 
utility, the slides becoming slightly faster towards the end of the sequence as even 
more recreational possibilities are proffered: a shop; a restaurant; a golf course. 
Earlier, I suggested that these were spaces without bodies, emblematic of the 
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expulsio1 of carnality from the building. But now I want to read them as objects 
displayed in order to incite the body. 30 For while Merrick's voice is calm, 
reassuring, and benevolent, the logic of consumption also provokes a more 
ambivalcnt response. Writing in 1958, John Galbraith gave the following account of 
capitalism: 
Were it so that a man on arising each morning was assailed by demons 
which instilled in him a passion sometimes for silk shirts, sometimes for 
kitchenware, sometimes for chamber pots, sometimes for orange squash, 
there would be every reason to applaud the effort to find the goods, 
however odd, that quenched his flame. But should it be that his passion was 
the result of his first having cultivated the demons, and should it also be that 
his effort-to allay it stirred the- demons to even greater and greater effort, 
there would be question as to how rational was his solution. Unless 
restrained by conventional attitudes, he might wonder if the solution lay 
with more goods or fewer demons 
So it is that if production creates the wants it seeks to satisfy, or if 
the wants emerge pari passu with the production, then the urgency of the 
wants can no longer be used to defend the urgency of the production. (The 
Affluent Society, p. 127) 
Galbraiti figures consumption as a demonic presence, produced and installed 
within tke subject, and figured as a series of bodily desires: the hunger of the skin 
for silk, of the bowels for a chamber pot, of the mouth for orange squash. 
Capitalism is here experienced as a corporeal phenomenon 
- 
the body's immediate 
desire for pleasure. The very calmness of Merrick's voice is then a duplicitous 
disavowal of the frenzy that the slideshow both constitutes and evokes. 
Consumers, as Toby Miller has argued, constitute a point of some concern 
in liberal social theory because of their production as 
-subjects who desire, . and who 
consequently are consumed by passions that defy altruism in favour of self- 
30 The possibility of reading the slide-show as a critique of capitalism is offered in a 
different form by Dana B. Polan, `Eros and Syphilization: The Contemporary 
Horror Film', p. 205. 
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gratification (The Well-Tempered Self, pp. 129-172). Even though, as John O'Neill 
says, Adam Smith and other laissez-faire economists hoped ` that if men would only 
restrict themselves to trading in their private passions, there would result a public 
order more secure than anything church or state could guarantee' (Five Bodies, 
p. 94, emphasis in the original), Marx and Engels's description of competitive 
capitalism as leading into the ` icy water of egotistical calculation' (The Communist 
Manifesto, p. 82) suggests that we should regard consumption rather as the 
province of rapacity and selfishness. At the beginning of the rise of modern 
capitalism, the author of Leviathan asserted: `a man 
... 
cannot assure the power and 
means to live well, which he bath present, without the acquisition of more' (p. 161). 
He was, of course, Thomas Hobbes, whose name 
- 
as many commentators on the 
film have noted31- chimes conveniently with that of the producer of Cronenberg's 
parasites. If, as I have suggested, Hobbes's parasites should be read as marking a 
presence already active in these inhabitants, which they render graphically visible, 
then perhaps we must understand that presence not only as a racially stigmatized 
sexuality, but also as the capitalist impulse to escalating consumption in the name of 
enhanced pleasure. 
As the opening sequence makes clear, the environment of Starliner Towers 
is one of an incitement to pleasure which, for all its apparent disembodied order, is 
in fact directed at the body. Just as the cinematics of a sexualized architecture 
reveal the productivity of the building, so too it reveals the spaces of the building as 
designed to facilitate other forms of immediate bodily gratification: Nick's whiskey 
bottle sits beside his chair, Betts's wine beside her bath. As these bodies reach, 
turn, and move, they encounter at every point the objects of their desire, located in 
a physical space which encourages their expectation for immediacy and pleasure. 
31 See for instance David Sanjek. `Dr Hobbes's Parasites', p. 60; Maurice Yacowar, 
`The Comedy of Cronenberg', pp. 82-83 and `You Shiver Because It's Good', p. 54. 
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The emphasis on the easy access to shops, and the tracking shot of room-service 
with a trolley of food making its way along the corridors, figures bodily appetite as 
the requirement, not the antithesis, of the building. As the waiter walks down the 
corridors, infected residents watch him hungrily through the cracks of their doors, 
and when a door opens and a (sexually) voracious resident attacks him, the moment 
foregroi}nds the bodily hungers by which the lives of the inhabitants have already 
been constructed. They always were ravenous guests awaiting the delivery of 
consumable offerings, and the change of object in question from a body delivering 
meals to a body providing sex involves barely any change in roles 
- 
not least, we 
might think, because the economic pressures that lead to taking such jobs abolish 
the concept of consent every bit as thoroughly as the sexual assault (a point 
foregrounded by the predatory gazes which, even as they pursue him, remind us 
that he always has been situated as the object subservient to their desires). " 
The disgust which we feel at the parasites then fuels the critique of capitalist 
greed. While in my account the film erases any distinction between how these 
subjects are produced by their environment (bourgeois conformists) and how they 
are produced by Hobbes (libidinal anarchists), the potent repugnance of the 
parasites should not be ignored. But what it now enacts is the horror of recognizing 
a physical presence of consumption which is at work generating bodily desires: 
wanting objects of pleasure, missing them, going out and getting them. Janine's 
weeping face as the parasite pushes out of Nick's mouth, Doris Guilbault's shocked 
paralysis as one climbs onto her arm, or the children's disgusted shrieks as one 
crawls from the letter box, are the revulsion that Galbraith voices at the bodily 
needs already imprinted on our consuming bodies. The horror at the openness of 
32 Similarly, when an infected Merrick lures two potential guests into his office for 
sex, we may recall his equally `seductive' 
- 
but, in practice, coercive 
- 
sales pitch to 
which he subjected them earlier. Now, instead of pressurizing a lease onto them, he 
is pressurizing his new commodity, a parasite. 
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the body may then be read as the horror of the ease with which what Galbraith calls 
`demons', but Cronenberg figures as parasites, find their way into a system which, 
for all its border guards and perimeter fences, is in the process of preparing from 
the outset for their residence. 
The bodily metaphors that underwrite such accounts of capitalism 
- 
rapacious, hungry, devouring 
- 
alert us to the racial structuring of capitalist appetite 
as a lapse backwards into the realm of the appetites so that, even as, in Hobbes's 
account, civilization is the guarantee of a movement away from unfettered appetite 
and towards ordered society, we can see, as Terry Eagleton has noted, that such an 
account of `human nature' is in fact a transcoding of the values of nascent 
capitalism (Ideology, pp. 180-181). Thomas Hobbes's racial politics, in which 
civilization must be preserved from a lapse back into barbarism, thus struggles with 
the problem that the social order which it offers as the solution 
- 
the brake on 
aggressive rivalry 
- 
is in fact predicated on the values that ensure such savagery. In 
asking where this bodily anxiety resides, we might therefore rephrase Reid-Pharr's 
question as: what do we think about when we shop ? 
Shivers closes with a series of cars pulling out of the car-park, in which we 
see the new sexual family-units, now calm and satiated, as if leaving after a hard 
day's shopping: first Forsythe and St Luc, united at last; then Betts and Janine; then 
a father and daughter from one of the apartments; then a threesome whose sexes 
are not determinable. As they travel out into Montreal, we hear a radio broadcast 
recounting, from some future vantage point, the attacks that mark their infection of 
the city. The voice-over on the closing scene links back to the voice-over that 
accompanied the opening scene, the slide-show: this last, no less than the first, is 
the parade of the commodities that Starliner Towers offers the world, carrying 
desire into the bodies of others. Capturing consumerism's bodily doubleness as 
both systematic conformity and incitement to desire, the final image of rolling cars 
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reinserts these bodies into the production line as docile products, while the 
soundtrack recounts `a city wide wave of sexual assaults'. They are simultaneously 
products (disgorged by the machine), consumers (who have incorporated the 
parasitic product), producers (whose bodies will generate new parasites 
- 
one for 
every household) and advertisers (carrying desire to those so far untouched): the 
entire economic apparatus is consolidated in their bodies. If now the products have 
become dangerous and shopping is savagery, the point would seem to be that it was 
always like that anyway. Which might go some way to explaining the extraordinary 
change ip the performances of the survivors. No longer shuffling and moaning, they 
are now sedate, unruffled, and driving cars: the characters that we see leaving the 
building are entirely indistinguishable from those who we saw in it at first. " 
Forsythe, a flower tucked behind her ear, even leans over to light St Luc's cigar for 
him, as if the entire experience had never happened, a telling reminder of the 
minimal difference that the parasites make: the unresolved tension at the heart of 
capitalism still haunts the body. 
Even here, the logics of race persist: to reveal capitalism as `barbaric', or as 
`rapaciois' may shift Shivers from being read either as simply racist (a horrified 
depictiop of the white body under threat) or as simply another exercise in a white 
fantasy of joyful regression (whose position is little more than a sophisticated 
version of that perennial white construction of bodily racial otherness: `if only we 
lead their wonderful sense of rhythm'), but it still shifts it only to a satire on white 
culture which nevertheless installs the logics of race. The terms in which libidinal 
capitalism is indicted are still the logics of the perils of appetite, so that Shivers 
operates, like Heart of Darkness revealing only that `we' are as barbaric as `them', 
that the ieart of darkness is still at home 
- 
and thereby ratifies the necessity of the 
33 My thanks to Clare Hemmings and Ann Kaloski for drawing my attention to this. 
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project of civilizing the chaotic even as it indicts it. 34 
However, where the film goes beyond such a reading 
- 
and perhaps this is 
as far beyond such entrenched logics as is possible 
- 
is in its capacity to disarm 
those concepts. If the awful spectacle of barbarism is meant to shock, we are hardly 
able to resist it in the name of civilization, whose precepts have been rendered all 
but indistinguishable from the barbarism that it might oppose. And if we were to 
celebrate libidinal liberation against imposed and repressive order, we can hardly do 
so when such apparent bodily spontaneity has been revealed to be as regulated, 
ordered, and determined as any other bodily state. If the body operates as 
thoroughly in the service of modernity when carnal and rhapsodic, as it did when 
docile and sexless, what purchase is left by which to formulate a critique of either? " 
These ambivalences are not soluble 
- 
they are a modern problematic of the 
body which is hardly likely to be solved here, and I have no intention of offering a 
utopian programme of social policy as if that would do the trick. 36 It therefore 
comes as no surprise that so many writers on Cronenberg should focus on the 
ambivalence of his films, and the difficulty of deciding whether they trace anything 
ý° Such an account of Conrad's text has become fairly widespread. For instance, in 
Terry Eagleton's words: `the "message" of Heart of Darkness is that Western 
civilization is at base as barbarous as African society 
-a viewpoint which disturbs 
imperialist assumptions to the precise degree that it reinforces them' (Criticism and 
Ideologv,. p. 135). For a rebuttal of Eagleton's phrase see Cedric Watts, ` "A 
Bloody Racist": About Achebe's View of Conrad', pp. 203-204. 
3s Readings of Cronenberg's work as distinctively Canadian take this as one of its 
Canadiap features: the recognition that one is already colonized, and can become 
only more like the colonizer in attempting to overthrow its influence. See for 
instance Wood, `Cronenberg: A Dissenting View', p. 126; and Geoff Pevere, 
`Middle of Nowhere: Ontario Movies after 1980', pp. 19 20. 
36 John O'Neill suggests that rapacity is soluble by social policy: a global agreement 
on minimum standards of healthcare-andnutrition(Five Bodies, pp-115-117)- His is 
an entirely sensible political proposition, but the sheer improbability of its being 
implemented reminds us how far away we are from a solution to desire's modern 
incitement. 
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recognisable as progress or liberation, 37when the substance of his critique is to 
disarm tie terms by which to make such claims. We might condemn his constant 
figuration of these conflicts as insoluble, and of the language by which to engage 
with them as irrevocably disarticulated, as an abdication of political engagement in 
favour of resignation. " Instead, I want to suggest that it marks a specific point in 
the current development of a new understanding 
- 
and a new politics 
- 
of the body. 
For we are at the stage where the questioning of Cartesian dualism in favour of 
embodied subjectivity seems only to be offering us new recognitions of the role of 
the material in defining our subjectivity, and therefore only the most precarious 
hold on autonomy, agency, and choice, which all Foucault's claims that `wherever 
there is power, there is resistance' do little to soothe. Yet at the same time the 
beginnings of a more hopeful politics are also there in the very recognition that 
bodies are always artificial. For this is to bring to bodies the possibility of 
transformation, removing them from the ambit of `the natural' or `the given'. A 
social body is precisely a body that speaks to us of our political situation, and which 
can be read in terms of its location within a web of competing strategies of power. 
It is a body which, however much it enmeshes us within these repetitive and 
contradiptory logics, is also the place from which to rework and resist them. In the 
next two chapters I shall argue that Cronenberg also offers us ways of 
reconceptualizing bodily order and bodily disgust which make the meaning of 
resistance more focused and the physical possibilities for the body's deployment of 
power outside domination more explicit. 
37 See for instance Piers Handling, ` A Canadian Cronenberg', P. 113; and 
Christopher Sharrett, ` The Shape of Rage', p. 174. 
38 A reading which would no doubt delight Cronenberg, who is always swift to 
assert that art should have no politics. ` You don't have Politics in the viscera', 
insists Cronenberg (Chris Rodley, Cronenberg on Cronenberg, p. 60); a claim 




Embodying The Fly: 
Carnal Order and Carnal Disorder 
(i) The Meanings of Monstrosity: Cronenberg and Body Horror 
Printed overleaf is the image which perhaps came to define Cronenberg's 
position in horror: a head exploding in Scanners (1980). Although generically 
Cronenberg's science-fiction thriller falls outside the conventional parameters of 
horror, ' this has been described as an image by which `Scanners, alone, could rest 
as the penultimate Body movie' (Philip Brophy, `Horrality 
- 
the Textuality of 
Contemporary Horror Films', p. 8). The mise-en-scene systematically connotes the 
antiseptic order of science and business: men and women sit in suits in a clean 
lecture theatre, their bodies virtually unmoving, their faces expressionless; the grey, 
white and tan shades of the decor provide a featureless backdrop for these 
featureless bodies; the rows of seats offer a geographical order which arranges 
them in a mimicry of their own inner and outer systematicity. But before them the 
head of one man in a suit explodes, scattering blood and brains in slow-motion. 
The sudden screams and movements of the audience break up their order, just as 
the order of an individual body has been broken by the explosion. The body is 
turned inside-out and the matter contained within it is redistributed outside, 
violating the spatial regulations that organise it and becoming a gloriously graphic 
interpretation of Douglas's ` matter out of place'. 
Narratively it does so through the careful rationality of its explanations, the 
avoidance of any single monstrous figure, the sympathy the film shows for its 
outcasts, and the lack of an everyday community under threat; visually it relies on 
bright lighting and camera angles which keep scenes clear and unobstructed, and 
emphasizes the everyday appearance of the scanners; and thematically, as Beard 
notes, its conclusion stresses the optimistic possibility of human perfection through 
technology ('The Visceral Mind', pp. 49-50). Provocatively, Bart Testa suggests 
that all of Cronenberg's work be reclassified as science-fiction rather than horror (`Technology's Body: Cronenberg, Genre and the Canadian Ethos'). 
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Figure 1: Matter Out of Place, 
from Scanners. 
Reproduced from Chris Rodley, Cronenberg on Cronenberg, p. 91. 
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This contrast is repeated by Cronenberg fifteen years later in The Fly. Here 
the scene is the attempted teleportation of a live baboon by scientist Seth Brundle. 
Brundle has attempted to transport the baboon from one matter-transportation 
device ('telepod') to another. As the door of the telepod opens, white mist drifts 
put: it is reminiscent of both steam and dry-ice vapour, thereby simultaneously 
suggesting the purifying effects of both extreme heat and extreme cold. As the mist 
clears, we see the brightly lit white circle of the floor of the telepod: a perfect 
geometric shape, gleaming and clean. In it is the baboon, its body turned inside-out 
by the experiment: a twitching mass of matted flesh and hair. Again, it is watched 
by well-groomed, besuited professionals 
- 
Brundle, and the journalist who 
monitors his experiments, Veronica Quaife. Again, the contrast between the 
respectability of their physical forms and the bloody mess before them suggests a 
pointed reminder of the body matter that lies beneath their skins and their suits. 
On the basis of such scenes, Steven Shaviro has argued that Cronenberg 
seeks to `affirm the impropriety of the real body' (The Cinematic Body, p. 155). 
Examples such as those above certainly demonstrate a cinematic coding of body 
matter as shocking and as intrusive into spaces from which it has been banished, so 
as to shatter an illusory denial of their civilized facade. But rather than assuming 
that such shocking asociality is a given characteristic of what Shaviro calls `the real 
body', we must rather ask how a fiction of the body is constructed along such 
lines, with such a status, and with what results. This language of the superior 
reality of body matter is a familiar one in the discourse of modernity, sitting, as I 
have argued throughout this thesis, in tandem with a dismissal of the importance of 
the body. Attempts to undo that stress on the transcendence, remodelling, or 
control pf the power of raw body matter, are nevertheless still obliged to rework 
these terns, with the result that an affirmation of the legitimacy or potency of a 
disorderly body, such as Shaviro's, still relies on a fiction of its biological facticity. 
In attempting to rework their relationship to the need for transcendence - which is 
itself the origin of the definition of the body as so `real' 
- 
significant elements of its 
logic remain in place. How successful are such attempts ? What are the 
consequences of attempting to `affirm' the body, when the notion of the body as a 
pressing reality has historically been bound up with its denigration? In order to 
understand the relationship between these questions and Cronenberg's work we 
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must situate his films within one recent appearance of this problem: the genre of 
body horror. 2 
In asking how we might analyse a genre, Stephen Neale insists that we 
must consider not only the more traditional concerns of its distinctive iconography 
and narrative, but also the economic value of genre as a marketing device, the 
particular pleasures made available for the spectator, the expectations of audience 
and reviewers, and the impact of technological change (Genre). This is a lengthy 
list and it would be foolish to privilege any one of these areas. Therefore, before 
offering my analysis of one particular feature of this genre 
- 
that of body horror's 
roots in a discourse of the body's alterity, and its particular inflection of that 
discourse in Cronenberg 
-I wish to outline two other important criteria by which 
we might specify the nature, and account for the rise, of what Peter Boss has 
described as `a genre presently devoted to the construction of explicit and detailed 





anatomy' ('Death, Disintegration of the Body and Subjectivity 
in the Contemporary Horror Film', p. 49). I will therefore briefly consider firstly the 
economic conditions that facilitated the emergence of body horror and secondly 
the role of new audience expectations in securing its existence. 
Gareth Sansom and Peter Boss have both convincingly argued that body 
horror should be seen not as a development out of the mainstream horror traditions 
of the 1930s 
- 
such as Universal Studios' cycle of Frankenstein and Dracula films 
- 
but ratier as the co-option of techniques and images from so-called `exploitation 
cinema'. Faced with the decline in audience figures over the 1950s, major 
Hollywood studios responded by `having to transform their strategies for audience 
construction which had been oriented by the concept of a homogeneous audience 
toward a strategy for capturing a more heterogeneous set of specialized audiences' 
(Sansom, `Fangoric Horrality: The Subject and Ontological Horror in a 
2A more complete account of Cronenberg's relationship to the genre would also 
encompass his films The Brood and Videodrome. 
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p 
Contemporary Cinematic Sub-genre', p. 165). One element of this strategy was to 
draw on the audience that had built up around `exploitation cinema', those cycles 
of quickly made low-budget films produced by the small companies outside the 
Hollywood studio system, capitalizing on events that held current public interest 
(such as notorious crimes or currently debated social issues), and whose material 
was regarded as sensationalist or tasteless ('Fangoric Horrality', pp. 163-165). As 
Boss observes `unlike the restraint and frequent concern for good taste which 
accompanies much early horror, the exploitation market relied heavily upon the 
promise of precisely the most disreputable and lurid elements of the genre' 
('Death, Disintegration of the Body and Subjectivity', p. 46). But as the audience 
for the graphic imagery of exploitation cinema consolidated around these products, 
they provided a niche market with a guaranteed return for the investment of larger 
studios, who then also came to produce films containing the elements that would 
be consumed by this specialist audience. What we might call the ` apparatus' of 
body horror thus originates with these earlier cinematic texts, before moving 
through a series of groups of films which consolidate and rework its significance. 
Firstly the lurid low-budget films of the sixties, such as Blood Feast (1963) and 
Two Thousand Maniacs I (1964), in which narratives serve primarily as contexts to 
enable the depiction of bodily violation; then films like The Texas Chainsaw 
Massacre (1974) and Last House on the Left (1972) in the seventies which rapidly 
develop a new special effects technology which facilitates the representation of the 
abject body, and which in turn give rise to products like Videodrome and 
Poltergeist (1982), which are situated between the two sets of conditions of 
production, taking advantage of both new technologies of the depiction of the 
body and their audience, but without heavy backing from major investors. Finally, 
even as low-budget body-horror persists, its imagery, its technology and, crucially, 
its audience, are incorporated into heavily marketed high-budget films like Alien 
(1979), Gremlins (1984), or Seven (1995). For both Boss and Sansom, the formal 
features of body horror must be understood as deriving from a distinctive 
293 
al 
economical and historical form whose elements have now come to dominate 
contemporary horror 
- 
to the extent, I would suggest, that `body horror' as a 
distinctive genre in fact no longer exists: rather, an apparatus of repulsive carnality 
now defines horror as a genre, such that it is no longer possible to think of the 
existence of a horror film without its requisite moment of the body's graphic 
display. 
In preference over `body horror', Sansom coins his own term ` fangoric 
horrality' as a description of the graphic textuality of films consumed by these 
specialist audiences. He derives it from the title of the horror film magazine 
Fangor f a, since he wishes to stress that we can understand the genre only by 
reference to its particular audience, and not simply by reference to its formal 
features. Similarly, Boss insists that what marks these films is ` a reading context, a 





Pink Floyd., The Wall 
... 
based around the imagery of the body's destruction' 
(`Death, Disintegration of the Body and Subjectivity', p. 52). 3 This hermeneutic is 
articulated in a range of magazines 
- 
from the glossy Fangoria and Samhain, to the 
often short-lived horror fanzine? 
- 
which focus specifically on the technology, the 
imagery, and, perhaps most importantly, on the emotional impact of seeing what 
Sansom refers to as `the transformation of the body into flesh' (p. 167), by which 
he means the graphic on-screen transformation of an integral body into substances 
such as J, lood, bones, mucus, and vomit. This emotional response combines both 
an intense physical revulsion, and a distancing humour, both of which are mediated 
through the pleasure of familiarity. The iconic status that Brophy accords the 
The Wild Bunch (1969) constitutes a point of debate in what is distinctive about 
body horror. While Sansom excludes it from his category of `fangoric horrality' 
on the basis of its lack of other relevant narrative features, Boss's account clearly 
places the focus on the audience. Edward Lowry offers an interesting intervention 
in this debate, by suggesting that horror should be seen not as a genre, but as a 
mode of enunciation which may be deployed in any one of a number of other 
genres ('Genre and Enunciation: The Case of Horror'). 
4 See David Sanjek, `Fans' Notes: The Horror Film Fanzine'. 
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explodi3g head in Scanners evinces precisely this mixture of familiarity, pleasure 
and disgust which marks body horror's horizon of reception. 
Brophy, Boss and Sansom all stress the visibility of bodily destruction in 
these films, but the genre's focus on the body goes much further than that. I would 
argue that the emphasis is rather on abject carnal matter, which need be neither 
human i}or destroyed or damaged in order to be an object of disgust (for instance, 
the creature in Alien or the parasites in Shivers). ' I would therefore want to extend 
their account of how the violation of the human body is depicted into an analysis 
of how the materiality of the body is figured as shockingly inappropriate for social 
spaces because of its disorderly organic substance. It is the meaning of this organic 
matter that interests me here. Therefore, while I do not wish to downplay the 
significance of these other considerations in locating where and how the meaning 
of this imagery is negotiated, my interest here in body horror focuses on two 
particular textual features: an imagery of the human body as disgusting and 
disordered in its carnality which links it to other non-human bodies, and the 
figuring of that body as the site of the collapse of culture into barbarism. It is this 
second device in particular that concerns me here: what concept of embodiment is 
achieved by the figuration of the body as improper and as antithetical to culture ? 
Towards the end of Tom Savini's 1990 remake of George Romero's Night 
of the Living Dead (1968), Barbara, a survivor of a house besieged by zombies, 
finds herself in a camp of zombie hunters. Part of an American survivalist response 
to the zombie hordes, they have turned their undead enemies into sources of 
pleasure. As Barbara looks around the camp she sees first a wrestling match, 
where drunken heavy-metal fans cheer on a competition between one of their 
number and a lurching zombie (although at first it looks as though it might be two 
zombies 
-a doubling which is crucial). She then sees a row of thrashing zombies 
hanging from a tree by their legs and necks, and set up as target practice for the 
' For an account of the depiction of living grotesque bodies in horror, see Michael 
O'Pray, `Carnival Time: Cinema, Society and the Body Business'. 
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survivalists. As bullets and arrows send the animated corpses jerking, they do not 
die, but go on providing moving targets which will survive indefinitely. Turning to 
face the camera, Barbara says: `they're us'. And then, just in case we might have 
missed it, she repeats the line: `we're them and they're us'. Two of the survivalists 
look at her in disbelief and laugh. 
At this moment, the film repeats an established critical position on the 
contemporary horror film 
- 
that it is concerned with eroding the difference between 
the monstrous and the human, and exposing their shared identity. In her article 
`Aliens', a reading of Alien and its sequel Aliens (1986), Jane Goodall notes 
horror's abiding concern with a struggle to keep a monster out of a sealed space. 
Locked doors, bolted windows and barricades are stock features of horror 
- 
from 
the locked bathroom door Jack Nicholson smashes open in The Shining (1980), or 
the boarded windows in Night of the Living Dead, to the electronically coded 
doors of the Alien series. The terror of the film resides in the question: can the 
monster be kept out ? But, notes Goodall, this obsession with locks, welded 
barricades, and electronic keycards is rendered ineffectual by a series of affinities 
between the aliens and those who are trying to keep them out. These affinities 
include the shared egg-like structures out of which both crew and alien hatch in 
Alien, the carapace-like exoskeleton which Ripley wears in Aliens, and, most 
importantly, the shared qualities of the aliens and the company which employs 
these characters: a ruthless, devouring approach to the world, in which all subjects 
are simply means to their final end. Goodall suggests that the deeper horror of the 
film is therefore that `seals, barriers, systems and structures cannot keep out the 
vampires within' (p. 81): for all the array of monitoring equipment which attempts 
to mark out, and separate us from, the monstrous, it exists all the time inside the 
human. In such a reading the barrier between self and other is always already 
breached, making a mockery of any other barriers that might be constructed. 
Goodall is not the only writer to offer such an account of horror - we have 
already considered Robin Wood's claim that in horror we see a return of the 
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repressed. But we might also consider Stephen Prince, who argues that by 
problematizing this line of difference, horror has ` a profoundly conserving, rather 
than radical function', whose goal is to ask `the persistent question of what must 
be done to remain human' ('Dread, Taboo, and The Thing', p. 28). For Prince, 
horror Hereby invites the audience to make an effort to reaffirm the collective 
values of their culture in order to restabilize the line that is shown to be under 
threat. Or we might think of Barbara Creed's argument that horror replays a primal 
psychic fear of the body matter that we must break away from in order to become 
conscious subjects (The Monstrous-Feminine). For Creed, the abject matter of 
horror films is the reminder that our bodies too are made of such matter, try as we 
might to forget it. Like Barbara in the camp of the barbarians, these arguments all 
claim that: `They're us and we're them'. 6 
The ability of horror to absorb and redeploy the critical apparatus directed 
at it, as demonstrated by Savini's film, is hardly new 
- 
and Wes Craven's recent 
attempts to push horror towards the most relentless self-referentiality in Scream 
(1996) and Scream 2 (1997) are only the most visible expressions of a recurrent 
trend. But this might also make us pause to reconsider this sense of `us as them', 
given that while this notion of the erosion of difference has hitherto been viewed as 
the final hidden and horrifying truth to be wrested from the text by its critics, it 
6 Along similar lines Andrew Tudor distinguishes between what he terms `secure' 
and `paranoid' horror on the basis that in paranoid horror `the disordering 
unknown [is] often located deep within the commonplace ` (Monsters and Mad 
Scientists, p. 215). In her thesis `A Cultural Analysis of the Horror Film as Genre' 
Isabel Pinedo argues that there has been an erosion of the barriers between human 
and monster in post-1960s horror. She lists such features as: the rise of the 
popularity of the psychotic human as monster (monstrosity located within 
seemingly normal people); the failure of expert knowledge to resolve threats; an 
avoidance of narrative closure; monstrosity as a function of, rather than an 
exception to, the status quo. She argues that: `as the genre draws further into the 
present, the narrative categories and binary differences (like normal/abnormal) 
become increasingly indistinct and interchangeable' (p. 50). For similar arguments 
see also Mary Campbell, ` Biological Alchemy and the Films of David Cronenberg'; 
and Dana Polan, ` Eros and Syphilization: The Contemporary Horror Film'. 
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now seems to be the self-knowing manifest content of the horror genre. ' Rather 
than viewing these claims as a final resting point of an analysis, should we not 
consider this entire trope rather as the symptom of a wider, unanalyzed discourse, 
which constructs both the horror genre and the work of its critics ? 
If the structural principle of body horror is this erasure of a barrier, then the 
image by which this barrier is both installed and breached is the body 
- 
usually the 
human body but, as Boss says, not always. Sansom calls these moment of bodily 
impropriety ` the body to flesh transformation', a phrase that makes clear the 
implicit logic behind these films: the body is not the flesh, and the flesh is not the 
body. Op the one hand there is that unified whole, the body, with its demarcated 
social functions; on the other there is the flesh, disordered matter which threatens 
the stability of the spaces which depend upon the body that is composed of just 
such matter. And yet Sansom's language also indicates the uneasiness of this 
process: can there ever be a body which is not also flesh ? Is the possibility of 
becoming flesh not always present in the body ? As Laura Doyle argues, the 
attempt to assert a civilized subjectivity by ordering the flesh, leads to a need to 
erase the body altogether, with the result that `disembodiment seems preferable to 
mastered embodiment' (Bordering on the Body, p. 33), because mastery is always 
threatened by failure. 
If we try to specify what qualities `flesh' in Sansom's sense possesses, we 
might begin by looking at Alien, `the film in which the body invades the pristine 
and sexless rational spaces of the science fiction film' (Scott Bukatman, Terminal 
Identity, p. 267, emphasis in the original). The two attributes which make the alien 
7A theme treated with particularly offensive conservatism in The 'burbs (1988). 
There, white American suburban householders persecute Eastern European 
neighbours in the belief that they are a family of cannibals. Initially `proved' 
mistaken, the white Americans are arrested by the police and intone the regulation 
litany: `It's not them who are the monsters 
- 
it's us'. And yet, warding off this 
indictment of the racism and masculinist aggression of middle-America, in the final 
minutes of the film the suburban residents turn out to be right: the disabled, non- 
English speaking, older East Europeans are indeed cannibals - we are not, after all, 
them; we are us, and they should clearly be imprisoned or deported. 
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an object of terror are its instinctuality (it is dangerous because its only concern is 
to hunt, eat and reproduce) and its organic substance (its claws, the saliva that runs 
from its mouth, its acidic blood, the double rows of teeth in its mouth). Both 
attributes focus our attention on its body as an object that cannot be 
accommodated within the ordered (technological, corporate, domestic) space of 
the starship Nostromo, whose functioning the creature disrupts. However, as 
Goodall points out, these attributes are then repeated by the company that employs 
the crew, and sends them to their death: the Company too is instinctual in its goals 
(greedy, unfeeling, ruthless) and biological by virtue of its products (the ship, with 
its vein-}ike corridor; the android Ash, with his bubbling milky inner organs). As 
Goodall says: `the technological forms and functions we witness schematically 
duplicate the alien manifestations that instil such terror' ('Aliens', p. 77). 
The language of Goodall's analysis reveals that underlying this anxiety 
about the untamed body is its barbarism. Describing the resemblance of the 
Company to the alien in Alien, she says that : `it is the devouring principle that 
drives man [sic] into ever-expanding technological conquests and impels him to try 
and harxess the energy of his savage double' (p. 81). Goodall's point would seem 
to be that it is ` man' who is the `savage', and whose dangerous body (`the 
devouring principle') is denied, while it in fact motivates `his' behaviour. Tied to 
the material alterity represented by the alien body is a moral alterity: because flesh 
is a form of matter that is antithetical to civilization, it also represents a mode of 
behaviour that is uncivilized or barbaric 
- 
the behaviour of a savage. Exemplifying 
such a reading of horror, Christopher Sharrett defines the thrust of the modem 
horror film as a depiction of `society's return to barbarism' (`Apocalypticism in the 
Contemporary Horror Film' p. 56). 8 
Thus, like Wood, these explorations 
- 
critical and cinematic - of horror 
circle around the assertion of an unsettling truth that is denied: that supposedly 
$ The racialized logics of such a position might be explored further, as a way of 
developing the arguments about whiteness from the preceding chapter. 
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bodiless culture is in fact embodied. For what constitutes the (falsely asserted) 
difference between `us' and `them' is that `they' are supposedly material while 
`we' have supposedly transcended our body matter in order to become cultured. 
Wood's position is, as we have seen, to celebrate this recognition that `they' are 
`us' as a rapprochement with those aspects of self and the social order that have 
been abjected, while Goodall and Prince dread the possibility that `we' could turn 
into `them' and see the horror film as the location of a resistance to such a 
transformation. Nevertheless, in all these cases the denial of difference 
- 
the claim 
that `we' are turning into `them' 
- 
sustains the notion that the two are somehow 
potentially radically separate since it appeals to the fantasy of an uncontaminated 
`us' acting as a benchmark by which to makes such judgements. Such a logic of 
difference operates strongly even as, ironically, the claim seems to be asserting that 
the two are in fact identical. The possibility of identifying that difference itself 
assumes a capacity to rise above it, one recognized in the identificatory process of 
these films 
- 
so that as Ripley destroys the corporate wealth of the Nostromo in 
Alien, or Barbara surveys the survivalist camp in Night of the Living Dead, these 
films offer the critics the detached position from which they may, with the 
characters, make such a judgement. The visual separation of the witness from the 
scene which they survey, and their explicit disengagement from those on whom 
they pass judgement, preserves the possibility of transcendence: we may be them, 
but some of us may also choose not to be them. That is 
- 
some of us may keep 
control Aver our bodies. " 
But Savini's Night Of the Living Dead also offers a critical purchase on 
this account of the body, for Barbara's statement is spoken precisely in the context 
where the film's mise-en-scene also visibly disputes it: the survivalist camp. Here 
we see a whole range of activities which, while she reads some of them as 
9And, we may note, both spectators are women: if materiality is itself coded 
feminine, then Ripley and Barbara become protagonists only by triumphing over 
their own bodies, disavowed in the abject bodies on which they gaze. 
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if ' 
signifying our identity with the zombies, might also be read to signal our 
difference. The humans are using guns, radios and tools 
- 
whereas the zombies 
never use implements or technology, only their bodies. The humans have a social 
structure, marked out by sheriff's badges on some of the survivalists 
- 
the zombies 
have no structure, they are an undifferentiated mass. The wrestling ring within 
which human and zombie seem to resemble one another is itself a proof of a 
capacity, not just for technology, but also for humour, which the zombies lack. The 
humans are shown in heterosexual relationships at several points 
- 
the zombies 
have no sexuality and no relationships. And, crucially, there is a shot of a pig being 
spit-roasted: within Barbara's gaze, which locates human/zombie commonalities, 
this roast meat recalls the zombies feasting on roast meat earlier 
- 
namely the 
charred remains of two humans trapped inside a car which exploded. But while 
there are affinities between the acts there are also crucial differences 
- 
for while the 
humans actively select and deliberately cook their meat, for the zombies the 
cooked flesh is purely accidental: they usually eat flesh raw. And it is perhaps 
around the raw and the cooked that all the differences cluster: the zombies are 
asocial, ßcultural, atechnical 
- 
the humans are social, cultural, and technical; the 
humans are rational, the zombies instinctual; the humans have minds, the zombies 
have bodies. Even Barbara's final, purely vindictive, shooting of an erstwhile 
companion, which in the ` we're them' reading would function as the sign of her 
own descent into zombie-like barbarism, is rather, I suggest, indicative of a 
complex network of emotions which the zombies never exhibit. 
Commenting on Romero's 1968 original, Isabel Pinedo has stated that 
humans `take on the function of marauders, killing indiscriminately, virtually 
indistinguishable from the zombies' ('A Cultural Analysis of the Horror Film as 
Genre', p. 37). But that `virtually' marks the attempt to deal with the difference 
between the two groups by erasing it altogether. Barbara's claim - like Pinedo's, 
like Creed's, like Goodall's 
- 
thus overestimates the similarity, and thereby 
exempts the processes of acculturation from analysis. In doing so it deprives us of 
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an analysis which would chart where and how these various aggressive behaviours 
were formed, since it imputes all of them to an essential bodily violence. Its 
apocalyptic vision of an irredeemably `zombified' humanity 
- 
while operating as a 
salutary critique of capitalism, masculinity, and racism10 
- 
erases the specific 
processes through which culture produces those behaviours which are here 
imagined as acultural. Rather than attending to the different routes by which these 
aggressively cultural practices come about, it maps a division between the social 
and the asocial onto two types of body, the orderly and the disorderly (or, in 
Sansom's terms, ` the body' and `the flesh'), and then projects all that is destructive 
back onto the asocial body, imagined as always ready to break through the veneer 
of civilization. 
We need to consider how the idea of an uncivilized body operates in these 
texts, and I want to focus here on these two important features of this discourse of 
the horrific body. Firstly, it occludes the fact that these destructive behaviours are 
in fact culturally specific forms, rather than buried instincts which resurface. Unlike 
Goodall I read the creature in Alien not as the revelation of some savage instinct 
that propels corporate technology, but rather as the doubling of an entirely cultural 
set of practices, a corporate rapacity which is only naturalized by the film's 
rendering it in the form of an instinctual, organic creature. Secondly, in figuring 
bodily disorder as asocial, these accounts ignore the ways in which the experience 
of bodily disorder is in fact not originary, but is rather an effect of the process of 
the body's inscription by culture, as we are made to experience various socially 
produced bodily states as disorderly. What is at stake in denying the difference 
between human and monstrous are the specificities by which culture works to 
produce the body, so that in their place is the Hobbesian notion that we are all 
material flesh, acting out barbaric desires, and in need of order: in need, that is, of 
10 As George Romero's original trilogy 
- 
Night of the Living Dead, Dawn of the 
Dead (1979) and Day of the Dead (1985) 
- 
does so insistently. See Richard Dyer, 
`White', pp. 157-160. 
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II 
having our `flesh' turned back into `body'. But there is no natural body buried 
beneath civilization 
- 
rather the apparently disordered body which requires mastery 
is produced by culture in order to legitimate control over it. Where Creed and 





of disordered flesh is already central to practices of 
domination. 
These different ways in which the body is used to represent benign liberated 
instincts (Wood) or the barbarism of culture (Goodall) should remind us that abject 
flesh may be used to represent different sorts of `monstrosity' 
- 
it is important not 
to assume it always has only one meaning. However, what particularly interests me 
here is the way that bodily disorder comes, in all these accounts, to mean the 
absolute displacement of culture. When Barbara declares `they're us', she does not 
mean that the zombies have taken up reading and writing, but rather that humans 
have been revealed as stupid and barbaric. While the precise meaning of that 
barbarism may be inflected differently to suit the particular ideological agendas of 
the critics who identify it 
- 
barbarism as US militarism; barbarism as masculinist 
aggression; barbarism as white supremacy; barbarism as instinctual emotion 
- 
it is 
important to recognize the affinities in these different meanings: they all figure the 
carnality of the body as that which culture tries, but fails, to transcend. They 
deploy a language in which the body is a materiality which is incompatible with 
culture, and which represents a state of instinct and barbarism back to which we 
may at any minute to regress. " The pointed dismissal of the difference that culture 
makes 
- 
as witnessed by the activities in the survivalist camp 
- 
is then to insist that 
it in fact makes no difference: culture is only ever a thin veneer over an unruly and 
natural materiality. In a sense then, these various texts 
- 
and body horror itself - all 
share in that modem project: to constitute a notion of `the body' as that which we 
" For readings of horror as effecting a necessary repression of unruly desire see 
James B. Twitchell, Dreadful Pleasures: An Anatomy of Modern Horror; Leonard 
G. Heldreth, ` The Beast Within: Sexuality and Metamorphosis in Horror Films'; 
and David J. Hogan, Dark Romance: Sexuality in the Horror Film. 
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must transcend, and to affirm the existence of a bodily order that is itself 
untouched by culture. Against this, I shall suggest that we might also discern in 
body horror an alternative discourse about the body, which I have suggested in my 
reading of Savini's Night of the Living Dead and which I hope to elaborate upon in 
this chapter: one which suggests a more precise indication of where and how those 
thoroughly cultural practices came about which we here see posed as barbaric 
- 
and how, and in whose interests, they come to be offered to us to read as 
aculturally corporeal. " 
In understanding body horror we must therefore consider its dependence 
on the notion of the body as an object that is incompatible with culture, and only 
ever precariously socialized. The sudden splattering of blood across the conference 
room in Scanners, or the thrashing baboon on the floor of the telepod in The Fly, 
are orchestrated to represent the body as inappropriate, suggesting that it has a 
volatility and a disorder which do not belong in the realm of technology, hygiene, 
and business, but which may be ordered so that it does belong. And the chaotic 
panic of the audience in Scanners, or the subsequent narrative twists of The Fly, 
suggest that the ordered bodies may at any minute regress back to a state more 
closely resembling that of the material bodies which revolt them. 
And this is just how Cronenberg's work has been read, as displaying `an 
insistence on the physical, unknowable, untameable half of the human animal - an 
aspect that lies forever in wait beneath the bland assumptions of control, and the 
airy cerebrations of the conscious mind' (William Beard, ` The Visceral Mind', 
p. 4). As we saw in the last chapter, the idea that it is this mastered body that stages 
a rebellion in Cronenberg's work is a major critical commonplace, with the 
emblematic moment coming in Cronenberg's The Brood where a patient, 
displaying the extraordinary cancerous growth on his neck, declares: `I have a 
'Z In a similar vein, Sumiko Higashi traces the human violence of Romero's original 
to the specific concerns about the behaviour of American soldiers during the 
Vietnam war (`Night of the Living Dead: A Horror Film About the Horrors of the 
Vietnam War'). 
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small revolution on my hands and I'm not putting it down very successfully'. 
The idea that the clean, ordered, civilized body has in fact an unnerving 
proximity to a disordered, messy, barbaric body is hardly specific to body horror, 
and might be read as equally central a theme in Hobbes, St. Augustine or Darwin. 
While I think it is absolutely essential to consider the determining forces of recent 
technology and economic situations on body horror, it is also important to treat it 
as the inflection and modification of a discursive dynamic with much older roots. 
We must thus consider it not only as a historically original form, but also as a form 
of corporeal nostalgia predicated on a strong strain in Western thought: that the 
body poses a threat to civilization, and that unless it is suitably controlled it will 
break the rules that enable a society to function. Bryan Turner describes this 
position as `the argument that there is a fundamental incompatibility between the 
satisfaction of human instinctual needs and the requirements of society' (The Body 
and Society p. 62). Tracing this argument back to Christianity, he links it to such 
modern commentators as Hobbes (for whom without social restraint, life must be 
destructive), Durkheim (for whom without socialization there must be suicide), 
and finally, of course, Freud (for whom without sublimation bodily desire will 
destroy civilization). It is impossible to understand the force of Cronenberg's 
work without understanding this context, as I have outlined it in chapter two. I 
will, however, be arguing here that what makes The Fly such an interesting film to 
study is that it works to undermine these oppositions of instinct and civilization, 
nature and culture, the body and society, by imaging the process of bodily 
disordering as a thoroughly cultural one, which we are invited to reread in a critical 
and sceptical manner, seeing the notion of a naturally disorderly body as a tool of 
political disempowerment. 
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(ii) New Flesh, New Bodies, New Pleasures 
- 
Old Power 
Pasi Falk suggests, following Foucault, that the modem processes of 
power produce new and intense forms of bodily sensation: 
We may even claim that only in modem society has the individualized body, 
with all its restricting networks, been able to enjoy the full scale of sensory 
pleasures in all its richness, be they erotic, gastronomic, visual or 
combinations of all these. (The Consuming Body, p. 65) 
We might think here of Roland Barthes's account of Sade not as a transgressor of 
order, but as the compiler of a regular and orderly grammar of sex acts 
-a kind of 
geometric libertine ` who, through writing, constructs extremely well-made 
novelistic structures that are also erotic structures' ('A Great Rhetorician of Erotic 
Figures', p. 253). " In the rest of this chapter I want to argue that carnality may 
operate as just such an intensified site of pleasure-through-order, but also that this 
does not prevent it from offering a politically effective intervention. 
Brundle, the protagonist of The Fly, begins the film as the very figure of 
the Cartesian scientist 
- 
but he will end it as a geometric libertine. How far, we 
might ask, is the gap between the two ? Brundle is building a teleportation device 
because 
- 
as we are shown 
- 
he is travel sick, and is therefore attempting to 
produce a technology which will circumvent the problems of having a vulnerable 
body. " His project is thus presented as antiseptic, ordered, and disembodied: when 
Ronnie, a journalist documenting his project, opens his cupboard she finds there a 
row of identical suits, one of which he wears every day, his practical determination 
circumventing any considerations of tactile pleasure in favour of the arrangement 
that will least interfere with his thought processes. 
But this failure to account for the body is the flaw in his project: like him, 
An argument that Barthes develops at greater length in his Fourier/Sade/Loyola. 
14 See for instance Allison Graham, `Motion Sickness: Strangers in Our Own 
Dying? '; and Helen Robbins, "'More Human Than I Am Alone" : Womb Envy in 
David Cronenberg's The Fly and Dead Ringers' 
. 
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his machine is unable to understand flesh 
- 
hence the accident with the baboon. " 
Later, he attempts to transport a steak, and cooks it for Ronnie, who tells him that 
`it tastes synthetic', the machine having destroyed what is alive, organic, and carnal 
in it. But when Brundle and Ronnie begin an affair, his newly aroused sexuality 
gives him the capacity to communicate to the computer the experience of the body 
that he has lacked 
- 
the one rediscovery of the body acting as the impetus for the 
other. `I haven't taught the computer to be made crazy by the flesh' he tells 
Ronnie, `I must not know enough about the flesh myself 
- 
I'm going to have to 
learn'. Brundle teaches his new-found body-consciousness to the computer, and 
the machine becomes able to teleport living creatures. 
The film then shifts into a more sustained tone of body horror as Brundle, 
experimenting with the machine, is unwittingly merged with a fly that enters a 
telepod with him. At first he is unaware of the change, but gradually he becomes 
stronger, acquires an appetite for sex and sugar, and eventually begins the physical 
transformation into a human-fly hybrid, a new entity which he nicknames 
`Brundlefly'. Along the lines of thinking which we have seen associated with body 
horror, this transformation is heavily coded as the extension of the rediscovery of 
carnality that begins in his affair with Ronnie: his body grows, it starts to secrete 
new substances 
- 
eventually it splits open and a new body emerges from within, 
pushing aside the old, scientific Brundle to make way for a new, more carnal form. 
The transformation of `body' into `flesh' is also indicated by the social 
markers of race and class. As Andrew Knee has remarked, when Brundle's 
transformation begins he moves from his scientific world and onto the streets, 
heading straight for a working-class bars where he arm-wrestles, and picks up a 
woman whose accent, make-up and sexualized clothing overcodes her class 
"At the same time, in its failure to understand it, the machine may also be seen as 
displaying Brundle's understanding of the flesh: disordered, disturbing, messy. In 
turning the baboon into a carnal mess, it reproduces the form in which he himself 
experiences the body. 
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location ('The Metamorphosis of The Fly', pp. 27-28). 16 This shift marks his 
devolution down from the more ordered forms of bodily matter to the more 
disordered, and therefore the ` natural', allied to the class hierarchy down which he 
travels. It is while he is arm-wrestling in the bar that the film's second moment of 
graphic body horror occurs, when he snaps the wrist of his opponent and the 
fractured bone breaks out through the skin. The working class men of the bar are 
thus linked 
- 
with Brundle and the baboon 
- 
to an intensified, and reviled, carnality. 
So too the link back to the disordered matter of the baboon implicitly locates 
Brundle's change as an evolutionary descent (the first sign of his transformation is 
the growth of thick black hairs), in which Jeff Goldblum's Jewishness 
- 
emphasized 
by having him play a character named Seth 
- 
may play the role of a deployment of 
racist discourse to signify Brundle's predisposition to lapse back into a subjectivity 
more in the thrall of the body. 
And yet it may be through this question of ethnicity that the film also 
reminds us that the horrific body is only ever a body socially designated as horrific 
- 
rather than being inherently so. If it is his name (Seth) which first indicates his 
Jewishness (echoing as it does the Jewishness of the name of the performer, Jeff 
Goldblum), then it is an identity that is marked physically by a series of signifiers 
that have come to be associated with Jewish difference: his prominent nose, dark 
skin, curly black hair and bright staring eyes. The construction of his scenes with 
Ronnie are used to stress this. In bed, the pallor of Ronnie's skin is used to 
accentuate the darkness of Seth's when the two bodies are pressed together; while 
in conversation, the cross-cutting between their faces highlights the fact that her 
equally thick and curly hair is so very like his 
- 
accentuating the connoted 
femininity of the Jewish body. If we take as our touchstone Sander Gihnan's 
16 `The film can barely repress its animosity/fear of the economic others who 
frequent this establishment, using stereotypical representations to suggest they are 
generally unclean, lacking in manners and intelligence, and possessing an 
animalistic sexuality almost commensurate with Brundlefly's' ('The 
Metamorphosis of The Fly', p. 28). 
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seminal text The Jew's Body, we could work through Gilman's series of portraits 
of anti-Semitic discourse and apply each in turn to Brundle: Gilman's ` The Jewish 
Genius' outlines the stereotype of a lonely scientific genius ('an inch away from the 
nobel prize for physics', says Borans) who is nevertheless not really a creator, but 
only a skilful compiler of the work of others (as Brundle points out 
- 
`there's a lot 
of stuff in there I don't even understand. I'm really a systems management man 
-I 
farm bits and pieces out to guys who are much more brilliant than I am 
... 
I just 
stick `em together'); from Gilman's chapter on sexual rapacity and the figure of the 
murderer who preys on the inhabitants of run-down areas precisely because he too 
is degenerate (a figure which Gilman connects to the anti-Semitic representations 
that clustered around Jack the Ripper), we have Seth stalking the streets in search 
of working-class women to take home; and from Gilman's chapter on syphilis, 
Aids and anti-Semitism, the deviant figure who brings illness into the healthy 
community ('it could be contagious', warns Ronnie's outraged WASP employer, 
Stathis Borans). 
Similarly, Seth's characteristics as socially insecure 
- 
from his isolation in 
his apartment through to his terror that Ronnie might have left him 
- 
recall the 
stereotypical Jewish intellectual, cinematically associated so heavily with Woody 
Allen: lonely, shy, lacking social skills. " Hence the particular irony of his 
ascendancy to a language and a physique of physical purity which, based on his 
first appearance, is precisely what one would least expect. Even here, we might 
hear the echo here of that discourse, variously deployed both by Zionism and by 
voices less sympathetic towards Jewish bodies, for the Jews to rework their 
supposedly weak physical shells and to form new and more powerful bodies 
(Gilman, Difference and Pathology, pp. 157-58). 
Brundle's trajectory is thus from the stereotypical Jewish genius, through 
this reformed physical body, and then to a monstrous body 
-a change that seems 
" Indeed they are characteristics which, to varying degrees, Goldblum now enacts 
in all his performances. 
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itself to recall the problems of passing in its insistence that the Jew cannot 
transcend or remake his body: can never assimilate, but will always be outcast by 
those who disapprove and always betrayed by a physicality that cannot be 
concealed. When Brundle's skin finally falls away piece by piece to reveal the 
hideous monster beneath, it is the abject materiality of an anti-Semitic construction 
of the Jewish body that is displayed. The importance of this ethnic coding is, then, 
not only that it locks into these other notions of materiality 
- 
that the body is 
perpetually vulnerable to those features which it cannot make fit 
- 
but also that it 
alerts us to the fact that this horrific bodily ethnicity is only the product of a 
socially constructed set of meanings, and that the body which suffers at the hand of 
such meanings does so because its own matter too is regulated and shaped so as to 
enable those meanings to function. 
But I want also to insist that at the same time, none of these ethnic features 
signify only Jewishness. Indeed, it would be easy enough to turn many of these 
features around to the encoding of Brundle as gay: his feminized good looks, his 
lonely bookishness and lack of social skills, his solitary work-outs in the gym, his 
hunger for anonymous sex. Indeed, as Warren Blumenfeld has argued, the Jewish 
and the homosexual bodies regularly find themselves imaged through shared tropes 
of bodily degeneracy ('History/Hysteria: Parallel Representations of Jews and 
Gays, Lesbians and Bisexuals'). ` The body in question thus acts less as the body 
of any single social marginality, but rather stands for the marginality of materiality 
itself, but only as imaged through those marginal socialities to which such 
grotesque materiality is attached. To read this body only as any one of these is to 
miss out its force precisely as the conflation of them all: the assertion of all the 
forms in which the body has been condemned. To read The Fly as either an 
indictment or a celebration of an innately dangerous materiality is to ignore the 
18 On readings of The Fly as a homophobic representation of Aids, see Edward Guerrero, ` AIDS as Monster in Science Fiction and Horror Cinema'; and Knee, 
`The Metamorphosis of The Fly', p. 25. 
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film's el4borate indexing of bodily impropriety as a phenomenon more social than 
biologicF1. And to read Seth as definitively other for the viewer is to overlook the 
extent to which, through all these various codings, he is made a body in which 
many of us may recognize our own stigmatized materialities. 19 
The fact that we are enabled to find such recognition is crucial here, for I 
want to argue that the film enables us to make this identification: it offers a 
multiplicity of points where we can see our own despised material bodies spoken 
of through Brundle. It may be at this point that Cronenberg's Jewishness is so 
importapt in demanding that we view the film as self-conscious about these 
processes. Critics reading Cronenberg's films as an expression of misogyny may 
simply place him as male, critics of his films' homophobia may place him as 
straight, and critics of his films' orientalist and colonialist tendencies may place him 
as white; but to unpick the film's systematic exploration of monstrous Jewishness 
requires that 
- 
unless we simply want to write him off as self-hatingly anti-Semitic - 
we recognize that his texts are aware of the social processes that lead to 
stigmatization of certain forms of body. 2° 
A9 Such a reading of Brundle as a figure in whom the audience recognises 
themselves is very different from Noel Carroll's reading of Brundle as a figure to 
whom `the ideal audience' will respond `with sympathy and care', overcoming 
their disgust in order to recognise his plight 
- 
an instance of our ability to overlook 
the ` monstrous' so as to recognise the `human' (The Philosophy of Horror, or 
Paradoxes of the Heart, pp. 35-36). My point is, to the contrary, that our moment 
of greatest identification with Brundle may come when we are least able to 
overcome our disgust. 
20 Cronenberg's treatment of his own Jewishness is interesting here. On the one 
hand he comments that as a result of his anti-religious upbringing `I just don't feel 
a part of it' (Rodley, Cronenberg on Cronenberg, p. 3). On the other, his recurrent 
use of Jewish perfomers to play his protagonists suggests more of an investigation 
of Jewish-identity than he acknowledges, as does his use of Jewish history to frame 
the meanings of his work. For instance, he compares Videodrome's Max Renn (played by James Woods) to `people in prison camps' (Rodley, Cronenberg on 
Cronenberg, p. 96). And describing the hostility he himself faced after the release 
of Shivers, he wrote in a letter to his local newspaper: `I was not, it seemed, to be 
exempted from the fabled insecurity of the prophet, the seer, the Jew, the alien 
who can live happily in someone else's house until he is recognized. Then it's the 
knock on the door in the middle of the night' (Cronenberg, `The Night Attila Met 
the Anti-Christ'). Although I am not aware of any sustained work on Cronenberg 
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And it is insofar as the production of both the matter and the meaning of 
these stigmatized bodies is recognized by the film that we may come to notice how 
it does more than simply offer some notion of carnal revolution. For at the same 
time that The Fly leaves itself open to a reading of Brundle's transformation as an 
increasing assertion of the reality of a bodily existence which he had previously 
avoided, we should also note that his new understanding of the flesh appears as a 
site of orderly social production, confirming this sense of the horrific body as a 
social product. Brundle says that his computer needs to understand `the poetry of 
the flesh', and he reprograms the machine to have just such an experience. But this 
new grasp of the flesh is represented as a series of numbers flashing across the 
terminal: the body as an ordered and definable flow of information. " Viewed in 
this light, the term `poetry' acquires a different resonance: although it is might be 
read as the signifier of the disordered and the spontaneous 
- 
those traditional 
attributes of the Romantic conception of poetry 
- 
as the new figures flash over the 
screen we may think of poetry too as a geometric form, whose rules, patterns and 
pulses encode experience no less rigidly than science. Indeed, the very fact that 
Brundle is capable of taking his new bodily consciousness and, in the form of 
poetry, making the computer able to reproduce it and `taste' the flesh returns us to 
the thoroughly ordered form that such knowledge takes. Similarly Brundle's tastes 
in clothes are apparently depicted as going from ordered to spontaneous, but in 
forms that always reinscribe their spontaneity simply as a new order: he makes the 
shift from identical suits to designer clothes. When Brundle suggests that his 
as a Jewish director, there are brief references in Ira Livingston, `The Traffic in 
Leeches', pp. 530-531; and David Chute, ` He Came From Within', p. 36. Richard 
DDellamora ('Queer Apocalypse') advances what sees to me to be a potentially anti- 
Semitic argument, that Cronenberg's Naked Lunch relies on a homophobic 
diminution ofBurroughs's queerness in order to shore up `the remnant of the 
alienated East Coast male intellectual elite who once dominated liberal thinking in 
the United States' (p. 154), and who Dellamora represents as heterosexual and 
Jewish. 
Z' On The Fly's encoding of the body as a distinctively postmodern phenomenon 
see Peter Boss, ` Death, Disintegration of the Body, and Subjectivity' pp. 245-246; 
and Scott Bukatman, Terminal Identity, p. 267. 
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conditiop may be ` a disease with a purpose' he reinscribes its physicality within the 
terms of logic and intentionality. 
The film plays with the sociality of this change by imaging his new found 
strength as a conventional attribute of contemporary masculinity. His muscular 
body resembles the disciplined body of an athlete, and we see him exploring his 
new strength through a series of exercises and performances in an airy, gym-like 
section of his apartment. By troping his change as body-building, the bodily 
changes are connected to other social body transformations, reminding us that 
culture is not a disembodied zone which the body disrupts, but is rather a space of 
embodied practices, which Brundle's change closely resembles. Brundle's 
transformation, rather than taking him away from culture by taking him into the 
body, in fact meshes him only in new culturally determined bodily forms. The 
creature that finally emerges must be seen not as a spontaneous celebration of 
instincti. 4 carnality, but rather as the outcome of a constant process of bodywork. 
Brundle's ethnic identity is thus heavily intertwined with these other forms of 
social embodiment, and the differing faultlines of cultural acceptance across which 
they lie n 
I have stressed this aspect of the film to show how it draws attention to all 
body forms as regulated rather than spontaneous, and relates those forms of 
regulation to a hierarchy of bodies. While it might be possible to read the film as 
rehearsipg a fear of evolutionary degeneracy, I want to suggest that it also offers a 
more political purchase on the body, which recognizes that different bodily forms 
are located in a field of social power in which some bodies are privileged over 
others. By challenging the representation of bodily disorder as a natural 
overthr9wing of order and picturing it instead as the transgression of particular 
social demarcations held in place by the moulding of the body into appropriate 
22 Similarly, Brundle's monstrous offspring is spoken about in terms that connect it 
to other, more familiar, socially stigmatized bodies, when a doctor is told: `we have reason to believe the baby will be born deformed'. 
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forms, tie film suggests that we must read the body in terms of the organized 
social situations which regulate its forms and meanings. How then can we relate 
the monstrous images of Brundle's transformation to the social conditions from 
which the film emerges ? 
(iii) Socializing The Fly 
Two recent accounts offer just such a reading of The Fly as staging various 
forms of social experience. Both Peter Boss and Andrew Tudor have considered 
the film, as using the body to symbolize the experience of contemporary 
subjectivity. Boss, drawing on Mary Douglas, argues that the changes in the image 
of the body which the film displays symbolize particular changes in experience: in 
this case, the experience of an increasing loss of the distinction of a separate and 
iptegral self in the postmodern environment of media saturation, escalating cultural 
transformation, and international commodity exchange. In such a reading 
Brundle's body is invaded by a computer code which disrupts his body and 
intermingles it with other stimuli, so that its final transformation is into a symbol of 
a sociall' overstimulated subject, which has lost any sense of its differentiation 
from its environment ('Death, Disintegration of the Body, and Subjectivity', 
pp. 244-256). Working with a similar model of the body as symbol, Andrew Tudor 
has argued that the film's `bodily disintegration gives expression to people's 
experiegces of social fragmentation' (`Unruly Bodies, Unquiet Minds', p. 40). The 
disintegrating body symbolizes the disintegration of a series of other heretofore 
stable objects 
- 
the nuclear family, the nation state, binary gender roles (pp. 39-40). 
Neither of these are readings that I would disagree with - indeed, it has 
been central to this thesis so far that the body maps out changing social forms. But 
what is perhaps most striking about these accounts is the way that the materiality 
of the body disappears from them, even as they foreground the psychic and 
discursive significance of the body. The bodily images on the screen seem not to be 
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about the body at all: the body is a symbol for the unsettling of a series of other 
heretofore stable objects. Consequently the images do not relate to the physical 
processes of the audience's own bodies: the ` unruly bodies' of Tudor's title are 
only textual images, and it is the ` unquiet minds' which are the reality that they 
depict. 2,1 Rather than seeing such imagery as solely figurative, I want to suggest 
that it is the fact that the body itself is materially changeable which makes it such 
an ambivalent object. Its mutability is threatening not because it is a useful figure 
for threatening non-bodily social transformations, " but because the physical 
changes of the body itself carry a discomforting psychic valency in that they alter 
the capacity of the body to fit with the social situations to which it is accustomed. 
Brundle's increasing social isolation might be read as an image of any one of a 
number of modem anxieties 
- 
but what concerns me here is its operation as an 
index of the impossibility of his body inhabiting its familiar social milieu. Not, I will 
stress again, because he passes into a state of bodily asociality, but because he 
becomes aligned with those social bodies which are no longer legitimate for a 
prestigious scientist. It is surely significant here that the film opens with Brundle at 
4 scientific convention, where he meets Ronnie 
- 
confident, articulate and clean, 
they both have bodies that fit them for this social space. 
Boss and Tudor thus make two assumptions which I want to challenge. 
Firstly, they assume that we are dealing here with socially reflective images: that is, 
that the relationship between body and society is an expressive one, in which an 
image o¬a body is the passive medium through which cultural tensions are 
represented. Instead, I am arguing that the physical body, and the ways it is 
thought about, maintain and produce that cultural situation. Secondly, they view 
the physical body as essentially unchanging: a biological given which may be 
23 For a similar reading of the carnal imagery of body horror as being reflective of 
anxieties about everything except, apparently, the body itself, see Noel Carroll, 
The Philosophy of Horror, pp. 211-213. 
24 Of course, these social changes that Boss and Tudor describe also take place 
through the bodies of those affected, a consideration which both writers omit. 
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symbolically represented in a variety of forms, but is not itself physically variable; 
whereas I am arguing that these images must be related to physical changes in the 
body. In pursuing the question of how the film speaks to and of our bodies, we 
must ask not what issues are metaphorically imagined through these bodies, but 
rather what physical changes in the body, and what psychic mappings of the body, 
it addresses. 
More successful in accounting for the film as an engagement with the 
physical problems of materiality are two recent texts by Scott Bukatman and Helen 
Robbins, which read Brundle's body not as metaphoric but as metonymic. Robbins 
and Bukatman both recognize that the bodily transformations of The Fly should be 
related to other bodily transformations. For Bukatman, the bodily experience in 
question is the gradual technologization of the postmodern body (Terminal 
Identity, pp. 267-268). Brundle's new physical state 
- 
transformed by a computer, 
spliced with foreign matter, genetically altered 
- 
is linked by Bukatman to such 
other bodily changes as prosthetics and genetic engineering. Experiencing new and 
more drastic alterations in its form, such a body recognizes its own situation in 
Brundle. Robbins treats Brundle's body as a representative of the male body, 
focusing on the imagery of pregnancy and masturbation in the film: pregnancy, 
because the male scientist envies and attempts to duplicate it through his womb- 
like telepods; masturbation, because it is the adolescent crisis which he relives 
before the mirror as his body alters (' "More Human Than I Am Alone": Womb 
Envy in David Cronenberg's The Fly and Dead Ringers'). Both states highlight a 
masculine unease at embodiment, and a constant returning to and questioning of its 
limits, risks, and discomforts. For Robbins, Brundle's seeping, swollen body 
marks the distinctively masculine dread at any recognition of the biological reality 
of the body. 25 It recounts the failure of a rational, disembodied, masculine science 
u On debates about Cronenberg's misogyny see Barbara Creed, `Phallic Panic: 
Male Hysteria and Dead Ringers'. For a more reductive interpretation of The Fly's 
treatment of gender see Cynthia A. Freeland, `Feminist Frameworks for Horror 
Films'. 
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to evade the everyday realities of a physicality which is necessarily perceived as 
feminine. 
But while Robbins is right in drawing attention to the ways in which such 
bodily attributes are designated repulsive as part of their social construction, in 
order to join her argument to mine it should be extended to reflect the ways in 
which these are not simply naturally occurring bodily functions, but rather are 
themselves generated out of a mesh of cultural conditions. Pregnancy and 
masturbation do not simply `happen': they are concrete bodily possibilities that are 
brought about through the pressures that guide bodies through living. What the 
organic changes of The Fly invoke then are not so much, as Robins suggests, 
inherent body properties, but are rather those particular bodily practices which are 
produced as problematic. 
To approach The Fly from these perspectives is to read it not only as an 
account of body-metaphors which reflect economic or environmental anxieties, but 
also as an account of the daily physical experiences which generate their own 
anxieties. Hence what horrifies is not some innate or spontaneous physicality, but 
rather, as Christine Ramsay rightly suggests, the physical possibilities `constantly 
welling up from the enabling conditions of body and psyche' (`Male Horror: On 
David Cronenberg', p. 89). In re-using a phrase so heavily associated with the 
notion of an organic or originary force, I suggest that we read Ramsay as 
reaccentuating the prevalent meaning of `welling up', so as to show us instead that 
it is not from below or outside of the social that this new body matter `wells up', 
but from it and as its product. We must therefore see in these forms of illegitimate 
matter not any innate biological resistance, but rather the practical possibilities of 
corporeal change as determined by a set of social conditions. 
We have seen how the body should be viewed as the expression of the 
social location of a subject, a physical form which fixes subjects into social 
structures. But I have tried to suggest that we must grant the body more flexibility 
than this 
- 
with the possibility of bodily transformations which will themselves 
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change the social structure. Brundle's bodily changes delegitimate him on the one 
hand 
- 
destroying his relationship and his career and leading eventually to his 
death. But in doing so, they may also be read as making him unfit to maintain the 
forms of social power from which he had previously benefited. As such, they are a 
reminder that the possibility for bodily change may unsettle a social order that 
relies on bodies to take 
- 
and remain in 
- 
particular physical forms. 
Approaching The Fly like this, we must re-work notions of the body as 
dangerous matter placed under social control. Instead of viewing the film in terms 
of a parable about the risk that the shaped body (whose order enables it to master 
its materiality) may also always become the unshaped body, we can see it as 
stressing the ways in which those terms ` shaped' and `unshaped' are no more than 
the hierarchical cultural alibi for different bodies that are all equally shaped. What 
differentiates such bodies is a perpetually unstable cultural transcoding. The 
malleability of the body makes it always open to changes, which may un-fit it: but 
these are not changes in which some inherent bodily disorder arises 
- 
rather, they 
are changes towards particular social bodily forms which are designated illicit. As 
such, the monstrous body is represented as the deployment of existing bodily 
possibilities in the service of resistance. The transgressions of race and class which 
Brundle's body enact offer a constant emphasis on the rise of new possibilities 
which, even as they emerge from patriarchal technology, also threaten to overturn 
its conventions. In such a reading, Brundle's entire technological project then 
stands for the social apparatus itself, which produces bodies so as to punish them, 
and then frames its punishment as an attack not on the possibilities that the 
apparatus generated, but rather on what is claimed to be rebellious raw material. 
The organic revolution which Cronenberg imagines in The Brood is thus 
not so far from the truth: the relations of force which constitute the body enable it 
to transform its physical matter into forms that may no longer consolidate the 
social order. The fact that such changes are figured as a form of regression may 
bear the traces of a degenerationist view of the subject's physical desires but, as I 
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have argued, this is no more than a means of stigmatizing particular social 
possibilities. It is to this marking of the material possibilities of social transgression 
that I will turn in the final section. Where Knee reads in The Fly an uncritical 
disgust at various abject socialities, in which the text is little more than a hysterical 
symptom of white masculinity in unwelcome crisis, I will be suggesting that the 
film offers a rather more insightful interrogation of such a horrified response to 
unacceptable bodies 26 
Any account of the social, such as that which I am offering, which 
emphasises the overwhelming construction of the subject might seek one avenue of 
escape ii an exploration of the possibility that there is a way of circumventing the 
social altogether, irredeemably tainted and tainting as it is. As Biddy Martin argues 
of recent queer theory, such a position leads to `a romantic celebration of 
queerness or homo-ness as the very demise of current forms of societalization'-, 
in some queer work, the very fact of attachment has been cast as only 
punitive and constraining because already socially constructed, so that 
indifference to objects, or the assumption of a position beyond objects - the 
position, for instance, of death 
- 
becomes the putative goal of queer theory. 
('Extraordinary Homosexuals and the Fear of Being Ordinary', p. 123)27 
y teven Shaviro advocates just such a position in his reading of The Fly. For 
Shaviro, Brundle's transformation takes him into a `hell of embodiment' in which 
his ` excruciating materiality' sets him apart from the society in whose power 
structures his body is caught: `Seth is free from social control only in the sense that 
he cannot be part of any society' since his ` becoming-fly is 
... 
always pulling him 
26 As Kelly Hurley so neatly puts it, Cronenberg's work 'exposes-(or manifests, if 
one doesn't like Cronenberg) the cultural repression of [the] non-normative' ('Reading Like an Alien. Posthuman Identity in Ridley Scott's Alien and David 
Cronenberg's Rabid', pp. 211-212). For a debate between representatives from the 
`exposes' and the ` manifests' camps see Linda Haas and Mary Pharr, ` Somatic 
Ideas: Cronenberg and the Feminine'. 
27 Although she, does not mention him. by name, the reference to `homo-ness' 
indicates that one of her targets is Leo Bersani, who argues in Homos that (male) 
homosexuality enables a `refusal to participate in any sociality at all' (p. 168, 
emphasis in the original). 
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further and further away from any community, any identity' (The Cinematic Body, 
p. 148). 2! But against reading the social as a destructive force from which the only 
escape is death, I am arguing that the social also supplies our best opportunities: it 
provides us with resources for pleasure, resistance, and power. I believe that it is 
thereforF possible to discern in The Fly a proposal of social transformation whose 
nexus is precisely the social construction of the flesh, rather than its asociality. 
(iv) Embodied Alliances 
As the film approaches its conclusion Brundle kidnaps Ronnie and tells her 
that he intends to fuse her, and her unborn child, with him: `we'll be the ultimate 
family 
-a family of three joined together in one body'. Robbins analyzes the scene 
as an expression of a patriarchal power which imagines that the incorporation of a 
woman and child are a guaranteed male right 
- 
their bodies will be subordinated to 
his needs in a grotesque re-enactment of the patriarchal dynamics of the nuclear 
family (' "More Human Than I am Alone" ', p. 142). But we must also recognize 
the forccthat the scene takes from its generic features. If we were to draw up a 
Proppian account of the recurrent narrative units of the horror film, one of them 
would be: `The Full Extent of the Monster's Intentions Are Revealed'. 29 I am 
thinking of such incidents as the realization in The Thing (1982) that if the creature 
leaves the military base it will take over the entire world in 2700 hours; Barbara's 
realization in Night of the Living Dead that in fact the entire human race might as 
well already be zombies; or in Alien 3 (1992) when Ripley realizes that she is the 
bearer of the new Alien queen. Structurally, this is not simply the moment at which 
the tension reaches a new peak, and the narrative enters its final stretch (the unit: 
28 For a reading of the film's nihilism which sees no productively critical force to 
such a vision, see Mary Ferguson Pharr, ` From Pathos to Tragedy: The Two 
Versions of The Fly'. 
29 Vladimir Propp's The Morphology of the Folktale argues that it is possible to 
draw up an inventory of narrative units, not all of which will appear in any given 
folktale, but from which all the units of a tale must be drawn. 
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`Can the Danger Be Averted in Time? ') but is also the moment at which the 
possibility of the monster's redemption is destroyed. The revelation is one of such 
absolute depravity and malice that the only option is the monster's destruction 
(although it should be noted that redemption may yet follow 
- 
as in, for instance, 
The Fly 2 (1989) where the emotional force of the redemption is precisely the fact 
that its possibility had apparently been renounced). More particularly, in body 
horror we can connect this device to the revelation of the body's uncivilized 
carnality, since it enables a film to announce the final irrecuperability of the 
monstrous body by the claims of culture. 
ýnd that is just how the scene operates in The Fly: it indicates Brundle's 
final loss of humanity, as an index of which, moments later, he sheds the remnants 
of his body and becomes the wholly monstrous fly-creature who is soon to be 
destroyed. The revelation of psychological monstrosity and narrative shock is 
doubled with the revelation of physical horror: we know that he can no longer go 
back, because the last traces of his old body have been shed. Brundle's 





status: the orchestral score rising to a crescendo; Ronnie's 
screams of desperation; the ominous close-ups of the telepods; Borans, the 
putative hero, unconscious and unable to help. Brundle's final bodily 
transformation follows, and it too carries such features: a new score to announce 
the moment of the most extreme graphic display of the body, more screams from 
Ronnie; a series of sudden cuts between Ronnie's horrified face and the different 
parts of Brundlefly's body as it sheds its human skin. 
I want to stress the formal, generic features of these two linked scenes 
because the film shows a consistent sensitivity to its generic devices and a concern 
to highlight and interrogate them, particularly as regards the assertion of the 
monstrous dangers of the body. In the key scene with which I opened this chapter, 
when the baboon is shown in all its horror, Ronnie is videotaping the scene for the 
benefit of her planned book on Seth's project. Similarly, as his transformation 
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increases, Seth videotapes himself, preserving his transformation to display to 
visitors. While these two incidents show a self-reflexive concern with the way in 
which the monstrous body is made into an image for its audience, there is another 
even more interesting scene in which Ronnie plays Brundle's tape to Borans: it 
shows Brundle dousing a tray of donuts with an enzyme that liquidizes them, and 
then sucking up the resultant liquid. When Borans views the tapes he acts as if he 
is watching a horror film: rigid in front of the screen, the camera zooms in on his 
face to show us that his eyes are wide and unblinking, his mouth open, as with 
increasing dismay and disgust he says `My God 
... 
Oh my God! ' The audience's 
responsg to monstrosity is thus part of the film's focus, in its dissection of the 
techniques by which disgust is orchestrated and then displayed to an audience in 
order to shock them. In this last case, the audience has already seen Brundle 
requesting that Ronnie carefully arrange the camera for his performance, which he 
enacts smoothly as if rehearsed, while offering a running commentary as if he were 
a television presenter. 
In fact, the moment of greatest disgust is erased: although we hear Brundle 
tell us what he is about to do, and hear the sound of it as Borans watches, we do 
not see the event at all. The audience knows so well what it would see, as it 
occupies so completely the position of the nauseated Borans, that a `graphics of 
non-representation"' merely alerts us to the fact that we are already subjects-who- 
know. We are so familiar with 
- 
and so well installed within 
- 
such structures of 
disgust that the scene's omission hardly registers. 31 
These two moments of self-reflexivity are not atypical in Cronenberg: 
Robbins considers certain key moments in his work as offering the devices of 
patriarchal technology ` carefully labelled and exposed to the eye of the self- 
11 1 take the phrase from a very different use of it by Sandra Buckley in her 
discussion of contemporary Japanese comic book pornography, "Penguin in 
Bondage": A Graphic Tale of Japanese Comic Books'. 
31 Indeed, some critics seem to believe that they did in fact see such a scene. Alan 
Stanbrook refers to the `spectacle' of `an insect 
... 
vomiting over its food before 
ingesting it' ('Cronenberg's Creative Cancers', p. 56). 
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conscious viewer' (' "More Human Than I Am Alone" ', p. 146). Nor are they 
unusual in body-horror as a genre because, as Brophy notes, it is acutely aware of 
`the saturation of all its codes and conventions' (`Horrality', p. 12). But the 
particular concerns of these moments of self-reflexivity are with the ways in which 
a set of Tepresentational practices constructs the horrifying. They index the devices 
by which bodily discord is put on display so that it carries a set of particular 
connotations. We can identify four key moments in this process of the staging of 
disgust: 
(i) The moment of revelation. Consider these moments: Brundle putting on a show 
for Ronnie; the door being opened to let us see the dead baboon; Ronnie showing 
her tape to Borans. In each case monstrosity is a staged event in which abject flesh 
is put on show in order to affirm its abnormality. It is a spectacle which showcases 
the body, and which is textually constructed to have the status of a key 
demonstration of the truth. 
(ii) Abnormality indicates the need for action. In all of these cases abject flesh 
initiates a decision to act. Borans watches the videotape immediately before 
switching in role from the corporate villain to Ronnie's protector/assistant, who 
takes on the responsibility of destroying both Brundle and his child. Brundle's 
witnessing of the failure of the baboon propels him into the affair that will enable 
him to perfect the process. The display of monstrosity thus calls for an act of 
recuperation 
- 
either the eradication, or the sublimation, of what is disgusting. 
(iii) A fear of one's own carnality. As Boss has noted, Borans is systematically 
connected to forms of organic disgust (`Death, Disintegration of the Body and 
Subjectivity', pp. 252-253): he tells Ronnie that he is ` feeling a bit scummy', while 
she refers to him as `personal bullshit 
... 
the residue of another life', a substance of 
which she says: `I have to scrape it off and get rid of it'. To which I would add that 
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if Borans's own organic connotations link him to the abject matter he sees on the 
screen, the affinity is heightened by the fact that their names mark them as doubles 
- 
the ` s' and `th' sounds of both Stathis and Seth, the `b', `r' and `n' sounds of 
Borans and Brundle. Borans's shock can be read as a confrontation with, on the 
screen, the double of his own `scummy' self The display of monstrosity is intended 
to depict not just a revelation of the truth about a body which needs to be resolved, 
but a truth about one's own body. 
(iv) Purification of the self. The moment of revelation hence fuels the project not 
only to deal with the alien object of disgust, but also to purify oneself. This is the 
point where Borans becomes hero 
- 
transformed by the vision of Brundle into the 
white knight who does the right thing, in a determined effort to reject his own 
scumminess. Brundle's failure with the baboon is what propels his attempt to 
reprogram his other self, his computer, with the geometric grasp of the poetry of 
the flesh, which has hitherto been missing 
-a gesture, as I have argued, not of the 
carnalization of the machine, but of the organization of the body by rational 
technique. 
These introspections of the text represent attempts by the film to account 
for its own procedures. They thereby enable the audience to distance itself from 
the structures which produce disgust 
- 
from the routinized display of monstrosity 
as an index of what is to be avoided, purged, or redeemed 
- 
and to consider instead 
the wider social motivations and effects of those daily events which index 
monstrosity for us: the incitement that we tidy up our own bodies, before they too 
follow such a path. 32 It is in this light that we must read Ronnie's final encounter 
32 Hence the text on the poster for the film reads `Be Afraid. Be Very Afraid': both 
an injunction to fear, and an acknowledgement that fear needs to be demanded 
and installed by the cinematic apparatus in order to operate. It is Carol Clover who 
draws our attention to the way that the slogans on horror film posters situate the 
audience as potential victims of the films they promote (Men, Women and Chainsaws p. 201). 
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with Seth, with its construction as the epitome of a generic display of monstrosity. 
Hedged around by reflections on its own operations, this must be read not simply 
as an indictment of the horrific, but rather as an invitation to scrutinize the 
depiction of the socially dangerous as the physically horrifying. We are encouraged 
to recognize that certain social groupings have an investment in marking out some 
bodies as horrific even as the film activates those traditional horrors. And if what 
this particular scene activates is Ronnie's fear of coming into contact with Brundle, 
I will be suggesting that it also activates, and thereby critiques, the fear of what 
might result from their union. 
Brundle initially imagines that the process of merging will purge him of 
impurity, with the combination of human matter driving out the fly to make him, as 
he says, `more human than I am alone'. But against such putative purification, 
there are a number of textual cues that point towards the production of a still more 
monstrous hybrid. Most obviously we must think of the effects of Brundle's 
previous experiment, which has given the telepods the status of a dangerous 
device, whose utopian aspirations have deteriorated into the generation of 
monsters. Moreover, in spite of the pseudo-science that motivates the computer's 
analysis, narratively what we have seen so far in the film is the combination of 
Brundle and fly into one single hybrid organism, and Brundle's vision of a 
combined body hardly seems likely to be the creation of a normal human body. The 
wish for purity thus turns 
- 
as it does throughout the film 
- 
into the threat (or 
promise) of an even greater intensity of impure carnality, signified here by the 
language of corrupted purity. Echoing as it does a nightmare that Ronnie has in 
which she gives birth to Brundle's child, a giant maggot, this union seems destined 
not for a body that is `more human' but rather one that is thoroughly post-human. 
Like the absent shot of Brundlefly eating, it need never be shown to us because, 
primed as we are to read the generic conventions, we already know what we 
would see. 
There are thus a host of strategies by which the result of this experiment is 
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set-up to be the display of another horrific body. But, pursuing the film's dissection 
of the sgcial conventions that designate certain bodies as horrific, we can ask: what 
is it about this unrealized body that is stigmatized ?I want to suggest that we 
might see in the monstrous figure which never materializes a concrete political 
opportunity that also never materializes: that of an alliance between Brundle, 
Ronnie and their child against the technologies of purification. 
As I have argued, this film explores the tensions in a range of practices 
whose goal is the production of a superior body, free from the discomforting 
carnalities of motion sickness, and experiencing the body not as matter but as 
poetry. perhaps their most ominous convergence is when they are marshalled 
around Ronnie in her dream that, in the course of her abortion, she gives birth to a 
giant maggot. Surrounded as she is by surgical technicians, the abortion is figured 
as another attempt to orchestrate a well-functioning body. One reading of the 
gendered implications of the scene would be that it expresses a male fantasy of the 
horror of the female body in which, along the lines suggested by Kristeva, the 
repulsive nature of this birth functions as a version of the repulsion with which 
masculinist culture regards birth in general. " Conversely, we might read it as a 
more knowing analysis of Ronnie's situation: Boss points out that throughout the 
film technological masculinity treats the body as its proper possession, over which 
to exercise its control 
- 
as Borans says to Ronnie: ` do I have permission to claim 
your body when this is all over ?'- so that the horror of the scene may lie rather in 
the extent to which the birth is horrific for Ronnie herself because of the male 
power which, as Boss points out, she herself may be being said to critically 
interrogate precisely because it is it in the form of a nightmare that she relives 
(`Death, Disintegration of the Body, and Subjectivity', p. 253). 
3ut by relating this moment of masculinist regulation to the other, equally 
33 The theme which Cronenberg unpicks with such rigour in Dead Ringers. See 
Linda Badley, Film Horror and the Body Fantastic, pp. 125-136; Barbara Creed, 
`Phallic Panic'; Maggie Humm, Feminism and Film, pp. 58-89; and Helen 
Robbins, `  "More Human Than I Am Alone" '. 
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disastrous, attempts to refine the body, it might also remind us that these 
manipulations of body matter yield unnerving results. And here I hope that my 
reader will recognize that we can add the birth scene to the gallery of 
Cronenberg's characteristic set-pieces with which I began this chapter: the unruly 
body shattering the antiseptic domain. By virtue of its textual excess, its function 
as a kind of bravura spectacle of special effects, and its coding of opposed terms 
(science/carnality, horrified observers/horrific display, order/disorder) it belongs 
alongside these other attempts to speak about our relationship to horrific bodies. 
As with the other examples, I want here to refuse to follow the easy path of 
celebrating this as a triumph of bodily spontaneity over a repressive culture. " 
Rather, I want again to stress the extent to which this moment is marked as 
produced. The properties of Ronnie's body are not somehow the antithesis of 
those who observe it, but are rather intimately related to their own practices. 
Insofar as they oversee the birth, its result should recall Brundle's own 
technological disciplining of the body, so that what is horrific about the event is 
less the workings of Ronnie's body, than the contexts within which the working of 
her body is co-opted by the men around her. It is they who assign its meaning, just 
as it is Brundle whose genetic marking is most prominent in the offspring. 
Famously, the presiding gynaecologist is played by Cronenberg himself, suggesting 
that we should therefore read this as another self-reflexive comment on the ways in 
which narrators of narratives of monstrosity position and display the body as 
disgusting in order to elicit a response of horror. Crucially, then, it also makes us 
aware of the fact that the forces that orchestrate Brundle as repulsive may need to 
render Ronnie repulsive as well. 
But before this risks rendering Ronnie merely a passive vehicle for male 
activities, I want to argue that her becoming-monstrous takes place as the 
" Not least because to do so entails us reading the abortion as a destructive 
attempt to purify the body of what in fact belongs to it 
-a reading that colludes 
with anti-abortion positions. 
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consequence of her own series of decisions. Although I have suggested that horror 
is particularly concerned with the possibility that the apparently normal might in 
fact be the monstrous, it is Carol Clover who has offered a particularly astute 
analysis of how this has recently been deployed in horror in the form of the figure 
which she has named `the Final Girl' (Men, Women and Chainsaws). This figure is 
a female hero who survives the other characters and finally defeats the forces of 
monstrosity. She makes her first appearance in The Texas Chainsaw Massacre, 
rises to prominence in Halloween (1978), and has now become a staple figure in 
contemporary horror 
- 
from Barbara in Savini's remake of Night of the Living 
Dead, to Sidney in Scream. 3S Ronnie conforms to this model on a number of 
counts: her ambivalently gendered name; her short hair and trousers; her constant 
assertive refusal to concede to any of Borans's demands; her professional status as 
investigative journalist; her usurpation of the prerogative of the male gaze through 
her use of video; her decision to instigate sex with a confused Brundle; her 
determination to manage her own body through an abortion, with the concomitant 
refusal of a traditionally female role as mother; and at the end of the film, wielding 
the phal#ic gun, her roles as executioner of Brundlefly and saviour of the by-now 
symbolically castrated Borans. 36 
Yet while the Final Girl figures as female hero, the films in which she 
appears also register an ambivalence about her usurpation of the gendered 
attributes usually reserved for male heroes 
- 
all the more so, suggests Clover, as 
she moves from the less tightly regulated domains of low-budget low-culture 
3i For Clover, she is able to occur because of the particular flexibility of the sexed 
body evident in horror films. Clover argues that horror sees the recurrence of 
ambiguously gendered figures, of which feminized monsters and effeminate men 
are both instances. The Final Girl is another: a girl who acts Ifice a boy. Clover 
regards this as a result of horror's inheritance of certain recurrent anxieties about 
the stability of gender, a position which Mark Jancovich has criticized as failing to 
consider the particular historical conditions behind any given text's deployment of 
gender ambiguity (Rational Fears, pp. 225-226). 
36 Linda Badley offers a reading of Ronnie's monstrous masculinization in terms of 
her usurpation of the male gaze via her filming of Brundle's experiment (Film 
Horror and the Body Fantastic, p. 129). 
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horror to the more heavily regulated domain of heavily marketed cinema (Men, 
Women and Chainsaws, pp. 231-236). Bearing testimony to her power to unsettle, 
high-budget horror like The Silence of the Lambs (1990) or Aliens goes to great 
lengths to resorb the Final Girl and reproduce her in a less threatening form: Ripley 
as maternal protector or Clarice Starling as loyal servant of the FBI. There is thus 
a crucial sense in which Ronnie too is a monster 
-a gender deviant, whose body 
violates the traditional roles of femininity. 
Power thus produces the bodies which it dreads 
- 
the bodies which are 
excluded and stigmatized, and which carry with them the threat of overturning the 
order which keeps them in those places. It is surely also significant that while she is 
in hospital, Brundle arrives through the window to 
- 
depending on our 
interpretation 
- 
abduct or rescue her. We may certainly read this as representing a 
continuation of Ronnie's enmeshment within oppressive male power, in which she 
passes from the hands of one figure of male power to another. But it also operates 
as the moment of her liberation from this territory in which she is shown as 
powerless. His abduction of Ronnie resonates symbolically with such monstrous 
liberation-abductions as Quasimodo and Esmeralda, or King Kong and Fay Wray, 
and as such figures him not only as monster but as rescuer, facilitating not just her 
abduction but also her escape. Hence it marks not her passivity but the extent to 
which the monster of the horror film may 
- 
either phobically or affirmatively - stand 
in for the outlawed needs of the woman in question. In that sense, it may be that in 
his abduction of her Brundle signals not so much his opposition towards her as her 
oppressor, so much as an affinity between them: as Linda Williams suggests, the 
gaze of the monster's victim discloses her own recognition within the monster of 
herself ('When the Woman Looks'). Thus if I have so far read these scenes as an 
encounter between `monster' and 'girl'/victim/heroine this has occluded an 
account of the scene as a meeting between two monsters. Ronnie figures as 
monster both because of her defiance of dominant gender conventions and yet at 




in its references to wombs, abortions, pregnancy, it maintains her 
connection to a more traditional femininity only to figure that too as a monstrous 
bodily state. Indeed, the double-monstrosity of Ronnie's position thus neatly 
figures the double-bind in which women are located: to be marked as female by 
giving birth is to be corporeally alien to the order of rationality; to seek an abortion 
and thereby refuse that image by refusing that biological event is to be monstrous 
by being masculinized. 37 
Brundle's imagined `family' can thus be read also as the utopian site for the 
meeting of those who have all been, in different ways, targeted by male technology 
as objects of assault: Brundle, the physical alien targeted for execution; Ronnie, the 
`final girl' whose femaleness constantly usurps the signifiers of masculinity; and the 
unborn child targeted for destruction because biologically undesirable. If, as I have 
stressed, Goldblum's Jewishness is linked to his status as bodily alien, the 
convergence of his body with that of the illicitly masculine Ronnie and her 
biologically disallowed child makes for a suggestive coalition of the socially 
stigmatized, whose monstrous fusion may be dreadful to some groups within the 
audience precisely insofar as it represents the dreadful possibility of an alliance 
against their culture, but is also welcome to others insofar as it constitutes a point 
of recognition and a call to resistance. Bearing in mind his openness to incarnating 
a range of stigmatized bodily socialities, we should then read Brundle as a form of 
monstrous hero 
- 
his story indexing the various means by which his body is 
delegithpated, the forces that act to achieve this, the strategies that they deploy, 
and our own complicity with these as the audience of the horror genre. In 
Brundle's monstrous body, we are encouraged to recognize the traits of our own 
bodies that are designated repulsive 
- 
and by implication, invited to extend our 
"A double-bind which we might understand as encompassing the two forms of 
grotesque body as defined by Stallybrass and White: `the Other', the body which is 
the hated binary opposite of the legitimate body and which is seen as revolting 
because it is on the wrong side of the line; and the hybrid', which combines 
attributes of both poles of the binary and is seen as revolting because it flouts that 
very line (The Politics and Poetics of Transgression, p. 193). 
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recognition to other bodies which suffer the same treatment. We are, moreover, 
invited to imagine the possibilities of a revolutionary fusion and to overcome the 
learnt repugnance that impedes it. 
Fusion, as Andrew Knee has noted, is a key term in the film ('The 
Metamorphosis of The Fly'): Brundle begins to lose his integrity when he is fused 
with a fly, and in the final scenes he loses his life because he is fused with the 
mechanical segments of one of the telepods. Fusion leads finally to such a state of 
disorder that it is impossible to go on living. Knee reads this fear of fusion as the 
film's anxiety about emotional intimacy 
- 
the other fusion that takes place in the 
film, that of Seth and Ronnie's affair. In keeping with his general account of The 
Fly, Knee reads this 
- 
like all the film's sites of horror 
- 
as expressive of an 
uncritical dread of certain challenges to a rigid and pathological status quo, which 
the film seeks to preserve. But if we read the film as inviting an interrogation of 
such sites, as encouraging the viewer to ask for whom and by whom certain bodily 
configurations have been rendered horrific, then we may instead see that fusion is 
offered as a provocative possibility, revealed to be branded horrific insofar as it 
represents a real threat to a particular social order, but which can be welcomed by 
those of us wishing to challenge such an order. 
Knee points out that Ronnie and Brundle are both corporate tools - he in 
the service of Bartok Enterprises, she in the service of Monolith Publishing, both 
of whore have legal rights over their work. But we should also note their resistance 
to this situation. Ronnie risks breaking free of her contract by electing to write up 
the story of Seth's invention in a book of her own 
- 
and is quickly threatened back 
into submission by Borans, her boss: ` I'm your editor, and I'm shaping your 
material into a story'. Similarly Seth 
- 
not unlike Shivers's Dr. Emil Hobbes - is 
using Bartok's resources to fund a project which attempts to ease his own personal 
anxieties. The relationship between them thus marks a fusion between rebellious 
corporate employees 
- 
what Luce Irigaray might call a getting together of the 
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goods. 38 For as part of his constant attempts to exert his control over them, Borans 
takes care to try to keep them apart. At the moment of their most romantic 
promise of unification, when Seth observes that they are becoming `old and 
married', it is Borans's intervention that separates them 
-a logic of division that 
will reach its apotheosis in Borans's categorical command to Ronnie: ` don't go 
back to him'. Thus Borans's heroic arrival, while generically marked as the unit 
`The Girl is Rescued from the Monster', must also be read as the determination of 
an employer/investor to reassert his corporate rights over these various wayward 
products: Seth/Brundlefly, the telepods, Ronnie, and their child. 39 What prevents 
such an alliance is precisely the horror that parts them 
- 
that intervenes between 
Ronnie and her child, between Ronnie and Brundle, a horror which, as the film 
replays the narrative unit of `The Full Extent of the Monster's Plans Are Revealed' 
is not recruited as the natural disgust for what is physically dangerous, but rather 
exposed as the social abhorrence of what has been disallowed by a culture of 
bodily purification and control. 
The ways in which communities are constructed along the lines of bounded 
bodies makes it clear that social power is thought in terms of bodily contact: what 
must be kept inside the body, what must be kept outside it. And this is to argue 
more than that the body operates as a metaphor, but to insist on the irreducibly 
physical experience of such contact 
- 
our daily experience of what substances must 
be kept away, what bodies must be avoided. When lines of social demarcation are 
crossed, it is at the level of the body that anxiety emerges. At the political level, 
bodily disgust thus operates to segment and compartmentalize communities 
through physical disgust which sustains social demarcations. 40 
"' The title of Irigaray's `Des Marchandises entre elles' has various translations: I 
prefer Claudia Reeder's colloquial `When the Goods Get Together' to Catherine 
Porter's rather literal `Commodities Among Themselves'. 
s9 The Fly 2 spells out this appropriative logic, with Ronnie's son placed in a laboratory by Bartok Science Industries as their legal property. 
"For instance, Steve Pile makes this case for the hostile representation of the 
unwelcome bodies of travellers and gypsies (The Body and the City, pp. 3-6). 
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It has been argued by Bernice Johnson Reagon that one site where such 
discomfort is particularly problematic is in the formation of political alliances 
between subjects who have been segregated, and who find that, because of their 
differences, coalition building is an unpleasant experience: `most of the time you 
feel threatened to the core, and if you don't you're not really doing no 
coalescing'('Coalition Politics: Turning the Century', p. 356). Brundlefly, Ronnie 
and the child are indeed `doing coalescing' 
- 
doing that terrifying mixing of bodies 
of which Reagon says: `we are at the point where in order to take the next step 
we've got to do it with some folk we don't care too much about. And we've got to 
vomit over that for a little while' (p. 368). A coalition is not a comfortable meeting 
place, says Reagon, rather `it's a monster' 
- 
and so, I would suggest, we need 
resources that will enable us to negotiate its monstrous becomings. 
The Fly's unseen monstrous family is just such a map. For all Brundle's 
threat and terror he and Ronnie need each other 
- 
because as Reagon says, `the 
only reason you would consider teaming up with someone who could possibly kill 
you, is because that's the only way you can figure you can stay alive' (pp. 356- 
357). The interweaving of bodies that is prevented from taking place is thus a 
promise whose possible resistance to power comes through its uncomfortable 
crossing of the enormous barriers of disgust that stand in its way. Against those 
barriers stand the results of Brundle's machine, which he calls `the one that ended 
all concepts of... borders and frontiers' 
- 
the project that holds out the promise of 
erasing barriers and dividing lines. The horror of the resultant meldings and 
interweavings of bodies is the horror of joining in with those unlike us - of politics 
itself. If Brundle goes out of his way to dismiss the possibilities that such alliances 
might usher in, with the declaration ` insects don't have politics', we should 
conversely be reminded that it is in the very place that politics is disavowed that it 
needs to be reasserted. This insect does have politics 
- 
and it is the role of the critic 
as consciousness-raiser to restore it against Cronenberg's own wishes. 
If our bodies map out the social structures 
- 
both micro and macro - within 
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which we are situated, then the film's figures of authority (its gynaecologists, 
Borans cleaning away his scumminess in the shower) stand as models of conflict 
and separation, for whom and by whom certain zones are marked as illicit (but 
incited) and others as licit (but pleasurably scrutinizing the illicit). Authority lies in 
the hands of those who sanction, purify and punish body types, and who stand 
watch over forms of biological 
- 
and therefore political 
- 
fusion. The fused family is 
an altogether different imaginary anatomy from this authorized one, in which 
different bodies mingle, their boundaries no longer clear. The feminized man and 
the masculinized woman, the fly and the child, merged like the flickering data that 
flashes across Brundle's computer screen. The genetic map that has operated in the 
film as the index of technological power, and whose current role in biology is 
precisely to shore up such specious notions of biological singularity and irreducible 
difference (Donna Haraway, ` The Biopolitics of Postmodern Bodies', pp. 215- 
217), is now redeployed as the model of an interlocking 
- 
but never unified 
- 
conglomerate of disenfranchized others. As such, it is the reminder that bodily 
disorder is not in any necessary sense liberating or revolutionary - but rather 
become* so when harnessed to demands for a world in which power has been 
taken away from the forces that render its difference as disorder. 
The Fly thus rehearses these conventions of stigmatization not because they 
can be sublated into moments of more comfortable rational choice; nor because, as 
in Wood's or Knee's readings of Cronenberg, they are offered in a spirit of 
outright rejection which endorses such a stigma, but rather, as in Reagon's 
account, in the acknowledgement of the revulsion that attends the production of 




(i) Introduction: Body Fundamentals 
In Cronenberg's Crash, the charismatic `mad scientist' figure, Vaughan, 
explains the motivation behind his recreation of car crashes: `There's a 
benevolent psychopathology that beckons towards us. For example, the car 
crash is a fertilizing rather than a destructive event: a liberation of sexual energy 
that mediates the sexuality of those who have died with an intensity that's 
impossible in any other form. To experience that, to live that 
- 
that's my 
project. ' `What about the reshaping of the human body by modem 
technology? ', asks his interlocutor, Ballard, referring back to the explanation 
that Vaughan had given earlier in the film; `I thought that was your project. ' 
`That's just a crude sci-fi concept', replies Vaughan. ` It kind of floats on the 
surface and doesn't threaten anybody. I use it to test the resilience of my 
potential partners in psychopathology'. 
We might well want to read this as Cronenberg's characteristic push 
away from any attempt to locate his film within a historically specific 
problematic, and towards a reading of it as the dramatization of some timeless 
human dilemma. Rejecting an explanation for the impact of the car crash on the 
body in terms of technology, he offers instead one in terms of the body's own 
innate capacities to experience and interpret trauma as ecstasy. Whatever the 
problems with this attempt to dehistoricize his own text, I would also suggest 
that Cronenberg's sceptical account of the appeal of postmodern technology as 
a new phenomenon is absolutely right. While technology may well seem to be a 
promising new phase in the experience of embodiment, it may in fact be no 
more than a new site for a more general problem of embodiment: the difficulty 
of defining what constitutes a proper and integral body, and the pleasures and 
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dangers of the states enabled by such uncertain boundaries. If techno-culture 
confronts us with this problem with particular forcefulness, it does not change 
the fact that this is a problem that is central to embodiment itself the question 
of which aspects of the body are legitimate and which are alien; and the question 
ofwhat sorts of social identities are effected by changes in the form of the body 
This thesis is therefore sceptical of the idea that techno-culture will inaugurate 
some new relationship to the body, since it seems rather to be the site of the 
playing out of much older anxieties. 
ývly scepticism about the radical impact of technology derives from two 
positionp central to this thesis. Firstly, the question of the material properties of 
the body, as we have seen, is always a vexed one. Insofar as no body simply 
exists in itself, but is brought about, maintained, and regulated by the society in 
which it operates, the question of how a body should be, what strains it can be 
subjected to, and what reformings it may endure, is central to the anxieties 
attendant on being an embodied subject: it is not a new problem for the body, 
but is rather the necessary condition of embodied subjectivity. Secondly, the 
idea that technology is for the first time subjecting a fantasy of an integral body 
to intolerable strains seems unconvincing in the face of a psychoanalytical 
literature which documents how few of us in fact experience our bodies as 
integral. Didier Anzieu's The Skin Ego, a commentary on a collection of 
psychoanalytic case-studies, offers a series of instances of our bodies being 
experienced as invaded or disorganized, their component parts becoming 
detached, and the relationship between inside and outside being permanently 
unstable. 
focusing in this way on the fact of a routine sense of bodily 
disorganization should remind us that the disruptions of the boundaries that 
maintain a sense of integral selfhood are not confined to the more spectacular 
instances of body modification. Rather, the body is always that object invoked 
as needing to be released from contamination, and unable to exist without it; as 
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threatereed by invasion, and as always already invaded. Thus when Max Renn, 
the protagonist of Cronenberg's Videodrome, goes in search of an invasive 
video signal which he believes will change his life in the future, he in fact finds 
that even before the narrative of the film, he had already been exposed to the 
signal and been physically altered by it: the film thus dramatizes the proposal 
that our physical invasion and transformation has always already taken place. 
The texts of Burroughs and Cronenberg that I have studied here 
constantly straddle these two contradictory positions: an attempt to defend 
against invasive transformation, and an acceptance that such an invasive 
transformation founds embodied subjectivity. Simultaneously occupying both 
positions, these texts then speak perhaps more than anything else of the position 
of the embodied subject, which exists only by virtue of its simultaneous and 
contradictory colonization and fortification: by virtue of its definition of itself as 
a self-cgntained unit at the same time as by the generation of its varying forms 
through invasion. This necessary placement of the integrity of the body in high 
risk situations is neatly summed up in a briefing given to one of Burroughs's 
agents l1y his controllers: `as you know most existing organizations stress such 
primitive reactions as unquestioning obedience. Their agents become addicted 
to orders. You will receive orders of course and in some cases you will be well- 
advised not to carry out the orders you receive' (7TE, p. 15). Such an 
ijnpossible position serves in many ways as an account of the body as I have 
described it in this thesis: both obliged to be transformed, and revolted by those 
transformations; both addicted to the necessity of following its orders and 
resisting them; imagined to be demonstrating freedom through rebellion, but in 
fact rebfllious only as a by-product of its programming. What the work of both 
Burroughs and Cronenberg depicts is how the body is caught up in, and enabled 
by, these tensions between regulation and transgression. 
In this conclusion I wish to return to the four aspects of embodiment as 
detailed in my chapters on Burroughs and Cronenberg, and to suggest that these 
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four aspects of bodily anxiety may all be read as central problems within the 
experience of embodiment. They are not an exhaustive account of the 
experiences of embodiment, but they do sketch out aspects of embodied 
subjectivity that are experienced with particular intensity, and that underpin, as I 
hope I have demonstrated, a wide range of the material, psychic, and discursive 
conditions of embodiment today. Thus although there are many different 
situations or texts in which the body makes an appearance, this account 
attempts to sketch a set of fears, desires, and social dynamics which are not the 
defining problem for the body, but rather represent a set of particularly 
persistent problems for many of the bodies we might document. 
At the risk of imposing an over-simplified grand narrative on this range 
of perspectives of the body, I would suggest that the body as described in this 
thesis looks like this. It is a body that has been shaped by social processes so 
that it is constantly confronted by the fact that its material form is in no way 
natural, even though the supposed naturalness of the body continues to be the 
dominant concept through which its is thought (chapter one). It is confronted 
by a process of the designation of certain bodies as dirty, grotesque, or 
disordered, and others as clean and tidy, and experiences this conflict in terms 
of an attempt to transcend materiality in order to become clean, while 
perpetually, and ambivalently, being attracted to/repelled by the aspects of its 
own carnality that connote those stigmatized attributes (chapter two). The body 
produced by such a system seals itself up against invaders, but cannot evade 
the fact that it is only through acts of invasion that it exists (chapter three); it 
defines itself against what it regards as abject, but in doing so may seek a sense 
of integrity by regarding as abject not its own social marginality, but rather the 
institutions that attempt to control it (chapter four); although caught between 
the desire to transcend its materiality and the desire to affirm it, it remains 
unable either to abandon its carnality in the name of civilization, or reject 
civilization in the name of carnality, since both positions are in fact entailed in 
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each other (chapter five); finally it finds in its abjection the signs of its own 
relationship to those power structures which shame it, and consequently may 
become able to interrogate both the ways in which such shame determines its 
choices, and the legitimacy of those power structures which so construct it 
(chapter six). 
In these last pages I will offer a reading of Cronenberg's Rabid as a 
representation of the body focused on the four strands of the problems of 
embodiment that I have mapped out in the last four chapters of this thesis. I 
suggest that the film offers a useful analysis of the strengths and limitations of 
each strand as resources for political resistance. Moreover, Rabid suggests two 
important aspects of embodiment: firstly, that central to our understanding of 
what our body is, is its relationship to the bodies around it, those networks of 
meaning and desire, coercion and incitement, that pass between bodies; and 
secondly, that in a sense each subject is itself `between bodies', moving between 
different bodily forms and meanings, without ever coalescing finally into any 
one. 
In this final chapter, I want to suggest the range of the directions in 
which thinking about the body in these terms might be taken. In trying to 
suggest the full range of possibilities that my approach opens up, and the sheer 
diversity of sites of bodily change which might be incorporated in such an 
analysis, I offer readings of Rabid which often only touch briefly on some 
possible avenues, or which race through a number of equally plausible 
possibilities. I hope that these readings manage to be both provocative and 
speculative, since I want them to open up the arguments of this thesis even as 
they attempt to summarize and, to some extent, close it down. It is in the very 
failure to suggest some final, overarching textual emphasis derived from the 
arguments that I have made so far, that I intend this agglomeration of ways of 
reading Rabid to demonstrate conclusively the richness of thinking about the 
ambivalences of the social production of the body. 
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(ii) Foir Aspects of Bodily Ambivalence 
(a) Necessary Invasions: Revisiting Chapter Three 
`I'm hideous, doctor. I'm crazy. I'm a monster'. The resentful address 
of monster to mad scientist, creature to creator, is a familiar one within texts on 
unconventional bodily production 
- 
epitomized by the words spoken to Victor 
Frankenstein by his creation: `at first I started back, unable to believe that it was 
indeed I who was reflected in the mirror; and when I became fully convinced 
that I wis in reality the monster that I am, I was filled with the bitterest 
sensatiops of despondence and mortification' (Frankenstein, p. 114). ' In this 
case, it is spoken by Rose in Cronenberg's second commercial feature, Rabid. 
Rose is the survivor of a motorcycle crash who has been rescued from death by 
the surgical techniques of Dr. Daniel Keloid, near whose plastic surgery institute 
the accident occurs, and to whom she will later speak these words. Keloid takes 
skin from Rose's body and 
- 
via an unseen form of treatment 
- 
transforms it into 
`morphogenetically neutral tissue': tissue able to imitate the functions of 
whatever part of the body it is grafted onto. In Rose's case, however, she 
emerges from a month in a coma to find that the tissue has evolved into a new 
organ: under her arm is an opening, within which lies a fleshy protuberance 
tipped with a sharp spike, through which she drinks the blood of other humans. 
`His depiction of physical aberration and change is always metaphorical, 
never realistic' says Mark Kermode of Cronenberg ('David Cronenberg', p. 13) 2 
' Although Rabid is not one of her examples, Linda Badleygives an interesting 
account of the range of cinematic derivatives of Frankenstein (Film Horror and 
the Body-and Fantastic, pp. 65-100) 
2 Cronenberg, however, resists the metaphoric reading of his texts: `when I did 
Shivers and Rabid, any of the medical people we connected with thought it was 
realistic, not ridiculous' (John G. Harkness, `David Cronenberg 
- 
Brilliantly 
'Bizarre', p. 17). His own accounts of his work stress, 
-as 
I have done in this 
thesis, the proximity of his imagery of physical change to the physical realities of 
the human body. See for instance his comments inAlan Stanhrrook, 
`Cronenberg's Creative Cancers'; and Mark Kermode, ` David Cronenberg'. 
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which explain the precise nature of the metaphor. For 
Andrew Parker, the libidinal graft is a figuration of the relationship between 
Canada and Quebec, that sexualized, exoticized, feminized other intimately 
grafted ? nto 
- 
but somehow alien to 
- 
the Anglo-Canadian sense of self 
(`Grafting David Cronenberg: Monstrosity, AIDS Media, National/Sexual 
Difference'); for Robin Wood, Rose is the embodiment of a heterosexual male 
terror of female independence, her vampiric potency a phobic representation of 
the imaýined threat that women pose to men used rather to living off them 
('David Cronenberg: A Dissenting View'). Perhaps most ambitiously, Ira 
Livingston has juxtaposed Rose's implant with the film's first shots of Keloid, in 
which his business partner, Murray Cypher, puts a business proposition to him: 
to expand his hospital into a series of franchized plastic surgery clinics, funded 
by interested speculators. As Livingston points out, Keloid is concerned not to 
become transformed, mutated, or monstrous as a result of such an operation. 
He declares to his associates, `I sure as hell don't want to become the Colonel 
Sanders of plastic surgery', only to recognise that such economic necessities are 
out of his hands. Keloid's imminent fate thus suggests both the impossibility of 
independence and the inevitability of mutant growth: the logic of capitalism is 
the constant renewal, take-over, reappropriation and reinvention of existing 
product. In Livingston's reading Rose's bloodsucking new product thus 
exemplifies the logic of capitalism itself ('The Traffic in Leeches: David 
Cronenberg's Rabid and the Semiotics of Parasitism'). 
Such readings offer us a vision of Rose's new body as located within 
two discourses, each implicated with the other: the one which differentiates her 
(hideouf, crazy, a monster) from the other normal humans and settings of the 
film; and the one which erases her difference from them, insisting on the 
arbitrariiess of the differentiation. For this second discourse, Rose is only made 
monstrous as a displacement of the monstrosity that sustains the society which 
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produces her, which requires parasites, infection, and mutations in order to 
survive, so that in a sense the film turns her self-accusation against those who 
have produced her: you're hideous, you're crazy, you're monsters. 
However imprecise, I want here to retain the polyvalence of that term 
`the society which produces her', rather than to identify any particular aspect of 
it (its economics, its gender relations, its investment in national identity). For all 
of these readings suggest less the desirability of relating such images to any one 
facet of modem society than the general importance, across a range of social 
phenomena within modernity, of the concern with infection and mutation. 
However appealing these ideological diagnoses are, I want to suggest here, as I 
will repeat throughout this conclusion, that what interests me about this text is 
less its amenability to this or that ideological reading than its capacity to 
generate such readings. The recognition that all cultural artefacts are 
overdetermined makes it quite legitimate to go on producing new explanations 
for Rabid's bodily imagery, but I am suggesting here that it may be possible to 
restore that perhaps discredited structuralist project of asking not what a text 
means, but how it means. In the case of Rabid, its repetitive structure of 
transformative invasions may certainly be welded to any particular cause, but 
like Rose's own skin graft, it may mutate in directions beyond that, and not 
necessarily consonant with it. Just as Rabid is about monstrous growths, so too 
we should not expect the film itself to remain attached to any particular critical 
project, any more than Rose's new skin obeys Keloid's intentions. 
Rabid itself insists on making this point about the necessity of the 
invasive process by repeating its own central motif again and again: Rose, 
having acquired the graft that renders her hungry for blood, goes on to infect 
each of her victims with what appears to be a strain of rabies. Like her, her 
victims then infect others, their own biology transformed by the introduction of 
a new appetite. In its production of a chain of events which themselves each 
resemble one another, the film seems to play with the inescapability of its own 
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representation of modernity as a space of transmission, mutation and 
reproduction. Indeed, I would suggest that it even goes so far as to suggest that 
there can be no social phenomenon which does not follow the logic of 
infection/mutation. For in response to the plague, the authorities react by 
propagating a `plague' of their own 
- 
they inaugurate a vaccination programme, 
accompanied by an unstoppable spread of identity cards used to indicate 
successful immunization. Like Rose's plague both cards and cure are pressed 
onto unwilling subjects, imposed by border guards onto untreated citizens who 
pass through checkpoints. The biological intervention of the vaccination, the 
viral spread of cards, and the grafting of a new identity (as vaccinated) onto the 
old one recall the surgical procedures that inaugurated the crisis and the 
infectious practices that maintain it 
- 
so that we may reasonably read the film's 
represeý}tation of the World Health Organization as indicating a doubling of 
Keloid'I medical institute. But if we do so we must also in turn read it as a 
double of Keloid's other double 
- 
Rose. 
The film, then, is particularly unremitting in its representation of all 
forms of action as versions of the infectious dynamic. We might want to explain 
this in tTrms of an underlying social situation which generates such a view of the 
world. If we prefer a marxist explanation, that it is the commodity structure of 
capitalism; if we tend towards deconstruction, to argue that it is in the never- 
ending signifying chain of language; if we are postmodernists, to see in it the 
endless proliferation of the image heralded by Baudrillard and Debord 3 Yet in a 
sense to follow such paths is only to follow the path of the authorities in the film 
itself: the search for a founding point for the chain of contamination! I want to 
insist rather on the undecideability of this question, and to stress instead the 
s See Jean Baudrillard, `Simulacra and Simulations'; and Guy Debord, The 
Society of the Spectacle. 
' Bart Testa has suggested that the search for the origin of a bodily 
transformation is the central obsession of Cronenberg's-films-(`Technology, s 
Body: Cronenberg, Genre, and the Canadian Ethos'). 
343 
impossibility of defining any starting point, any `Patient Zero', for this 
condition. Rather than asking the diagnostic question `why? ', let us ask a 
question more appropriate to this thesis: what can we do with this situation? 
Rather than decoding the metaphors of the text, let us ask how we might 
encode our own bodily possibilities in their terms. 
The film's stress on invasion and mutation as the incessant logic of 
modernity is a reminder that Rose does not simply become a rebellious figure by 
her actions, but embodies the conventions of the society that produces her. As 
such, her monstrosity is not simply a sign of transgression, of bodily difference, 
but also of her sameness 
- 
her conformity to the monster that is modernity. The 
film thus dramatizes that particular political question that this thesis has focused 
on: the problems of staging acts of transgression or resistance while necessarily 
deploying resources produced by that which one would resist. In confronting 
both the damage that Rose does to the society around her, and the extent to 
which she resembles it, Rabid would seem a hopeful text precisely because it 
insists that the latter in no way limits or inhibits the effectivity of the former: to 
live via enforced forms of embodiment does not curtail the possibilities of our 
damaging the system that enforces them. 
Infection is, then, figured on the one hand as the destructive condition of 
the modem body, depicted here as the site of the replication of biological 
properties which may not be of any benefit to the bodies possessed by them and 
simultaneously as an assault on the integrity of the systems which require such 
biologically ordered subjects in order to go on functioning. When one of Rose's 
victims' victims' victims goes berserk on an underground train, her interruption 
of the smooth flow of commuters and consumers around the arteries of the city 
- 
itself suggestive of the inhabitants of the city as cells in circulation, some of 
them infected and some of them not 
- 
is as effective as any terrorist attack. The 
crowds that flood, terrified, from the open doors of the carriage are a sudden 




and therefore, we might suppose, late for work, for school, for 
meeting, for church. The body's openness to invasion, and its own invasive 
position vis-ä-vis the bodies around it, is then 
- 
as perhaps any Foucauldian 
position must always end up arguing 
- 
both the form of power, and the form of 
resistanne. Rabid warns both against the hope of some revolution which is not 
fashiongd out of what it opposes, and also against assuming that change cannot 
come about through such a heavily determined practice. While the film thus 
stresses the pain of being invaded, in the form of Rose's self-denunciation with 
which I began this section, it also insists on the necessity of such invasions in 
order to exist at all, and the possibility of deploying them creatively. If, in this 
way, the body is always both invaded and invading, then rather than 
constructing a politics primarily around a denunciation of those who invade us, I 
suggest that we recognize that we too are invaders of the bodies of others. 
Perhaps politics is simply the acceleration of our invasions. 
(b) Abject Heroism: Revisiting Chapter Six 
Rabid closes with Rose's corpse, lying amongst garbage bags, with a 
dog pulling at its leg. Waste disposal men, deployed as part of the imposition of 
martial flaw on a plague-ridden Montreal, retrieve her body, unaware of its 
importance, and throw it into the back of a garbage truck. Credits roll over the 
closed maw of the vehicle. 
rose's death signifies her final abjection, her reduction to the waste 
body. Tiffs end-point fulfils the logic of a process of abjection which has 
dominated the film: her becoming corporeal. Rose's descent into materiality is, 
in one important sense, prepared for even before the film begins: her part is 
ylayed by porn star Marilyn Chambers whose status 
- 
as stressed by the 
suggestive marketing stills used to promote the film (see Rodley, Cronenberg 
on Cronenberg, p. 55) 
- 
already functions to suggest that Rose is a character 
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more mrked than others by her use of, and involvement with, her body! 
! ler route into the final abjection that is death passes via other signposts 
of the dangers of being lost in embodiment: the increasing visibility of her naked 
body while other characters always appear clothed, her growing enslavement by 
her appetite, her associations with death, blood and plague. Our last view of her 
feeding comes when her lover, Hart, surprises her over the body of her friend, 
Mindy. The camera frames her entire body, one arm raised to display the 
protuberance which, before our eyes, slides back into the body as if in shame. 
The doifible close-ups of facial horror 
- 
his disgust at seeing what she has 
become, her shock at realizing that she has been seen by Hart for what she is 
- 
would seem to invite the audience to join in moral and physical repulsion. 
Such a representation of abjection will not, however, serve to make the 
simple case that the film constructs body matter as undesirable, in an 
unproblematically phobic way; nor, equally, the reading that I have disputed in 
chapter four, that abjection is a promising liberation from stifling convention. 
Rather, Rose makes again for us the point that I have stressed in my reading of 
Burroughs: an abject body is both the body at its most vulnerable and the body 
at its most potent. It is both a suffering body that is unable to escape its location 
as socially marginal, and a defiant body that refuses to hide the corporeality that 
certain bodies are obliged to symbolize so that others may deny their materiality 
more easily. 
If the abject body is a body that, in spite of its weaknesses, achieves 
i 
social change, it may be that in fact these images are less aversive than is often 
assumed. Too many accounts ofhorror routinely assume that abated and 
monstrous otherness can be read unproblematically from the diseased or 
s On Cronenberg's use of Chambers see John Harkness `The Word, the Flesh, 
and David Cronenberg', p. 92; and David Sanjek, `Dr Hobbes's Parasites', p. 65. 
Cronenberg discusses the casting of Chambers, over his initial choice of Sissy 
Spacek, in Rodley, Cronenberg on Cronenberg, pp. 45-56. For an analytical 
account of Chambers's career in pornography see. Linda Williams,. HardCore, 
pascim. 
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suppurating flesh of a monster. " In fact, I have sought with my reading of Seth 
Brundle to argue the opposite: that such a figure is the all too familiar 
materialization of our routine fears about our bodies, namely that they are ugly, 
unwelcome, and uncomfortable. Rather than seeing monstrosity as otherness, it 
may be }pore plausible to suggest that we see the monstrous body as very much 
like our own, and that rather than distancing ourselves from such images with 
dread, the dread that we experience in fact forms the ground of our 
identification with them, I have, though, steered clear of the notion of 
redeeming our dreaded materialities, since the force of these texts is to remind 
us that such an option is not (yet? ) possible. The attempt to overcome bodily 
discomfort seems fated to fail. Instead, though, we may identify the structures 
that encourage us to see ourselves as monstrous and the zones of privilege that 
they are connected to. We may deploy our discomfort as a 'resource, and 
through it come to ask: for whom am I disgusting, such that I have been made 
by them to feel also disgusting to myself? 
The case most commonly made by critics to explain Rose's construction 
as horrific is that her phallic protuberance marks her as usurping a male role - in 
particul4r through her appropriation of aggressive sexual appetite. In such a 
reading, Rose violates gendered norms, stepping outside her boundaries to 
become phallic woman extraordinaire. It is a critical commonplace to assume 
that her designation by the text as monstrous is an ideological strategy to render 
us hosti'e towards her: for men in the audience, to affirm the dangers of female 
autonomy; for women in the audience to warn against aspiring to such a 
monstrous status. ' But, as Carol Clover has insisted, the audiences of horror 
show few signs of such complacent identificatory practices (Men, Women and 
6 See for instance Noel Carroll, The Philosophy of Horror; Barbara Creed, The 
Monstrous-Feminine; and Stephen Prince, 
_ 
`Dread, Taboo and The Thing'. 
See for instance Noel Carrolll, The philosophy of Horror, p. 196; Michael 
O'Pray, `Primitive Phantasy in Cronenberg's Films' p. 50; and Robin Wood, 
`Cronenberg: A Dissenting View', pp. 130-131. 
347 
Chainsaws). Indeed, more recent writers on Cronenberg have moved away from 
the comfortable assertion of Rose as ideological pawn and towards a sense that 
she offers rather a defiance of male power 
- 
that her transformation suggests a 
refusal to be the passive recipient of the technology which attempts to 
appropriate her. " 
I would therefore suggest that we see in Rose a form of abject heroism, 
in which the audience may exult. Kaja Silverman has remarked that `the 
unconscious manifests a striking indifference to the question of what is 
conventionally assumed to be important or worthless' (The Threshold of the 
Visible fVorld, p. 180), instead investing devalued or loathed objects with 
positive emotional meanings. Nor is such a process solely unconscious, since 
creative audiences can selectively edit out, or re-accent, aspects of Rose 
represei ted as abhorrent: we may for instance read her violence as comic rather 
than horrific; find her graft erotic rather than repellent; or rejoice in the 
destruction of Montreal as a welcome violence against the modem urban order. ' 
Even if Rose's monstrous body is an image which derives from a dread of 
female power, there is no guarantee that the audience will read it in such a light. 
The appropriation of Rose for any given audience is thus not simply a 
function of the text. Our role here is not to read off its encoded messages (to be 
infected by it), but rather to insinuate our own interests into its images (to infect 
8 Kelley Hurley, `Reading Like an Alien', p. 214; and Ira Livingston, `The 
Semiotics of Parasitism', p. 522. 
9 This would suggest another limitation to Robin Wood's account of the horror 
genre, 'ýn Introduction to the American Horror Film' 
. 
Wood treats the 
question, of the appeal or repulsion of monstrosity as a purely formal feature. of 
the text, objectively embedded in its use of image, narrative, and sound, rather 
than negotiated creatively between audience members and their films (for a 
psychoanalytic account of film more along such lines, see David Rodowick, The 
Difficulty of Difference). It should also be-acknowledged that part of the force 
of Wood's account is his insistence that monstrosity may represent a desire for 
revenge against a repressive culture, but he limits such an argument by seeing it 
as active only- in those films that contain a_set of relevant textuaL features that 
constitute an intentional critique. 
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it in return). Against the question of whether a text has anything to teach us, I 
am offering the question: what can we teach it? Can we make Rose's story an 
affirmation of the overthrow of heterosexual monogamy in favour of bisexual 
promiscuity? " Of the refusal of patients to adhere to medical prescriptions of 
`health' (which might include the affirmations of bodies that are fat, suicidal, or 
anorexic 
- 
or, as in the case of Kathy Acker's refusal to submit to orthodox 
medical treatment, cancerous)? Of the pleasures of addiction? Of the right to 
perpetual travelling over a settled residence? Of the `mixing of blood' between 
cultures invested in the myth of racial purity? Within the constraints of academic 
discourse, we may be limited by certain interpretative rules (even though the last 
thirty years have seen those parameters stretched productively). But in the 
conversations that we may have with our friends about film the rules are, if not 
more flexible, at least flexible at different points. That is to say, while popular 
discourse rules out certain interpretations that academia may sanction (`that's 
going too far'), it also allows interpretations based on much more casual 
evidence (`well, what the film made me think about was... '). Our exposure to 
images that are designated repulsive may therefore motivate us to resist the 
larger structures that sustain such repulsion, rather than merely reinforcing our 
feeling stigmatized. Indeed, perhaps to the extent that those targeted by 
oppressive exercises of power live with the knowledge that our bodies carry the 
signs of our monstrous alien-ness, it is such monstrous images which will most 
secure our identification, as reminders of the ways in which we too may be 
marked as monstrous. 
Yet for both Rose and her progeny, the film offers no happy ending: the 
state moves quickly to treat the disease, to impose martial law, to secure its 
10 I retain 
- 
without any tone of disapproval 
- 
`promiscuity' over the currently 
popular `polyamöry', whose ideological complicities with notions of love, 
responsibility, and fidelity, seems to me to be a particularly distasteful sort of 
failure to challenge the wider terms in which `sex' and `love' are 
conceptualized. 
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boundaries. However much we re-imagine the film, we are still left with Rose's 
corpse removed by the garbage men. It is, though, the very difficulty of 
integrating this image with these more affirmative readings 
- 
its refusal to graft 
comfortably 
- 
that makes it such an important moment. For also, I now want to 
go on tq argue, a more exhaustively politicized reading of the film in fact 
requires this reminder of the force targeted against abject bodies: firstly as a 
reminder of what is at risk in refusing to denounce the abject, and secondly as a 
reminder of what is at stake in how we choose to position ourselves with 
respect fo abject bodies. 
That the film ends with Rose's death, her return to the status of waste, 
testifies to the dangers of occupying the place of the abject: in celebrating our 
monstrosity or marginality we make ourselves targets for sanitation. The 
'arbage truck has appeared already in the film. Rose's lover, Hart, and Keloid's 
business partner, Murray, have arrived in Montreal looking for Rose. They are 
stopped by police to allow the garbage trucks to pass, which have been sent out 
to collect the corpses of those shot down under martial law. As they wait, we 
watch the procession of trucks going past them 
- 
four, then six, then eight. 
Eventually Hart and Murray turn away to find another route, as the garbage 
trucks still file across the road, leaving us to register the impossibility of ever 
fully measuring the resources at the disposal of the state. To be abject is to be 
the target of such apparatus. 
1ýt the same time, Rose's abject body is also an important image, since 
the terror attached to such an image, and our concomitant experience of the 
risks that we run if we are unable to deny our proximity to the abject, has 
inaugurated an entire history of attempts by the marginalized to shift away from 
the site of such dangers, and towards constructions of identity which might 
enable them to be regarded as clean. For instance, sadomasochists, bisexuals, 
and tranýgendered people found themselves swiftly marginalized by lesbian and 
gay communities throughout the 1980s, as the hope that some had of becoming 
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acceptable bodies became mounted on the construction of other bodies as less 
worthy. " Hence, I suggest, to desire to be clean is also to be a cleaner 
- 
to be 
one of the garbage disposers who throw Rose's body away. One becomes a 
clean body only through participation in the logic of bodily waste, leaving the 
dynamiks of shame and transcendence untouched 
- 
or merely transferred onto 
another. If, in Douglas's formulation, dirt is matter out of place, one only 
becomes clean by defining that place in which others are designated dirty. Such 
a problem focuses us on one of the key questions explored by this thesis: in 
spite of all the ways in which to be stigmatized as monstrous are disenabling, 
how is # possible to dismantle the efficacy of such stigma by occupying, rather 
than distancing ourselves from, the sites of abjection? Such an approach 
suggests that it is most effective to initiate perspectives that will unsettle the 
discourses of stigmatization from within, since a more precipitate move simply 
to deny the experience of oneself as disgusting remains within the structure of 
an overriding faith in purity. 
The mobility of the meanings of Rose's monstrous body offers an 
audienc? the chance to sense the limitations of a contemporary social order, 
while fully aware of the terrible penalties attached to transgressing it. It eschews 
false promises of revolution as joyful, while also inviting us to develop new 
relationships between our own bodies and the bodies that surround us: new 
forms of desire, new forms of hostility, and new forms of consumption. Perhaps 
then it ý the audience who are Rose's final victims, and it is we who are the 
monsters, our own insurrectionary fantasies stirred to life by Rose's biology. 
Perhaps we should say that her own monstrous biology is ` morphogenetically 
neutral' in the sense that it is stripped of any particular meaning, so that we may 
graft it Qnto any part of ourselves, in the hope that it will take root. 
" On attempts by communities to render themselves more acceptable through a 
process of disowning, see Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, pp. 18-19 
andpp36-17 Mark Simpson(ed_)TAnti-Gay; and-Anna-Marie Smith, 
`Resisting the Erasure of Lesbian Sexuality: A Challenge for Queer Activism'. 
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(c) Avoiding Abjection: Revisiting Chapter Four 
Yet for all the necessity to find ways beyond faith in purity, it is also the 
case that the discourse of purity may itself be a valuable tool for an embodied 
politics 
- 
albeit at a price. Thus the third strand that I would suggest here is that 
of Burroughs's insistence that the abject body cannot operate in any simple way 
as a trope for liberation from an oppressive social order. The pleasures of the 
body 
- 
and more than this, the absolute phenomenological affirmation of the 
materiality of the corporeal 
- 
do not supply, stresses Burroughs, some primal 
grounding outside the ravages of culture, which we can affirm as an escape 
route. Our physical being is rather a site through which power struggles are 
enacted, and which is itself amenable to the demands of authority. Hence, of 
course, his proposal that we renounce embodiment altogether. 
If for some theorists cyberspace seems to offer just such a fantasmatic 
space of pure agency, shorn from a body weighed down by forces outside our 
control, then I am insisting that we remember that once we surrender the 
territory of embodiment, we have not escaped it, but have merely given up 
fighting for it: how then to make the most use of the desire to reject repulsive 
materiality? Since materiality in itself can be neither embraced nor rejected - 
being a contested site rather than one that is in some essential sense either 
within or outside operations of domination 
-I have read the Naked Lunch 
Quartet as offering us an alternative way of politicizing our discomfort with our 
materiality. Rabid offers an impressive development of the strategy pursued by 
Burroughs: that it may be possible to return abjection back against a dominant 
order in an act of strategic hygiene; it may be possible to affirm one's own 
cleanness not by stigmatizing the powerless, but by indicting the powerful. 
Barbara Creed has suggested that Cronenberg's films display and/or 
diagnose `phallic panic' 
- 
the male dread of female bodily otherness (Barbara 
Creed, `Phallic Panic: Male Hysteria and Dead Ringers'). But, I would suggest, 
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Rabid displays a different sort of phallic panic 
-a panic at the horror of the 
phallus itself. As we have seen Rose herself has been read as a `phallic woman': 
monstrous because her body has dared to appropriate male-ness to itself. At the 
most obvious level, Rose's protuberance is marked as phallic by its conventional 
resemblance to a penis: its shape and size, its sudden transition from passive to 
erect, its penetration of the bodies of others. Moreover, Rose's heavily 
sexualized encounters invite us to read her penetration of desired bodies not 
simply as an act of feeding, but of sexual congress. 12 
What is Rose's relationship to this organ that her body bears? Piers 
Handling suggest that `Rose's attacks can be read as being directed against the 
traditional male predator 
- 
the truck driver, the doctor' ('A Canadian 
Cronenberg', p. 112). But such a claim is, in one crucial respect, a serious 
misreading of Rose's encounters: many of the men she meets are not predatory, 
but are in fact heavily coded as un-masculine. Her encounter with the truck alno` 
driver nnnears at first to helnna to n ennventinnnl nnrnnaranhit. narrative (the >ý' 
.. 
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single female hitchhiker picked up by the truck-driver). In fact, the scene 
undermines such assumptions. The truck driver's first action is to offer Rose 
food, without any hint of innuendo or seduction strategy. However, when Rose 
reacts to the sandwich by becoming ill (since, as we know, she can only ingest 
human blood), he is quick to help her out of the truck, concerned about her 
health, supporting her as she leaves the truck, again without any traces of what 
we might read as an ulterior motive or attempted seduction. We then leap 
forward in time, to find the truck driver alone and asleep at the wheel of his 
12 More creatively, Livingston suggests that the organ's sucking of blood 
constitutes `an ecstatic kind of reverse ejaculation' (`The Traffic in Leeches', 
p. 518). In an altogether more straightforward fashion Cronenberg describes his 
own doubts during the script-writing stage: `At one point I said, "John, I just 
woke up this morning and realized this is nuts. Do you know what this movie's 
about? This woman grows a cock thing in her armpit and sucks people's blood 
through it. It's ridiculous !I can't do this. " '(Rodley, Cronenberg on 
Cronenberg, p. 53). 
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stationapy vehicle, having presumably been penetrated by Rose: but through its 
temporal leap any scene of an encounter between them has been erased, so that 
rather than suggesting pornographic or predatory codes, the sequence invokes 
them only to refuse them systematically at every available point. 
The truck-driver's concern, generosity, and worry on Rose's behalf 
should be seen as opposed to Rose's non-consensual appetite for blood, so that 
his (feminine) economy of a freely offered gift counterpoints her (masculine) 
economy of nutrition taken by force. The phallic aspect of Rose's graft is thus 
heightened by its systematic targeting of those marked as feminine: not only the 
female Victims Mindy and Judy, but also the virginal Lloyd (first seen in the 
feminine position of examining his face anxiously in a mirror), who responds to 
Rose's embrace with a coy `this is really weird 
- 
are you sure you know what 
you're 
.. 
', followed by his dismayed shedding of what we might read as 
hymeneal blood, after which Rose consolingly strokes his head; Dr. Keloid who, 
when he pulls away Rose's sheet to disclose her naked torso, looks not at her 
exposed breasts but only at her surgical scars; the fey, long-haired, young man 
mho approaches Rose in a shopping mall. 
Rose's organ serves to remind us that the phallic exists only by virtue of 
objects gendered 
- 
and I mean here, gendered rather than sexed - as non-phallic; 
as vulnerable, as passive, as caring, as weak: that is, as feminine. Rose's 
transformed body thus depicts phallic sexuality not as exciting, but as dependent 
on victimization. Rather than simply reading her attacks as acts of revenge 
between equals (one phallic body takes revenge on another), we should read 
them as acts constrained by 
- 
and revealing of 
- 
the destructive logic of 
heterosixuality itself 
Nevertheless, Handling's comment does point us towards another strand 
in Rose's attacks 
- 
against characters defined as conventionally masculine and 
predator\y. However, I would suggest that such encounters should not be read 
simply as a female revenge against male power, but also as reinforcing our sense 
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of the horrific nature of the phallic power which Rose's own body displays. In 
these encounters the film repeatedly deploys phallic tropes: the drunken farmer 
who attempts to rape Rose, announcing his attentions with the line ' I've got 
something you can drink off- and it ain't no whiskey neither'; the man at a porn 
cinema whose gaze moves casually from objectification of the actresses on 
screen to objectification of Rose in the seat in front of him. 
If these victims are deliberately offered to us as casualties of an ironic 
reversal 
- 
that they hope to penetrate, possess, and assert their power over a 
female target but end up penetrated, possessed and feminized 
- 
then the point is 
surely to underline the violence of their mode of embodiment, the violence of 
the phallic. This process reaches its apotheosis when an infected road-repair 
crew attacks representatives of the health authorities. Their weapon: a long road 
drill. Their attack would seem designed to recall Rose's mode of attack: the 
rigid protuberance that penetrates through the skin to draw blood. In shape, in 
function, in its associations with aggressive masculinity, it is the distillation of 
the phallic into the horrific: the phallus as the bloody, violent weapon, shorn of 
social utility. 




marks phallic masculinity, and 
Rose's acquisition of it, as itself monstrous, and the phallus as an object of fear 
and repulsion. It is not my aim here to make a more detailed argument for why 
the phallus might be amenable to refiguration as monstrous. A list of possible 
topics for future inquiry might include: that because he can never possess this 
fantasmatic organ, the sight of the perfect phallic creature provokes intense 
shame in the male viewer, and is therefore to be dreaded; that the phallus stirs 
homoerotic desires in the heterosexual male viewer which he transforms into 
horror in order to repress them; that the phallus denotes the fact that we are all 
forced to submit to the law of the father, and it is therefore the signifier of his 
hated domination; that the power of the phallus is also a displacement of the 
physical vulnerability of the penis 
- 
and so the very physicality, the fleshiness of 
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the monster, is a horrific reminder of everything about it that is not symbolic 
and transcendental (Rose's protuberance, for instance, appears as raw red flesh 
surrounded by a thin glistening membrane, suggesting that it might be easily cut, 
and it might easily bleed). 
It is not my intention to expand on any of these, but my overall point is 
this: Rabid depicts Rose's transformation as bad to the extent that it makes her 
like men 
- 
in the sense that male power is itself bad. I would insist that reading 
Rose's male attributes as being monstrous insofar as they are illegitimately 
possessed by a woman, along the lines that other critics have suggested, 
overlooks the ways in which they are systematically represented to us as 
monstrous in and of themselves. And this is achieved through the film's 
unremitting deployment of the most stereotypical definitions of the phallic: 
piercing protuberances; rigid tools; cylindrical weapons; tumescent organs; 
throbbing motorcycles 
- 
all coupled with aggressive, gazing, possessive, 
domineering, authoritarian behaviours. Yet their systematic distribution through 
the text serves, ultimately, not to confirm the meaning of the phallic, but rather 
to disorganize its meaning. It is precisely insofar as we recognize at every turn 
the familiarity of the phallic that we are enabled also to recognize the relentless 
assault to which its more conventional meanings are submitted, as they are 
stripped of any positive valency and replaced by the figure of the abject phallus. 
To cement this abjection of the phallus, Rabid also offers us men whose 
positive connotations he in their refusal to possess its characteristics. " The 
opening shot of the film shows Rose walking out from a bar towards a 
motorcycle. The camera circles her, starting from behind: in doing so it inscribes 
her within a system of vision which is both omnipotent (it can watch her, she 
cannot watch it), and omnipresent (it can see her from every possible angle), a 
textbook case of that staple of feminist film theory, the male gaze. There is an 
" It thus evinces that capacity for gender mutability which Carol Clover has insisted is central to horror cinema (Men, Women and Chainsaws). 
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immediate cut to Hart who also steps through the door, standing now in the 
place from which the camera began its journey, occupying the site of that 
omnipotent gaze. But rather than registering control, sexual objectification, or 
authority, Hart's face crumples into a smile: as he stands fixed to the spot, his 
wide, mournful eyes, his adoring gaze, and his gentle, sheepish grin signify 
adoration and tenderness. His expression marks him not as the possessor of that 
circling gaze, but as its antithesis, a utopian possibility of unoppressive romance 
signalled by the pastoral soundtrack which plays over the opening scene, and 
which afcompanies Hart throughout the film 
-a possibility most obviously 
marked by the pun associated with his name. "' 
This failure to occupy the conventional position of male authority recurs 
throughout the film: just as Hart's name places him not in the realm of intellect 
or actioi, but in that of emotion, so too other men are removed from positions 
of conventional masculinity. I have already noted the way that the truck driver 
fails to occupy the traditional pornographic role assigned to him, and in the 
same way we see Murray awake at four in the morning, nursing his baby, and 
holding p bottle 
-a kind of feminization of the phallus. Hart's investment in 
traditional masculinity extends to working ardently on repairing his damaged 
motorcycle, but he never in fact manages to fix the machine 
- 
just as he never 
manages to fix Rose's predicament; instead, he travels to one scene after the 
next, on each occasion arriving only after Rose has left. They thus join Lloyd 
and Kelpid in the film's litany of harmless, well-intentioned, thoughtful male 
figures. 
If the film opposes this benign masculinity to the phallic aggression that 
il-indicts, it does not do so by offering such warmth as a narrative solution to 
the problem of destructive masculinity embodied by Rose: none of these men 
" Williai Beard reads Hart's name as a commentary on the fact that in 
Cronenberg's-work love, fails to make- any real difference-to events ('The 
Visceral Mind', p. 29). 
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prevent or impede the phallic violence that devastates their lives. The litany 
would run: Lloyd, Keloid, the truck-driver, all killed by Rose; Murray killed by 
his infected wife; Hart wandering ineffectually from one scene to the next. It 
seems that to be a benign male is to be unable to defend oneself 
- 
that self- 
preservation is incompatible with abdication of the phallus. Indeed, such an 
incompatibility would seem to be particularly forcefully literalized when an 
over-zealous guard guns down a Father Christmas in the shopping mall. " 
Between masculine versions of ruthless efficiency and benign sentimentality 
there can only be eternal conflict. " Insofar as this masculinity is in any sense 
marked ps preferable, it is not in the sense that it is figured as a source of 
alternative achievements to violence, but only as its likeable, if useless, other. 
Given the curious fact that it is Rose who wields the phallus, we should perhaps 
offer a more nuanced term for the inability of these men to wield power: 
impotence. Which might, in a sense, constitute the most absolute rejection of 
virile notions of `heroism' that we could propose: to affirm the anti-masculinist 
possibility of being absolutely ineffectual. 
We can read the film's juxtaposition of these two alternatives in either of 
two ways. We can read it as an act of ideological recuperation: the presence of 
these benign men serves to make Rose even more repellent to us, replacing her 
P Santa's death has drawn its fair share of critical attention. Other writers on 
this incident include: Piers Handling, who sees it as an attack on `traditional 
bourgeois patriarchal morality' ('A Canadian Cronenberg', p. 111); Ira 
Livingston, who views it as a symbol for the auteurist position that is inevitably 
destroyed-by heavily generic cinema ('The. Traffic_ in Leeches', p. 528); and 
William Beard, who sees it as part of the film's insistent comic undermining of 
the stability of apparently normal situations ('The Visceral Mind', pp. 29-30). 
16 Of course, we might also want to argue that the sentimentalized figure of the 
benign male and the aggressive figure of the violent phallic male may collude as 
well: one thinks of the way that violent partners, abusive employers, and sexual 
abusers of children, play out the two roles, sustaining a system of punishment 
and reward which disempowers those whom they abuse by making it difficult 
for them to construct a. coherent and-oppositional image of their abusers as 
wholly bad. Considerations such as this might be the starting point for an 
altogether less sympathetic reading of Rabid's systematic confusionofgender 
codes. 
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more radical message of the horror of the phallic with a promise that in fact 
some mmn are not phallic after all 
- 
they are considerate, well-meaning and 
friendly. In such a reading the text in effect suggests not so much that male 
power is repulsive, but that women have no need to aspire to it since in fact 
aggressive heterosexual masculinity is itself becoming a thing of the past. 
Qn the other hand, we can see that through this juxtaposition the film 
strengthens the reading of Rose as possessed by a phallic invader, since it marks 
the absolute incompatibility of benign masculinity and phallic authority. There 
cannot be, this film insists, some sort of remaking of phallic masculinity into 
somethipg positively potent: the choices are to be violent and aggressive, or to 




competent. In a sense, the 
manner of Rose's death follows this position through to its point of necessary 
confusion: hoping to prove that she is not the source of the plague, Rose 
chooses a new victim, drinks his blood, and then locks herself into an apartment 
with his sleeping body. If, she reasons, she is not the source of the plague then 
she has nothing to fear from him when she awakes. Narrating her plan to Hart 
over the telephone, she has become the rational planner, in charge of her 
destiny, executing her own plan by means of the bodies of others. Minutes later 
she becomes the screaming feminine victim, calling `I'm afraid, I'm afraid' into 
the receiver as her victim/victimizer awakes: Hart, on the other end of the line, 
also scrgams and sobs, now her equally impotent mirror image. In these final 
moments Rose has plunged into the absolute indeterminacy of the gender codes 
mobilized by the text. Insofar as she has adopted a masculinized body she has 
received not only a violent phallic identity, but has also taken herself into that 
other mile possibility of the film marked by Hart and Lloyd, so that she now 
also emmodies impotent masculinity. Her rationality proves fatally flawed and, 
like Keloid's medical rationality which inaugurates the narrative, leads only to 
her destroying herself. Which of these choices if any, lead to bodies that we 
might feel happy with? 
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The undecideability of the text on this question mimes the 
undecideability of corporeality. Like the text, the body is torn between the 
impulses to constitute itself in any of these forms: abjectly phallic, abjectly 
feminine, aggressively masculine, aggressively feminine, benignly masculine, 
benignly feminine. Rabid reminds us that any given form of embodiment is not 
simply located within a definite ideological project, but is rather a contested site 
pulled between different bodily possibilities. The competing connotations of all 
the ways in which a body might be gendered, and all the physical forms through 
which that gender might be expressed, suggest a more fluid reading of the 
body's movement through gendered positions which are not in any simple way 
aligned for or against some hegemonic notion of corporeal gender. 
Such complexities all derive from the film's attempt to indict authority 
as abject. If the film at times seems like a celebration of fascism, with martial 
law the preferable alternative to impotence, then this is because it is unable to 
extricate itself from these impasses. For insofar as it seeks to condemn power as 
a sort of chaotic monstrosity it is indeed allied with a fascistic wish for control 
and purity. But insofar as it has figured authority as itself abject, the film 
simultaneously militates against such desires. And it is in its rendering it 
impossible to affirm any single form of ideal embodiment that Rabid suggests its 
own type of bodily freedom: there is no ideal bodily form 
- 
no body that 
guarantees liberation. There is only the politics of body's failure to occupy any 
one form or category. 
As I stressed throughout my earlier reading of Burroughs, these are the 
insoluble problems of attempting to articulate a political vision in terms of 
abjection: Rose's biology represents both the form of the modem body, and the 
form that resists it; it is both the promise of a different form of embodiment, and 
a descent into the embodied norms of masculinity; it encourages her to act in 
ways that are celebrated because they transgress bodily norms, and are hideous 
because they merely repeat the logic of those oppressive bodily norms. The text 
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thus encompasses, simultaneously: a representation of Rose as monstrous 
because she exceeds permitted female bodily forms; a representation of Rose as 
monstrous because she typifies oppressive male bodily norms; a representation 
of Rose as appealingly transgressive because she defies a whole range of bodily 
norms; and a representation of Rose as appealingly conservative because she 
embodies an acceptably potent masculinity. 
It would be too easy simply to lament the limitations of these visions of 
gender, abjection and transgression, and to offer in their place some new casting 
of the non-abject non-phallic body: the body that gets outside these repetitive 
circles. But what interests me is precisely the entrenchment of these positions. 
Even though they so obviously offer no decisive break from dominant 
conceptions of gender, they also suggest that it is not necessary to make such a 
break in order to push the codes of the gendered body towards uncertainty and 
confusion. Indeed, we might even say that it is only because Rabid is so 
relentless in its deployment of a set of conventional and reactionary images 
(warning against weak men and strong women), that it can make its equally 
insistent, and more subversive case 
- 
for the appeal of weak men and strong 
women. It therefore seems to me important not to try to elaborate some 
alternative that enables us to step outside of such codes, but rather to persist in 
working inside them, to see what sorts of resistance they may open up for us 
from within. 
(d) The Body Modelled: Revisiting Chapter Five 
What Rose helps us to resist 
- 
purity, invasion, aggression 
- 
then is, 
curiously, also that which she serves to celebrate or affirm In a sense it does 
not matter whether we attribute this to the multivalence of the text or to the fact 
that I am deploying several (incompatible) reading strategies: either way, the 
encounter with Rabid yields both an image of the possibility of bodily 
insurrection as an anarchic assertion against a repressive social order, and 
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equally the fact of invasive aggression as repulsive precisely because it fulfils the 
most destructive and unjust facets of such an order. 
This is the fourth aspect of bodily logic, which I have argued in my 
reading of Shivers: that modern embodiment involves both incitement to desires 
which are figured as animal/material, and condemnation of and warning against 
such desires. Modernity seems haunted by this fact: that which it warns against 
our ever being is that which it requires us to become. The modern construction 
of the desirable seems always to resemble the modern construction of the 
dreaded. When Joseph Conrad's definitive modern subject, Kurtz, names his 
own abjection with the words `the horror, the horror', he does not assert that 
horror is the recognition that a culture shames itself when it regresses to 
forbidden practices which it should have evolved beyond (which would be an 
essentially Enlightenment account of Heart of Darkness). Rather, he defines 
horror as the recognition that what is supposedly forbidden is in fact already at 
the heart of the routine practices of the culture that forbids. 
Rabid takes care to indicate that the pleasures of materiality are 
pleasures firmly within culture. Just as, as we saw in Shivers, alongside 
exhortations to eat, enjoy sex, shop and exercise, there exists the fear of 
becoming a dangerously material creature in the process, so too Rabid 
transposes this process onto other trappings of modernity: the libidinal roar of 
the motorcycle that accompanies the opening credits, the fetishistic leathers in 
which Hart and Rose are dressed, the bodily pleasures of plastic surgery, the 
jacuzzi in which the unfortunate Judy Glasberg takes her last bath. But even 
more than this, it locates such ambivalently regressive yearnings at the heart of 
modernity: in the violence of the bureaucratic state which legislates over its 
citizenry. 
Just as Rose has most often been read as a version of modern medicine 
- 
her bloodletting and bloodsucking a parodic re-enactment of that of the doctors 
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who transformed her"- we might also compare her to various other of the 
institutions in the film. `The city is a complex machine' declares the mayor's 
assistant, explaining his unwillingness to intervene - but the persistent 
suggestion of the film is that the city is less a machine than an organism. Against 
this attempt by the servants of the state to frame it in terms of the disembodied, 
mechanical world of modernity, Rabid restores to modernity the biology that it 
is attempting to deny. `I've got a pack of hungry investors waiting for me' quips 
Murray, inaugurating a chain of physical imagery associated with the apparatus 
of this world. Appetite is the recurrent concern of the film 
- 
from Rose's own 
bloodthirsty desires to the repeated observations regarding her glucose drip that 
`that juice is keeping you alive'- stressed in order to remind us that the appetite 
is never unproblematically modernized, but remains susceptible to connotations 
of animal impulses. Central to the film's elaboration of such a position is the 
scene in which Rose tries, but fails, to drink the blood of a cow in a barn. Once 
we begin tracing the film's interest in the bodily and appetitive operations of 
modernity, then this incident connects to the extended later scene at a roadside 
diner, in whose kitchen the sign `HAMBURGERS' is prominently displayed. 
The earlier rural scene transcribes into this modern, technological site a 
reminder of the origins of the meat that the customers eat (as it will again, when 
the truck driver offers Rose `steak on a bun'). It thereby marks as carnivorous 
the appetites of the customers, whose proximity to cannibalism will be 
underscored when the infected farmer 
- 
who interrupted Rose during her 
attempt to ingest the cow's blood 
- 
grabs first a piece of roast chicken and then 
the human arm of the waitress. Rabid thus folds one notion of meat onto 
another 
- 
marking the human body both as consumer and as consumed, but in 
" Ira Livingston amplifies this reading via an extended etymology of the term 
leech. Just as in the Middle-Ages medicine was synonymous with the leech, 
medicine may now be regarded as leechlike in another way: because private 
medicine siphons away the resources of its users and the obligations of the state. 
Rose's own leeching capacities thus doubly resemble the Keloid Clinic ('The 
Traffic in Leeches'). 
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either case as simply one point in an essentially animalistic food chain. The 
ramifications of such a suggestion reach even further when we recall Keloid's 
fear of becoming `the Colonel Sanders of plastic surgery', a phrase which now 
seems to make medicine and fast food simply two sorts of commercial delivery 
of meat. And in turn both of these may seem in this film to be figured as 
versions of a more animalistic impulse to rend or devour the flesh of other 
creatures. 
In my general concern to point out the ways in which modernity is 
rendered horrifically bodily, we should not ignore all the other ways in which it 
might alpo be figured as horrific. I am not suggesting that fear of the body 
constitutes the defining, and all-explanatory, case for horror. I am only offering 
a reading based on temporarily suspending an enquiry into those other anxieties. 
f3owever, it may also be that we can find another productive route into the 
construction of the body through those very moments at which it seems least 
central. We might, for instance, consider the way in which accompanying these 
images of modernity as a place of bodily drives is the unmasking of its 
calculatfd cruelty 
-a streak which, while it might at first appear to have little to 
do with this more bodily side of modernity, nevertheless constitutes an 
important variant of the representation of modernity as destructive. But here too 
I want to suggest, the film offers the possibility of reading a more visceral 
element into it. If the Keloid Clinic is one form of modern monstrosity, and 
Rose its embodied emblem, then the medical officials who monitor the spread of 
the plague are another. As Andrew Parker observes, `the director of the WHO, 
intoxicated with his own powers, is clearly a monster himself (`Grafting David 
Cronenlterg', p. 219). This character's defining (televised) speech runs: `what I 
am saying is very simple, and it may not be very palatable for your viewers: 
shooting down the victims is as good a way of handling them as we've got'. But 
Parker could perhaps have taken the argument further by defining the particular 
connotations that cling to this figure: his being the only character in the film 
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with an English accent, his careful distancing of his own cultured presence from 
the plebs who are `your viewers', and his pointed surname of Dr. Gentry, surely 
invite us to read his callous willingness to countenance the extermination of the 
masses as an echo of the class structure that sustains the West 
-a connection 
surely even more pointed in a Canadian context, where the English overseer 
acquires a distinctively colonial cast. " 
Such an account reminds us that modernity appears not only as 
horrifically bodily, but also as horrifically disembodied: as the calculating 
cynicism of authority, and rationally organized bureaucratic cruelty. Yet even 
here Rabid also offers a reminder that the suspiciously libidinal body is never 
absent from modem power. For Rabid insists on posing the question of the 
bodily pleasures that might drive such attitudes. Its representation of modernity 
is as that which is driven by destructive hunger. Such a construction of the body 
as the driving force of the disembodied is the reminder that behind the cold 
calculations of the businessman is the endless hunger of the profiteer 
- 
and, as in 
this case, behind the detached facade of the international bureaucrat is the 
murderous megalomania of transnational government. Whatever the problems 
of collapsing these various forms of violence into one another 
- 
and, as I 
suggested in my readings of Night of the Living Dead and Alien, there are many 
- 
it is this systematic erasure of the differences between these various 
institutional forces that makes the film able to mobilize its central trope of 
bodily greed. It is as if under every aspect of the modern economic-political 
order, from aristocracy to shareholders, corporate chairmen to middle-class 
consumers, over-paid professionals to legislating bureaucrats, is this single 
bodily impulse: appetite. And such a critique is wholly appropriate, since those 
who have benefited economically from the state's uneven distribution of wealth 
- 
whether the indulgent aristocracy, the affluent middle-classes or the 
supposedly parsimonious petit-bourgeoisie 
- 
have traditionally been the targets 
'$ Full Canadian independence was not secured until 1982. 
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of a critique of carnal excess, enunciated by those at whose expense they 
possess their wealth. The bodies of the privileged display the signs of their 
prosperity and are the targets of hostility 
- 
or indeed envy 
- 
directed at their 
possession of an excessive material wealth which is derived from the consuming 
of-the energy and well-being of the bodies who maintain that affluence. 
Such a critique of class structures as essentially cannibalistic 
- 
which 
finds its most visceral expression in the body horror film Society (1989), where 
the grotesque upper classes are revealed as surviving because they dissolve and 
devour their proletarian inferiors 
- 
thus runs alongside this other critique of 
modernity. The over-rational, disembodied, cold expression of power doubles 
with the aggressive, visceral, appetitive expression of power. Rabid is thus a 
reminder of the ways in which the figuration of bodily desire as the expression 
of destrictive authority imbricates itself with these other, less explicitly organic, 
represerations of evil. 
Composed of this assembly of violent parts, the state finally fulfils its 
brutal promise through the imposition of martial law. Where Wayne Drew reads 
such a process as one in which `the mechanisms of the state collapse and 
fragment when faced with the horror of a disease infested city' ('A Gothic 
Revival', p. 20), I would argue that the all-too thoroughly effective imposition of 
martial law signifies rather the proximity of the democratic state to efficient 
tptafitarianism. The linking of these less explicitly bodily indictments of state 
brutality should, I suggest, be taken in parallel with the more obviously 
embodied forms of business 
- 
hungry investors, leeching doctors, carnivorous 
fast food franchises 
- 
as a picture of modernity imaged as animalistic or 
barbaric, 
Again, we should not try to read any single one of these power 
structures as the ground, to which the others are figures. Rather, the entire 
thrust ofthe film is to level out these differences, representing the modern state 
as a conglomeration of technologies working in tandem. The Foucauldian 
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settings of the film 
-a prison, a hospital - combine with the shifting of scenes 
between porn cinemas, hamburger bars, shopping malls, military units, health 
officials, garbage disposal crews and bureaucrats. All suggest that modernity is 
a combination of monstrous bodily functions: appetite, aggression, 
bloodsucking, excretion, rape. But, as I have stressed throughout this thesis, I 
am not arguing that any innate biological instincts are in fact the origin of these 
social structures. Rather I am suggesting that Rabid invites us to take the entire 
language of monstrous biology that is conventionally used to define the 
parameters of ab/normal bodies, and to turn it against the structures of the 
modem state 
-a gesture which should be read as a political strategy of 
dethroning their supremacy, since that supremacy is based on the myth of their 
disembodied rationality. And it is on these terms that I suggest that we may 
make the best allegiance with Cronenberg: to take his films' figurings of the 
body as the hidden truth of modernity and read it not as an insight, as we have 
seen so many critics do with his work, but rather as an ironic and provocative 
reversal which is at its most effective when, as in Rabid, we can simultaneously 
see any myth of a natural corporeality being dismissed by the film's insistence 
that the body is as much produced by the conditions of these institutional 
apparatuses as it is productive of them. 
Produced by the forces which she antagonizes, rendered variously as a 
futuristic promise of modern technology, a regression backwards to animal 
passion, and a contradictory trope for the dependence of the modern 
(disembodied) state on those attributes most conventionally designated 
excessively bodily, Rose remains a difficult object for the text 
- 
and, I hope, for 
its audience: again, we are left wondering in which of these possible ways to 
read her. That the ways in which our bodies are physically shaped, psychically 
invested, and discursively defined, are never totalizing or final, has been one of 
the abiding concerns of this thesis. And it is, I would suggest, at the heart of 
Rabid, which plays with the tension between the image of the body as matter 
367 
under cgntrol, and matter refusing to follow orders: the difficulty of knowing 
which way to read Rose is a function of the difficulty of pinning down the 
meaning of bodies themselves. 
One innovation brought into textual analysis through Critical Theory is 
the liberty to seize on some almost incidental device of a text and to use it to 
open up an entire new current in its reading: a mis-spelt word or muffled line, a 
pun or echo of another text, a single ambiguous word or punctuation mark. 
Although I have some reservations about such a route, its appeal lies in its 
capacity to heighten a text's amenability to the network of uses to which it 
might bý put by its readers (and perhaps, in the case of this text, it suggests an 
echo of the rabid process itself 
- 
the meanings of one moment spreading, 
unstoppably, to infect other moments, images, characters, scenes, camera 
movements, and narrative devices in the film, which might have hitherto seemed 
immune to such an interpretation). "' It is in that spirit of pandemic semiosis that 
I conclude this analysis of Rabid with a poster seen briefly outside a 
pornographic cinema which Rose enters. Waiting to enter the cinema, in search 
of a nevr victim, Rose looks momentarily at a poster that reads `Models for 
Pleasure'. And it is this question of the models available for pleasure that the 
film seems to address: where does desire originate? What is it in the body that 
seeks out disruptive pleasures? If Rose's body exceeds conventionally 
conceptualized forms of embodiment, is she then a representation of a new form 
of pleasure? 
Such a position has certainly been taken by Kelly Hurley, who argues 
that the elm explores the desire to exceed our received notions ofbiological 
pleasure `Reading Like an Alien'). She suggests that for all its passing 
" As Rita Felski has suggested, this willingness to find new meanings in any text 
should l? e regarded not as an essential feature of some entity called `textuality', 
but ratheLas a historically specific effect of the way that the construction of the 
category of `the aesthetic', and the freedom to interpret texts in that category, 
has been produced through bourgeois notions of apublic sphere 
-ofmultivocal 
cultural debate (Beyond Feminist Aesthetics). 
368 
resemblances to a penis, Rose's development of a new organ exceeds any 
hitherto imagined sexual organ, while its invention of new modes of accessing 
the bodies of others (through an eye, an armpit, an elbow, the neck, the hand, a 
cheek) shows a disregard for conventionally sanctioned modes of sexual contact 
and offers the invention of original bodily possibilities. But despite the appeal of 
such a reading, the poster would conversely suggest that perhaps pleasure can 
only exist with a model: that there is no original pleasure, but only pleasure that 
is modelled on some other form Certainly Rose's pleasure, for all its apparent 
biological innovation, can also be read, as I have stressed throughout this 
chapter, as an expression of other sorts of relationship. It is this capacity of 
Rose to resemble so many other forms of institutional interchange that has led 
critics to suggest that the film's titular adjective, `rabid', be applied to the 
workings of the film itself. 20 The film thus maps out processes that are 
themselves rabid: the endlessly infectious nature of signification, whose 
meanings transfer from one object to another without any one term having 
priority, and the appetite's hungry pursuit of the next object to devour. 21 
This ceaseless transmission of meaning should also, I want to suggest, 
be read as a ceaseless transmission of physical change. For it is fundamental to 
bodies that they are in a process of becoming, that they learn from and react to 
those bodies around them. Our bodies are always in search of the models by 
which we make them comprehensible both to ourselves and to others around us 
- 
always enacting the repetition of norms and the absorption of physical 
conventions by which the body's place within the social is regulated. To 
20 See Tania Modleski, `The Terror of Pleasure: The Contemporary Horror Film 
and Postmodern Theory', p. 161; and Ira Livingston, `The Traffic in Leeches', 
p. 527. 
21 `This indeterminacy of the metaphorical order, usually overlooked by the 
psychology of archetypes, in fact merely reproduces the random character of 
associative fields, as established so forcefully by Saussure: there is no giving 
pre-eminence to any of the terms of a declension' (Roland Barthes, `The 
Metaphor of the Eye', p. 123). 
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reiterate the tripartite division that I made at the start of this thesis, this 
necessitates: the harnessing of opportunities to regulate the physical form of 
bodies, the maintenance of a psychic body-map invested with fear and desire, 
and the constant discursive definition of a body's meanings. In looking again at 
these prpcesses, I want to emphasise the extent to which, in all of these 
domain, they take place through the body's imitation of other bodies around it. 
Such imitative re-production includes those material changes by which 
the body is refitted for new functions and activities, and their concomitant social 
domains: the development of a new body shape through exercise, or of new 
body movements and postures to facilitate the inhabitation of particular 
subcultures (one thinks for instance of the way that gay men newly coming out 
may develop camp as a means of defining a relationship in and to gay 
- 
and for 
that master straight 
- 
culture). It includes psychic changes, by which the 
imaginary body which models subjectivity is remade to enable different desires. 
This body-image, as we heard Lacan say earlier, has `an autonomous existence 
of its own, and by autonomous I mean here independent of objective structure' 
('Some Ieflections on the Ego', p. 13), and as such might include: the 
anorexia's dependence on a psychic body-map that borrows fat from the bodies 
of others; those psychic re-imaginings of the human body as an animal body, 
which so fascinate Deleuze and Guattari (A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 232-309); 
or-the more prosaic absorption of everyday objects (from wedding rings and 
wheelchairs to body piercings and handguns) which become so intimate as to be 
psychically fitted into the conception of one's own body. And it includes 
discursive transformations by which one set of meanings attached to a body are 
reaccentuated in favour of another: for instance, the transformations in the 
namings of skin colour, physical impairment, and genitals, that are so 
vehemently being fought around those contested words `nigger', `cripple', and 
`cunt'. Iý all these cases, bodies change through the other bodies that they come 
into contact with 
- 
absorbing and transferring their characteristics, their outlines, 
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their meanings, into the psychic-material-discursive substance of that 
phenomenon called the body. 
In my insistence on the malleability of the body at all levels, I have tried 
to stress both the body's amenability to control and its capacity to exceed 
control. It is regulated by being offered the conventions of other bodies to 
follow but, as we can see from the preceding list, bodies become unstable 
through their very eagerness to attain the stability promised by absorbing the 
properties of those other bodies. In re-producing themselves bodies absorb not 
only the permitted possibilities of the right posture or voice, but also other 
materials, any one of which may be legitimate in the location at which it is first 
noticed, but becomes illegitimate when taken on by a body for whom it was not 
intended. That is, I am suggesting, Rose's annexing of the phallic should be seen 
as the appropriation of a legitimate bodily possibility, which becomes 
illegitimate in the act of being located in a new place 
- 
both on the body of a 
woman, and indeed under the armpit ! As such, I would want to read it in 
conjunction with other bodily borrowings, such as: white youth's co-option of 
dance forms from black culture; drug users' demands that when their bodies 
become unwell they receive the same healthcare routinely accorded to bodies 
injured in the pursuit of other equally pointless leisure activities; or lesbian 
culture's annexation of the poses, styles and codes of male bodies. These are all 
acts which relocate in inappropriate bodily places certain forms or meanings 
which had been entirely sanctioned, if not compulsory, in their original 
locations. Such an account finds a way of granting agency, rebellion, innovation, 
and resistance to the body 
- 
goes beyond treating the body merely as the passive 
matter on which culture writes 
- 
while avoiding the temptation of granting the 
body some sort of originary or independent life. As I have sought to do 
throughout this thesis, it situates the body's capacity for innovation as a 
condition of its dependency on what surrounds on 
- 
on its very malleability. 22 
72 This is one crucial way in which my account differs from the work of Judith 
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Yet, as the above examples should all indicate, it reminds us of the extent to 
which in doing so bodies become enmeshed with the regulatory power of forces 
such as medicine, racism, and masculinity, which may do as much damage as 
they enable opportunities for pleasure and resistance. 
It is thus fitting that Rabid stages a thorough disarticulation of attempts 
to pin down the form or meaning of the body 
- 
the project which defines martial 
law within the film. The law's attempts at separation, identification, and 
elimination are confronted by the ways in which various forms of classification 
prove unstable throughout the film. For all the apparent success of identity 
cards, vaccinations, and checkpoints, the film is more pointedly about the 
collapse of various crucial epistemological distinctions: between male and 
female, between civilization and barbarism, between human and non-human 
- 
social categories which are, after all, only sustained through regulatory practices 
that are more socially acceptable versions of Rabid's martial law. The 
movement between those terms is rendered through the bodies on display, 
reminding us that it is through the material and psychic forms taken by bodies 
that such systems are destabilized. Attempts to keep bodies separate founder on 
this problem: that they borrow from one another. Rose's acquisition of the 
phallus 
- 
like her lover's becoming all `h[e]art' or Murray's acquisition of 
maternity 
- 
suggests the body's mutability in terms of its adoption of other 
models of being and pleasure. The possibility of defining and sustaining 
difference, and with it purity, is thus constantly compromised by the rabid 
transmission of corporeal forms from one embodied subject to another. 
Butler. For Butler, illicit body forms emerge through the body's failure to 
adequately incarnate the injunctions directed at it. In her account such failure 
seems to be an inevitable instability within all attempts to duplicate an original 
model, and as such is almost magically fated to happen by itself (see for instance 
`Imitation and Gender Insubordination', where we are told that heterosexual 
gender `is bound to fail'(p. 21)). I am suggesting that alternative possibilities 
emerge rather from the inappropriate imitation of bodily possibilities that are 
licit for certain bodies, but not for all those bodies who adopt them. 
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But the most important aspect of Rabid 
- 
and beyond that, I have 
suggested, of the work of Burroughs and Cronenberg in general 
- 
is its refusal 
to render such bodily becomings as benign or welcome. The film documents 
Rose's distress 
- 
in her cries, the pain of her hunger, her self-loathing. In doing 
so it is careful not to render this merely as a regrettable resistance to a desirable 
evolutionary shift, but rather as the crisis of recognizing that change involves a 
painful annihilation of the old self. In this sense, such bodily becomings are 
parasitic 
- 
nourished by us, but at the expense of our own identities. Murray 
watches, horrified, as the rabid Dr. Keloid snarls and slavers through the 
window of a police van. `Will you confirm the identification of this man as Dr. 
Daniel Keloid? ' asks the investigating policeman 
- 
but in spite of Murray's silent 
nod, we can see that the creature bears only a passing resemblance to that 
subject previously called Dan Keloid, just as later, to her claim `I'm still me, I'm 
still Rose', Hart will shout back: `You're not Rose 
... 
What did he turn you 
into? ' Echoing down the intertextual trail which the name `Rose' belongs to in 
English, we must then hear Juliet's claim that `that which we call a rose / By any 
other name would smell as sweet' (Romeo and Juliet, Il. ii. 43-44). With its 
privileging of the physical matter of the rose over whatever identity it may 
assume, Juliet's claim is not a recognition of the truth so much as an attempt to 





which she desires, but is rather a product of the 
name that he has, the social location that he occupies. Attempting to separate 
his (welcome) body from his (unwelcome) name she states: 
What's Montague? it is nor hand, nor foot 
Nor arm, nor face, nor any other part 
Belonging to a man. 
(Il. ii. 40-42) 
But in the face of her disavowal, matter and meaning, biology and identity, 
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interfere with one another to the dismay of those who would try to hold onto 
any one 
, 
aspect of either term: the purity of the smell of a Rose is infected by the 
other conditions of its possibility. 
This stress on the open-endedness of any aspect of embodiment invites 
us to chpenge those discourses which would seek to define for us once and for 
all the meanings of our bodies: the body has no final form or final meaning that 
issues from some defining location. Exemplifying this instability, in her final 
words to him Rose turns the blame for events back onto Hart: it is not she who 
is responsible for the plague, through her actions; nor Keloid, through his 
surgery; but Hart 
- 
because of the crash. The biological plague which Hart tries 
to lay at the doors of others, is finally returned to him: his gaze, with its 
attempts at mastery, collapses, like all his attempts at mastery, like all those 
attempts made by any of the characters in this film to control the events, the 
meanings and, crucially, the bodies around them. 
The film's general suspicion of the effectiveness of authority 
-a 
suspicion, let us remember, which does not say that authority is ineffectual or 
not danýerous but, on the contrary, insists that it is capable of inflicting 
extraordinary amounts of damage while still never being infallible 
- 
then centres 
on this unpredictability of the body. At its most pessimistic, Rabid imagines 
forms of state power able to produce docile and obedient bodies: bodies that file 
through checkpoints, that accept immunization programmes. Early on in the film 
there is . brief cameo of a drunk driver being breathalysed. Located to one side 
of the screen and almost inaudible over the more narratively central 
conversation between Murray and Hart, it is nevertheless a reminder that the 
biology pf the modem body is already under routine scrutiny. But these passive 
bodies may also seem haunted by the spectre of Rose: if her body develops 
unexpected responses to this surveillance and control, might not theirs too? The 
apparent narrative closure achieved by Rose's death, by the WHO's 
announcement that it has an effective vaccine, and by the passage of the 
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narrative through night and into the dawning of a new day, is undercut by this 
more enduring logic: that the body is not the passive recipient of commands, but 
rather becomes more dangerous through the attempts to control it (a process 
that should herald as much dismay for projects of liberation as it does for 
repressive institutions). 23 
Caught up as it is within a network"of injunctions, whose conflicts 
produce a body whose polyvalence borders on incoherence, the body is an apt 
reminder of this impossibility of producing subjects which will conform to any 
one set of regulations. Since bodies absorb models from around them, we 
cannot simply harness them to a particular project of resistance, since their 
tendency is to take up the regulatory injunctions that surround them. But we 
may also find that following prescribed models to the letter is as difficult for the 
dominant social order as following proscribed ones: one thinks for instance of 
Burroughs's point that the state's antipathy to narcotics is in fact largely due to 
the fact that narcotics simulate so completely the logics of late capitalism 
- 
the 
quest for compulsive leisure products. Similarly, if defiantly abject heroism is 
one mode of resistance, then so too is Rose's hyper-real simulation of legitimate 
behaviours. In its representation of the monstrosity of the state, we are invited 
to read Rose as incarnating both an absolute opposition to that state, which then 
dreads and tries to annihilate her; and as the inevitable fulfilment of the violence, 
parasitism, and aggressive infectivity of the state itself. 
These then are the particular problems in embodiment that have driven 
this thesis: that the designation of bodies as socially licit, and their material 
construction as such, entails equally their being constructed as illicit and 
dangerous. Not only in the sense that they are constructed as chaotic so that 
23 Moving away from more obviously embodied scenarios, we might also note 
that the current political scene is dominated by a particular horror at the 
unexpected directions that projects of supposed liberation have led to: between 
gay men and queers, between second and third wave feminists, between 
socialists and New Labour. 
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they can be ordered but, more radically, that the process of the ordering, 
civilizing, or disciplining of the body itself both exhibits in its own technologies, 
and encourages in the bodies that it moulds, attributes that remain 
indistinguishable from those which it initially claimed to extinguish. 
It seems to me worth ending this reading of Rabid on this insoluble 
tension between these pairs of terms that have been central to my thesis 
- 
orderly/disorderly, bodily/disembodied, dirty/clean. It would seem that the logic 
that orchestrates them entails that the deeper we move into one, the deeper we 
move into the other, finding in each their unexpected 
- 
or perhaps, post- 
deconstruction, their all too expected 
- 
complicity with one another. I want to 
close, however, by suggesting that this is more than an ironic textual dead-end, 
but that in fact it is central to the mutable political valencies of the body. The 
sheer expess of meaning that attaches to the word `body' makes it difficult to 
figure it solely in any one form, constantly absorbing as it does other models for 
embodiment. Such an excess of meaning also, I suggest, adheres to our physical 
bodies: they are texts which signify overabundantly and which, for all the 
physical attempts to render them fit only for one role, one meaning, or one 
subjecti'yity, sprout others. 
(iii) Our (But Not Only Our) Bodies, Our (But Not Only Our) 
Selves 
Such a notion of the indeterminacy of meaning has clearly become 
something of cliche within postmodern literary theory 
- 
exemplified perhaps by 
Roland Barthes's call for a text whose plurality `does not mean only that it has 
several meanings but that it fulfils the very plurality of meaning: an irreducible 
(and not just acceptable) plurality' (`From Work to Text', p. 59, emphasis in the 
original). And Barthes follows his line of thinking to make the political claim 
that to the extent that there is no dominant meaning, there can be no dominant 
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social group or ideology. But plurality of meaning has come increasingly to 
seem suspect 
- 
as so many critics have noted, no degree of indeterminacy of 
meaning will necessarily diminish existing power structures. And yet, before we 
dismiss these texts as naive in their validation of indeterminacy, we should note 
that Burroughs himself makes just such a critique of radical pluralism. One 
recurrent location in his quartet is Interzone, a place where buildings, bodies, 
and practices constantly merge and permutate 24 Architecturally it is composed 
of `houses of bamboo and teak, houses of adobe, stone and red brick, South 
Pacific and Maori houses, houses in trees and river boats' (NL, p. 92); 
geograpiically it is a mixture of `minarets, palms, mountains, jungle' (NL, p. 91); 
while ethnically `the blood and substance of many races, Negro, Polynesian, 
Mountain Mongol, Desert Nomad, Polyglot Near East, Indian 
- 
races as yet 
unconceived and unborn, combinations not yet realized pass through your body' 
(NL, p. 91) 
This space is clearly figured as utopian in a number of ways: its 
celebration of different musics in which no one instrument or style 
predominates, its availability of sexual liaisons without any hegemonic 
normative sexual standard, its conglomeration of races without conflict or 
hierarchy. To produce Interzone Burroughs takes the areas in which hierarchies 
have been established and refigures them as horizontal displays of possibility, 
rather tlan vertical instances of domination. Meanwhile the disorganization of 
its instit} Lions erodes the power of authority: criminals `are escorted by a 
drunken cop to register in a vast public lavatory. The data taken down is put on 
pegs to be used as toilet paper' (NL, p. 92). Institutional power thus finds itself 
unable tp impose order, since it too has fragmented into a range of practices 
which dp not cohere into a single police state. 
24 Burroughs writes of this imagery as originating with hallucinations resulting 
from the South American drug yage (The Yage Letters, p. 21). See also his letter 
of July 10- 1953, to Allen- Ginsberg (The Letters of William S Burroughs: 1945 - 
1959, pp. 182-184). 
377 
Put Interzone is equally clearly marked as a space of domination and 
violence, its proliferation of characters including ` investigators of infractions 
denounced by bland paranoid chess players, servers of fragmentary warrants 
taken down in hebrephenic shorthand charging unspeakable mutilations of the 
spirit, bureaucrats of spectral departments, officials of unconstituted police 
states' ((VL, p. 93). The fertile chaos of the city generates new oppressions as 
well as new liberties. The seamless transition from the lists of forms of freedom 
and pleasure to the lists of forces of domination captures the doubleness of 
Interzone: both place of endless possibility, and regimented by forces of 
authority, `the Composite City where all human potentials are spread out in a 
vast silent market' (p. 91). 25 
Interzone is the reminder that a space of infinite diversity is not a space 
free from power relationships, and it would be foolish to imagine the 
Burroughsian body as exempt from such a critique. Burroughs's texts, like 
Cronenberg's, stress that these bodies exist only through the actions of 
aggressive power over them. The fact that the body appears in so many forms 
should iot then be taken to indicate that the body is being presented as outside, 
or free from, ideology, discourse, and their concomitant regimes of material 
inequality. Rather, we should read it as demonstrating that in the variety of 
socially produced forms that it takes, the body is never simply governed by any 
one regime. Here, we may read the heterogeneity of the body as rendering it 
problematic for any particular formation of authority: that is, that faced by any 
given configuration of power, the body must also incarnate values, practices, 
zs As such, it clearly corresponds to Burroughs's experience of living. in Tangier (1954-1958), a city which he recognized as both a place of sexual and economic 
freedom, and also a society whose forms of freedom were carefully orchestrated 
initially py the coalition of Western governments which administered it after 
WWII, and subsequently, following Moroccan independence (1956), by a 
government eager to maintain the advantages of retaining the interests of those 
governments (Jeffrey S. Dunn, `William S. BurroughsandTechnologi7i o 
Literary Studies in the Industrial Age', pp. 197-200). 
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states, and possibilities that such a configuration does not endorse. 
Again, this does not mean that bodies do not also incarnate values, 
states, practices and possibilities which sustain inequality - indeed, one 
consequence of the body's polyvalence is that it is necessarily always available 
in support of such regimes. But it will never function only in their support, and 
never mean only what it is called upon to mean. As a privileged symbol for the 
social order, the body is subject to an extraordinary range of competing 
discourses which construct it in different forms. Thus, rather than imagining that 
the body must be outside culture because it is resistant to certain social 
structures, I am suggesting that the body is resistant only because it is always 
within culture. 
And such a reading may return us 
- 
in a very different way 
- 
to Kristeva. 
It is the body's entry into culture which enables us to talk about it, to debate its 
significance. If the body is often disruptive that is not, I would suggest, because 
of its acultural properties, but rather because it is culturally produced, but not 
always necessarily meaningful in any coherent way as a result. The ruptures in 
syntax and logic which so enthral Kristeva might be read not as biological 
explosions, but rather as tensions within the psychic organization of a social 
body, whose heterogeneity is guaranteed, rather than forestalled, by its 
acculturation. Perhaps the paradigmatic example of this in Burroughs is his own 
hostility towards the body. According to Eve Sedgwick, the desire for bodily 
and social purity leads to a genocidal fantasy, which we should oppose out of 
sanity and self-preservation (Epistemology of the Closet, pp. 127-130). But it is 
precisely Burroughs's use of such a fantasy that leads to his more radical vision 
of embodiment. This is not to say that genocidal fantasies are not dangerous - 
but it is to remind ourselves that they may have effects which they cannot 
calculate. The heterogeneity of texts on the body is then less, as in Kristeva's 
account, the originary heterogeneity of the psychic, but rather the heterogeneity 
of the psychic as generated in tandem with the heterogeneity of the social. 
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''he possessed body is a useful image for this indeterminacy. Porous, the 
body is always open to control 
- 
but as such it is always also open to new forms 
of control, new possessors: it is the exemplary illustration of the Burroughsian 
maxim `all Agents defect and all Resisters sell out' (NL, p. 163). Its openness 
ipakes it impossible that the body ever be simply in the service of one controller, 
since it is always open to other influences; because it changes so much at the 
behest of power, it also always changes at other behests. Consequently, bodily 
disorder is never only the heterogeneity of the drives, and always also the 
heterogeneity of the social 
- 
the mixture of discourses available to think 
embodiment. It is thus the unstable double agent that best sums up the body as I 
have theorized it here: a collection of disparate goals which cannot be harnessed 
to any one particular project and which will not serve as the model for any one 
particular society or identity. And yet which may also be appropriated to model 
any number of possible societies 
- 
more or less free, more or less unequal. 
If these texts then enable the expression of a certain truth about the 
body's refusal to remain stable, they do so not so that a system of power can be 
overthrgwn by that truth, but rather in recognition of the ways in which that 
truth is thoroughly complicit with power, but never only complicit with one 
single monolithic instance of the exercise of power. Rather, the body is the site 
through which moments of power are exercised in different directions. It is not 
then the asocial or acultural body that will enable liberation, but the body so 
saturated by culture that it is not bound to any single destination. 
That the meanings of the body never settle into any one uncontested 
`discourse on the body' is not to say that we should not offer detailed histories 
of the ways that particular sites of the body are invested with meaning. Points of 
embodiment clearly are, as I have insisted throughout this thesis, the focus for 
temporary stabilization 
- 
both in terms of their meaning and their materiality - 
to variois degrees of success. But such an affirmation of the semantic and 
physical mutability of bodies should be a reminder of the ways in which the 
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attempt to claim any solid material form or meaning for the various bodies in the 
world founders on the body's own amenability to change. A (post)modern list 
of such opportunities might include plastic surgery; the sexual/racial 
phenomenon of `passing', in which the body displays, deploys, and is perhaps 
undone py, its capacity to adopt a new corporeal identity; the increasingly 
diversifiFd forms of transgendered bodies (hermaphrodyke, shemale, F2M, 
chicks-with-dicks); bisexual theory's insistence on the instability of sexual 
attraction, and the possibility of a predominance of desire for one sex being 
unsettlefi by the arrival of desires for another. The relative prominence within 
contemporary critical theory/cultural studies of these forms of bodily change 
should not detract us from those altogether less sexy, less heavily theorized, but 
perhaps ultimately more effectual, bodily changes that surround us: the 
investment of the disenfranchised in body-changing activities which might (but 
rarely d? ) offer a way out of economic marginality (dance classes for working 
class girls, sports for young black men); the transformation of the postures, 
defences, and `learned attitudes' of women's bodies to develop physical 
responses which will diminish the danger of rape; 26 the alterations in gay and 
bisexual men's eroticizations of our own, and other men's, bodies so as to 
facilitate safer sex practices; the retraining of the human appetite's learnt 
preference for the consumption of meat. 
ýt all these points bodies are changing in ways that are never 
unproblgmatically beneficial, but which bring with them opportunities to 
destabilize and confirm given notions of appropriate forms of embodiment, and 
the psychic and material structures that come with them - from extreme poverty 
to fleetipg emotions. Such body-changes are not, I want to stress again, simply 
26 See Sýuon Marcus, ` Fighting Bodies, Fighting Words: A Theory and Politics 
of Rape Prevention', in Judith Butler and Joan W. Scott (eds. ) Feminists 




although the adoption of a particular body-changing practice may 
contain Fn element of choice. Rather, they are imposed on and ingested by us 
as the condition of our embodiment: we absorb messages about the meanings 
and uses of bodies, and our bodies then adopt and transform them. 
It is this elaboration of the meanings and capacities of our flesh that 
makes it such an important site for conflict. Whether we are challenging the 
ways in which it is used as a metaphor to underwrite particular political 
projects, or the forces that encourage us to treat particular of its processes in 
ways that we are unhappy with, the body will never belong wholly to any one. 
And t' includes to those who might make the claim: `this is my body'. For my 
body will never simply belong to me, but can be assumed to prove resistant to 
my every desire, even as it is the vehicle of their fulfilment. It will never be fully 
captured by authority nor ever simply stand outside it; indeed the reflections of 
future historians may yet suggest that the moments where I believe it is most 
doing the one are in fact those at which it is most doing the other. It is thus the 
site of a constant vacillation, a constant unmaking and remaking of meaning 
- 
not because of an originary psychic heterogeneity, but because of its social 
heterogeneity, and the psychic heterogeneity which is co-extensive with, co- 
constitutive of and co-constituted by such social heterogeneity. 
The body is then that most utopian place 
- 
the place where no absolute 
authority can hold sway 
- 
precisely because authority of many different forms 
seeks to exert control, and often succeeds. It is utopian not because it is the 
fulfilment of any one particular dream of social cohesion, but because of its 
refusal to do so: my body refuses the authoritarianism of any particular set of 
meanings that I may hope for, and so holds open the possibility of change - it 
refuses to become static, to ossify, even as it so often seems absurdly static in its 
refusal to adopt those new meanings or potentials that I might desire for it. The 
body is in all these senses the guarantee of the open-ness of being embodied and 
of embodied societies; the guarantee of the erosion of structures that damage 
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bodies, lind that promote the well-being of one body over another or the idea of 
one forte of well-being over the diversity of other physical forms of well-being 
that proliferate. It is the guarantee of such a resistance to the stability of the 
social not because it is naturally resistant, not because it has natural desires, not 
because it is naturally good 
- 
but precisely because the human body never is, 
and never has been, naturally anything. 
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